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These men, all Soviet citizens by birth and devout Communists by lifelong training, hold most of the top positions and the key second- and third-level positions in the North Korean regime. That so many of them are Vice Ministers rather than full Ministers is not surprising. One of the effective techniques of creating and operating a puppet government is to put native-born citizens in apparently top positions, but to place the real power in the hands of their chief assistants.

These are the Russians who run the governmental apparatus of North Korea. They are also men who, when it was considered time to launch an attempt at military conquest of the Republic of Korea, ordered the attack.

Because these men were Russians, the Russian language played a major part in the actual operation against the Republic of Korea. Two Russian-language documents captured by the U.N. Command clearly revealed that the men who planned and instigated the aggression did it in the language they knew best.

One was titled "North Korean Army Reconnaissance Order Number One,” dated June 18, 1950. This order, originally transmitted in Russian showed that specific plans for committing the 4th North Korean Division for attack to the southward existed on that date.

Another was titled “North Korean Army Operation Order Number One," dated June 22, 1950. This order contained the detailed plans for the attack by the 4th Division and its supporting units. These and eight other similar orders were submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, in English translation, to prove where the guilt for aggression lay.

The North Korean regime, attempting to discredit these documents pointed out that place names were given in Japanese, which the North Korean Army did not use. Actually, this charge tended to validate rather than refute the documents. The U.N. Command translators, working from the original Russian of the orders, were not familiar with Russian transliterations of Korean place names. Consequently, they had to identify places with the Japanese names used on the maps available to them.

Right down to the commanders of line units, orders were transmitted in Russian. It was not until orders reached the men who were to do the actual fighting and dying that the Korean tongue could be used without fear of mistakes resulting from its improper use.

One prisoner of war, a Major of North Korean engineers, said that as the flow of Russian equipment into Korea increased during the period immediately preceding the initial attack, the flow of Russian advisors increased with it. All orders, he said, came from these advisors, and he, who spoke Russian, was given the job of translating them into Korean.

Many Russian “advisors” were attached to the North Korean Army advance headquarters established in June 1950. They wore civilian clothing, the Major added, and it was forbidden to address them by rank. They were introduced as "newspaper reporters" but they had supreme authority. They took the lead in making operational and mobilization plans, and in commanding and ma pulating troops. They treated the Korean officers who were nominally their chiefs, the Major said, “like their servants, or children.”

The North Korean Major identified two of these Russian "advisors" as Lieutenant General Vasiliev and Colonel Dolgin. Vasiliev, he said, apparently was in charge of all movements across the 38th parallel. Dolgin, assigned to the Engineer Department, was clearly the superior to the nominal head of the Department, Senior Colonel PAK Nam Il, although the latter also held a commission in the Russian Army.

Another prisoner interrogation report identified Colonel Yun, a Russian who spoke Korean haltingly, as advisor to the Tank Command of the North Korean Army in June 1950. It named as head of communications along the frontier before and during the initial attack a Russian colonel named Gregor. This prisoner also said he actually heard General Vasiliev give the order to attack on June 25.

Similar evidence came in many other interrogation reports. In some of them, the prisoner admitted that he was a Russian national of Korean ancestry, who had been ordered to Korea to take part in the creation of the puppet state's military force.

The Soviet Union withdrew its troops from North Korea in 1948, after training a native army to replace them and leaving many advisors. The destruction of that army following the U.N. Command landings at Inchon faced them with a serious problem. By agreement it was arranged that the Chinese enter the war, but the Chinese need of technical support aggravated the problem.

Therefore, in the spring of 1951 Soviet troops together with some medical and support units from other satellites, began to filter into North Korea.

They were largely specialists, utilized as individuals rather than members of operating military units. Their chief functions were training, advising and participating in the combat activities of engineer, armor, artillery, antiaircraft and air components, where they filled basic deficiencies in the Chinese and North Korean forces.

Estimates based on a large volume of reports indicate that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 Soviet military personnel in North Korea during the spring and summer of 1951. The numerical force varied constantly, since the Russians came into Korea with their combat equipment, trained Chinese and North Korean counterparts to use it, and then returned to Manchuria or the U.S.S.R. The only exceptions were antiaircraft personnel, advisors, and other technical experts, who remained in North Korea throughout the Panmunjom truce talks.

The advisors frequently remained in Soviet uniform, although on occasion they put on civilian clothes to prevent ordinary Chinese Communist and North Korea soldiers from learning their true military identities. Soviet troops actively engaged in antiaircraft, radar, and other technical duties usually wore Chinese Communist Forces uniforms, which failed to disguise their clearly Caucasian features, as many prisoners reported.

