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Soviets which involve the status of nations, peoples, or territories beyond the now existing territorial boundaries of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

In other words, U.S. policy is not designed to nor does it have the objective of frustrating those objectives of the Soviet and other Communist regimes which bear wholly on peoples and territories within the present territorial boundaries of the Sino-Soviet bloc; is this correct?

Mr. BALL. No, I don't think that states it quite accurately, Senator Thurmond.

As I said a moment ago, we are deeply concerned with what happens to the captive peoples within the bloc, and to the extent that our policies can be helpful in bringing about a greater measure of freedom for them, why, we certainly direct them in that way.

We, at the same time, do not wish to create any false hopes of imminent liberation or anything of that sort, and this is an area where one has to deal with great discretion.

But we certainly would not be prepared to say that we are unmindful of the circumstances of these nations or that we do not hope that, in the long pull, events will come about which will insure them a gradually evolving freedom.


Senator THURMOND. Well, you still have not pinpointed and precisely defined this idea of evolution of the Soviet system.

My difficulty, like that of some others, in understanding this idea undoubtedly stems from the fact that I am not immersed in the mainstream of policy, but I do want you to enlighten us with a little more about this matter of evolution.

The very word "evolution" implies the quality of gradualism, and the term "evolution" also implies to my mind a progression or development which occurs in normal course rather than as a result of any deliberate machinations by external forces.

If this is applied to the evolution of the Soviet system contemplated by our foreign policy, it would mean that such an evolution of the Soviet system would, or could, come about in the absence of external pressures applied to the Soviets or the Sino-Soviet bloc by the United States and the free world.

Is it true that the evolution of the Soviet system of which our foreign policy takes cognizance will occur, if at all, in the normal course of time as a result of internal progression within the Soviet system rather than as a result of any pressures which the United States or other free countries might deliberately bring to bear on the Soviet or the Sino-Soviet bloc?

Mr. Ball. Senator Thurmond, I tried to make clear a while ago that I do not believe in a passive attitude toward history. I think that one can observe great trends at work. But whether these trends work quickly or slowly or whether they work at all in some cases will depend upon the policies that we ourselves may adopt in trying to shape them and direct them.

I think that obviously the policies of the free world will have the greatest effect on the evolution of policy within the Iron Curtain countries, and I think that it certainly is one of the main considera

tions of our own policy to do such things and to pursue such general trends of policy that will bring about and accelerate and act as a catalyst to the forces which will open the closed societies and let the wind blow to the forces that will bring about a reduction in tension that may even permit a measure of disarmament, that will encourage the development of freedom within the Iron Curtain countries, and bring about a relaxation of the tight and sometimes brutal government controls which are sometimes imposed.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, when Mr. Mikoyan spoke in Detroit during his visit to this country a couple of years ago, he stated and I quote: The U.S.S.R. is evolving toward some form of capitalism.

Now, quite obviously there are many forms of capitalism. In India, for instance, capitalism is associated primarily with such pejorative implications as hoarding, manipulation, and monopoly.

In parts of Europe the word "capitalism” brings to mind cartels.

In the United States and some other countries, capitalism projects the idea of competition.

Mr. Mikoyan was obviously mindful of the enumerable connotations of the word when he said that the U.S.S.R. is evolving toward some form of capitalism, rather than merely saying that the U.S.S.R. is evolving toward capitalism.

In the relatively early years of Communist or Soviet domination of Russia, the Communists under Lenin instigated a propaganda campaign which emanated through an American-born newspaperman which sought to project the idea that the young Communist regime in Russia was favorable to the industrial barons and, indeed, had inaugurated, not anarchy, but rather a form of state capitalism in which the former industrialists under the czarist regime were being utilized at high salaries to manage state-owned industries.

The Soviets chose to call this form of capitalism state socialism.

Now, if, as Mr. Mikoyan asserted, the U.S.S.R. is evolving toward some form of capitalism, and this particular form of capitalism just happens to be state capitalism, then an evolution of the Soviet system, even when completed would not, in and of itself, be reflected by a change in the externally aggressive nature of the present Soviet system.

Is the evolution of the Soviet system contemplated by our foreign policy a different evolution then that to which Mr. Mikoyan referred?

Mr. BALL. Well, I would agree with you, I don't know what Mr. Mikoyan meant by “some form of capitalism."

It is a very vague expression and, as far as we are concerned, I don't see a rapid development of the Soviet Union toward any form of capitalism.

I think it may be significant, however, that within the last few days they seemed to have, as I mentioned earlier, recognized the market mechanism as the best way of trying to adjust the inadequate supplies of certain types of foodstuffs to the amount of money in circulation.

But I think these are very small matters. I think that what we have to focus on is the extent to which the bloc countries and, particularly the Soviet Union, may come to the decision that its long-range interests lie in trying to cultivate its own gardens and to live in peace with the world. This would obviously involve an abandonment of the aggressive aspects of the Communist international conspiracy.

The particular form of changes it may make in the organization of its economic system might or might not be relevant to this, I would suppose.

I think these are the considerations which we have to keep in mind.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, after stating that:
The U.S.S.R. is evolving toward some form of capitalism-
Mr. Mikoyan went on to suggest, and again I quote:

The United States has already progressed much further toward communism than you Americans think.

Now, obviously, the personnel of the State Department are better able to detect evolutionary changes in the Soviet system than are other Americans.

In your opinion, is there any more validity to Mr. Mikoyan's assertion that the U.S.S.R. is evolving toward some form of capitalism than there is in his highly questionable allegation concerning U.S. progress toward communism?

Mr. BALL. Well, I don't see evidences of U.S. progress toward communism at all.

