doesn't seem to me to be very useful, particularly when he couples it with the fact that we fail in our efforts to inform the Communist world. This again is attacking the Government.

If he has these feelings he should make them clear within the Government's structure. There is plenty of opportunity to do that, and he should do that rather than to indulge in public criticism in the name of somebody else whom he, at the same time, disowns as not necessarily representing his views.

All this does is confuse the American people, Senator Thurmond. It doesn't enlighten them.

Senator THURMOND. The final allegation of the State Department is that the material proposed to be used by the speaker alleges that we, and I quote, "are paralyzed by fear."

Mr. BALL. Paralyzed by what?

Senator THURMOND. Fear, f-e-a-r.

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. The specific_passage to which the State Department's remark is directed is, and I quote:

The West, unless it tempers its paralyzing fear of global war and brings the full impact of the Open Society against the Iron Curtain, will lose some of its most natural value allies-the peoples under Communist rule.

Now, we have already discussed the dangers of overemphasizing in our policy and in our public expressions the possibilities of escalation into a nuclear exchange of any power confrontation of the Soviets.

I have noticed with sad misgivings the inclination of top State Department officials, particularly, to counter any and all criticisms of our conduct in this cold war period with pointed appeals to hysteria by indiscriminately charging that criticis of our policies are either proponents of a preventive nuclear war or propose some step which will escalate into a nuclear war and incinerate the entire Northern Hemisphere.

Mr. Rusk, the Secretary of State, articulated such a rebuttal to criticism last Thursday night on television.

This is by no means the only example. The resort to such techniques of oversimplification and appeal to hysteria is contagious, and even your lower level officials are picking it up.

For instance, the State Department Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research recently scored what he called amateur anticommunism as, and I quote, "The most trigger-happy when it comes to brandishing thermonuclear weapons.'

This type of expression has by no means allayed the honest but exaggerated fears of the increasingly substantial groups who participate in public demonstrations protesting everything from nuclear test to reserve callups.

Is it the position of the State Department that we are in no danger of allowing the fear of escalation of any power confrontation into a general war from preventing positive actions which could, with a minimum risk, frustrate Communist aggressive thrusts?

Mr. BALL. Well, I can give you a very clear answer to that, Senator Thurmond. We have just been involved in this whole business on Berlin. This is a case where a confrontation of the great powers is a real possibility, where the issue was such that the Western World had to come face to face with the possibility that there might be a nuclear conflict.

We didn't give way in any way and we have no intention of yielding one iota of our vital interests in the Berlin situation.

This is done with the full consciousness of the implications that this is a confrontation between the center of Communist power, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States and the western allies, on the other, over a situation which is of such vital interest, such critical importance, such vital importance, that there can be no drawing back.

Now, it is far more effective to have this matter demonstrated by action rather than by words and this, it seems to me, is the full answer to the allegations of the "paralyzing effect of the fear of nuclear war.

We haven't been paralyzed. We have been perfectly willing to face the consequences in situations where our vital interests were such that we could not afford to give them up, and that has been the situation in West Berlin. There has been an absolute standing firm on the part of the Allies in this situation.

Now, on the other hand, I think that the people of the world have to understand the implications of what nuclear war means, because this is not a weapon which one brandishes idly. This is a weapon which is used when vital interests are at stake, but God knows everyone who understands the implications of this weapon would regard its use, the necessity to use it, and the circumstances which require its use, as a world catastrophe.

(At this point a short recess was taken.)

Senator STENNIS. All right, gentlemen, we will proceed.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, let us return for a moment to the State Department objection to the expression of the idea, and I quote:

Since 1945, the Communists have been able to confine the cold war to the "war zone" of the non-Communist world, while keeping in the "peace zone", namely, the Communist bloc of satellites, virtually closed to Western intervention.