By the end of May 1953, there were estimated to be from 6,000 to 12,000 Russian tactical troops in Korea. Most of them were located along main supply routes and near communication centers. The largest concentration, estimated at the equivalent of three antiaircraft divisions, was deployed in the SinuijuAntung area. Another unit was protecting the river bridges in the SinanuiPakchen area. A medium gun regiment, numbering some 400 men, was assigned to protect the Soviet Embassy, Advisory headquarters, and other Russian installations at Pyongyang. Other unidentified units, believed to have been quartermaster, railroad, and naval forces, were located in the northeast.

Approximately 1,300 Russians were employed as staff and technical advisors throughout North Korea. Most of them were assigned to North Korean forces, with only a few attached to the Chinese to insure proper maintenance of equip ment furnished by the U.S.S.R.

The system of “advisors” set up by the Russians actually assured them control over all important Korean elements in both making policy and directing resulting operations. It also applied to the policy and actions regarding prisoners of war. Camps were under the control of the Home Affairs Ministry's Social Security Bureau, which supplied guard personnel and conducted the attempts at political indoctrination. This control was personally wielded by KIM II, one of the Soviet citizens at the core of the North Korean regime. Along with personnel the Russians sent equipment into Korea steadily as the conflict wore on.

In various U.N. debates, Russian delegates sought to maintain the fiction that they sent materiel to Korea only prior to their 1948 troop withdrawal. On the face of it such a contention could not be made to hold water, for it would be impossible to maintain a 3-year military effort on supplies stacked up before the fighting began. War consumes materials at a fantastic rate, and as the original stocks of materials that had been accumulated in Korea were expended, they were replaced. The quantities needed and the more complex materials could come only from Russia, for neither North Korea nor China had at that time the necessary industrial complex.

But logic alone does not have to carry the burden of proof. On the occasions of their retreats, the Chinese and North Koreans had to leave materials behind, and many of these materials carried markings showing clearly that they were made in the Soviet Union after the 1948 withdrawal.

Artillery ammunition, hand grenades, signal equipment and 122 millimeter howitzers, manufactured in Russia in 1949 and 1950 were captured by the U.N. Command (see attached table). Russian-language entries in captured documents, dated after 1948, that were designed to accompany individual items of Soviet material, also were picked up by advancing U.N. forces.

Yet, with this tangible, physical evidence in U.N. Command hands, the Russians were still insisting as late as March 1953, that they had not given any material support to the North Korean forces after 1948.

The record from 1945 to the present is complete. First the Russians occupied North Korea. During the occupation they used Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry to create a Soviet-type Communist regime that could be depended on absolutely not to deviate from basic Soviet expansionist policies. When they thought that regime was strong enough to seek the conquest of all Korea they turned it loose

against the Republic of Korea and gave it continuing support during 3 years of fighting. When the effort at military conquest failed they sued for an armistice, and sent two Soviet citizens to represent the puppet regime in the armistice talks.

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREAN FORCES SUBSEQUENT TO 1948 Prior to the intervention of the CCF in Korea, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations consistently denied that his Government was implicated in the North Korean aggression. Not only did he deny instigation and direction of the move, but in addition he denied that the NKA was supplied with equipment of Russian manufacture. Recently it was pointed out that the Soviet not only instigated the Korean War, but that they actually directed the initial phases of hostilities and continue to control all military and political activity within the puppet state.

In light of the Soviet allegation at the U.N. that the North Koreans, prior to the Chinese intervention, were equipped with captured Japanese materiel, GS AFFE recently made a study of equipment captured by the UNC prior to CCF entry into the war. The report resulting from this study, along with the inclosures to that report, follow. It is reprinted in its original form in order to provide wider circulation, and it leaves no doubt that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been an active participant in the Korean War since the opening of hostilities. It also leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union laid careful plans for the attack many months before hostilities were initiated.

HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST (MAIN),
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE,

APO 343, 18 March 1953. 1. Evidence of Soviet military assistance to the North Korean Forces subsequent to 1948 and prior to the intervention of the Chinese Communist Forces has been compiled by this Office.

a. Soviet materiel manufactured in 1949 and 1950 captured in Korea consists almost entirely of artillery ammunition, hand grenades, and signal equipment, with two 122mm M1938 howitzers manufactured in 1949 being the notable exception. Two items were dated subsequent to June 1950. The following extract presents a noteworthy and interesting remark on this subject :

1

[graphic]

Soviet military materiel captured from or abandoned by North Korean forces

prior to intervention of Chinese Communist forces (manufactured by the U.S.S.R. in 1949 or 1950)

[Inclosure I]

Date of capture (C),

photo (P), examination (E),

or report (R)

Place of capture

Description of equipment

Date of manufacture

Umsong
Umsong-

7 Jul. 50 (C)
7 Jul. 50 (C)
16 Jul. 50 (E)
16 Jul. 50 E
21 Jul. 50 (C)

1949.
1949.
1949.
1949.
January 1950.

Northeast of

Taegu.

31 Jul. 50 (P).
31 Jul. 50 (R)
13 Aug. 50 (R)
14 Aug. 50 (P)
19 Aug. 50 (P)--

1950.
1950.
1949 & 1950.
1949 & 1950.

M-5 mortar fuzes.
Hand grenade detonators, model UZRG.
F-1 hand grenade
RG-42 hand grenades.
Military radio set, type RBM-1_
76-millimeter howitzer ammunition
120-millimeter mortar shell
122-millimeter HE ammunition.
85-millimeter HE ammunition, KTM-1

fuze.
RG-42 hand grenades (grenade, detonator,

label).
Mortar sight MPM-44, No. 11052_
45-millimeter HE ammunition.
45-millimeter HVAP ammunition.
M-5 mortar fuze KTM-1 artillery fuze.
45-millimeter APT ammunition
45-millimeter APHE ammunition
122-millimeter ammunition...
7.62-millimeter heavy ball ammunition.
76-millimeter HEAT ammunition..

1949.

20 Aug. 50 (E)
21 Aug. 50 (R
23 Aug. 50 (R)
28 Aug. 50 (P)
28 Aug. 50 (P)
28 Aug. 50 (P)
28 Aug. 50 (E
28 Aug. 50 (P)
29 Aug. 50 (R)

1949.
1949.
1950.
1949.
1950.
1950.
1949.
August 1949.
1950.

1 Extract from an official report dated 28 Nov. 50.

Soviet military material captured from or abandoned by North Korean forces

prior to intervention of Chinese Communist forces (manufactured by the U.S.S.R. in 1949 or 1950)-Continued

[Inclosure I

Place of capture

Date of capture (C),

photo (P), examination (E),

or report (R)

Description of equipment

Date of manufacture

[blocks in formation]

122-millimeter ammunition..

1950, 85-millimeter AP ammunition..

1949. RG-42 hand grenades (packing slip).

1949.
Artillery ammunition (being examined by 1950.

General Walker).
KTM-1 fuzes.

1949.
122-millimeter ammunition..

1949. 85-millimeter HVAP ammunition..

1950. F-1 hand grenade (grenade, detonator, 1949.

label).
Batteries (types 38-L-30 and BAS-G-60-February 1950.

L-1.3) for mine detector type VIM-203.
Two each military radio sets type RBM-1. 1950.
Receiver dynamotor (type RU-11AM for 1949.

military radio set RSB-F.
76-millimeter ammunition.

1949. 122-millimeter ammunition.

1949. Four each military radio sets type RBM-1. March & July

1949, January

1950.
122-millimeter ammunition..

1949 & 1950.
Military field telephone type TAI-43 1949,
Report lists various types of artillery 1949 & 1950.

ammunition encountered to date and
gives dates of manufacture and loading

arsenal.
Hand grenade detonators (packing slip). - 1950.
Six each wet cell batteries type 4NKN- 1950.

45S,
85-millimeter ammunition....

1949.
Two each military radio sets type RBM-1. June 1950, July

1950. Two each 100-watt tetrode oscillator radio June 1949.

tubes type GKE-150.
Transmitting triode radio tube type M-80- February 1949.
Military aircraft radio receiver type RSI- December 1949.

6M-1.
122-millimeter ammunition.

1950.
IP-40 gasoline pressure type preheater. 1950.
76-millimeter HVAP ammunition..

1949 & 1950. 76-millimeter APT ammunition..

1950. 76-millimeter APIT ammunition.

1949.

[blocks in formation]

(Photo) Soviet radio set type RBN-1, captured near Taegu on 21 July 1950. This radio was apparently manufactured in January 1950.

area

(Photo) Packing slip for RG-42, hand grenade fuzes (Type UZRG) captured from NKA prior to 15 August 1950. This packing slip is in Russian and bears a printed date of 1950. Examination of captured ammunition in collection points in the Hambung

has revealed large stores of recently manufactured rounds. Of particular interest were the 122-millimeter rounds recovered in the HambungHungnam vicinity.

