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this vantage point that they acquire the power to push America toward the right and nuclear war on the international level. If the ultra psychology is made in Moscow by Communist successes, the ultra power is produced in the United States by domestic social realities.

This means that the response of the democratic left cannot simply be the urging and affirming of a democratic foreign policy. To give that program substance and meaning, there must be a movement, a powerful coalition growing out of the domestic reality, which turns the pious sentiments about the "revolution of our times" into something meaningful.

One example should make this point clear. The most dynamic, popular movement of recent times is taking place in the area of civil rights. In this sector of American life, thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions of people are acting and acting boldly. This same movement has denounced Birchism with passion and effectiveness; it has demonstrated a sensitivity to the Colonial Revolution which goes beyond anything in our society. Out of the vitality and idealism demanded of the struggle for integration, there has come a much larger dedication to democracy and social advance, a profound sympathy for the principle of self-determination throughout the world.

But American Negroes are a minority. Their movement magnificent as it is, cannot transform the Nation in all of its politics. The point is not the obvious one that every white democrat must be the wholehearted and enthusiastic partisan of the Negro campaign for emancipation; the point is that the Nation desperately needs an interracial movement for broad social change which is as vital and dynamic as the civil rights movement.

This relates to another basic point. As this pamphlet is being written, there are some in the Kennedy administration who are beginning to argue that there must be a moratorium on domestic social advance so that the fight against communism can be carried out. Yet, it is precisely a cessation of internal change, a drying up of the springs of democratic creativity within the Nation, which will paralyze the struggle for peace and freedom, which will leave the militaryindustry complex dominant in America and therefore dominant in our foreign policy.

And conversely, the labor movement, the largest single potential of democratic transformation, cannot go on passing conservative foreign policy resolutions and thinking that this is irrelevant to the struggle for worker's rights within the Nation. When the unions support the force of the status quo internationally, when the federation is applauded by the McCarthyite National Review, it is helping to bolster the forces of antiunionism at home. A country which is suspicious of change in Africa and Asia and Europe is not going to be delighted with it in Detroit or Pittsburgh. Reaction is made out of a whole cloth.

And the labor movement is, of course, central. In the past, it has been the single greatest source of social change in America. Today, beleaguered by the problem of automation and torn by internal jurisdictional disputes, it is still the largest, most powerful force in the society committed to public housing, to medical care for the aged, to aid for education and the like.

And yet, when one compares the elan and enthusiasm of the civil rights fighters to the mood of the trade unionists, there is a glaring contrast. What is desperately needed is a rebirth of the traditional union spirit in the United States. That is clear enough.

Given this analysis, the problem of providing democratic alternatives of meeting the challenge of the ultras, can be put into perspective.

We believe that all of the democratic tendencies in American life, all the individuals and organizations committed to social change, must unite as never before.

We believe that we must reject the proposition that domestic change is to be sacrificed for the duration of the cold war: a really new movement capable of mounting a democratic foreign policy can only first develop in the struggle against the military-industrial complex at home.

We believe that it is time that America took some of the fine rhetoric about the revolution in our time seriously. We believe that we should join that revolution. We do not believe that corporations or generals will do it for us; we have to do it ourselves.

We believe, above all, that it is time for the democratic left to get radical. What makes the ultras such a challenge is that they are not simply the product of conditions and forces, but rather, they are building a movement. They have

touched a certain radicalism in their reactionary anticommunism, they have mobilized the incredible drama of these times in the service of the status quo and worse.

The democratic left can never be a demagogic revival meeting. It cannot rest content with political emotionalism. The democratic left believes in man's reason and the possibility of a decent, human response to the present crisis.

Granting all this, it is time that the democrat left got radical-that it match the militancy and dedication of the resurgent right, that it gain a sense of history and purpose equal to that of the bosses and the brass. The civil rights movement has demonstrated that working men and women have, right here and now, the passion to fight for justice, to risk and to struggle.

We Socialists are not liberals; yet we are part of the liberal community. We propose that the evidence is at hand, that all of us from center left on must unite in a common struggle. The American ultras are not a Fascist menace right now; but they are a sign of the gravity of the crisis, of the conflicts to come. We will ignore this evidence at our peril.

APPENDIX

[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 2, 1961]

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, I have been surprised in the past few days by a display of intense interest in a memorandum on propaganda activities of military personnel which I have submitted to the Secretary of Defense. Perhaps I am naive. I must confess that I was unaware that the subject was one which could arouse great controversy. The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control. There has been a strong tradition in this country that it is not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues. Military officers are not elected by the people and they have no responsibility for the formulation of policies other than military policies. Their function is to carry out policies formulated by officials who are responsible to the electorate. This tradition is rooted in the constitutional principle that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and that, therefore, military personnel are not to participate in activities which undermine his policies.

Madam President, I did not think that this constitutional tradition was controversial.

The memorandum was a personal one. The Committee on Foreign Relations did not act upon it in any way. It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a personal correspondence.

