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statements contribute substantially to the justification of any of the State Department's censorship?

Mr. Ball. Yes; I think it contributes. I think it contributes enough to justify recommendations being made for changes or deletions. "I don't mean to suggest that it is the only mechanism that the Soviet Union or the Communists have for propaganda. Obviously they can make films and do lots of things. But this is one technique, and I don't see any reason why we should help them.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, the principal period during which the committee selected examples of speeches which were censored was between the 1st of January, 1961, and sometime around the last of August 1961, at which time the committee commenced its study.

In commenting on the speech deletions, the State Department divided this time roughly into three overlapping periods, and for each of these periods the State Department furnished to the committee a chronology of events illustrating the sensitivity of our foreign relations.

This sensitivity, according to your letter of transmittal, was a principal factor in the requirement for the strict censorship of official statements.

In reviewing these chronological listings of events which, even judging from newspaper reports, must be typical of the activity in the field of foreign relations, there hardly ever has been nor is there a prospect of a period during the continuation of the cold war in which sensitive events, negotiations, and relations will not be present.

Is it the opinion of the State Department that the Communist actions will be adjusted or modified in response to official public descriptions of the state of the cold war?

Mr. BALL. No, I wouldn't say that. But I would say that when American official comment can be employed by the Soviet Union as a tool in their negotiations, and in their relations with the uncommitted nations, for example, and when there are situations where there is a conscious effort on both sides, as there has been from time to time, to bring about an easing of tension in order to accomplish a certain detente such as a certain kind of solution of a localized kind of problem—this is something which should be taken into account.

For example, if at the time that the RB-47 flyers were released soon after the administration came into power, President Kennedy had launched an all-out attack on the Soviet Union in a speech, do you think for a minute the flyers would have been released? They obviously wouldn't have been.

These are matters of normal prudence in international diplomacy.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, does the State Department not argee that our actions and official positions will have greater influence on the attitudes of both the Communists and our allies and other nations of the free world than will the remarks and words of our officials?

Mr. Ball. I entirely agree that our actions speak louder than words, which is one of the reasons why I thought it was more important for us to be in a posture of strength, as demonstrated in Berlin, than to make speeches which can be described as "bellicose."



Senator THURMOND. If the Communists, by so arranging, and influencing the orchestration of events and level of tensions in international relations can succeed in causing our policies to discourage and dampen free discussion and exchange of ideas on the problems of the cold war, is it not quite obvious that they can also, by the same means, influence our policy in the direction of paralyzing our activities in defending our interests in the cold war?

Mr. Ball. Well, they haven't. There is absolutely no evidence that they have diminished the present debate in the United States. It would be the greatest distortion to read into recommendations with respect to certain speeches by high military officers, such as some suggested changes in phrasing, as indicating any diminution in the present debate. This hasn't occurred.

Senator THURMOND. Did you catch that question well or would you like me to repeat it?

Mr. BALL. No, I thought I answered it.

Senator THURMOND. I want to repeat that now to be sure you understand it.

Mr. BALL. Yes.
Senator THURMOND. This is an important question.

If the Communists, by so arranging and influencing the orchestration of events and level attentions in international relations, can succeed in causing our policies to discourage and dampen free discussion and exchange of ideas on the problems of the cold war, is it not quite obvious that they can also, by the same means, influence our policy in the direction of paralyzing our activities in defending our interests in the cold war?

Mr. Ball. Well, I answered the question, Senator Thurmond, by saying they can't. They haven't, and they won't influence the quality of the free debate. I answered the “if” part of the question on which the rest of the question depends.

Senator THURMOND. I just wanted to be sure you understood it. Mr. Ball. Right.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as you yourself have stated, you do not see why we should help the Soviets by lifting censorship of speeches of our officials.

Now, the Soviets are interested in suppressing anti-Communist statements, aren't they?

Mr. BALL. Not necessarily. I think they are much more interested in utilizing them and expressing them.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as you yourself have said, actions speak louder than words and, therefore, if firm, accurate, and objective statements must be restrained out of respect for the sensitivity of our foreign relations, why does not our national policy, which dictates such reticence of speech, not also, if it is consistent, circumscribe any responsive actions which logically have a greater likelihood of affecting adversely what you call the sensitive and delicate level of our international relations?

Mr. Ball. Because the action is important and the language isn't. In the great generality of cases it makes very little difference whether one phrase is used rather than another so far as achieving the objectives of the speaker is concerned.

It does make a difference insofar as the use which the Soviet Union can make of it. Actions are another matter.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, you have explained that there is a danger in military speakers publicly commenting on foreign policy and relations, since they might unknowingly and inadvertently say the wrong thing, because foreign affairs and foreign relations are not the primary specialty of military personnel.

Now, Mr. Secretary, would you say that there is a similar danger for a similar reason in State Department personnel expounding as authorities in public statements on our military policies and strategy?

Mr. BALL. Exactly, which is precisely, why we send our speeches over to the Defense Department if there is any slight possibility that they might impinge on military policy.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, do you see any more danger in military personnel speaking about foreign policy than you do in State Department personnel writing military policy?

