Изображения страниц


Here there was an overlapping interest which made it possible to bring about the establishment of Austria as a free nation. I think this has been a great success.

But as far as the overthrow of the Salazar regime, that is not an objective of American policy.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, you referred

Mr. BALL. Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, make the record perfectly clear on this point. I wouldn't want any misunderstanding

Senator STENNIS. Oh, yes, proceed.

Mr. BALL. Portugal is an ally of the United States. The last thing in the world we are concerned with is to try to undermine any regime of any ally. This is not the foreign policy of the United States or one of our objectives.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.


Senator THURMOND. Isn't it, as a matter of fact, you are speaking of Yugoslavia and helping Yugoslavia, and that they are not part of the Communist bloc, I believe you said-isn't it true that Yugoslavia's U.N. voting record has adhered closely to that of the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries when questions affecting the international Communist movement were voted upon ?

Mr. BALL. It has voted with the Communists very often. It also voted with us on significant votes.

Senator THURMOND. On December 12, 1958, Yugoslavia voted "no" on the 37-power resolution condemning continued defiance of General Assembly resolutions on Hungary, didn't it?

Mr. Ball. That is my understanding, yes. Senator THURMOND. Although the resolution was adopted by a vote of 54 to 10, the entire membership of the Communist bloc voted against it.

Again on December 9, 1959, Yugoslavia voted “no” on the 24-power resolution deploring the continued U.S.S.R. and Hungarian disregard of General Assembly resolutions on the Hungarian question, didn't it?

Mr. BALL. That is right. You can go down the list and cite many instances where the Yugoslavian Government has voted on the same side as the U.S.S.R.

By and large, it follows the line of the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N., and it votes

Senator THURMOND. Who do they follow, the Afro-Asian bloc; don't they follow the Communists?

Mr. BALL. Not faithfully at all. When the Afro-Asians differ from the U.S.S.R., why, Yugoslavia, by and large, has voted with them and against the U.S.S.R.

On 43 selected rollcall votes on major issues at the 16th General Assembly, Yugoslavia's vote coincided with the United States six times, with the U.S.S.R. 24 times; with both 5 times, and with neither 8 times.

What this indicates is that they have a more or less independent voting record.

Senator THURMOND. How many times did they vote with the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. Ball. They voted 24 times, and they voted 6 with us.

I am perfectly well prepared to say they tend to vote more with the U.S.S.R. than they do with us, but they are a Communist country. But the fact is they also have a measure of independence of the U.S.S.R., which is the point I was making.

Senator THURMOND. And speaking about the 24-power resolution, although the resolution was passed by a vote of 53 to 10, it was with Yugoslavia and the entire Communist bloc voting the other way.

Mr. BALL. They vote with them sometimes, and sometimes not. At the 16th General Assembly again, there were


Senator THURMOND. Throughout the entire period of the Hungarian uprising, Yugoslavia lent tacit approval to the slaughter of the freedom fighters by a total lack of criticism, and they maintained a strict adherence to the Communist line, and unflinching loyalty to the Communist movement, did they not?

Mr. Ball. I would like to put a statement in the record in regard to that. It is in answer to an earlier question which you asked, which was question 85. Since I have some classified material on this sheet, I would like to ask permission of the chairman to submit this tomorrow, but I might read the relevant parts into the record right now.

Sénator STENNIS. All right, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BALL. It would not be accurate to state that the Yugoslavs carefully refrained from any criticism of the Soviet action in Hungary. Following the outbreak of the Hungarian national uprising on October 23, 1956, the Yugoslav press gave full support to the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy. After the first Soviet intervention on October 24 against the revolution, prominent Yugoslavs privately deplored, and expressed deep regret at, the action taken by Soviet troops.

When Soviet troops on November 4, 1956, intervened for the second time to suppress the revolution, Yugoslav delegates to the United Nations voiced sharp disapproval of Soviet actions.

