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position that the only way in which there can ever be a resolution of the problem of communism of the Communist bloc and the rest of the world—is by war. On the other hand, you have a situation in which the Soviet leaders are at least talking in terms of economic competition-of competition in other areas than the military—as providing the means by which, in Mr. Khrushchev's phrase, the East would bury us.
Now, we think that this rift, since it has now been translated into concrete terms of a withdrawal of assistance by the Soviet Union from Red China to a considerable degree, that has a degree of depth and permanence which had not been entirely as clear before.
Having said all that, I should like to make clear, Senator Thurmond, that we think it would be not prudent to base U.S. policy on the certainty that this rift will deepen and become permanent.
I think that we are dealing with forces here where, while we know quite a bit about them, we do not know enough about them to be positive. While we recognize the rift, and while it becomes an element in the formulation of policy, we do not think it prudent to base policy on the complete assurance that this is a rift which is going to get wider and deeper, and that it is going to go permanently.
COMPARISON OF GOALS AND TACTICS OF RUSSIA AND RED CHINA
Senator THURMOND. Is it not a matter of fact that the goal of Red China and Red Russia is the same, and that is to dominate and enslave the world?
Mr. Ball. I would certainly say that they each hold to the principle of ultimate world domination.
Senator THURMOND. And is not the position of the State Department that the main difference between them is that Russia feels that the world can be taken over piecemeal without a general war, while Red China would like to do it with a bang?
Mr. Ball. I think that is the most striking difference between them.
I would suppose that one of the reasons for that difference is that the Soviet Union, since it has nuclear capability itself, is aware of the implications of what a major nuclear war would mean.
Senator THURMOND. So their goals are the same but the tactics are different?
Mr. BALL. I think that is true.
EFFECT OF SOVIET-RED CHINA RIFT ON COLD WAR
Senator THURMOND. Since this spring much publicity has been given to the idea that there is a very substantial rift between the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union. Articles have appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post, several books have been reviewed on this subject, and State Department officials have devoted some time to its discussion in their official remarks.
Now, it would be tragic indeed if through overemphasis of differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China, peoples of the free world were to conclude therefrom that it was only a matter of time until the squabbles between the various members of the SinoSoviet bloc led to a disintegration of the Communist empire and ended the cold war.
The State Department does not conceive that the so-called rift provides any relief from the pressures of the cold war for the free world, does it?
Mr. Ball. No, not now. I would say that the pressures continue.
FITCH AND ROSTOW ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET-RED CHINA RIFT
Senator THURMOND. It is very important, if our Government officials are to speak with one voice and I include our Defense officials in that group-that they understand exactly what our official policy is on what the State Department calls the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Now, when General Fitch, Chief of Army Intelligence, appeared before this committee, he agreed that there was a general acknowledgment of some real doctrinal differences and some hard feelings within the Sino-Soviet bloc.
General Fitch concluded, however, by stating: But these are not serious enough to make them fight each other and certainly neither will let the other be destroyed under attack. I think it is most dangerous indeed to entertain hopes for such a division.
Does the State Department's assessment of the “rift” coincide with General Fitch's conclusion!
Mr. BALL. Yes, that is exactly what I was suggesting, Senator Thurmond. I think it would be very imprudent for us to base our policy on the fact that this was a widening and deepening rift which was permanent.
Senator THURMOND. Somehow, it does not seem to me that the assessment of General Fitch on this matter is consistent with the assessment made by Mr. Rostow on March 15, 1962, when he spoke at Purdue University.
Mr. Rostow stated : This crisis takes the form of the deep dispute between Moscow and Peipinga dispute which has engaged, in one way or another, Communist parties throughout the world. What lies behind this dispute, among other factors, is the rise of nationalism as a living and growing force within the Communist bloc. It is a force within Russia itself; and it is a growing force as well in other regions where Communist regimes are in power. Despite the interest of Communists in maintaining their cohesion against the West, the slow fragmentation of the Communist bloc and the diffusion of power within it goes forward.
Then, after warning that we expect no quick benefits from this crisis, Mr. Rostow states that the assertion of nationalism within the Communist bloc should tend to produce a “more livable world.”
Mr. Rostow concludes, and again I quote: We should, therefore, be prepared as these national interests exert themselves to find limited areas of overlapping interest with Communist regimes and to work toward a world which increasingly approximates the kind of world we envisaged when the United Nations was set up.
Now, does Mr. Rostow's assessment of what the State Department calls the apparent rift between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists coincide with the official view of our policy?
Mr. BALL. I think it is a very accurate assesssment, Senator Thurmond, as Mr. Rostow makes apparent there. We cannot base our major policy on the fact that this is a widening and deepening and permanent rift.
But, at the same time, it is an element which is working on the side of the Western World.' That it may be an element, may prove to be an element of very great importance over a time span, seems to us perfectly clear.
This is what Mr. Rostow is saying. Now, what we are talking about here is a very substantial time span. We are talking about a trend which may continue over generations, not a trend that is going to change anything in the course of 6 months or a year.
We are always dealing in foreign policy on at least two levels: the level of the long pull, and the level of the immediate problem.
I would simply say that so far as the immediate problem is concerned, we should not base our policy on the assumption of the deepness and permanence of this rift. Over the long pull
, I think we would be quite derelict if we did not see in it possibilities which might be advantageous to us and take that into account on a very long term basis.
PURCHASE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CANADIAN WHEAT BY RED CHINA
Senator THURMOND. I can easily understand the difficulty which our various official speakers have in trying to assess precisely what is our official attitude toward this apparent rift in the Communist empire, or as some official spokesmen have called it, “fragmentation" of the Communist empire.