I think the evidences are very slight regarding the evolution of the Soviet regime toward some form of capitalism. There are changes going on in the organization of the Soviet economy. But they are all changes which are within the framework of a Communist system.

How it may evolve in the future, I think, is very hard to tell at this time. It depends upon some very difficult decisions which the Communist regime itself is going to have to make.


Senator THURMOND. It would seem that the theory of evolution of the Soviet system is relied on to provide the successful end result to the policy of deterrence or containment.

The policy of deterrence is by its very nature limited to deterring aggressive forays of the Communists against the free world and, as such, capable at the maximum only of containing the Communists within the existing territorial limits of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Does the State Department conceive that there is some difference between a policy of deterrence and a policy of containment other than semantics and, if so, what is the difference?

Mr. Ball. Well, let me try to put this in some perspective, Senator Thurmond.

What the United States faces in the world today is the existence of an aggressive conspiracy which_commands vasť forces and which commands the new technology. It commands weapons which are of

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potentially very great destructive power and which could bring about enormous losses to civilization.

So that when you come to the question of winning or of not winning over communism, which is one of the matters which we have been talking about here, I think that President Kennedy himself stated the point very clearly when he has indicated that nobody wins a nuclear war.

That doesn't mean we may not have to resort to nuclear arms to defend our vital interests. But nobody can think of this with equanimity as being a real solution to anything.

Therefore, the policy which we pursue has to be a policy, it seems to me, of maintaining and building the strongest possible strengththe greatest possible strength—for the free world while at the same time pursuing those policies which will try to bring about, or attempt to bring about, the opening of the windows in the Iron Curtain in order to encourage the creation of open rather than closed societies.

Now, from the direction of the questions which you have been asking me, I think

you are seeking to find out the extent to which we are merely thinking of holding the line, so to speak, of maintaining the areas of the world that lie outside the Iron Curtain, or to what extent we are trying to bring pressures upon the bloc countries themselves which will bring about some changes within the Iron Curtain.

The policy of containment, so-called, has in popular use—even though it may not have been originally intended to be thought of as having so simple a meaning—been viewed as trying to keep the real estate that lies outside the Iron Curtain in violate from Communist takeover.

We, I may say, have never accepted the idea that that is an adequate policy.

We do believe, generally, that history is on the side of freedom, but only if freemen are prepared to work for it. We, therefore, feel that we must make the greatest efforts to try to bring about those situations which will prove the greatest attractive force to people behind the Iron Curtain, which will make the free world a model for them so that they will reject the kind of society in which they live, which is not a free society, and which will encourage the ideas of freedom.

This is why we maintain, ourselves, very large information programs beamed at the people in the Communist societies in order that they may know what is happening outside, and by having such information, may be encouraged themselves to reject some of the aspects of life which are based on totalitarianism, and are the negation of freedom.

Now, this is a positive policy, Senator Thurmond. It is not a policy of simply trying to defend against communism and huddling ourselves on our own territory and hoping that nothing will happen to us.

This is an attempt to take the leadership in the world, to mobilize the forces of freedom, and to bring about those forces, those actions, over the world which will result ultimately in the great extension and spread of freedom everywhere.

Now, in doing that we have to act in a way which avoids to the greatest extent possible a nuclear confrontation which could mean no victory for anyone and which can mean the great destruction of the values that we believe in.

This is a very difficult operation. It is a very complex operation. It involves constant attention to situations as they arise all over the

world, and to the development of techniques for dealing with those situations as they arise. This is not an easy business, and if I have appeared in the course of testimony not always to be able to give you precise answers, it is because it is not a precise business either. It is a buisness which involves great elements of judgments, and which requires that we be able to not merely respond but to respond appropriately wherever a response is indicated, and to take the initiative and to create pressures, movements, on forces moving over the world which will bring about the advance of the kind of interests and the kind of world which we favor.

So I want to say quite explicitly that I reject the idea that all we are trying to do is to contain aggression. We are trying to encourage the forces of freedom. We are trying to encourage the forces of freedom without getting the world involved in a major nuclear war. This is the hard framework within which one has to work.

Senator THURMOND. The State Department does not take the position that we can deter the Communists into a retrograde movement; does it?

Mr. BALL. Into a retrograde what?
Senator THURMOND. Into a retrograde movement.

Mr. BALL. If you mean by retrograde, an erosion of communism itself-retrograde means in this sense a moving backwards—then I suppose you mean the deterioration of the strength of the Communists; is that it?

Senator THURMOND. That is right.

Mr. Ball. Well, I would suppose that again when we are talking about deterrence—and let me say that the word "deterrence" has a very special meaning in the vocabulary of foreign policy—that it relates to the maintenance of a sufficient posture of strength so that any potential aggressor can be sure that if he undertakes that aggression it will not be worth it to him. He will be hurt more than he gains.

Now, this is what we mean by deterrence. And the way in which we apply that term normally is simply that the possession of nuclear force, nuclear capability, which is supplemented by adequate conventional force, is enough to persuade any aggressor not to make an aggressive move. But this is used primarily in a military sense of discouraging aggressive military action.

Our policy, as a total foreign policy, is a very positive one.

Senator ŠTENNIS. Senator Thurmond, is that a convenient place for you to yield to me for a few questions?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.


Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a few questions about your statement. I have had a chance to read your statement again. I want to ask you a few questions about your new setup.

You are going to have a representative from the Department of Defense to come over to the State Department, and then you are going to put an officer in charge. It was Mr. Tully that you mentioned this morning, was it not?

Mr. Ball. That is right, sir. Senator STENNIS. Now, going one step further, how are the writers of these speeches going to appeal and get the chance to be heard ?

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