On March 15, Mr. Rostow made a speech at Purdue University which received considerable attention, as it certainly should have. In this speech Mr. Rostow lists three principal areas in which there are Communist efforts systematically to exploit conditions. These areas he lists are, and I quote:

Indochina, Suez, Iraq, Cuba, Algeria, the Congo, Bizerte, Goa, West New Guinea, the Dominican Republic.

Does not each of the areas listed by Mr. Rostow fall in what the authors of "Protracted Conflict" call the "war zone" of the non-Communist world?

Mr. BALL. As I understand the excerpt that you read, I would assume that they did, yes.

QUESTION OF U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF DIRECT STRUGGLE WITH

COMMUNISTS

Senator THURMOND. As a matter of fact, is it not our policy in the event a direct struggle between the Communists and ourselves ensues that we shall seek as a maximum settlement the status quo as of the time of the beginning of the open struggle?

Mr. BALL. If an open struggle ensues? You mean anywhere in the world?

Senator THURMOND. In the event a direct struggle between the Communists and ourselves ensues that we shall seek as a maximum settlement the status quo as of the time of the beginning of the open struggle. Mr. BALL. Well, it depends on the form that struggle may take. It has been obviously the desire of the United States and the Western world to try to avoid the kind of situation in which resort is had to nuclear force.

Now, if we are talking about a localized struggle involving the use of conventional weapons, then the desire is to try to resist aggression. We are not in the business of trying to move against the bloc as such, because the dangers are too great by direct military means. We are trying to pursue such positive policies as will have the result of eroding the power of the Communist areas.

Senator THURMOND. Well, for instance, in North Korea we could have won the war there, but we didn't do it. We just went to the 38th parallel, at least we withdrew to the 38th parallel, after we went beyond that, and we turned that over to the Russians.

Mr. BALL. Well, you say we could have won the war; that is a very, very big and arguable question, as you know.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, the understanding was that the Russians would take the surrender of the Communists above the parallel, and we would take it below the 38th parallel. The country was to be united. But after the Russians got in there and took the surrender they didn't get out, and then when the war came on, although we had them whipped, we withdrew and only maintained that status quo there, didn't we? That is the way it is today.

Mr. BALL. That is the way-yes, the decision is still one

Senator THURMOND. That was a proper answer as to what happened. Isn't that the policy of the State Department?

Mr. BALL. Well, it is the policy of the State Department in Korea. To say as a generalized form that, when there is a struggle, the solution of the struggle is always the restoration of a status quo, is, I think a generalization I could not accept. I would have to know what the circumstances were. There is no general policy to that effect.

U.S. POLICY ON VIETNAM

Senator THURMOND. Well, suppose we get engaged in Vietnam. Are we just going to-if we are forced to fight over there, are we just going to go to South Vietnam's border?

Mr. BALL. I wouldn't want to make a prediction about that.
Senator THURMOND. And stop there?

Mr. BALL. I would not want to make a prediction about that, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Or are we going to win in Vietnam?

Mr. BALL. I wouldn't want to make a prediction in those terms. The situation at the moment is we don't have combat troops in Vietnam. What we are trying to do is to assist the people of Vietnam to fight their own battle. They are fighting the battle.

We are simply providing them technical assistance, some transport, logistical help, training, and so on. But they are fighting the battle, and I certainly

Senator THURMOND. But I mean, suppose they could win there, would we stop them or would you let them go on and win, if we were supplying weapons and equipment?

Mr. BALL. Well, at the moment all that the South Vietnamese are attempting to achieve is to attain the freedom of their own country, the country of South Vietnam, the Republic of South Vietnam.

Senator THURMOND. They would like to achieve more than that if our State Department would go along with it, wouldn't they? Mr. BALL. So far as we are concerned, there has been no declaration of a desire on the part of the South Vietnamese to reconquer the whole country.

