This was a speech by Gen. F. F. Everest, commander, TAC. Speaking of the Soviets, this military officer proposed to state: They have employed every means from economic pressure and subversion, as in Iraq, to indirect military action-limited in area and scope as in Korea and Indochina. In commenting on the deletion of the words "Korea and Indochina," the State Department reply, which you submitted states: As noted by the reviewing officer, the reference to Soviet action in Korea and Indochina was inaccurate, since intervention in these areas was by Communist China. This must have come as quite a shock to the military speaker. Does the State Department take the position that the Soviets were not directly involved in the Korean war; and, if so, when did the State Department reach this conclusion? Mr. BALL. Well, the principal adversary in the Korean war after the Yalu had been crossed was, of course, Red China. I think that the initiative for involvement came on the part of the Red Chinese Government. That is, I think, a matter of history. Now, the extent to which there was encouragement and some assistance provided in Korea by the Soviet Union, I think, is also clear, but the main initiative there was an initiative on the Red Chinese Government's side. SOVIET-RED CHINA ACCORD IN KOREAN WAR Senator THURMOND. Does the State Department feel that actions by Red China in Korea were part of the intentions and plan of the international Communist conspiracy? Mr. BALL. I think that the decision of the Red Chinese Government to intervene in Korea directly was a decision which it made. The extent to which it may have been discussed with the Soviet Union, I do not know at this point, but Senator THURMOND. You feel free to confer with your aids, if you wish. Mr. BALL. Again, this is something I would be glad to provide you with what information we have on it. I think that the general impression is that this was a decision made by the Chinese Communist Government and that the initiative did not at all come from Moscow. Senator THURMOND. If you do not care to answer the question I asked there, would you supply the answer for the record? Mr. BALL. We will be glad to supply that. (The information supplied is as follows:) RED CHINESE DECISION TO ENTER KOREAN WAR We do not have any precise information as to the processes of decision involved in the Chinese Communist entry into the Korean war. Doubtless the influence of the Soviet Union as well as internal conditions within Communist China played an important part, as did the fact that American troops were approaching the Yalu River, the border of Communist China. It is, of course, true that the governments of Moscow and Peiping were in very close accord in December 1950 and we may thus assume that both regimes believed the decision to be in line with the common objectives of the Communist movement for worldwide domination. Senator THURMOND. The State Department's position is that what Red China did in Korea was part of the international Communist conspiracy, is it or is it not? Mr. BALL. I should say it was certainly advancing the interests of the international Communist conspiracy. I would not question that. The only distinction that I was making was that this decision was, so far as I know, a decision of the Red Chinese government, and the extent of the discussion with the Soviet Union, I think, is something which I would like to look into. I just frankly do not know. Senator THURMOND. This officer proposed to state that the Soviets employed indirect military action, limited in scope and area, in Korea. THE 1954 DOD PRESS RELEASE ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR Are you familiar with the press release of the Department of Defense dated May 15, 1954, which consisted of two studies of Soviet participation in the Korean war, and which purported to establish, in the words of the release beyond any reasonable doubt the true nature of Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, the Soviet and Chinese Communists support of, and participation in that aggression, and the blunt truth about the internal and external manifestations of Communist control in North Korea. Mr. BALL. Well, that there was equipment and supplies furnished by the Soviet Union, I think is perfectly clear. Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with this press release that I referred to? Mr. BALL. Of 1954? Senator THURMOND. Dated May 15, 1954. Mr. BALL. I do not recall the precise release, no. Senator THURMOND. I would suggest that you read that release, and you will find on page 1, and this is entitled "The Truth About Soviet Involvement in the Korean War," the last paragraph of the first page, which goes on into the next page, reads, as follows: That It is impossible to separate the military and political aspects of Russian control over the North Korean regime. In the course of interrogation, a highranking North Korean officer, captured by the U.N. Command, said, "What are you people trying to do, prove that Russia is running the Korean war? is not necessary. I am living proof of that fact." He then requested that the rest of his interrogation be continued in Russian, the language in which he thought and talked most easily. Then it goes on to say that his was not an isolated case, and it documents item after item after item the material here that is incontrovertible, and substantially it is that position. Are you familiar with the material of the State Department or the State Department's position on this question? Mr. BALL. I am not familiar with the press release that you mentioned, Senator Thurmond. Let me point out that this was a change that was made quite a long time ago under the