YUGOSLAV ACTION ON COMMUNIST UPRISING IN GREECE

Senator THURMOND. Now, time and again we have all heard that it was Yugoslav action in closing its borders to partisans who were fighting in Greece that was so decisive in bringing the Greek fighting to an end.

A recently published book brings to light certain considerations that bear on this conclusion. The book to which I refer in "Conversations With Stalin," by Milovan Djilas. On May 14, Djilas was again sent to prison by the Communist government of Yugoslavia. He was convicted of divulging official secrets in the book, "Conversations With Stalin."

Have you seen the book?

Mr. BALL. I have a copy which I received only yesterday, and which I haven't yet read.

Senator THURMOND. One of the conversations between Djilas and Stalin related in this book took place on February 10, 1948. Djilas had this to say about Stalin's comments on the Communists' insurgency then in progress in Greece, and I quote from "Conversations with Stalin":

Stalin then turned to the uprising in Greece: "The uprising in Greece has to fold up." (He used for this the word "Svernut," which means literally "to roll up.") "Do you believe”—he turned to Kardelj—“in the success of the uprising in Greece?"

Kardelj replied, "If foreign intervention does not grow and if serious political and military errors are not made."

Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj's opinion:

"If, if! No, they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States-the United States, the most powerful state in the world-will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea? Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible.”

Now, Mr. Secretary, when our policymakers came to the conclusion that the war in Greece was concluded successfully against the Communists' insurgency by the Yugoslav action in closing their borders to the Communist partisans, were they aware that Stalin had himself previously directed that, and I quote, "the uprising in Greece must be stopped"?

Mr. BALL. I would be glad to get you an informed comment on this, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Would you supply that answer for the record? Mr. BALL. Be glad to, surely.

(The information supplied is as follows:)

The incident described in your question is reported in substantially the same fashion by Vlado Dedijer, a confidant of Djilas and a former member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, in his biography of Tito published in 1953. The point here is that the conversation described above took place on February 10, 1948, and the Yugoslavs closed their Greek frontier on July 10, 1949, 11⁄2 years after Stalin's reported demand, and 13 months after the Yugoslav break with Moscow became public. The closing of the YugoslavGreek frontier, in our opinion, was not the result of Stalin's orders; otherwise, it would have taken place immediately. General Van Fleet's offensive in 1949 led the way to the final defeat of the Communist uprising in Greece, but the closing of the Yugoslav-Greek frontier by the Belgrade Government in July 1949 also contributed decisively to ending the Communist threat to Greece, by denying Communist forces a base and a sanctuary in neighboring Yugoslavia.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S EVALUATION OF ACCURACY OF DJILAS BOOK

"CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN"

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, how much stock, just how much stock, does the State Department, do the State Department officials, put into the accuracy of what Mr. Djilas has to say?

Mr. BALL. I don't have a judgment on it, Senator Thurmond, but I will be glad to find out. I am not sufficiently expert on that. Senator THURMOND. Would you supply that answer for the record, too?

Mr. BALL. I will be glad to.

(The information supplied is as follows:)

Of course no Westerners were present in the inner sanctum of the Kremlin when Soviet, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian Communist leaders met in 1948. For this reason, naturally, we are not in a position to pass definitive judgment on the accuracy of the account given by Djilas of the conversation with Stalin. Vlado Dedijer's version of the conversation substantially corresponds to what Djilas reports. In the light of Stalin's character as we now know it, it is reasonable to assume that what Djilas says in his book "Conversations With Stalin” is a credible version of what happened in conversations at which he was personally present between Yugoslav and Soviet leaders.

YUGOSLAV REACTION TO SOVIET ACTIONS IN HUNGARIAN UPRISING

Senator THURMOND. It is interesting to note the connection with our official estimates of the position of the Yugoslav Communist regime that after the uprising in Hungary, Djilas criticized the Yugoslav Government's position toward the brutal Soviet action in Hungary and was, as a result, sentenced to 3 years in prison at that time. The Yugoslavs carefully refrained from any criticism of the Soviet action in Hungary; did they not, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BALL. It is my recollection that they did not criticize it. But here again my direct knowledge isn't adequate, and I would much rather give the committee the benefit of a reasoned statement which is based on full access to the facts.

Senator THURMOND. Would you furnish the answer to that for the record?

Mr. BALL. Yes, I would be glad to.