President Tito's position on the Hungarian revolt was stated in a speech given at Pula, Yugoslavia, on November 11, 1956. He believed that the early stages of the revolt were similar to the Yugoslav anti-Stalinist position in 1948, and that this was a progressive development. Therefore he condemned the first Soviet intervention of 1956 as a “fatal mistake” which drove the Hungarian people into an extreme anti-Communist position. At this point, he stated, "reactionary forces" took over the Hungarian revolt and changed it from a move to liberalize the Communist regimes of Rakosi and Gero to a move to restore the prewar regime. The alternatives were “a civil war, chaos, counterrevolution and a new world war, or Soviet intervention.” “The former," Tito said, “would have been a catastrophe, and the latter is a mistake."

The second Soviet intervention, therefore, was "the lesser evil," justifiable only if it "saved socialism in Hungary:" Tito stated that

. the Soviets had promised the Hungarians to withdraw their troops as soon as the situation became stabilized. He added that he believed that the sacrifices of the Hungarian people were not in vain, as the Soviets would now realize "that things cannot be done (in the old, Stalinist way) any longer.” As for the Stalinist elements in Hun

' gary, "they are reaping now what they sowed since 1948.”

[ocr errors]

While Yugoslavia hardly supported the American position in the U.N. in the aftermath of the revolt, they did not directly support the Soviets either. They twice abstained from resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

All this indicates is a measure of independence, and this is all I asserted was the situation.


Senator THURMOND. Djilas' criticism of both the Hungarian and U.S.S.R. tactics in Hungary constituted one of the major charges that Yugoslavia had against him at one of his trials, that by displaying open contempt for the handling of the Hungarian uprising he was deviating not only from Hungary and U.S.S.R. policy, but necessarily from Yugoslavian policy at the same time.

The conviction of Mr. Djilas reaffirms the fact that at the present time Yugoslavia is adhering strictly to the policies emanating from Moscow and being implemented by all Communist regimes.

On the many other matters which have been up for vote in the United Nations General Assembly, my research has failed to reveal any question of a political or security, nature in which Yugoslavia voted with the United States and against the Soviet Union.

The only instance of significance in which the Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations voted with the United States and, at the same time, against the Soviet Union was with regard to the resolution appealing to the U.S.S.R. not to explode a 50-megaton bomb. This was Resolution No. 1632, and the vote took place on October 27, 1961.

Yugoslavia voted with the Soviet Union and against the United States on approximately 21 separate votes in the 1961 United Nations General Assembly. These included the item on Tibet, the item on Hungary, against the U.S. resolution not to seat North Korea, against the resolution denominating the Chinese representation question as an important question, and for the Soviet resolution to seat the Chinese Communists.

On all questions of any importance to the international Communist conspiracy, Yugoslavia voted with the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the satellite countries.

Now, if you have any information to the contrary, I wish you would give it to us or put it in the record.

Mr. Ball. All right.

As I stated, Senator Thurmond, our figures are a little different, and I would be glad to put in the record a specification of these votes during the 16th General Assembly: It voted with the United States 6 times, with the U.S.S.R. 24 times, with both 5 times, and neither 8 times.

Senator THURMOND. Twenty-five, did you say?
Mr. BALL. Twenty-four.
Senator THURMOND. Twenty-four times.
Mr. BALL. Yes, with both five times, and with neither eight times.

Also at the 16th General Assembly there were four very important resolutions which deal with this whole question of the United Nations financing for present and future operations in the peace and security field, a matter which is central to the conduct of the United Nations operations in several areas of the world.

There was one authorizing the United Nations Emergency Force financing; one authorizing United Nations Congo operations financing; one requesting the International Court of Justice to rule on the binding legal obligations of all members to pay their assessed share of U.N. Congo operations; and United Nations Emergency Force costs, and one authorizing a U.N. bond issue.

