Chinese units, and they were replaced with Koreans from other elements of the Chinese Army. Most of these troops had been inducted into the Chinese forces after Japan's surrender. The division was moved to Korea in July 1949,

for integration into the expanding North Korean Army.

The North Korean 6th Division was created similarly on the framework of the 166th division of the Chinese Communist 56th Army, and was moved to Korea in July 1949.

Early in 1950 all remaining Koreans in the CCF, numbering about 12,000, were moved to Honan Province on orders from Mao Tse-Tung. They were organized into the 15th Independent Division, which moved into Korea in April 1950 and was redesignated as the 7th North Korean Division, and later was further redesignated as the 12th Division.

All this Chinese activity toward building North Korean armed forces was completed before the general aggression began in June 1950.

In addition, following this, three CCF armies, the 38th, 39th, and 40th, were moved from south China to the Korean border between June 25 and September 15. In addition, the 42d Army, already in Manchuria, was put into intensive training to fit it for combat.

Between these dates, also, Peiping began a major propaganda campaign to whip up domestic enthusiasm and prepare its people for intervention in Korea, playing the necessity of opposing "U.S. aggression" on China's borders and the necessity for helping the Korean people. This was developed into a major propaganda campaign which occupied the largest portion of the regime's propaganda efforts for many months.

The decision to intervene actively was apparently made in mid-August 1950, and immediately thereafter the staged Chinese Communist troops started moving into position north of the Yalu. Late in September, Chinese communications and supply forces started crossing the Yalu, and in October, combat forces started moving into Korea at the rate of one or two army corps per week. Troop movements were made chiefly at night and involved only a relatively short march of 20 to 40 miles to reach the rear of the aggressor North Korean Communist forces being pushed back by the advancing U.N. armies. The first combat contact between U.N. and Chinese Communist forces was made on October 12. By December 15 the Chinese had moved approximately 10 army corps, comprising 30 divisions, into Korea, and thus made certain that there would be no early collapse of the Communist effort to occupy all of Korea by force.

Clearly the Peiping regime calculatedly sought to destroy a neighboring free nation.

The second count against the Peiping regime actions in Korea departs from the impersonal realm of international affairs, and deals with the way in which men treat their fellowmen. It is the story of the treatment the Chinese Communists inflicted on the war prisoners they captured, and it is a story of attempts at two kinds of destruction-of men's bodies, and of their minds.

The United States submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1953 detailed documentation of an organized campaign of atrocities carried out by the Chinese and North Korean forces against war prisoners. After considering and debating these documents, the Assembly on December 3 approved the following resolution:

"The General Assembly, having considered the item 'question of atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces against United Nations prisoners of war in Korea,' proposed by the United States of America in documents A/2531 and A/2531/Add. 1, of 30 and 31 October 1953, recalling that they seek legal requirements for humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in connection with the conduct of hostilities as established by general international law and find authoritative reaffirmation in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and in the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, recalling that these conventions also embody precise and detailed provisions for giving effect to the basic legal requirements referred to above, and that these provisions-to the extent that they have not become binding as treaty law, have been accorded most general support by the international community. Designed to secure general and full observance of the requirements of international law and the universal standards of human decency, (1) expresses its grave concern at reports and information that the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces have, in a large number of instances, employed inhuman practices against the heroic soldiers of forces under the United Nations Command in Korea and against the civilian population

of Korea: (2) condemns the commission by any governments or authorities of murder, mutilation, torture, and other atrocious acts against captured military personnel or civilian populations, as violation of rules of international law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person."

Most of the civilized nations of the world have signed the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. And most of those that have not signed the Conventions have signified that they will abide by them. The Chinese Communists are in this latter category, but the evidence shows a wide gap between what they said and what they did.

They

The Geneva Conventions provide, in effect, that captors shall give decent physical treatment to their captives. The stories of how the Chinese actually treated thousands of their prisoners are well known and well documented. are stories not only of inadequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, but of conscious and calculated cruelty, through the quick release of a bullet or a shove over a cliff, to the slower and hence more crude methods of exposure, starvation and personal torture.

It is easy to destroy a man's body, and the Chinese Communists destroyed the bodies of thousands of prisoners. It is harder to destroy a man's mind, but the Chinese Communists did everything they could to coerce them into becoming tools of Communism.