Mr. Ball. I think it is important that there be a full exchange of suggestions in each case so that the State Department has the benefit of the Defense Department's views, and the Defense Department has the benefit of the State Department's views.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I am afraid that I can understand why it is necessary for someone in the State Department to prepare our basic military policy paper if our national objective is not victory, but merely the defeat of Communist aggression, as the State Department has asserted in its replies to the committee.

This is by no means, of course, the first indication that the objective of our policy is not victory but rather was limited to the defeat of Communist aggression.

One of your censors commented at the time he made a change in a speech that it is only the aggressive type of communism which the United States is committed to check.

This same theme has appeared in statements of other public officials. For instance, Mr. Edward R. Murrow stated that:

Fundamentally, the thing to which we are opposed is the aggressive nature of the Communist state.

Mr. Rostow, in several of his speeches, has attempted to define what type of victory we shall seek, and from his description I am quite sure that the victory he describes is more nearly represented by the phrase "defeat of foreign aggression."

Many other items of censorship illustrate the same point. In one instance, the term "extend freedom” was deleted from a speech, and this explanation given by the State Department, and I quote:

In this period when the new administration was still feeling its way in our policy toward the Russians, references which might suggest adherence to a policy of liberation of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe were considered inadvisable.

Now, Mr. Secretary, is our policy of long standing to the effect that the time for detachment of a satellite is not in the foreseeable future still continued in effect?

Mr. Ball. You know, I thought, Senator Thurmond, that I had made clear this morning that so far as the policy of the State Department is concerned we are looking forward to the utilizing, as we are attempting to do, the forces that are at motion within the Communist bloc and within the Communist system. Our very concern, for example, that the President has some freedom of action with respect to Yugoslavia is precisely for that reason, as is our very concern for the maintenance of positive policies which will be a source of attraction to the Communists. All of these things are designed to bring about the erosion of the strength of the bloc.

On the military front, what we are concerned with is stopping aggression. But, as a matter of overall strategy, there is no question that our objective is to have the values that we believe in prevail in this world.

ROSTOW STATEMENT ON NATIONAL OBJECTIVE Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow states that our national objective, and I quote: will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism.

This, incidentally, was in his speech at Fort Bragg, N.C., last June.

He repeated the same theme in a speech at Minneapolis on May 3, 1962.

Mr. Rostow should know as well or better than anyone what our national policy is. He is the author of our basic policy paper on foreign and military strategy, is he not?

Mr. BALL. Mr. Rostow is the head of Policy Planning Division of the Department of State. But papers such as you are talking about are the composite work of a great many people, and to a great extent they represent simply a kind of putting down on paper what policies are already in existence.

To say that Mr. Rostow is the author of the overall U.S. strategy is quite wrong

But what Mr. Rostow was saying in those instances is that, certainly, our policy is not the victory of the United States over the Soviet Union in the sense we are going to have a major war and that when all the pieces are picked up and the atomic cloud disappears we will have won, because that won't be a victory.

Senator THURMOND. You don't think there is a way to win other than a military conflict ?

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Mr. Ball. Well, what he was addressing himself to was the United States winning against the Soviet Union.

Now, when you talk about victory in those circumstances, what you are talking about is a victory that is achieved by military means.

If what you are concerned with is that the forces of freedom triumph around the world, then there is no question that that is the objective of our policy. It has to be achieved by many means, on many fronts, and this is what we are trying to do.



Senator THURMOND. And when we furnish foreign aid to these Communist countries, aren't we helping to strengthen their economy and taking the pressure off Russia ?

Mr. Ball. No. I would say that one has to make a distinction about what one is talking about.

Let us take the case of Yugoslavia. We have assisted Yugoslavia for only one purpose, and that is for her to maintain her independence of the Communist bloc countries. Actually the assistance in later years has been very limited indeed.

But if Yugoslavia retreats within the bloc, then there is no real chance of encouraging the forces of freedom within Yugoslavia. As long as she remains outside there is some chance. That is what we are trying to do.

Senator THURMOND. I want to come back in a few minutes to a point on Yugoslavia which you raised.


Mr. Secretary, perhaps Mr. Rostow's speeches provide a good example of what the State Department is trying to achieve in its speech review, and we might examine some of them to see if they could serve as a guide for military speakers, for he speaks on military as well as international, economic, and domestic matters.

Some of his phrases, I believe, might even escape the distortion of the Communist propaganda machine, for they are too elusive to be easily characterized.

For instance, Mr. Rostow almost invariably states in his speeches that, and I quote:

We are prepared to find and to consolidate even very limited areas of overlapping interests with Communist regimes.

Now, this term "overlapping interests” is an interesting one. I have tried to think of examples of the kind of thing to which Mr. Rostow is referring.

Recently Poland announced that the Communist regime in Poland was going to support the overthrow of the Salazar regime in Portugal. Some of our official positions indicate strongly that we, too, oppose the Salazar regime in Portugal.

Is the overthrow of the Salazar regime in Portugal the type of "overlapping interests” with the Polish Communist regime which we can consolidate?

Mr. BALL. No, not at all. The type of overlapping interest with which we can consolidate is best exemplified by Austria. It is an example which I suggested on Monday.

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