Mr. Secretary, can you give us one example to show that the Communists since 1945 have not been able to confine the war to the "war zone” while keeping the "peace zone" virtually closed to Western intervention?

Mr. BALL. Well, they have had internal trouble within the satellites since 1945. They have had the Hungarian problem; they have had a problem in Poland which resulted in a substantial change of their attitude with regard to Poland and a great loosening up. It hasn't been in all cases, from their point of view, the easiest road.

But, as a generalization, I should say that there has not been serious Western intervention behind the Iron Curtain, within the bloc countries.

Senator THURMOND. It is closed to Western intervention, isn't that right?

Mr. BALL. It has been very largely.

Senator THURMOND. Very largely? Well, is it entirely?

Mr. BALL. It is not closed to Western ideas altogether. It is not closed to the fact, as I say, that the very success of the West has led to internal difficulties within the satellite countries.

SUCCESS OF FREE WORLD AND COMMUNISTS SINCE 1945

Senator THURMOND. What successes has the West had since 1945? While 15 countries have gone behind the Iron Curtain, 900 million people, what have we gained since that time, the free world, I mean? Mr. BALL. The free world has grown very much stronger than it was; the free world has managed to attain a standard of living far beyond that of the Communist countries; the free world since, let's say, 1950 has, with the principal exception of Cuba, held its own very well as far as any territorial gains are concerned. Meantime, all the forces of the free world have gotten stronger and more resistant. Senator THURMOND. How many countries have gone behind the Iron Curtain since World War II ended? Around 15, aren't they? Mr. BALL. The Iron Curtain wasn't even set up until after World War II, if one could find precise dates on things of this sort.

The shaking down that followed the war was pretty well complete by 1950, and the Iron Curtain then really became a reality, as the lines were drawn around the satellite countries and around Red China.

I should say that if you take from 1950 on that, by and large, the Western World, the free world, has been far more successful than the Communist countries in those disputed countries which represent the uncommitted nations. We have made great strides and the Communist countries have made very few. As of today, the free world is far stronger, as a whole, than it was before.

Senator THURMOND. Now, since World War II ended, approximately 15 countries, 900 million people, have gone behind the Iron Curtain.

How many countries have come from behind the Iron Curtain in that period?

Mr. BALL. As I said

Senator THURMOND. And how many people?

Mr. BALL (continuing). We are dealing, juggling with dates here. Because when do you start with the creation of the Iron Curtain?

Senator THURMOND. I have said at the end of World War II.

Mr. BALL. Well, I think

Senator THURMOND. Between that period and now.

Mr. BALL. At the end of World War II the whole world was in a state of flux and lines were then being drawn and things were being shaken down.

In the shakedown process a lot of countries came down on the side of the Communists. The result was that we had the drawing of lines around a bloc of satellite countries which were largely influenced by the threat or the reality of the Red Army.

Lines had been drawn around Red China by about 1950 when this situation began to stabilize. One starts at 1950; since then I would say the free world

Senator THURMOND. I am not talking about 1950. I asked you since 1945 how many countries have come under the domination of the world conspiracy of communism which is

Mr. BALL. What you are talking about is a span of years.

Senator THURMOND (continuing). The headquarters of which are in Moscow.

Mr. BALL. You are talking about a span of years which were in the shakedown period.

Senator THURMOND. I don't care what period it was in. I am just asking you for the period after 1945. That is when the war ended, and the people in Czechoslovakia and other countries thought they would be free, and it turned out that they weren't, and they went behind the Iron Curtain, and you know, I think, how many countries have gone behind this. I want to know how many countries have come from behind the Iron Curtain since that period, if any.

Mr. BALL. Again I say you have got to look at the reality of the situation after the shakedown period after the war when the lines were effectively formed. The reason that you had the satellites come up in Western Europe was the threat of force of the armies, and the position of the armies was very well known at the end of the war. You had the Communists deep in Germany; you had a massive mobilization of Communist forces, maybe 175 divisions; you had the ability to impose threats on a whole bloc of adjacent countries.