They carried on a detailed, scientific process aimed at molding war prisoners into forms in which they could be exploited. Prisoners who underwent the experience and later returned to their own countries reported that the experts assigned to wearing down prisoners were highly trained, efficient, and well educated. They were, in short, specialists in applying psychological rather than physical torment.

Physical torment of a rather subtle sort was used, but it was not the ultimate basis of the process. It was, rather, a case of keeping a prisoner at the minimum survival level, so that if he responded favorably to indoctrination, he could be rewarded with a slightly higher level of existence. This reward in turn would become the stimulus for a further degree of acceptance, to be followed by further rewards.

The process begins immediately upon capture. Throughout, it is featured by constant indoctrination, accompanied by steps designed to force real, rather than feigned, acceptance of the concepts presented.

The minimum amounts of food, sleep, shelter, and ill treatment (either through threats or actual torture) that each prisoner can stand are first established. At first he is given an average of 600 grams of food daily. His clothing is scanty and primitive, not including shoes. He is housed in filthy surroundings, without bedding and with lice.

As the process goes on, these prisoners who show signs of succumbing to the indoctrination get better food and treatment. They are relieved of the most arduous labor details. Their hours of work are cut down, and their hours of listening to lectures are correspondingly increased. The most likely prospects, who appear on the verge of embracing Communism, are transferred to special camps, where the only activity is "education."

emerge.

From the full process, three types of prisoners One is those who can be depended on completely. They can be used to further Communist doctrine, or to act as spies out of direct control of their captors. Another is those who can be used under control. These are the ones who are willing to make false confessions, such as those of germ warfare.

The third are the ones on whom the process failed. They are either eliminated or used as slave laborers. It is considered likely that the thousands of U.N. Command prisoners whom the Communists did not return or otherwise account for fell into this category.

In some cases a different process is used. Prisoners are held for only a comparatively short time, and then allowed to escape or otherwise return to their own command, where they will spread stories of the good treatment they received. At no time were they allowed to see how the great majority of prisoners were treated.

Whatever results the Communist either achieved or failed to achieve through their efforts at using war prisoners is less important than the nature of the methods themselves. They show the Peiping regime as one utterly unconcerned with the rights of individuals-as one that sees the individual as nothing more than a mindless body to be used only for the aggrandizement of the regime.

SPEECH DELETION ON SOVIET ACTIONS IN KOREAN WAR

Senator THURMOND. It is just such well-informed judgments as this that create among the public the increasing suspicion that the State Department is infested with apologists for communism.

If you will bother to check, you will find that the Defense Department prepared a similar study on the Soviets' activities in Indochina.

Did you have your files checked before giving us the reason for the deletion in this instance?

Mr. BALL. What we gave you was a reflection of the reason given by the reviewer at that time.

Now, in these comments that we have sent you we have not attempted to pass judgment as to whether this was a sensible deletion or not. As I say, my own view is that this is a deletion which we would not make today.

ADEQUACY AND JUSTIFICATION OF EXPLANATIONS OF SPEECH CHANGES

Senator THURMOND. In the letter of transmittal which accompanied the State Department's explanation of the speech changes, you stated that in those instances where no reasonable explanation was found, the comment on the change was "no explanation."

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator THURMOND. I judge from the letter of transmittal that where an explanation of a change is offered, the Department is of the opinion that the change was justified; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. No.

I have tried to indicate to this committee, in the course of this discussion, those cases where there was a reasonable explanation. This last is an explanation which seems to us not to have been adequate and would not have justified a change being made today.

This, again, as I point out, was a change made in 1960 at a time when the State Department was under different direction.

Senator THURMOND. By my last question, I did not intend to question the fact that those changes for which the State Department transmitted explanations were made for any reason other than insuring consistency with our foreign policy. Many of them, however, do not appear to be necessarily justifiable when carefully examined, and I am sure you will want to explain some of these in a little more detail.

Mr. BALL. That is exactly what I have had in mind, Senator Thurmond.

Where I felt that the changes were not fully justified, I have so told the committee in the course of our discussion here.

Senator THURMOND. Consider, if you will, speech No. 61.

Mr. BALL. What period is that, sir?

Senator THURMOND. If your aid does not find it, we will get it for you in just a minute.

Mr. BALL. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That falls in the miscellaneous category.
Mr. BALL. Oh, yes, thank you.

Yes, I have it.

Senator THURMOND. The speaker proposed to enlighten his audience on what the Communists actually mean when they use certain specific terms. As the speaker proposed originally, his remarks read, as fol

lows:

In the Communist dictionary "peaceful coexistence" is defined as a period in which communism can further its goal of world empire without interference or resistance. A program of organized starvation and murder is neatly labeled “agrarian reform" and "people's democracy" is the name given to rule by brutal dictatorship.