(The information requested is as follows:)

It would not be accurate to state that the Yugoslavs carefully refrained from any criticism of the Soviet action in Hungary. Following the outbreak of the Hungarian national uprising on October 23, 1956, the Yugoslav press gave full support to the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy. After the first Soviet intervention on October 24 against the revolution, prominent Yugoslavs privately deplored, and expressed deep regret at, the action taken by Soviet troops. When Soviet troops on November 4, 1956, intervened for the second time to suppress the revolution, Yugoslav delegates to the United Nations voiced sharp disapproval of Soviet actions.

President Tito's position on the Hungarian revolt was stated in a speech given at Pula, Yugoslavia, on November 11, 1956. He believed that the early stages of the revolt were similar to the Yugoslav anti-Stalinist position in 1948, and that this was a progressive development. Therefore he condemned the first Soviet intervention in 1956 as a "fatal mistake" which drove the Hungarian people into an extreme anti-Communist position. At this point, he stated, "reactionary forces" took over the Hungarian revolt and changed it from a move to liberalize the Communist regimes of Rakosi and Gero to a move to restore the prewar regime. Tito stated that the Soviets had promised the Hungarians to withdraw their troops as soon as the situation became stabilized. He added that he believed that the sacrifices of the Hungarian people were not in vain,

as the Soviets would now realize "that things cannot be done [in the old, Stalinist way] any longer." As for the Stalinist elements in Hungary, "they are reaping now what they sowed since 1948." While Yugoslavia hardly supported the American position in the UN in the aftermath of the revolt, it did not directly support the Soviets either. It twice abstained from resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Senator THURMOND. The State Department has pointed to Yugoslavia's U.N. voting record as another evidence of Yugoslavia's independence of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

I believe Mr. Rusk cited this as a major point when he testified last year before the House committee investigating trading with the

enemy.

On December 12, 1958, on the 37-power resolution condemning continued defiance of General Assembly resolutions on Hungary which was adopted by a vote of 54 to 10, Yugoslavia voted no, as did the entire membership of the Communist bloc in the U.N.

Again, on December 9, 1959, on the 24-power resolution deploring continued U.S.S.R. and Hungarian disregard of General Assembly resolutions on the Hungarian situation, which passed by a vote of 53 to 10, Yugoslavia again voted no, as did the remainder of the Communist bloc.

Would you not agree, Mr. Ball, that with regard to the Hungarian matter, Yugoslavia maintained a firm and unflinching pro-Soviet position?

Mr. BALL. It would appear so from what you have just said, Senator Thurmond. I would prefer to have an opportunity to insert a reasoned answer for the record.

Senator THURMOND. If, for any reason, you disagree with what I just said, would you place your answer in the record?

Mr. BALL. I will be happy to place a reply in the record. (The information supplied is as follows:)

Yugoslavia's negative votes in these instances are open to interpretation. I do not believe that their action in this regard reflected Soviet control of their vote but rather their own independent judgment on the substance of the issues.

VOTING RECORD OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE U.N.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, if I recall correctly when you were here before, we discussed Yugoslavia's U.N. voting record, and you were to furnish this to the committee for the years 1960 and 1961. Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. You furnished a compilation for 1961 which has been inserted in the record. Now that you have had a chance to refer to the record of the votes in the U.N., would you tell us as to the record on political and security questions how many times in 1961, if any, Yugoslavia voted with the United States and against the Soviet Union, and feel free to confer with aids because I would like to get your answers.

Mr. BALL. I am told we haven't it here, Mr. Thurmond. It wasn't broken down on that basis.

Again, let me submit this on Thursday to you, and I will be prepared to discuss it with you at that time, if that is agreeable. (The information submitted is as follows:)

Although the overall pattern is considerably closer to that of the Soviet bloc than that of the U.S., we have had no indications that Yugoslavia consulted

the U.S.S.R. in advance as do those members of the Soviet bloc whose votes never vary from those of U.S.S.R. The Yugoslav position frequently parallels that of the Afro-Asian nations when they differ from the U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia has also demonstrated its support for the U.N. as an organization even when the U.S.S.R. is attacking it. On 43 selected rollcall votes on major issues at 16th General Assembly, Yugoslavia's vote coincided with U.S. 6 times, with U.S.S.R. 24 times, with both 5 times, with neither 8 times.

Senator THURMOND. The only instance I have noticed in the record of votes in the United Nations for 1961 in which the Yugoslavs voted with the United States and against the Soviet Union was with regard to the resolution appealing to the U.S.S.R. not to explode a 50-megaton bomb. This resolution was No. 1,632 and was voted on October 27, 1961.

Do you know of any other political or security question on which Yugoslavia sided with the United States and against the Soviet Union?