previous administration, so that all we are trying to do is to reconstruct what the reviewer had in mind at that time. I think that the whole question here is to what extent the initiative came from the Red Chinese government and to what extent there could have been limited assistance through the Soviet Union. Frankly, I would regard as a fairly marginal question as to whether it was useful for the commander of the Tactical Air Command to make this statement or not. Again, I would imagine that this is the kind of change which would not be made today. At that time, as I pointed out in my statement, there were a great many more changes being made than we are now making. Senator THURMOND. I may have stated that the Department of State gave out that release, I am not sure. This release was by the Department of Defense. I think I stated that but I want to be sure. On the front page of this release, the last paragraph reads: The documents establish beyond any reasonable doubt the true nature of Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, the Soviet and Chinese Communists support of, and participation in that aggression, and the blunt truth about the internal and external manifestations of Communist control in North Korea. So there is no question in your mind about Russia's participation in the Korean war, is there? Mr. BALL. No. As I say, I have never questioned the fact that they supplied technical weapons Senator THURMOND. The State Department has never questioned that, have they? Mr. BALL. They have never questioned it. Senator THURMOND. Then what was the objection to that officer making that statement? Mr. BALL. The only objection I can imagine, and, as I say, this is an attempt to reconstruct a reason for something done under the last administration when none of the present principal officers of the Department were in the Department, is that it simply gave an impression of a degree of Russian involvement which obscured the real initiative coming from the Red Chinese Government. As I say, I would have regarded this as a marginal change, and I frankly do not know why they felt it necessary to make it. Senator THURMOND. The State Department is highly sensitive to any possibility that a speech might confuse the Communists or the neutralists, as is demonstrated by this strict censorship. But the censors never seem to give a thought to the utter confusion and frustration which the censors at the State Department create in the minds of our own officials. The Defense Department, acting as official spokesman for the United States in a matter involving military intelligence, took the position that the Soviets not only were directly involved in the Korean war, but, indeed, that the Soviets directed the aggression. Now, what I want to know is when our State Department repudiated this official U.S. position, which was based on facts amply documented and released? Mr. BALL. It is no repudiation of the position, Senator Thurmond. I am rather surprised that the Defense Department, in view of that, did not raise a question as to this change. We were in a position at that time that any change which seemed to go contrary to the beliefs or views of the Defense Department could have been raised for review and have been reconsidered. Senator THURMOND. If there is no objection, I would like to have this press release placed in the record at this point. (The press release referred to is, as follows: FOR THE PRESS: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NO. 465-54 In the interest of throwing further light on the facts of Soviet participation in the Korean War and on the Chinese Communist record in Korea, the Department of Defense has released two special studies on these subjects. These documents represent conclusions which are based on intelligence research and examination of many sources of information over a considerable period of time. The documents establish beyond any reasonable doubt the true nature of Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, the Soviet and Chinese Communist support of, and participation in that aggression, and the blunt truth about the internal and external manifestations of Communist control in North Korea. THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR General Communist aggression in Korea began in 1950, but the preparations for it began north of the 38th parallel in 1945, when Russian occupation forces moved in. Among their first preoccupations was the creation of a North Korean Army. While they were directly occupying the country, they recruited, organized, and equipped local forces. After those forces reached a degree of strength that could allow the Russians to remove their own occupation forces, they did so. But, first they created a hand-picked, puppet regime controlled by Russian citizens of Korean ancestry. This puppet regime continued the military buildup with Russian help in materials and training personnel. When the North Korean Army had reached a degree of strength which indicated it could conquer all of Korea, the Russians gave it the signal for the attack across the 38th parallel. And when this army failed to gain its objective despite its great initial superiority over defending forces, the Chinese came to its rescue, and Russia continued to give support in material, advisory personnel, AA units, and strategic counsel to the Chinese and North Koreans. The course of the first few weeks of fighting in Korea provides all the proof needed that the Russians had carried on a major military buildup in the north. In those weeks the North Korean Army showed strength in numbers and equipment far superior to those defending the Republic of Korea. It would have been absolutely