In an exclusive appearing in the Chicago Sun-Times for April 15, 1962, Thomas B. Ross describes the position of the policy paper on what is called in policy circles our first-strike capabilities.

The New York Times of April 16, 1962, discussed the content of what is called the "Secret" policy paper, and reported that the paper was in the third-draft stage.

The Washington Post of April 18, 1962, in an article entitled "Rostow Seeking To Define America's Global Objectives and Strategies," over the byline of Carroll Kilpatrick, gives a lengthy description of many particular aspects of the policy set forth in the policy paper.

Even the Russian paper Izvestia published a long article on May 24, 1962, by Korionov, which discusses our new policy paper and the positions taken in it.

From this, it is clear that the Congress is the last to know.

Under the circumstances it seems rather ridiculous that we should have to go through this secondhand discussion with you in an effort to determine what our policy is so that we might, in turn, judge whether the speech changes were, in fact, required by our foreign policy.

The best evidence is the policy papers themselves.

Without intending any reflection on you, I must say that this matter can be satisfactorily determined only by the committee seeing the policy papers themselves.

I realize or at least until the rash of newspaper stories on the contents of our policy papers, I thought-that such papers were classified.

The committee could examine these papers in executive session, of

course.

Will you please furnish to the committee the basic policy papers themselves, the old ones and Mr. Rostow's new ones, in order that wẹ may examine them in executive session and get the best evidence and firsthand proof of whether the policy is as indicated by some of the censors' remarks and the State Department's remarks, or as you have attempted to explain it.

Mr. BALL. Well, first of all, the question of any newspaper access to these documents is a question of testimony as to the diligence of our press rather than to any intended policy of the United States.

I mean, the idea that we are trying to disclose these to the press and, consequently, to the Communists is not true, and I would like to note that categorically.

Senator THURMOND. How do they get to the press?

Mr. BALL. I have no idea. I would like to know.

Senator THURMOND. Could you tell us how it got to, how this information got to Newsweek?

Mr. BALL. We have been trying to find out.

Senator THURMOND. Could you tell us how this information got to the Chicago Sun-Times?

Mr. BALL. You know the problem of running down leaks is a very difficult one, and we have made a diligent effort to find out. Senator THURMOND. Could you tell us how it got to the New York Times?

Mr. BALL. The fact that a newspaper may know that something has 300 and some pages and a blue cover does not necessarily mean that there have been any disclosures to a newspaperman.

The fact that there have been some leaks is a source of distress to us, and we have done our best to tighten up security so that this

doesn't happen.

In Washington, as you well know, Senator, leaks are difficult to avoid. They do sometimes occur.

Now, this paper of Mr. Rostow's, for example, to which you refer, is a document that has been written in draft by a number of people who have tried to put down some of the elements of our policy in a coherent form. It is not an official paper.

It has never been approved. It has never been examined officially. The treatment which it may be given is a matter of some discretion, particularly as to whether we should try to have an approved paper along this line. It is a working paper

Senator THURMOND. Can I interrupt you for a moment? I am anxious for the chairman to hear this, and if you don't mind I will repeat the last question.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. I had a very urgent telephone call and I had to leave.

Senator THURMOND. The question I put is, Mr. Secretary, despite your very articulate attempts to explain it away, there is just too much in the written replies of the State Department supporting the conclusion that our policy is one of accommodation, containment of aggression, as that term is defined and limited by the State Department, and paralysis induced by the specter of escalation toward nuclear war to be dispelled by your testimony.

The best evidence of our national policy is the basic policy papers themselves. It appears that newspapermen are being given access to some of these policy papers.

As a matter of fact, indications are that an integral part of our policy is to systematically expose to the Communists and to the public the broad outlines of our policy, in order to dispel what fears the Communists may have of us, and to reorient the thinking of the American public toward a favorable attitude to our policy.

For instance, Newsweek for April 9, 1962, not only characterized the contents of the new policy paper being written by Mr. Rostow, but described its physical appearances as

a book 2 inches thick, 285 pages, triple spaced, on legal-size paper, and bound in light-blue paper.

In an exclusive appearing in the Chicago Sun-Times for April 15, 1962, Thomas B. Ross describes the position of the policy paper on what is called in policy circles our "first strike" capabilities.

The New York Times of April 16, 1962, discussed the content of what is called the "Secret" policy paper, and reported that the paper was in the third-draft stage.

The Washington Post of April 18, 1962, in an article entitled "Rostow Seeking To Define America's Global Objectives and Strategies,' over the byline of Carroll Kilpatrick, gives a lengthy description of many particular aspects of policies set forth in the policy paper.

Even the Russian paper Izvestia published a long article on May 24, 1962, by Korionov, which discusses our new policy paper and the positions taken in it.

From this it is clear that the Congress is the last to know.

Under the circumstances it seems rather ridiculous that we should have to go through this secondhand discussion with you in an effort to determine what our policy is so that we might, in turn, judge whether the speech changes were in fact required by our foreign policy.

The best evidence is the policy papers themselves.

Without intending any reflection on you, I must say that this matter can be satisfactorily determined only by the committee seeing the policy papers themselves.

I realize or at least until the rash of newspaper stories on the contents of our policy papers, my thought—that such papers were classified.

The committee would examine these papers in executive session, of

course.

Will you please furnish to the committee the basic policy papers themselves, the old ones and Mr. Rostow's new ones in order that we may examine them in executive session and get the best evidence and firsthand proof of whether the policy is as indicated by some of the censors' remarks and the State Department's remarks or as you have attempted to explain it.

I was anxious for the chairman to hear that.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, the reply which I was making to Senator Thurmond was, first of all, to deny categorically that there was any policy of the United States to disclose these to the Communists. This is obviously not true.