The United States voted for all four, the U.S.S.R. voted against all four; Yugoslavia voted for three; that is, voted for three with the United States, and against the U.S.S.R. and abstained on one, which was the request to the International Court of Justice, which again demonstrates an independence in their voting posture.


Senator THURMOND. If there is any question about how Yugoslavia and Tito stand, I want to say that I recently had the opportunity to view a film which was an interview with Tito by Edward R. Murrow. Although this film was made in approximately 1956, it is not available to the American public. Although it contains nothing which should be of a classified nature, it has been kept secret and its existence is not generally known.

In this film, the whole tenor of the statements made by Tito reaffirmed his dedication to communism and his belief in its eventual goal of world domination.

In response to the request that he describe the basic difference between communism in Yugoslavia and communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, Tito said, and I quote:

These are not big ideological differences. They are not too big. We have the same aims, that is to say, the building of socialism and communism.

Tito readily admits that his eventual goal is exactly the same as that of the Soviet Union. And yet our policy planners do not have the fortitude to face up to this warning:

The goals of communism are well known. It is their intention to engulf the world with their insidious and atheistic way of life, and snuff out the last flicker of hope for free people everywhere.

Tito explained his foreign policy as one of coexistence. At the same time he states flatly that he is in complete accord with Mao Tse-tung. He reiterates what he terms as “my point-by-point agreement with Mao."

Without a doubt the coexistence of which Tito speaks is the same as that practiced by the U.S.S.R under Khrushchev. This is the type of coexistence which has enabled them to take over some 15 countries since the end of World War II, Cuba just a few short years ago, and now has put Laos practically within their grasp.


Now, Mr. Secretary, in several of its comments the State Department referred to our desire and interest to seek an accommodation with the Soviets.

Is it our policy, and have we, in fact, encouraged our allies, for instance France and West Germany, to also make an accommodation with the Soviets?

Mr. Ball. I don't know what that refers to. If you are talking about the kind of accommodation with the Soviets which I mentioned to you earlier as an example of what we are talking about, which is Austria, this was done with the cooperation of our allies.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I cannot escape the conclusion that our actions in seeking to force Mr. Phoumi into a coalition with the Communists in Laos is susceptible to the interpretation that we are trying to make the Laos Government seek an accommodation with the Communists.

Does our policy specifically recognize that the withholding of foreign aid can be just as effective or more so than the giving of it in achieving our national objectives!

Mr. Ball. You are speaking with respect to Laos now?
Senator THURMOND. Laos.
Mr. BALL. I don't follow the question.
Senator THURMOND. I will repeat it.
Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. I cannot escape the conclusion that our actions in seeking to force Mr. Phoumi into a coalition with the Communists in Laos is susceptible to the interpretation that we are trying to make the Laotian Government seek an accommodation with the Communists.

Does not our policy specifically recognize that the withholding of foreign aid can be just as effective or more so than the giving of it in achieving our national objectives!

Mr. BALL. Senator Thurmond, the Laotian question is one that has, I said to the chairman on Monday, ramifications that I would be happy to discuss in executive session.

Senator THURMOND. You would rather answer that in executive session?

Mr. BALL. Yes, I would, sir.


Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, despite your very articulate attempts to explain it away, there is just too much in the written replies of the State Department supporting the conclusion that our policy is one of accommodation, containment of aggression—as that term is defined and limited by the State of Department—and paralysis induced by the specter of escalation toward nuclear war to be dispelled by your testimony.

The best evidence is the basic policy papers themselves. It appears that newspapermen are being given access to some of these policy papers.

As a matter of fact, indications are that an integral part of our policy is to systematically expose to the Communists and to the public the broad outlines of our policy in order to dispel whatever fears the Communists may have of us, and to reorient the thinking of the American public toward a favorable attitude to our policy.

For instance, Newsweek for April 9, 1962, not only characterized the contents of the new policy paper being written by Mr. Rostow, but described its physical appearance as a book 2 inches thick, 285 pages, triple spaced, on legal-size paper, and bound in light blue paper.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »