Mr. BALL. I would like, if I may, Mr. Chairman, even at the risk of taking 5 or 10 minutes, to try to put the Yugoslavian matter in some perspective.

Senator STENNIS. All right, sir.

Mr. BALL. It seems to me that we, as a free, democratic country, and the whole free world is in this situation: That, because of the implications of nuclear warfare and the world-devastating effects that it can have, major war, as Mr. Walter Lippmann says, is no longer available as an effective instrument of national purpose.

Now, this means that in this contest in which we are engaged with the Communist world, the development of a nuclear war could mean a situation in which we would not win and they would not win. No one could win. The President, I think, has stated this very clearly. At the same time we must be ready for a confrontation if it comes. Failing to do so would mean giving up our vital interests. So we keep a firm posture; we keep a posture of readiness to protect the values we hold most dear by whatever means are essential. At the same time, we have this nuclear stalemate which may continue or may not, but for the moment it is continuing.

Now, how do we see to it that our values prevail over the values of international communism under those circumstances without the kind of confrontation, without the kind of war which nobody could win? It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the meaning of a "win" policy, since this dichotomy has been suggested in this dialogue, is that what we do is to work with the great historic trends, which I am convinced are working on our side, to achieve the gradual opening of these closed societies, the gradual encouragement and resurgence of the forces of freedom.

We have had such an opportunity in Yugoslavia. We have seen the situation of a country which, because it is composed of very strong and proud people and has a strong spirit of nationalism, has, since 1958, taken itself out of the bloc and maintained a very considerable degree of independence.

Seventy percent of its trade is with the West. Its thinking has gradually become more westernized. Its very economic organization has departed from the classical kind of communism, which one sees more in the other bloc countries, and has become much more decentralized.

The state does not own all of the means of production. They are owned cooperatively. Western ideas have been flowing in. Western literature has been on sale and Western radio broadcasts have not been jammed.

We have had a situation where a very considerable degree of freedom has been permitted for a Communist society.

Now, admittedly, this is a Communist country. Admittedly, Mr. Tito is Communist, and the major figures in the Government are Communist. But coming up is the new generation, many of whom have been in the United States, many of whom have been here because of our own efforts in bringing them over here, and these people are generally Western oriented. These people have come to the United States. They have seen the advantages of democracy. They have gone home with quite a different point of view.

Now, what are we going to do here? Are we going to give these people the cold shoulder and say, "You have no hope in the West.

You have got to go back into the bloc if you want to live and fluorish. You trade 70 percent with us. We are going to cut off that trade. Your economy has some difficulties, but we are going to deny you any kind of credit. You want to defend yourself militarily, but you are going to have to buy your arms from the Communist countries."

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And what are the implications of buying arms? It means that then, when they have arms that are made in the Soviet Union, they are dependent for maintenance, for supply, and for replacement on the Soviet Union, and they thereby acquire a dependence which they

have not otherwise had.

If they have Western arms, the contrary is true. They are dependent for maintenance, supply, and replacement on the West.

Now, are we going to turn our backs and give these people a cold shoulder and say, "Look, there is no hope for you in the West. Bring the Iron Curtain around. Bring the Red Army in. You are going back into the Communist bloc."

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that if this is our policy, then we are denying one of the great forces which is potentially working on our side; namely, the opening up of the bloc through the offering of some kind of hope and attraction to these countries. If they will progressively ally their policies with the West, if they will permit freedom, if they will let the new generations that are coming along have some option so that they are not tied irretrievably to Communist doctrine, if they permit opinion to develop fairly freely, then we offer them hope.

And if we are not going to offer them hope, then I submit, Mr. Chairman, we are pursuring not a "win" but a "no-win" policy. Because, with the possibility of major war offering no solution, we are denying the only solution that is available to us. This is the encouragement of the forces, the historic forces that can bring about an opening up of the bloc and a gradual transformation of these societies into societies with whom we can live at peace and with stability in the world.

