Senator THURMOND. Do you want to answer that Thursday, did you say, Mr. Ball?

Mr. BALL. Yes, if I may, Senator Thurmond.

(The information requested is as follows:)

It is apparent that the recent indications of increased cordiality in SovietYugoslav relations are the result of a shift in Soviet policy rather than Yugoslav policy. In seeking better state-to-state relations with Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R. has made it clear that it still considers Yugoslav revisionism as a major threat to the unity of the international Communist movement.

The joint Soviet-Yugoslav communique stated, and the Yugoslavs have emphasized, that the April 16-21 visit of Gromyko to Belgrade was to return the July 1961 visit of State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic to Moscow. The communique was brief and its substance largely parallel to the contents of the communique on the visit of Popovic to Moscow last year. It indicated that Belgrade continues to hold views similar to Moscow's on many East-West issues and demonstrated as well that the Yugoslavs agree with the Soviets on those foreign policy concepts to which the Chinese Communists take exception. The visit apparently only concerned state-to-state relations without any partyto-party overtones.

Khrushchev indicated in his May 16 speech in Varna that good relations had been established with Yugoslavia and that "our positions on many international questions related to peace coincide." He said good trade relations existed and expressed the hope for better relations in the fields of science, culture, and the exchange of delegations. On the other hand, however, he admitted the existence of differences on a series of political and ideological questions, but said that despite these differences the U.S.S.R. seeks Yugoslavia's cooperation. Both the Gromyko visit to Yugoslavia and Khrushchev's recent statements in Bulgaria appear as evidence of improved state-to-state relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. There are no indications from these developments of a resumption of Communist Party relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the Soviet bloc.

APPEARANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN BELGRADE

Senator THURMOND. Would you say the Russian-made T-54 tanks and the SU-100's which were in the Belgrade May Day parade were evidence of reverse evolution?

Mr. BALL. This again I would like to answer on Thursday, and it may be, as I say, that some of this we would prefer to answer on an executive basis.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, this is general knowledge. Some of it has been in the newspapers what I am asking you about now. Mr. BALL. Senator Thurmond, I am not questioning you on facts. On the other hand, for me to give a public interpretation of what those facts may be can have some obvious political significance, and I think that I want to consider

Senator THURMOND. You make the point Thursday if you wish to ask for an executive session, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

Senator THURMOND. Would you agree that the Soviet helicopters in the Belgrade May Day parade are further evidence of reverse evolution?

Mr. BALL. I would like to make the same answer.

(The information requested is as follows:)

The appearance of Soviet military equipment (e.g., T-54 tanks, SU-100 assault guns, helicopters) in the May Day parade in Belgrade occasioned comment in foreign circles in Belgrade and elsewhere, since it is the first evidence of Soviet military equipment known to have been acquired by the Yugoslavs since 1948.

The acquisition of this equipment from Soviet sources is, we believe, attributable to two factors: (a) Yugoslav authorities felt that, as a result of vocal opposition in some public quarters in the United States to their recent attempts to purchase U.S. military equipment, they could no longer rely with certainty on the United States as a source of supply for their military needs; (b) Yugoslavia lacks dollars and other foreign currencies, but it does have a favorable balance in its bilateral clearing account with the U.S.S.R. Also, the Soviets are apparently willing to sell military equipment to Yugoslavia. We do not believe that the Yugoslav purchase of Soviet military equipment means that the Yugoslavs are sacrificing or intend to sacrifice their independence.

Senator THURMOND. You want to answer that Thursday, too, and place it in the same category.

DISCUSSION ON FORMULATION OF POLICY APPLIED TO EXTERNALLY

AGGRESSIVE REGIMES

Let us see if we can further pinpoint the application of this characterization of "externally aggressive.'

Judging from our policy we do not consider internal actions within the Communist bloc in determining the quantity of external aggressiveness which the United States is committed to check.