impossible for the North Koreans by themselves to have created so strong a military force, and it is inconceivable that such a force was created for any purpose other than aggression. Again, when the tide of battle turned against the North Koreans and the Chinese entered the conflict and stayed in it for more than two years, it was Russian support that made it possible for the Communist forces to ward off complete defeat. Without that help, the Chinese with their inadequate industrial structure could not possibly have maintained effective military forces in Korea on their own resources. It was because of this Russian direction and support of the aggression in North Korea that the United States firmly insisted that in any postarmistice political conference, Russia could not be considered a neutral participant, but must be present as a nation with, at the least, a "special interest" in the Korean conflict. It is impossible to separate the military and political aspects of Russian control over the North Korean regime. In the course of interrogation a highranking North Korean officer captured by the U.N. Command said: "What are you people trying to do, prove that Russia is running the Korean War? That is not necessary. I am living proof of that fact." He then requested that the rest of his interrogation be continued in Russian, the language in which he thought and talked most easily. He was no isolated case. On the contrary, he was one of a number of Russian citizens, members of the Communist Party, who was ordered to Korea in 1945 to set up what became a classic example of a puppet government. Most of the top positions, and many of the key positions at the lower, operating levels of the North Korean government are held by these Soviet citizens descended from Korean immigrants. Because of their strategic positions in the bureaucracy, it is impossible for the government to take any course of action that would not be acceptable in Moscow. And it is certain that any line of action ordered from Moscow will be inaugurated. Thirty-six of these Russians went to the country of their ancestors in 1945 to set up the Korean satellite regime. With them went a much greater number of lower ranking Russians of Korean ancestry who were spread through the regime, to carry out its operations, and to check on the native Korean officials who might tend to deviate from Russian-approved policies. The leader of the key group was HO Ka I, a prominent Communist Party official in Uzbekistan. In North Korea he became the real leader of the regime. While the regime was still in its formative state, during the period of direct Russian occupation, he functioned as First Secretary of the Korean Labor Party (KLP), the formal name of the Communist Party in Korea. Even with HO Ka I now dead, having committed suicide at about the time Beria was purged, KIM Il Sung and other Soviet citizens still are the top men in the North Korean regime. KIM Il Sung, Premier of North Korea since February 1946, came to Korea with these 36 Russians. Although born in Korea, he is an officer in the Soviet Army and is in Korea under orders. NAM Il, whose name became well-known when he was a senior Communist delegate at the Panmunjom armistice talks, is another Soviet citizen and Red Army officer. He was born in Soviet Siberia, and is said to have served as a captain in the Red Army during World War Two. He was Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army, and now is North Korean Foreign Minister. On down the line through the North Korean regime the story is the same. Consider the following list of high-ranking officials—all of them Russian citizens in Korea under Soviet orders: PANG Hak Se-Minister of Internal Affairs (in charge of police and intelligence). KIM Yol-Chief, Organization Department of the Korean Labor (Communist) Party; Cabinet Secretariat. KIM Pa-Former Vice Minister of Internal Affairs. Pak Chang-OK-Chief, Propaganda Department of the KLP, member of the recently established Central Presidium, member of the Central Political Committee of the KLP, and Vice Premier. KIM Chae Uk-Chief, Political Bureau of the North Korean Army, and Vice Minister of Agriculture. KIM IL-Member of the Korean Labor Party's Central Political Committee; member of the Central Presidium, and Vice Premier. Formerly political commissar of the North Korean Army and Deputy Chief of the Army's Political Bureau. LEE Pil Ku-Vice Minister of Internal Affairs. LEE Tong Kun-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. KIM Chan-Vice Minister of Finance. LEE Sang Jo-Chief, Reconnaissance Bureau of North Korean Army, and Deputy Truce Delegate. PAK Chong Ae (Madame)-Vice Chairman, Korean Labor Party; member of its Political Committee, and formerly Secretary of its Central Committee. PAK I Wan-Vice Premier. (Also known as KAK Uihwan or Ivan Pak, a Russian with an obviously "Koreanized” name.) HAN Il Mu-Chief of North Korean Navy and Vice Minister of Defense. TAE Song Su-Vice Minister of Culture and Propaganda. WANG Yon-Commanding General, North Korean Air Force. KO Kwi Man-Vice Minister of Industry. KIM Sung Hwa-Minister of City Planning. KI Sok Pok-Former Chief Editor of Labor News, the Korean Labor Party's official publication (a former Major General who has assumed civilian status); North Korean representative in the Panmunjom talks for arranging a Korean political conference. PAK Tae Jun-Vice Chief of the Textbook Compilation Bureau of the Cultural and Propaganda Ministry. KIM I Se Member of the Soviet Young Communist League and Russian language instructor. HO Hak Pong-Colonel; instructor at North Korean Officer Candidate School. PAK Chang Son-Vice principal of Pyongyang Teachers College. |