I thank you for the opportunity of being able to put this in some perspective, but this is the situation, as I see it.

Senator THURMOND. Do you think that the people there are going to be able to have freedom and to overthrow Tito?

Mr. BALL. Freedom is a relative matter in these countries, Senator Thurmond. They certainly have far more freedom in Yugoslavia than they do in many other bloc countries.

Senator THURMOND. I have sent for some information that I wish to bring out as soon as I get it.

In the meantime, we will go ahead with another question, Mr. Chairman, until that comes.

Senator STENNIS. All right, Senator, proceed in your own way.
Senator THURMOND. We will return to this question.

RIFT BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA

Mr. Secretary, I would like to direct your attention to speech No. 1, prepared for delivery on June 14, 1961, which falls within the fourth category set up by the State Department. In this speech the speaker proposed to state-do you have speech No. 1 there?

Mr. BALL. I have the speech. I do not have our own comments.

Senator THURMOND. Prepared for delivery on June 14, 1961.
Mr. BALL. I have the text of the speech.

Senator THURMOND. In this speech the speaker proposed to state:

In addition to the sheer weight of its forces, Communist China has territorial aspirations of its own which must be reckoned with quite apart from loyalties to Moscow.

During review of the speech by the State Department, the last part of that sentence, which reads "which must be reckoned with quite apart from loyalties to Moscow," was deleted.

In giving the reason for this deletion the State Department states: The decision on how to treat the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese has not been taken at this time.

Now, this was in the early part of June 1961.

Has a decision now been made on how to treat what is called here the "apparent rift between the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese"?

Mr. BALL. At this time, Senator Thurmond, this phenomenonSenator THURMOND. At which time are you speaking of now? Mr. BALL. June 1961.

At this time there was considerable confusion as to the meaning of this rift, as to whether it was going to be extended, the seriousness of it, or whether it would be patched up the next day.

And at that time, as was pointed out here, it was not regarded as advisable to talk about an independent Chinese Communist policy or independent Chinese territorial objectives. I should say that today we would have no difficulty with this language because I think it has become clear that the rift is very deep and that there is very serious question, although one cannot be certain in these matters, that it will ever be healed.

I would say that today we would have no difficulty with this language.

Senator THURMOND. When was a decision on how to treat this apparent rift reached?

Mr. BALL. The matter was discussed all through last year, and, generally, it became apparent as the year wore on that this was a serious rift.

We did not want to be in the position, frankly, of encouraging the rift to be healed or to be papered over.

Now, I would say that toward the latter part of last year it became quite clear that this was a rift which was very deep and perhaps permanent. Thereafter, we would have approved language of this sort. Senator THURMOND. When did you say this decision on how to treat the rift was reached?

Mr. BALL. I would have thought it was about the end of last year. Senator THURMOND. I want to be sure that I understand you correctly. When you say that no decision had been reached on how to treat the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, you mean, of course, that no decision had been reached by the new administration on this point rather than that no decision had ever been reached by our Government with regard to this matter, do you not?

Mr. BALL. That is right.

The new administration was reexamining all policies.

Senator THURMOND. Do you mean to tell us that no intelligence estimate on the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists had been made prior to June 1961?

Mr. BALL. Oh, no. I think many estimates. This is a matter under constant review, to try to ascertain the significance of something that is as obviously as important as this.

Senator THURMOND. Is it not true that as early as 1954, or even slightly previous thereto, there was an official intelligence estimate which described the growing rift between the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese?

Mr. BALL. I do not know of that particular one, of my own knowledge, but, obviously, there had been evidences of a divergence of purpose for a very long time.

Now, when the administration came in last year, it was obvious that there was considerable movement within the structure of the bloc, and that there was a growing kind of dissension among the bloc between the two major power centers of the bloc.