It was the fact that the satellite countries are contiguous which is very significant. They are contiguous because this is the area in which the Red army can mount its pressures.

Senator THURMOND. Well, Mr. Secretary, you haven't given a very satisfactory answer, but if that is the way you want to answer it we will pass on.

Can you name a country that has come from behind the Iron Curtain since World War II ended?

Mr. BALL. I can name countries which have been for periods of time under Communist influence and where that Communist influence has subsided now because of Western success.

We have been carrying on a contest with the Communists over onethird of the world's population which is represented by the uncommitted countries. I would say we have been much more successful than they in that contest.

Senator THURMOND. Isn't it, as a matter of fact, correct that only one has come out?

Mr. BALL. Well, you have

Senator THURMOND. East Austria.

Mr. BALL. This was a matter that was worked out by agreement, as you know.

Senator THURMOND. I say, isn't that the only one, as a matter of fact? I am just trying to bring out the facts.

Mr. BALL. Well

Senator THURMOND. We will pass on if you don't want to answer. The next example given by the State Department of material that is either contrary to or critical of our national policy is, and I quote: It was stated that the Communists possess a mentality that is better suited to the protracted conflict which the authors describe.

Now, the full context in which the statement referred to by the State Department is as follows, and I quote:

The authors maintain that the West can only hope to defeat the Communists by learning to counter the strategy of protracted conflict-to manage conflict in space and time. This will be immensely difficult for us. The Communists possess a mentality that is much better suited to protracted and controlled conflict. They are patient and tenacious. For example, when the Western statesmen attended the Geneva summit conference, they may have had private reservations, but they were under the pressure of their people's perennial hopes for a settlement with finality and surcease from all strife. The Soviets, on the other hand, came to establish another position of maneuver in the protracted conflict.

Again, in this passage the speaker reminded the audience that it was the authors of the book who maintained the position he proceeded to relate.

Is it the position of the State Department, Mr. Secretary, that the Communist mentality, based as it is on a complete lack of moral restraint in matters where the advance of Communist world domination is involved, is not better suited than the American mentality to the dirty, unprincipled, ruthless type of conflict which the Communists have chosen to wage against us?

Mr. BALL. I have great confidence that the mentality of the West will outlast the Communist mentality in this struggle.

I have great confidence in the power of truth, the power of justice, and the attractive power which this has for men over the long pull, which is far greater than any temporary advantages that may be won by deceit or by subterfuge or by any other form of machination.

I feel, therefore, that to talk about the West as though we could not win, and we were ill suited for this, and that the other side was in much better shape through equipment and temperamentally than we, and that they had advantages through chicanery which we did not possess through the power and force of truth itself is not very useful.

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION ON DELETION OF SPEECH SUMMARY OF

"PROTRACTED CONFLICT"

Senator THURMOND. The next example given by the State Department to show that the material used is either contrary or critical of national policy is a statement which, according to the State Department, and I quote: "implies that we and our allies are misled by the Communist techniques of deception."

80752-62-pt. 625

The passage referred to by the State Department is as follows:

However, the central military problem, as the authors see it, is to stand up against the Soviets' military-scientific blackmail and not to be misled by their skilled techniques in deception and exaggeration. The Communists are masters in displaying such exhibits as military power and technological achievement. They are also experts in the art of planned misinformation.

Again I would point out that in this paragraph the speaker inserted the phrase, "as the authors see it." Throughout the proposed speech he inserted phrases to remind his audience that he was relating an opinion of the authors of the book as he had so emphatically stated prior to beginning the summary.

Now, Mr. Secretary, would you point out, first, in just what particular part of this passage you and the State Department find the inference that the United States and its allies are misled by the Communists; and, second, will you tell us whether or not the Communists have from time to time been successful in misleading us and our allies by their skilled techniques in deception and exaggeration?

Mr. BALL. Frankly, Senator, I get a little tired of the constant praise of the superior skills and virtues of the Communists.