Mr. BALL. I will be prepared to answer that, and we will have it prepared in a way that will give you this information for the record. (The information requested is as follows:)

At the 16th General Assembly session there were four very important resolutions dealing with U.N. financing for present and future operations in the peace and security field-one authorizing U.N. Emergency Force financing, one authorizing U.N. Congo operations financing, one requesting the International Court of Justice to rule on the binding legal obligation of all members to pay their assessed share of U.N. Congo operations and U.N. Emergency Force costs, and one authorizing a U.N. bond issue. The U.S. voted for all four; the U.S.S.R. voted against all four; Yugoslavia voted for three and abstained on the request to the International Court of Justice.

Senator THURMOND. Yugoslavia voted with the U.S.S.R., and I believe the time was September 25, 1961-on both the item on Tibet and the item on Hungary; did they not?

Mr. BALL. I don't have an independent knowledge but, as I say, I will certainly get this information.

(The information requested is as follows:)

Yugoslavia voted against the inscription of the item on Tibet on September 25, as did the U.S.S.R. On December 20, a resolution reaffirming the right of Tibet to self-determination was passed by a vote of 56-11 with 29 abstentions. United States voted for; U.S.S.R. against; Yugosalvia abstained. On the Hungarian item Yugosalvia voted with the U.S.S.R.

Senator THURMOND. Would you be prepared to answer that when you come back?

Mr. BALL. Certainly.

Senator THURMOND. Yugoslavia also voted against the U.S. resolution not to seat North Korea, did they not?

Mr. BALL. Again I will be prepared to answer this.

Senator THURMOND. To seat North Korea.

Mr. BALL. I say I don't know the answer, Senator Thurmond, off hand, but I will get it.

Senator THURMOND. You will answer that Thursday?

Mr. BALL. Yes, sir.

(The information requested is as follows:)

Yugoslavia joined the U.S.S.R. in voting against the U.S. resolution not to seat North Korea on December 19. On December 20, a resolution reaffirming previous U.N. resolutions on Korea (calling for reunification by means of U.N. plebiscite, condemning North Koreans and Chinese Communists, etc.) passed by a vote of 60-11 with 27 abstentions. The United States voted for; the U.S.S.R. voted against; Yugoslavia abstained.

Senator THURMOND. Yugoslavia also voted for the Soviet resolution to seat the Chinese Communists on December 15, 1961, did they not?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would like to make the same reply to all of these because I don't know the specific detail at this point, but I will————— Senator THURMOND. You would like to answer that Thursday, too? Mr. BALL. Yes, please.

(The information requested is as follows:)

Yes.

SIGNIFICANCE OF YUGOSLAV VOTING RECORD

Senator THURMOND. Would you say that these votes support a conclusion that Yugoslavia has evolved into a nonexternally aggressive Communist state?

Mr. BALL. Well, on the question as to whether it is externally aggressive or not, I don't know that the votes in the United Nations by themselves will indicate much one way or the other.

The test of external aggression, I suppose, is whether a country itself maintains a propaganda apparatus directed at subverting other countries; whether it maintains agents abroad; whether it supports guerrilla warfare activities; whether it has armies and armed forces that threaten other countries, and so on.

This is a matter based on a number of complex elements. But I would suppose that the test of whether a country is externally aggressive are things of that kind.

(Additional information supplied by the Department of State is as follows:)

We do not believe that votes in the U.N. are indictative of whether a country maintains espionage agents and a propaganda apparatus for externally aggressive purposes or participates in the international Communist conspiracy to undermine the governmental systems and national independence of other countries. Section 143 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 requires the President in furnishing assistance to Yugoslavia continuously to assure himself in the words of the act: "that Yugoslavia is not participating in any policy or program for the Communist conquest of the world ***" We have established no information which would in any way cast doubt on Yugoslavia's independence, or which would warrant the conclusion that Yugoslavia is participating in the international Communist conspiracy. On the contrary, we are convinced that Yugoslavia not only competes in a real sense with the Soviet bloc in commercial and cultural activity in the underdeveloped areas of the world, but also serves, through its own experience prior to 1948, as an example of the dangers inherent in overdependence on, and domination by, the Soviet Union.

YUGOSLAVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Senator THURMOND. Would you say that the Tito-Gromyko talks and Khrushchev's overtures to the Yugoslavs is evidence of reverse evolution?

Mr. BALL. Again I would like to comment later on this, and it may be that, Mr. Chairman, on some of these matters we could submit a memorandum. It is possible we would like not to have it made a part of the public record, but for the use of the committee in any event. But this is something which I would like to determine after I consult with our experts in this area.

Senator STENNIS. Well, the subcommittee will be considerate of your counsel with reference to what is in the published record and what is in the executive record.