We are all aware that for some time Red China has been experiencing a food shortage. In May 1961, the Chinese Communist Government negotiated a purchase of $362 million worth of wheat and barley from the Canadian Government. The sale involved 186.7 million bushels of wheat and 46.7 million bushels of barley. The agreement became effective June 1961, with delivery scheduled through December 31, 1963.
There was much speculation at the time this transaction was consummated that the so-called rift between Red China and the Soviet Union prevented the Chinese Communists from obtaining foodstuffs from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellites to ease its severe shortage.
Now it was recently revealed that up to February 21, 1962, a total of 21.2 million bushels of wheat and barley had been shipped from St. Lawrence and Atlantic ports destined for non-Asian ports.
Of this total, we know that 9.9 million bushels definitely have gone to East German ports and 3.1 million bushels have gone to Albanian ports. It has not been revealed what the ultimate destination of the grain entering these Eastern European ports was. Neither has information been released as to the destination of the other 9.2 million bushels shipped to non-Asian ports. There are also reports that in return for Canadian wheat received in Eastern Communist countries, the Soviet Union is, in turn, shipping grain by ship and rail to Communist China.
The facts about this grain transaction between the Chinese Communists and Canada certainly indicate that Communist China may be acting as purchasing broker for food for the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. This would seem to depreciate seriously any theory that differences between the Soviet Union and Red China have reached the extent where they have diminished practical coordination and cooperation within the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Now, undoubtedly, these facts on this grain deal are known to our Government officials, including those in the Department of Defense who prepare speeches which are ultimately reviewed by the State Department.
This, too, might contribute to the confusion concerning our official attitude toward what the State Department calls the “apparent rift" between the Soviet Union and Red China.
Now, could you tell us whether the official policy decision on our attitude toward this "apparent rift”, or any subsequent reappraisal of our policy decision, took into account the circumstances surrounding the shipment of grain bought by Red China from Canada and shipped to Eastern European ports; and, if so, what evidence of a higher probative value overrode the implications of these grain shipments?
Mr. BALL. Well, if I understand what you are suggesting, Senator Thurmond, it is that Red China was acting as kind of a broker for the procurement of grain for the rest of the bloc.
To the best of my knowledge, the only shipments that Red China made to any other parts of the bloc were some shipments to Albania.
I find very little in any of that which would cast very much light on the amount of the rift. The fact is that the Soviet Union has had an agricultural problem of its own which certainly has limited its own ability to make food available.
The Chinese Communists have been buying wheat around the world at a great cost to their foreign exchange position. They have not bought any wheat from the United States because of the policies which we have pursued.
But I do not see anything in those facts which would suggest that the rift was less than it might have been otherwise. The fact is that the withdrawal of the technicians is very practical and tangible evidence of the withdrawal of a form of cooperation which is of vital importance to the Chinese.
Senator THURMOND. Do you know whether the technicians have been returned or not?
Mr. Ball. I think some of them have come back, but this, again, is one of the reasons why I think it would be a mistake to base any immediate policies on the permanence of the rift. This is a fluid situation.
Now, for us to have gone flat out and said that this rift was going to get wider and deeper and was going to last forever and to base our immediate policies on it, would be a mistake. That it appears to be a trend which is developing with some fluctuation up and down is an element which certainly ought to be taken into account over the long pull.
Senator THURMOND. I presume the State Department is familiar with the fact that the Canadian Embassy announced that this grain went to East German ports, this 9.9 million bushels, and 3.1 million bushels to Albanian ports?
Mr. BALL. Yes, I think so.
Senator THURMOND. Then that would furnish information that would be valuable to you, would it not?
Mr. BALL. Well, I do not quite understand the significance of the fact that grain went to non-Asian ports. You mean grain purchased by Red China went to non-Asian ports? Senator THURMOND. That is right.
You do not think that is significant: That grain purchased by Red China went to East German ports?
Mr. BALL. This may very well be a part of a larger internal transaction in which Red China got something from East Germany for doing so. But I will be glad, if you would like, to give you what we do know about this and submit it to the committee.
Senator THURMOND. Does this not indicate that Communist China may be acting as the purchasing broker for the entire Soviet, for the entire Sino-Soviet bloc?
Mr. Ball. If you are going to have a broker, Red China would be the worst possible broker because the Red Chinese relations with the free world are much stickier than the relations of any other part of the bloc.
No, this would suggest to me—and this is something which I will be glad to look into that there may well have been some fairly elaborate internal financial transactions in which Red China got something from some of the other countries for it.
But I would not want to venture a prediction or an analysis of this without giving you the facts, and I will be glad to do so.
(The information supplied is as follows:)
RED CHINESE GRAIN PURCHASES
We have information that several millions of bushels of wheat have been bought by the Chinese Communists from Canada for delivery to Albania and East Germany. We believe that the Peiping regime was, through special purchases, merely fulfilling its trade commitments to East Germany and its aid commitments to Albania. There is no reason to presume that the Chinese Communists have been acting as brokers for the rest of the bloc. In fact, there is no information available indicating that the Chinese Communists have been able to buy grain from free world sources on more advantageous terms than other Communist bloc countries.
Senator THURMOND. Would this not be one way in which Communist countries could get grain without Soviet Russia admitting a shortage?
Mr. BALL. There has been no doubt about Soviet Russia admitting a shortage. It has talked at great length about its agricultural problems. There has been no attempt to conceal this.
SPEECH DELETION ON SOVIET ACTIONS IN KOREA AND INDOCHINA
Senator THURMOND. These are but some of the things that I am sure are confusing to those who have their carefully prepared speeches censored.
Let me ask you about another apparently inconsistent deletion. This was in speech No. 137, scheduled for delivery May 19, 1960.
Mr. BALL. 1960 was that, Senator Thurmond?