I think that this can be injurious to the American people as well as to overstate the simplicity of the problem.

I think it is a very complicated problem. But I think that the armory of weapons, the armory of power which the West commands, which is the power of truth and justice, and the power of a superior economic system, and the power of greater command of resources, is going to prevail in the long run.

I think that this kind of constant suggestion that we are going to fail because the other side is so much brighter and smarter than we are is a very injurious business.

Now, again, I think that for a high-ranking officer of the U.S. Navy to make a speech in which he constantly quotes views and then says, "But these are views of the author, they aren't views of mine," is not very useful.

What is he making a speech for? He ought to be making a speech to expound what the U.S. policy is. This is what he can usefully do if he wants to advance the national interest. To advance somebody else's views which don't represent the national policy, and then keep saying, "Well, these are somebody else's views," is quite a futility and a very misleading one.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, were we not misled and were not our allies misled by the fact that the Soviets continued to negotiate over a long period of time, in innumerable conferences, on the question of a nuclear test ban during the whole of which period they were frantically, but covertly, preparing for the test series which they proceeded to conduct upon completion of their preparations?

Mr. BALL. I don't think we were misled. This was a basis of a calculated risk. If we could maintain a moratorium during that time it might or might not be possible to negotiate a test ban agreement. The stakes were very high for reaching some such agreement.

In the eyes of the world we had every advantage in maintaining this posture because it was evidence of the good faith and effort of the Western World to try to find an agreement of this kind.

We always were aware of the fact that the Communists might not be sincere in this. When they proved they were not sincere in this,

then we went ahead and tested. This is perfectly clear that this was the course that we had to follow.

We were pursuing a policy which was a serious policy, for which we shouldn't have the slightest regrets or the slightest apologies at this point. It was the only policy to pursue.

Senator THURMOND. As a final example of a passage contrary to or critical of 1 ational policy, the State Department cites a passage which, in the opinion of the State Department, and I quote:

Would have said that while the Communists have a strategy, we have no strategy and are indeed paralyzed by fear.

The passage to which the State Department refers is as follows: The United States has many policies, each more or less sensible, for coping with the Communists. Sensible or not, they do not total up to a coherent overall strategy. Also, we do not work hard enough to project our image of the Open Society to the millions behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains in contrast to the Communist system of the Closed Society. The West, unless it tempers its paralyzing fear of global war and brings the full impact of the Open Society against the Iron Curtain, will lose some of its most natural valuable alliesthe peoples under Communist rule. More than that, it will lose the potentially

decisive battle in the protracted conflict.

Now, with respect to the State Department's allegations that this statement implies, and I quote:

That while the Communists have strategy, we have no strategy

I think is some of the recent comments by personnel of the State Department are appropriate.

Mr. Rostow, the present counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee of the State Department, according to press reports, has quite frankly stated that in the drafting of the basic foreign and military policy paper for the administration, no attempt is being made to hide the inconsistencies of our various policies. Indeed, according to press reports, one of the principal needs for the basic overall policy paper now in the process of being formulated is to achieve what is not yet in existence, to wit, an overall strategy. Now, Mr. Secretary, would you tell us whether this particular passage is considered by the State Department to be contrary to or critical of national policy and, whichever it is, in what particular is this passage contrary to or critical of our national policy, and also whether it is or is not accurate?

Mr. BALL. Well, in the first place, I deny the fact that we do not have an overall strategy. We do have an overall strategy. I think that to take the position that the Communists have an overall strategy and we have none in nonsense.

I think that what Mr. Rostow is referring to is a kind of constant revision of overall strategy which is being undertaken all the time. What he has been trying to do in the formulation to which you refer is not to develop an overall strategy but to write it down in its various parts.

This is an exercise which has been undertaken before, and it will be undertaken again and again.

Obviously, you don't have a strategy which is permanent and unalterable for all time.

Now, again, for a high-ranking naval officer to quote somebody about the failure of the United States to have an overall strategy