The line of the 17th parallel was worked out in the Geneva Accords which were reached at the time that the fighting stopped and the cease-fire was declared. I don't know of any intention on the part of the South Vietnamese to try to recover the whole country.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA USE OF STATEMENTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS

Senator THURMOND. Both in your previous statement to the committee and in the comments as to the reasons for deletions submitted by the State Department to the committee, great stress is laid on the necessity for preventing speakers from making statements which would, as you phrased it, provide "grist for the Communist propaganda mill.”

In your previous testimony we discussed whether or not care and restraint in verbiage by official U.S. speakers would diminish the ability of the Communists to successfully propagandize, particularly on antimilitarist themes against the United States.

Your final position on this matter was summed up by the following comment, and I quote:

I would say that it is being substantially aided to the extent that it can give even the most fictitious kind of documentation to what it says, and it does this by the distortion of statements that are made.

I recall that we were in disagreement on this point since it was my conclusion that the Communists are perfectly capable of fabricating, without any basis or raw material in the form of public statements, a very vicious anti-U.S. propaganda barrage.

Now, I presume, Mr. Secretary, that you and the State Department would agree that we cannot completely eliminate public statements and discussions by our Government officials, including the President, our various State Department officials, and Members of the Senate and House just in order to deprive the Communists of "grist for their propaganda campaign." Is that correct?

Mr. BALL. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. Since you were before the committee last we have had considerable testimony by witnesses familiar with Communist techniques.

All in all, we have given rather considerable study to Communist propaganda, and I am more convinced than ever that the tenor or effectiveness of their propaganda is totally independent of the degree of care and restraint which our officials use in preparing their remarks. While I agree that bellicose and intemperate remarks are unbecoming, and do not reflect favorably from any standpoint on our country,

I can't see how, short of total silence, we can prevent the Communists from distorting whatever is said.

Let me give you some examples. On November 10, 1961, Moscow radio broadcast a commentary by Zorin on President Kennedy's news conference. In replying to a question during the news conference the President summarized the progress made in 1961 in strengthening our defense forces.

His remarks were but a brief summary of what had been accomplished. Yet the final sentence of the Communist propaganda broadcast was, and I quote:

Total responsibility for the present aggravation of international tension lies squarely on American ruling circles, and the President of the United States, at his latest press conference, whether he likes it or not, has confirmed this. Now, Mr. Secretary, we know there is nothing in the President's words which even remotely admit that the United States is— totally responsible for the present aggravation of international tension.

Do you think that the State Department or anyone else could have so phrased the information which the President sought to impart in this instance in such a way as to prevent the Communists from distorting in precisely this manner the President's remarks?

Mr. BALL. No, but I think it is significant that they did not quote specific words of the President in that context. I think that the credibility of what they said would have been substantially heightened if they could have pointed to some specific remarks and quoted him.

The point about the propaganda is, sure, they can always make propaganda, and they always will. They will make propaganda with whatever materials are at hand.

But if the materials are more suited to their purposes, they will do better with it, and the credibility of what they say will be increased. Senator THURMOND. Well, they are not going to tell the truth, so what difference does it make?

Mr. BALL. The fact that they quote language, and that the language speaks for itself, is the best propaganda they can have.

Senator THURMOND. So long as what our people say is true, whether military or civilian, the Communists will use it to their own ends. They will distort it. They will falsify it, they will supplement it, they will delete it. They will follow any course to bring about the desired result, won't they? Isn't that true? Won't they do that? Mr. BALL. Well, they will try.

Senator THURMOND. How is that?

Mr. BALL. The most persuasive kind of propaganda is the quotation of a man's words. If the man has uttered those words, then quoting those words gives a credibility to propaganda which it wouldn't otherwise have.

For them to say that Admiral So-and-So has said words which give an indication of the bellicose intent of the United States is not nearly as effective as to say that Admiral So-and-So, speaking at such-andsuch, said the following thing, and if that is a bellicose statement, and it appears to be bellicose then they can gain greatly in the credibility of their propaganda.

Senator THURMOND. Well, suppose he doesn't say them but the Communists say he says them, as they did with the President's statement?