Now, so far as the paper of Rostow's to which you have referred, there has been unfortunately, a leak in very general terms of some of the material which is in the paper. This is a regrettable leak, which we are endeavoring to run down.

This is a paper which is a working document, which is not completed. It has not had the approval of the

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me, let us wait until the Senator is through so that he can hear you.

I want to ask a question right there. What policy papers are we discussing, policy papers as to Laos or Yugoslavia or what?

Senator THURMOND. The foreign policy papers.

Senator STENNIS. All policy papers?

Senator THURMOND. Concerning the foreign policy.

Senator STENNIS. All right. Proceed.

Mr. BALL. The paper which is referred to in the newspaper clippings to which Senator Thurmond referred is a paper which Mr. Rostow, as the head of Planning Staff, has been working on, together with other people in the Department, in an attempt to try to put down on paper some of the key aspects of our foreign policy.

This is a working document. It is incomplete. It has never been examined. I have never read it myself. The Secretary of State hasn't read it. It hasn't had the approval of the Department. It is an attempt to develop something.

It is going through a series of drafts. It isn't completed yet. Whether it will ever be officially approved or not, I don't know. Whether it will ever be submitted to the National Security Council for consideration I don't know.

But it is an attempt to put some of these things down on paper, and we are going to take a look at it when it is finished.

I think that to get it into the discussion as though it represented the settled views of the U.S. Government or even of the State Department on particular positions would be quite wrong.

Senator STENNIS. The policy papers to which you refer now, have not been approved by you or the Secretary of State, as I understand it?

Mr. BALL. That is right. The Rostow paper which is the one under discussion.

Senator STENNIS. It has not been approved by the National Security Council?

Mr. BALL. No.

Senator STENNIS. And, of course, it hasn't yet reached the President?

Mr. BALL. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. Is that right?

Mr. BALL. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. Are these papers what you call working papers? Mr. BALL. It is a working document, and it is going through a number of drafts. It is an effort to see if it would be useful to try to have a coherent statement of the U.S. foreign policy.

Senator STENNIS. What is your position now? Of course, I understand you cannot disclose it here in open session. But what is your position fully?

Mr. BALL. Well, I am sure that I can speak for the Secretary and say that he would be extremely reluctant to give the committee a working document which we ourselves haven't even approved and which does not represent the settled views of the Department.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I want to say that it is mighty strange that these policy papers seem to get into the hands of reporters for Newsweek, Chicago Sun-Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, all of which are leftwing newspapers, and carry the soft line toward communism.

Mr. BALL. I cannot believe, Senator

Senator THURMOND. It is very strange they seem to get into the hands of favored papers and favored reporters, and conservative papers don't get them.

Mr. BALL. I cannot believe, Senator Thurmond, that any one of those newspaper reporters has a copy of this document. That somebody may have discussed certain aspects of it with a reporter is a matter which he should not have done. We are trying to endeavor to run these leaks down.

Senator STENNIS. Now it doesn't sound good at all, for those kinds of papers, to which I give a high priority, working papers

Mr. BALL. That is right.

Senator STENNIS (continuing). That are necessary to have to work with, to get out in any way.

I have sympathy with the idea of the fact that until they reach a certain point they are, of course, working papers. But certainly it does concern me. I think it concerns all of us, and I am sure it does you

Mr. BALL. We are very much concerned about this problem of leaks. Senator STENNIS (continuing). For this to get into the hands of anyone else that way at that stage.

Mr. BALL. I cannot believe that this paper is actually in the hands of any reporter.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I mean for any of the contents to get out. Mr. BALL. I am fully in accord, sir. This is a matter of great concern to us, and we have been endeavoring to run this down and find out how this occurred.

Senator STENNIS. Of course, the legislative branch of the Government gets disappointed, too. I know this week the Appropriations Subcommittee voted out a bill, with a very strict understanding, you know, that it would be held intact until it went before the full committee.

Well, the next day all these enterprising papers had it, and I do not know how and why it happened. It is not a grave matter there. But this is a grave matter, I know.

Senator THURMOND. And even Izvestia has it.

Mr. BALL. Well, Izvestia has, so far as I know, simply recorded the fact that there has been this comment in the United States papers, that is all. It doesn't mean it has

Senator STENNIS. Are you doing anything to prevent a recurrence of papers getting out?

Mr. BALL. We have had a full check by our security people.

Senator STENNIS. It is not just the fact that they are in the hands of the American newspapers. It is the fact that they get out at all. Other papers could get into the hands of the enemy.

Mr. BALL. I agree entirely. This is a matter with which we are very concerned, and we are having careful security checks made on all of it.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, you say the Rostow papers are not complete and they are considered working papers; is that right? Mr. BALL. That is right. They are working papers.

DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PAPERS

Senator THURMOND. Will you submit for the committee the National Security Council papers which the Rostow papers are intended to replace?

Mr. BALL. I don't know that they are intended to replace any, and I don't know that the Rostow papers will ever be submitted to the National Security Council. I think there has been no decision as to what disposition will be made of it. The National Security Council papers are not papers which are within my control.

Senator THURMOND. Will you then furnish to the committee the policies that the Department of State has been following pursuant to the National Security Council?

Mr. BALL. That is exactly what I have been attempting to do, Senator Thurmond; to give you a statement as to what our policies are. Senator THURMOND. Well, you have seen these papers, haven't you, the National Security Council papers?

Mr. BALL. I see

Senator THURMOND. Certainly as the No. 2 man of the State Department you have seen them.

Mr. BALL. Certainly I have access to them, but I don't have control of them. These are papers which are approved by the National Security Council under the direction of the President.