vention from outside that was being considered. Again, this was a speech by a military officer delivered at the time when President Eisenhower was trying to make it appear there would be no intervention. To talk about this could have given Castro the occasion for using it in one of his propaganda speeches which he was making in Havana at that time.

Senator THURMOND. Well, Mr. Secretary, does that mean that our military officers now cannot use any realistic language against the Communists for fear Castro will use that as propaganda?

Mr. BALL. No, it does not mean that. But it means that there is no reason why they should contribute to his propaganda effort unless they are trying to say something which is absolutely essential to be said, particularly at the time that President Eisenhower was trying to give assurance to the other American states that we were not intending any intervention on our own part.

WHETHER MILITARY OFFICERS SHOULD USE TOUGH LANGUAGE AGAINST COMMUNISTS

Senator THURMOND. Well, under your interpretation then it would be just safer for the military officers not to use any tough language against the Communists, would it not?

Mr. BALL. No. There are occasions for it, and there are occasions when it is quite useful to do it. I think the whole point of this discussion that we are having, Senator Thurmond, is that, from our point of view, we can see great utility from strong tough speeches, from very forthright, straightforward speeches, by military officers but, at the same time, those speeches should be made under circumstances where they will do the most positive good and where they will not be subject to the kind of misuse by the other side which could defeat our own policy objectives.

DISCUSSION ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, on February 11, 1961, General Decker proposed to state, and I quote this is speech 100, incidentally, if you wish to look at that.

Mr. BALL. All right, yes, I have it.
Senator THURMOND (continuing) :

Aggression and subversion in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are timely examples of the means used to pursue their aim of world domination.

Now, that statement was proposed to be made by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Decker.

The State Department deleted the term "aggression" and substituted therefor the term "intervention."

In explaining the substitution, the State Department said, and I quote:

The methods used by the Communist nations in the areas referred to had not been officially labeled by the U.S. Government as aggression.

Has our policy changed since that time to the extent that we now label the methods used by the Communist nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as aggression?

Mr. BALL. Yes, we have no difficulty in calling them aggression at this point, and I must say I think in this case there was a bit of overzealousness. I don't see any particular reason why the word "aggression" shouldn't have been used.

Senator THURMOND. The fact that the methods used by the Communists in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were not characterized as aggression by our policy is very enlightening, especially when considered in conjunction with another comment of the State Department on a deletion.

In commenting on the deletion of the word "victory" and the substitution therefor of the term "defeat of Communist aggression," the State Department said, and I quote:

The word "victory" has militaristic and aggressive ring less suited than the substituted phrase to describe our national objectives.

One cannot help but conclude, therefore, that our national objective is the defeat of "Communist aggression," which does not include defeat of the methods used by the Communist nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. I presume you would care to comment on this?

Mr. BALL. Well, as I say, I think it was a mistake to have made this suggestion, although actually intervention and aggression are pretty closely related, and I do not see that there was any great reason one should have been substituted for the other.

I certainly would not have felt that this change should have been made today. I don't see why it was made then.

NATIONAL POLICY OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Senator THURMOND. Are our national objectives the defeat of Communist aggression rather than communism?

Mr. BALL. Our national objective is certainly the defeat of Communist aggression; but it is also the ultimate victory—and I have no hesitation in using the word-of the ideas and ideals for which we believe over the world.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, it is hard to escape the conclusion from the deletions and the presumably carefully considered reasons for deletions submitted by the State Department, despite your articulate attempts at explanation, that the objective of our policy is to defeat foreign aggression, as "foreign aggression" is defined by the State Department in its written reply.

This definition excludes from the definition of "foreign aggression" the methods used by the Communists in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

For instance, on one occasion, an officer proposed to use the phrase "to meet and beat the Communist challenge." The State Department changed that to read "to meet the threat of foreign aggression," which is much more specific and much more limited.

In this instance, the State Department could find no explanation of the change. If, indeed, our foreign policy does not contemplate dealing with intervention and subversion by the Communist nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America which falls short of aggression, as defined by our State Department, would you tell us just what methods and means our policy contemplates using in each of these areas?

Mr. BALL. Well, I can tell you, Senator Thurmond, that a great deal of all of our waking hours in the State Department and they are very long hours indeed-are devoted to trying to defeat subversion and trying to defeat economic penetration and trying to defeat propaganda efforts of the Communist, and in this case I think that actions, perhaps, speak louder than words.

Now, to have words which do have a normal military connotation used by a military man may, under some circumstances, create false impressions abroad.

But so far as the policies, or so far as the efforts of the State Department are concerned, we recognize the Communist effort in all of its manifestations, and our objective is to frustrate it and to defeat it wherever we may find it.

DISCUSSION ON STATE DELETION OF SUMMARY OF "PROTRACTED CONFLICT"

IN SPEECH NO. 94

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, several questions are raised in my mind about the reasoning of the State Department for the very major deletions from Speech No. 94 prepared for delivery on April 19, 1960.

In this speech, the speaker proposed to summarize for the audience a book entitled "Protracted Conflict," coauthored by four men, one of whom was Col. William P. Kintner who, at the time of the speech, and at the time the book was published, was on active duty with the Army, but who since has retired and is now with the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania.

The speaker began his remarks concerning this book by stating, and I quote:

May I make clear at the outset that all the opinions that follow are those of the four authors of the book and not necessarily our own nor do they reflect the studied viewpoints of the Navy Department or the Department of Defense.

The speaker then gave his reason for calling the book to the attention of the audience in these words, and again I quote:

My only purpose in reviewing and summarizing this book is to call to your attention some of the new ideas about our relations with the Soviet Union that deserves serious consideration by all thinking Americans.

The speaker did not stop with this disclaimer but also, subsequently, pointed out that the conclusions of the book were "at variance with the concepts we now take for granted.”

The State Department, in explaining its reasons for deleting the entire several pages of the speech devoted to the summary, said, and I quote:

While the speaker stated that the views were not necessarily his own or those of the Navy or Defense Department, he did propose to devote a large part of his speech to these views. In such instances, it is always easy for others to ascribe the words and views to the speaker.

The connotation which the State Department remark has, to my mind, is that an audience will not believe a speaker's forthright remarks contained in a disclaimer or, in other words, this comment of the State Department presupposes that an audience of U.S. citizens will automatically disbelieve and ignore a frank and candid disclaimer by an officer of flag rank in the U.S. military service.

If an audience cannot be trusted to believe one particular statement of a speaker, such as the disclaimer of the type so candidly stated here, I cannot see why they would be expected to believe anything else he had to say.

Now, Mr. Secretary, do you subscribe to the philosophy, psychology, morality or whatever it is which prompts such a lack of faith in human nature as is inherent in this comment of the State Department?

Mr. BALL. The speaker in question was a rear admiral of the U.S. Navy, and in making this speech he was speaking in his capacity as a high naval officer.

When one speaks in an official capacity, it is expected that the views that one expresses are the views of the Government of which he is a part.

He was quoting at great length from a book which sets forth views which did not represent the views of the Government. I think, quite frankly, that it is impossible for an official to make an unofficial speech.

I think that if I were to make a speech anywhere I couldn't say, "Well, now, these are not the views of the U.S. State Department, but I want to call them to your attention. The U.S. Government does not believe in these views but these are views which are worthy of careful consideration."

It seems to me a very curious performance, frankly, and one which doesn't again help the American interest very much.

Senator THURMOND. Suppose that admiral went to a parent-teachers meeting out of uniform and made a talk there; do you think he would be considered as representing the views of the Defense Department?

Mr. BALL. That is the case. He was speaking at a management club in Springfield, Ill., and, presumably, he was speaking as a rear admiral of the U.S. Navy.

I don't think, myself, that as an official of the U.S. Government and an official of the State Department I should go around and make speeches which express views, even though I say these are not official views, that I want to put forward because they are interesting and important. I don't think that is a very useful performance.

Senator THURMOND. Well, suppose this admiral was speaking on the school situation there?

Mr. BALL. Then he wouldn't be talking in an area where there would have been any question raised.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, you think that he would be considered a spokesman for the Government, although he tells his audience he is not?

Mr. BALL. I think that if anyone who is a high official of the U.S. Navy or the U.S. State Department or any other Department of the Government is going to make a public speech, it could be expected that he will express the views of his Government. If he stands up and says, "I have just been reading a book, it has many interesting views, and I am going to make my speech about that book; now, these views aren't necessarily the views of my Government," then I think he should have stayed home. I don't, frankly, see any point in a speech of that sort because the purpose of the admiral should be to explain the position of the Government and why the Government is taking that position, and to educate the American people in national policy.

But for him to make a speech about a book which didn't represent national policy, and put these views forward, I don't see how that is very useful, frankly.

Senator THURMOND. You don't think as an individual he ought to be allowed to give his views?

Mr. BALL. I don't think when he is a high naval officer, speaking as a high naval officer, he is speaking as an individual, and I think he has to speak in a responsible way.

Senator THURMOND. Although he just holds the rank of an officer? Mr. BALL. The very fact that this speech was submitted to the State Department for comment meant that, in the opinion of the Department of Defense, this was an official speech. If it was an official speech, then it was a speech which should represent national policy, and not talk about something else.

Senator THURMOND. Well, they have to submit all of them, don't they? Isn't that the regulation, any speeches a military person makes?

Mr. BALL. Because it is assumed they are speaking officially.

Senator THURMOND. I cannot subscribe to the basic mistrust of American mentality and morals which is implicit in the State Department's assumption.

To continue, however, with the State Department's comments, it is interesting to note that the State Department says, and I quote:

The deleted parts as a whole were in several respects contrary to national policy.

The State Department comment also notes that the material in the book is "critical of national policy." The State Department goes on to say, and I quote:

At page 10 of the draft speech it was stated that the Communists have been able to confine the cold war to the "war zone" of the non-Communist world, while keeping the "peace zone" virtually closed to Western intervention.

Now, the language of the speech itself with this quotation in context is as follows, and I quote:

Since 1945, the Communists have been able to confine the cold war to the "war zone" of the non-Communist world, while keeping the "peace zone", namely, the Communist bloc of satellites, virtually closed to Western intervention and, incidentally, the ministrations of the United Nations. When the West wins a round as, for example, in the Berlin blockade and Quemoy, it is to maintain the status quo. When the Communists win a round as, for example, in Indochina and the Middle East, they gain access to ground previously closed to them. Meanwhile, the Soviets are immune from outside intervention because we consider the Communists' "zone of peace" as untouchable.

Now, Mr. Secretary, since this is cited as an example, will you tell us whether this is an example in which the material is contrary to national policy or whether this material is critical of national policy?

Mr. BALL. I think it is critical of national policy, and I think it is highly dubious whether it should be put forward by a high naval officer of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, this State Department comment is directed specifically at the statement, and I quote:

Since 1945, the Communists have been able to confine the cold war to the "war zone" of the non-Communist world, while keeping the "peace zone", namely, the Communist bloc of satellites, virtually closed to Western intervention and, incidentally, the ministrations of the United Nations.