This has broadened since the end of last year; it has broadened considerably. The withdrawal of the Soviet technicians from Red China, and a number of other actions, and the kind of abuse which has been directed at Soviet policy by the Red Chinese leaders have suggested a deepening and widening of the rift.

Senator STENNIS. Senator, suspend just a minute, will you, please. They have sent for me around at the Armed Services Committee on a matter on which I must appear.

Will you proceed? I think Senator Jackson will be here. I will get back as soon as I can.

Senator THURMOND (presiding). As a matter of fact, did not this estimate originate with Mr. Walter Rostow, who was then a professor at MIT and a consultant to CIA on the Soviet Union and who is now councilor to the State Department and chairman of the Policy Planning Committee?

Mr. BALL. I am unaware of that. It may well be. Certainly, at that time I know that at MIT Professor Rostow was carrying on intensive studies of relationships within the bloc.

Senator THURMOND. To get back to this specific speech No. 1, is it not possible that if, in fact, such a national intelligence estimate was made prior to June 1961, that the speaker who proposed this speechwho, incidentally, is General Counsel to the Department of the Army— might well have used that as a basis for his proposed statement, and, therefore, would have suffered substantial consternation and confusion at the deletion of this particular material?

Mr. BALL. Well, he did not raise the question with us, Senator Thurmond. Actually, the changes which the State Department proposed were always subject to discussion if the Defense Department or the speaker had any basic concern about it. So he apparently did not regard this as a matter of major consequence.

Senator THURMOND. You mean after the deletion was made, he did not contend for his position?

Mr. BALL. No. He did not raise it for reconsideration, which he was certainly entitled to do.

Senator THURMOND. A great many, after the Defense Department makes a decision, abide by it without going any further.

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Mr. BALL. Yes, they do. As a matter of fact, so far as the State Department was concerned, when we made these recommendations, we made them in the form of advice that was never regarded as beyond discussion.

Senator THURMOND. What the State Department calls the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and China does not appear to be a very new idea.

Mr. Rostow, to whom I referred earlier, alluded to it in an article entitled "Economics for the Nuclear Age," which appeared in the Harvard Business Review in 1959.

In a speech in April 1961, at the Asilomar Conference in California, Mr. Rostow discussed what he views as factors promoting the cleavage between the Soviet Union and China, and also in the Asilomar speech made reference to, as well as quoted from, a talk he was invited to give in Moscow earlier on the same subject.

What evidence is there available to the State Department to substantiate any real rift or cleavage between the Soviet Union and Communist China?

Mr. BALL. A great deal of the evidence of a hard nature has come only within relatively recent months. I think that the most significant evidence is, as I say, the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians from Red China, and at a time when Red China was having a great deal of difficulty in trying to maintain her economic progress and, in fact, was having to shut factories and having enormous agricultural problems.

At the same time, there has been a kind of tightened level of attack on an ideological front so far as the Red Chinese leaders are concerned. The phenomenon of tension between the Soviet Union and Red China is, as you say, nothing new.

It is a matter which has gone on for

many years.

But until fairly recently, as long as there was active help from Soviet Russia to the Red Chinese in the form of technical assistance, credits, and aid of this kind, the debate which went on, and which evidenced an ideological difference, was always something which could be easily papered over and was not being translated into action so far as cooperation between the two was concerned.

Now, it has been translated into action, and this indicates that it is of a much deeper character than might otherwise have been the

case.

This is an area where we want to move very cautiously. We have no desire whatever to restore relationships, nor do we have a desire to bring about the kind of pressures which might induce either party to soften its attitude toward the other.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON SOVIET-RED CHINA RIFT

Senator THURMOND. Would you define for us the State Department's official postion on the breadth and depth of whatever rift exists between the Soviet Union and Communist China?

Mr. BALL. The State Department regards this rift as a matter of very great importance. It considers that the rift is not only a basic ideological rift in which the Chinese leaders are following more of a historic Stalinist position and a much more aggressive position toward the West, but one in which the Chinese leaders are taking the