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Mr. BALL. We are talking here, the passage begins, "The whole history of imperialism”—whether Soviet”—“is a history of aggression you use “Communist” or “Sino

"” Now, this is a history of the moving out of the forces of the Chinese and the Soviet Union from their power centers, successfully_subjugating one area around the fringe of the Iron Curtain or the Bamboo Curtain after another. The technique by which this has been achieved is, as I say, the threat, very largely the threat, or the use of the Red armies.

This talks in geographical terms, “the expansion of area of control, one aggression after another, advances in the face of weakness”.

This is talking about the geographical spread of the control of the Sino-Soviet bloc. This is the mechanical means by which they have achieved a greater geographical area of control over more and more countries.

Now, in the case of 35, it is simply talking about what the purposes are, and the purposes here are the purposes of the Communists who are in control of these countries.

Senator THURMOND. Would you tell us why the passage in speech No. 35 has an exclusively ideological connotation?

Mr. Ball. Because it is stated in terms of purpose. They are dedicated. This means that this is their objective, this is a part of their ideology.

Senator THURMOND. And you think there is a distinction ?

Mr. BALL. I think there is a very highly subtle distinction here, Senator Thurmond, which I think is probably too subtle to have justified these recommendations.

I cannot regard them as very serious in one way or another because the meaning ultimately shines through, in any event. But

Senator THURMOND. Would you make such deletions today?
Mr. Ball. No.

Senator THURMOND. From comments of the State Department included in your explanations, to which we have already referred, the State Department makes it clear that in most passages or treatments, the Communist camp—as the State Department calls it in its comments-should be referred to as "Sino-Soviet” in order to exclude Yugoslavia.

According to the comment on the passage in Speech No. 35, however, it is proper and acceptable under our policy to use the term “Communist”: --which, even according to the State Department's definition, includes Yugoslavia—when the speaker is articulating on ideological positions.

Are we to infer from that in the contemplation of our policy that there is no difference in the ideological position of Communists in Moscow or Peiping and Communists in Belgrade?

Mr. Ball. I would say that the Communists in Belgrade are very largely concerned with the development and advancement of Yugoslavia.

It is communism with a highly nationalistic trend, and this has dominated the policies of the state.

Now, that does not mean that the individual Communists who may be in the government are not dedicated to the broader purposes of the Communist movement, but the fact is that the policies of the state have been very nationalistic in character. The state has not joined in the bloc, in the larger purposes of the bloc, to any considerable extent.

Senator THURMOND. From an ideological position, then, you would say that they are similar?

Mr. BALL. Well, they would not admit that they were similar because there are ideological deviations between the position, say, of Mr. Tito and Chairman Khrushchev. I think there is no question that they are both dedicated Communists.


Senator THURMOND. I do not know whether you have had a chance to read the address I made in the Senate yesterday or not.

Mr. BALL. I am sorry, sir; I was in Omaha yesterday.
Senator THURMOND. I made this statement:

Recently I had the opportunity to view a film which was an interview with Tito by Edward R. Murrow. Although this film was made in approximately 1956, it is not available to the American public. Although it contains nothing which should be of a classified nature, it has been kept secret, and its existence is not generally known. In this firm the whole tenor of the statements made by Tito reaffirm his dedication to communism and his belief in its eventual goal of world domination.

In response to the request that he describe the basic difference between communism in Yugoslavia and communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, Tito said, and these are his words and I quote: “These are not big ideological differences. They are not too big. We have the same aims; that is to say, the building of socialism and communism."

Tito readily admits that his eventual goal is exactly the same as that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BALL. I do not question that, Senator Thurmond. I do not know about this particular film. I have not seen it or heard of it, for that matter.

But I readily concede-
Senator THURMOND. It might interest you to see it.

Mr. BALL. Yes, I would be interested in seeing it. I readily concede that Marshall Tito is a Communist and that his longer range aims are similar to, if not the same, as the other Communists.


The point that I am making about Yugoslavia—and I think this is important—is that because the policies of the Yugoslav Government have been directed within a nationalistic framework, and because there has been the kind of access to the West which there has been, that there is growing up a generation in Yugoslavia who are oriented very differently from the generation that is growing up behind the Iron Curtain, and that this is a very important asset from the point of view of the West if we are ever going to bring about the gradual opening of the closed systems and the letting of some light and air into this whole structure of communism. Senator THURMOND. Now, one can hardly escape

the obviously intended impression given in the comments of the State Department that our policy contemplates Yugoslavia as a very special case.

The State Department has gone to great lengths in its censorship actions to avoid any pejorative implications against Yugoslavia.

Since our policy recognizes the fact that Yugoslavian Communists are on the same plane ideologically as other Communists, is it possible that this is the reason that our policy discourages any approach which pictures the differences between the Communists and the free world in ideological terms?

Mr. BALL. No.

The reason for the policy with respect to Yugoslavia, as I say, is to try to encourage those forces which are oriented to the West.

When you have a country which has adopted a quite different economic method from the bloc countries, which has succeeded, by and large, much more than they have, which has raised its own standard of living above those of the bloc countries by association with the West and by the adoption of methods from the West, and is developing a generation of people who think in Western terms, then I think that this is worth encouraging, that is all.

Senator THURMOND. It is a fact, is it not, that our policy takes the position that ideological motivations are unimportant?

Mr. BALL. It does not take the position that ideological motivations are unimportant. We are dealing in terms here where what, in fact, are the determining elements from the point of view of policy are the policies of the governments and how they translate themselves into action.

Now, the policy of the Yugoslav Government has been to maintain a considerable degree of independence from the bloc and this has been, in our judgment, a considerable asset over the years. It is an asset which ought to be encouraged, because by beginning to provide a kind of attraction to the new generations coming up within Yugoslavia, we are providing the possibility of a gradual kind of contact with the peoples of the bloc countries that can, over a period of time, in our judgment, help assist the trends which are working on our side.

I think this is a matter of very real importance. I think to discourage those trends by denying a group of people who are growing up with Western ideas the possibility of any progress or hope through the increasing of Western contacts, then I think we simply defeat our own objectives.


Senator THURMOND. Our policy has not so candidly deprecated the ideological differences until recently, but for a long time I believe you will find that our policy has deemphasized ideological differences.

You are familiar with the phrase that "anticommunism is negative,” are you not?

Mr. Ball. Yes, I am familiar with the phrase that "anticommunism is negative," and I think that I have tried to explain just what we mean by stating that if we do not admit to the possibility that communism will ever loosen its hold on these countries by the development of peoples who have freedom-loving ideas, then it seems to me that we indulge in a kind of negation of confidence in our own policies or of confidence in the ability of freedom itself to prevail.

Senator THURMOND. I believe our policies have taken the position that "anticommunism is negative."

Mr. Ball. Our policies have taken the position that anticommunism itself is not enough; that you have got to have some positive ideas in foreign policy; and this is what we have been trying to inject into it.

We have nothing against anticommunism, but it is a policy which is passive.

What we are talking about is the injection of something positive into the components of foreign policy.

Senator THURMOND. Would you not say that a policy which specifies that public opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, we will avoid placing the Soviets in a position of embarrassment, is another example of a fundamental policy that anticommunism is negative?

Mr. Ball. Well, I would say that there is no such policy to avoid placing the Soviet Communists in positions of embarrassment.

I think that we recognize that there are times when it is more to the purposes of American foreign policy to try to bring about some kinds of solutions around the edges of the major questions, and that this should be a factor which goes into the kind of utterances which we are making at that time.

Senator THURMOND. This conclusion that "anticommunism is negative,” when implemented, has far-reaching implications. Just in the one narrow application of avoiding any action which would place the Soviets in a position of embarrassment can have far-reaching effects.

For instance, an application would be a policy to seek disarmament by systematically eliminating certain types of weapons, ourselves, unilaterally, and letting the Communists know what we were doing in the hope or expectation that they would do likewise. In this manner of achieving disarmament, negotiations would be eliminated and the Soviets would be relieved of the embarrassment, in the eyes of the more aggressive Chinese Communists, of reaching a formal accommodation with the United States.

Is this not another illustration of what the statement "anticommunism is negative” means as it is used in policy circles?

Mr. BALL. No.

There is no responsible official of the Government who would advocate a policy of that kind. Obviously, we are very much opposed to unilateral disarmament. We have made this manifestly clear.

But the statement that "anticommunism is negative” simply means that it is not enough. No one quarrels with anticommunism, but the point is that we have got to have some positive policies that offer some hope to the freedom-loving elements that are developing within the world and encourage the historical trends which are working on our side.

Senator THURMOND. By the phrase, "anticommunism is negative,” the thought is conveyed that it was negative to take actions specifically designed to put pressures on the Communists.

I am under the distinct impression that beginning in 1955, it was our policy position that while anticommunism is negative, foreign aid and information were positive. Much of

this was spelled out in an article which appeared in the New York Times for December 28, 1944, by James Reston, including the number of the N.S.C. paper in which it appeared.

I assume this basic principle is still in our policy, since evidences of it crop up so often. For example, on May 22, 1962, the State Department, in commenting negatively on proposed legislation to create a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy,” stated :

Finally, we believe that positive programs aimed at furthering the cause of freedom represent the best means of fighting communism.

Thereafter, the letter gives as examples of these positive programs: the Peace Corps, foreign aid, and the Alliance for Progress.

Now, the implication is clear that the proposal for a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy falls in the category of "anticommunism” and is, therefore, negative. Is not the Department of State's attitude on the Freedom Academy bill a manifestation of the State Department's adherence to our policy that anticommunism is negative?

Mr. Ball. I would say that the right formulation of the State Department position is that anticommunism is not enough, which does not mean that we repudiate the idea of anticommunism, but that the elements of a foreign policy must contain something more than that we are against communism.

We are also for something.

What we are talking about here is how we advance the principles that we are talking about and not simply deny the principles that other people are talking about.

This seems to me to be the only way in which we are ever going to see that our side prevails.

Senator THURMOND. Some people like to hit anti-Communists with any terms they can, do they not?

Mr. Ball. † do not know who those people are.

Senator THURMOND. Do you read the New York Times and the Washington Post?

Mr. BALL. I do; even the Herald Tribune, I may say.

Senator THURMOND. Had it occurred to you, Mr. Secretary, that counterinsurgency is negative, as is any other purely defensive concept?

Mr. Ball. Of course, but, Senator, you are illustrating my point.

My point is simply that we accept all of this, and these are the elements of our policy. We practice anticommunism. This is a major tenet of policy. But we do not stop there. It is not enough. It is not a complete foreign policy. You have got to have positive elements as well.

Senator THURMOND. Would not the Freedom Academy fall in the category of something positive ?

Mr. BALL. What is proposed is that this be handled by a development of the Foreign Service Institute, and that the whole emphasis be put on all of the elements. Counterinsurgency would be one of them, but also on the element of the development of positive policies as well.

Senator THURMOND. If ideological motivations are important to the extent that they are the bond of cooperation and control between Communists of all nationalities, then our policy's assumption that Yugoslavia is an independent Communist regime not acting in concert with the Sino-Soviet bloc would be highly dubious, would it not?

Mr. BALL. I did not follow the first part, sir, I am sorry.

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