Now, the first sentence was altered by the State Department censor to read:

In Communist terms "peaceful coexistence" actually means a period in which communism can further its goal of world empire without interference or resistance.

So far, the censor, according to the State Department, merely altered a figure of speech in the interest of accuracy. This first change appears to be nothing more than a substitution of the censor's choice of words for those of the speaker with slight, if any, change in context.

In the next sentence, however, the censor changed the term "agrarian reform" to "collectivization of agriculture." The State Department's explanation of this change is:

This might have been construed to confuse the program of forced collectivization which the Communists impose with the kind of agrarian reform which so many of the underdeveloped nations and peoples long for. Moreover, the deleted passage could have been used to indicate that American leaders were really opposed to agrarian reform.

At first glance there may appear to be some merit in the State Department's explanation, but, upon careful study, the explanation becomes totally inapplicable. Now, it is impossible to read the context of the speaker's proposed remarks without coming to the conclusion that the speaker was discussing terms which are used by the Communists which have different meanings to the Communists than to freemen. According to all reports, the Soviets, from the time they began to consolidate their domination of Russia between 1917 and 1921, outlined their agriculture policies, not as "collectivization," but as "agrarian reform."

The Chinese Communists did not call themselves, and we do not call them, "collectivizors of agriculture." They called themselves "agrarian reformers," and, officially, we went along with this propaganda

term.

During the prerevolutionary days of the Communist Castro, he did not propagandize his program as one of "collectivization of agriculture," but time and again he ranted about "agrarian reform."

What the speaker was discussing and attempting to enlighten his audience on was Communist propaganda terms, of which "agrarian reform" is among the most commonly used and perverted by the Communists.

The Communists do not use "collectivization of agriculture" as a propaganda term. "Collectivization of agriculture" is what the Communists mean when they use the legitimate term "agrarian reform" to camouflage illegitimate conduct.

The censor and the State Department, by endorsing his action with this attempted explanation-shows a substantial degree of imperception.

Do you personally think that this change was justified and that the explanation is meritorious?

Mr. BALL. Let me say, Senator, with regard to the first change here, I can only comment that it was a very liberal-minded reviewer, because it seems to me that this, as you pointed out, is simply a substitution of words, and I thought the first formulation was the better

one.

With regard to the second, I would like to call your attention again to the fact that this was a speech made in 1960 under the previous administration, and that the explanation is "this might have been construed," which is simply an attempt to try to find what the explanation was when there was none on the record.

Now, I would agree with you that I think this is basically a silly change. I think the reviewer did not read this carefully. I think you are quite right. I have no argument at all with what you suggest here.

Senator THURMOND. Now, peaceful coexistence," like "agrarian reform,” is a legitimate term. Why would not the same impression have been created if the speaker was allowed, as he was, to use "peaceful coexistence" in the same manner as he proposed to use "agrarian reform," to wit: that American leaders were against peaceful coexistence?

Mr. BALL. I agree.

STATE SUBSTITUTION OF TERMS REFERRING TO COMMUNISM, COMMUNIST WORLD, ETC.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, some of the officers whose speeches were censored, and who testified before the subcommittee, drew our attention to the fact that the censors in the State Department could apparently not make up their minds on preferred semantics as between the use of such terms as "Sino-Soviet bloc," "the Communists," "the Soviets," and "the Soviet Union."

Viewed individually, the State Department explanations for any particular substitution of such terms appears to be founded on some reasoning. When the substitutions are studied, however, from a comparative standpoint, the confusion lingers.

In speeches 30, 51, and 95, to mention a few, the State Department censor substituted the term "Sino-Soviet" for the originally proposed term. In each instance, the explanation for the substitution by the State Department revolved around the necessity for excluding Yugoslavia from the reference. It is against the policy of the United States to refer to Yugoslavia as Communist?

Mr. BALL. Well, the basic reason for substituting "Sino-Soviet” is simply to give a very specific responsibility for what is being done.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, certainly we regard it as Communist. The only distinction between Yugoslavia and the other Communist countries is that it is not a part of the bloc, but it is certainly a Communist country. There has been no question about that.

Senator THURMOND. Sometimes the inconsistencies remained in the same speech after censorship, or, as in the case of speech 95, as a result of censorship.