2. For this initial report evidence has been limited to that captured from or abandoned by the North Korean Forces during the period from the start of the war to the time of Chinese Communist intervention. This limitation obviously negates any argument that materiel sold by the Soviets to the Chinese was obtained by the North Koreans from the latter. Much larger quantities of Soviet materiel manufactured or repaired (by the Soviets) in 1949 and 1950 were undoubtedly captured during the early months of the war.

3. In view of the admission by Mr. Vishinsky that the U.S.S.R. has supplied war materials to the CCF, it is felt that compilation of evidence of this assistance is not necessary.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND BARBARISM IN KOREA

The Geneva Conference is now considering the two major problem areas of Asia, Korea and Indo-China.

The Chinese Communist regime is present at the Geneva Conference but not as a fully accredited member of the society of respectable nations. This was made clear by John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, when he reported on the Berlin Conference at which the Geneva meetings were arranged.

Rather, Dulles emphasized, the Peiping regime will be present at Geneva because it has engaged in aggression against its neighbors. The counts against the Chinese Communist regime's actions in Korea are:

(1) That Peiping abetted North Korean aggression in June 1950 and made a direct aggression itself in October 1950, after long and careful preparation.

(2) That Peiping mistreated POW's, in violation of accepted international rules, which it had specifically announced it would observe.

The initial aggression against the Republic of Korea in June 1950 was inspired by the Soviet Union, and carried out by the puppet regime it had created in North Korea. The U.N. assisted the ROK in repelling the aggression, and it soon became apparent that the North Korean Army not only would be incapable of achieving the Communist goal of complete conquest of the peninsula, but also was being defeated and destroyed.

If the war had been a Korean affair, as the Communists claimed, it would have ended late in 1950. It did not, because when the Chinese Communists saw it was going badly, they moved in and kept it going for nearly three more bloody years.

Officially the Peiping regime claims variously that it intervened in Korea because the U.N. Command forces were nearing the Yalu, or the Chinese people "heroically volunteered” to protect China's border, or the Chinese people “heroically went to the aid of the Korean victims of U.S. aggression."

The action of the U.N. Command's forces in driving the North Korean aggressors back behind the 38th parallel was taken under the authority of the U.N. General Assembly when it became obvious that the North Korean Communists were not interested in halting their aggression, even after the world body had demonstrated that it would not countenance this aggression, and the aggressors had suffered serious military setbacks.

Furthermore, anyone familiar with the complexities of modern warfare could not possibly believe that a major action could be decided on and organized within the space of a few days or weeks. Actually, the first definitive Chinese steps toward intervention in Korea were taken well in advance. Behind them was a history of years of preparation involving Communist China for an ultimate attempt to bring all the Korean peninsula under Communist rule.

Official Chinese Communist activity which had a bearing on Korea's future began in 1939 when, in their Yenan fastness, a Korean Volunteer Army was formed as part of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA). Subsequently, many Chinese of Korean ancestry in Manchuria were mobilized in CCA units.

In 1946, officers from this Korean force were released by the CCA to become cadres for the North Korean armed forces being organized, trained, and equipped by Russian occupation forces above the 38th parallel. This process went on to the point where units of Koreans and Chinese of Korean ancestry were sent to Korea on a large scale.

Throughout the period when the Communists were fighting against the Chinese National Government, forces were freely transferred between the Chinese Communist and North Korean Armies. In January 1947, for instance, the Chinese indicated their need for additional trained troops in conferences with the North Koreans and the Russians. This led to the transfer of substantial numbers of North Korean troops to Manchuria in the spring of 1947.

In 1949 and 1950, after the Communists had gained control of the Chinese mainland, regular divisions of Chinese of Korean ancestry were transferred from the CCA to the North Korean Army. They entered Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. tactical troops from the Republic of Korea had been completed. They were a major factor in creating the substantial superiority the North Korean Army had over ROK forces when full-scale aggression was launched.

These troops formed the cadre for the North Korean Army, and were at the spearhead of the 1950 aggression. Together, they comprised three divisions of the North Korean assault forces. The 5th division was formed from veterans of Korean race in the 164th division of the Chinese Communist 55th Army, stationed in Manchuria. Non-Koreans of the division were transferred to other

80752-62—pt. 6- -22

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