Would it be correct to assume that our policy concludes that the time for a split-off of a satellite nation is not in the foreseeable future and that, therefore, we should limit our judgment as to the external aggressiveness of Communist regimes to those activities which are external, not just to the boundaries of the particular Communist regime, but to those which have an aggressive application beyond the boundaries of that territory now controlled by the Communist bloc? Mr. BALL. I would answer the question this way, I think, Senator Thurmond, that whatever response we may make to an act of aggression on the part of any of the countries in the Communist bloc would have to be determined with relation to a whole series of factors, including what the consequences might be in terms of the danger of starting a nuclear war or on the other hand-what benefits and what interests of importance to the free world may be involved in this particular situation.

This is a complex judgment, so it is a little hard to answer the problem in anything approaching precise terms.

Senator THURMOND. I assume, of course, that the State Department is constantly engaged in appraising and reappraising the activities, actions, and attitudes of various Communist regimes to determine whether and to what extent they are externally aggressive at a particular point in time in order that our policy would be current and up to date; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. Yes, that is certainly correct.

Senator THURMOND. It is true, however, is it not, that in the State Department's constant appraisal and reappraisal for signs of externally aggressive activities which the United States is committed to check, that primarily attention would be directed to those activities of Communist regimes which overlap or extend into the periphery of the free world?

Mr. BALL. I think that is a fair statement, yes.

Senator THURMOND. I gather that while our State Department people might be, and probably are, interested in and concerned with all of the activities of the various Communist regimes, that their prime

concern, indeed their almost exclusive concern, insofar as it involves the implementation of U.S. policy are those activities of Communist regimes which are directed primarily to influencing events outside the Communist bloc; is this correct?

Mr. BALL. This is true to a very large extent, yes.

That doesn't mean we are unmindful of events that occur within the Communist bloc or, as in the case of Hungary, where there is action that occurs within the bloc that it is not a matter of deep concern and that full consideration is not given to all the possibilities of providing assistance.

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION ON EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SYSTEM

Senator THURMOND. Would the evolution of the Soviet system contemplated as a possibility by our policy involve a change in the Soviet relations to the other Communist regimes within the bloc, or would it merely involve a change in the attitudes and relations with nations outside the Communist bloc?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would suppose quite clearly that if, for example, you did have a change in the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the whole question, say, of international communism, that this would necessarily have an effect on all the relationships within the bloc itself, and that you could not separate these in that way necessarily.

At the moment, we have the situation where an effective force in maintaining the cohesion of the bloc is the international Communist movement itself and the relations of the Communist parties within these countries.

Now, let us suppose there was a dissolution-which I don't expect, but suppose there was a dissolution-of these relationships between Communist parties. A part of the cement which holds them together would be dissolved.

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION ON EXTERNALLY AGGRESSIVE COUNTRIES

Senator THURMOND. It is not clear to me what is meant by "dissolution" of the Soviet system. It is difficult to understand how a Communist regime cannot be Communist and still actively support the Communist goal of world domination and yet, through the process of evolution, not be externally aggressive.

Somehow, you people in the State Department have reasoned that Yugoslavia has reached this point. They were once a part of the Sino-Soviet bloc. It is obvious from your replies submitted in writing to the committee, and from what you say here today, that Yugoslavia is no longer considered by the State Department to be a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc and, therefore, is no longer considered by the State Department to be externally aggressive.

Yet, at the same time, the State Department admits that Yugoslavia is still communistic, is still supporting the goal of world domination by the Communists, as illustrated by their relations with Cuba, and appears, certainly of late, to be in very close relation with the Soviet Union.

For a number of years during which the State Department placed Yugoslavia in the nonexternally aggressive class and without the Sino-Soviet bloc, I know, and I am sure the State Department must

know, that Belgrade has served as the espionage and subversion link between Moscow and Havana.

Now, just what precisely is it that makes Yugoslavia not externally aggressive and, therefore, not a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc, while Cuba is classified by the State Department as externally aggressive and as a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc?

Mr. BALL. Well, Senator Thurmond, I would like to separate several of the ideas which you put forward, for analytical purposes.

First of all, the question as to whether a country is externally aggressive is a question of fact and it doesn't depend upon whether the country is committed to the extension of international communism. You can have a country which is not Communist at all which is still externally aggressive.

If a country is committed to the extension of communism around the world, and it practices that by the maintenance of a conspiratorial apparatus working around the world, backed up by propaganda directed toward the subversion of other countries, backed up in some cases by the threat of armed aggression, and backed up by the subsidization and support of guerrilla activities, then clearly this is an externally aggressive country.

Cuba is a country which, from the point of view not only of the United States but of the Organization of American States-the whole American system-has been deemed to be an aggressive country because the present Cuban regime is spending a great deal of time and effort and resources in trying to subvert nations of Latin America.

This is a form of aggression which has been recognized now by the Organization of American States as being of the same kind of aggression, in its same general intention, as armed intervention.

Now, the situation in Yugoslavia is that Yugoslavia is a Communist state. Yugoslavia has broken with the bloc and has maintained a considerable measure of independence from the bloc in that it has not taken its directions from Moscow and it has maintained independence in a whole series of arrangements.

YUGOSLAVIAN-CUBAN RELATIONS

The relations which Yugoslavia has had with Cuba have been and are limited in character, involving trading relations and the extension of some very short-term credits, as I understand it, and I think even on that the facts are not entirely clear.

Now, the Yugoslavs, to the best of our knowledge, have not spent their resources in trying to propagandize other countries or in trying to subvert them.

It does not threaten other countries with its armies; it does not support guerrilla activities; it has maintained a measure of independence, and to the extent that it maintains a measure of independence it is a kind of thorn in the side of a bloc. This is the basis for which suport has been given to Yugoslavia by the Eisenhower administration and presently by the Kennedy administration.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, when you testified here before didn't you state that Yugoslavia was suporting the export of the Cuban revolution to the South American countries?

Mr. BALL. I don't recall any such testimony, Senator Thurmond. To the best of my recollection, what I indicated was that it has trade

with Cuba, in not very large amounts, and that incidental to that trade, and in connection with the maintenance of ordinary trade relations, I think there have been some small commercial credits extended, but for no more than its normal trade, I believe.

U.S. POLICY RELATING TO SINO-SOVIET BLOC

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, previously you were asked a question of whether you thought that the Soviet Communists were going to change their ways.

In response, you stated that, in your opinion, "nothing was immutable."

It is intersting, of course, to have the personal opinion of such a high-ranking official like you from the State Department on this question. But what is relevant in this instance is the position of our official policy as to whether the Soviets will change their ways.

Is our official policy premised on the assumption that if Soviet objectives are continually frustrated, the Soviet leaders would have to reappraise some of their key doctrines?

Mr. BALL. The policy, our policy, Senator Thurmond, is postulated on the assumption that if we maintain adequate strength on the side of the free world, if we resist and check the efforts to penetrate, and to take over areas of the free world, if we work toward the great strengthening of the free world, for the independence of the uncommitted nations, toward the builidng of the Western alliance, and toward the building of the strength of the great industrialized nations of the free world, that our preponderance of strength will give us a kind of assurance against that kind of danger over the years. But in order to do this we have to be constantly alert; and that if we pursue the right measures there may be a tendency on the part of the bloc-certain other nations in the bloc, at least-to become more and more open societies.

You ask, Will the Communists change their views? The Communists are not permanent as individuals. They are born and they die, and you have one generation succeed another. You have a change of ideas with generations.

I am not a prophet in the sense that I can give you the answer to what kind of change there will be. That there will be changes, it seems to me, is perfectly evident. There already have been. There is movement within the bloc.

I don't think that we can count on it in the sense that we simply sit and wait and hope thing come to pass. We have to work toward it, and we have work toward it by the right policies on our own part.

U.S. POLICY RELATING TO CAPTIVE PEOPLES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC

Senator THURMOND. Now, the State Department officials quite frequently speak in terms of frustrating Soviet objectives. At the same time, both the comments of the censors and the public utterances of the State Department officials make it clear that it is the externally aggressive actions of Communist regimes against which U.S. policies are directed.

We must, therefore, conclude that the Soviet objectives which our policies are designed to frustrate are only those objectives of the