Madam President, I must confess to still another misapprehension. I was unaware that it was the custom, the practice, or the right of Senators to demand access to the private correspondence of their colleagues. Although I should not have thought it my duty to open my private files, I would have been quite willing to show the memorandum in question to any Senator who courteously requested to see it. I was not willing, however, to comply with an ultimatum such as I received from the junior Senator from South Carolina on July 21 demanding that he be provided with a copy of the memorandum "within the next hour." Aside from the fact that I had no copy of the memorandum available at that time, I was unwilling to open my private papers in response to so impertinent a letter.

Madam President, I have now been apprised of the misapprehensions under which I was laboring. Apparently the constitutional principle of civilian control of the Armed Forces is indeed a subject of political controversy. In view of this fact and in order to dispel the fears of those who have persuaded themselves that the memorandum contains material which is sinister, subversive, or sensational, I have decided to release the text of the memorandum. I therefore ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record at this point.

(There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

MEMORANDUM: PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, DIRECTED AT THE PUBLIC

1

There are four attachments to this memorandum from which the following conclusions are made:

1. Under a National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of the U.S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.

2. Basic material for implementing the policy, under the title of "American Strategy for the Nuclear Age," prepared and disseminated by private organizations with close military connections, and being distributed as a master curriculum for strategy seminars, is by no means representative of the President's announced strategy for the nuclear age. Although scholarly, and worth attention as elements of strategy, its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President's program.

3. In at least 11 instances of what apparently are implementations of the National Security Council policy, the actual programs, closely identified with military personnel, made use of extremely radical rightwing speakers and/or materials, with the probable net result of condemning foreign and domestic policies of the administration in the public mind.

The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with the underlying problem.

The attached list of instances of military participation, in varying degrees, in programs having as at least part of their purpose to educate or propagandize the public, as well as the military, does not purport to be exhaustive. It was gathered from newspaper reports, interviews, and other sources. It is believed there have been other similar cases, perhaps many others, and that still more may well be in the process of formation.

As a generalization, the instances described in the attached list involve the participation of military personnel in programs on the nature of the Communist menace and proper methods of combating it. Under such names as "alerts," "seminars," "freedom forums," "strategy for survival conferences," "fourth dimensional warfare seminars," and perhaps others, military personnel of various services and rank have participated to such a degree as to identify themselves with the fact of the program and, at least to some extent, its content. The content no doubt has varied from program to program, but running through all of them is a central theme that the primary, if not exclusive, danger to this country is internal Communist infiltration. Past and current international difficulties are often attributed to this, or ascribed to "softness," "sellouts," "appeasements," etc. Radical rightwing speakers dominate the programs. The thesis of the nature of the Communist threat often is developed by equating social legislation with socialism, and the latter with communism. Much of the administration's domestic legislative program, including continuation of the graduated income tax, expansion of social security (particularly medical care under social security), Federal aid to education, etc., under this philosophy, would be characterized as steps toward communism.

This view of the Communist menace renders foreign aid, cultural exchanges, disarmament negotiations, and other international programs, as extremely wasteful, if not actually subversive. This is a most moderate characterization.

Whether these instances are representative of programs implementing the National Security Council directive is not known, but the pattern they form, makes it strongly suspect that they are. There are many indications that the philosophy of the programs is representative of a substantial element of military thought, and has great appeal to the military mind. A strong case can be made, logically, that this type of activity is the inevitable consequence of such a directive. There is little in the education, training, or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own

1 The attachments are:

1. A summary list and descriptions of 11 instances of education and propaganda activities of military personnel.

2. A copy of an article from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. XVII, No. 3, dated Mar. 3, 1961, entitled "School for Strategy."

3. A copy of a news story from the New York Times of Sunday, June 18, 1961, pp. 1 and 56.

4. A copy of a letter from Brig. Gen. Fred C. Weyand, Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, dated June 12, 1961, and addressed to Senator Joseph S. Clark.

ultimate solution-those with which their education, training, and experience are concerned-into proper perspective in the President's total "strategy for the nuclear age."

THE DANGERS

These propaganda activities may well become important obstacles to public acceptance of the President's program and leadership. If they are not already. However, this is by no means the limit of the danger.

The view of the menace of the cold war described above already has great appeal to the public. In the future it may well have much greater appeal. This opinion is based upon an appraisal of the cold war struggle now and in the future, never better described than in the President's inaugural address when he spoke of "the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out," which he also said, may not be solved "in our lifetime on this planet."

The American people have never really been tested in such a struggle. In the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we've got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to MacArthur's revolt and McCarthyism.

This problem of democratic attitudes toward foreign policy has never been better stated than by De Tocqueville, who wrote:

"Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient * ** a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual [a dictator], or to an aristocracy [or an oligarchy or presidium]."

He also wrote of "the propensity which democracies have to obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice."

It is probably the view of most Members of Congress today that if foreign aid were laid before the people in a referendum, it would be defeated. The question arises, how will it be 5 or 10 years from now? Even the most devoted adherents do not expect immediate or dramatic results, particularly since, in contrast with the European recovery program, foreign aid will be operating primarily upon primitive economies. Yet, in the meantime, all the paraphernalia of our international programs must be at least tolerated by the people during the "long twilight struggle."

The radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily understood: Scourging of the devils within the body politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.

If the military is infected with this virus of rightwing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention. If it believes the public is, the danger is enhanced. If, by the process of the military "educating" the public, the fevers of both groups are raised, the danger is great indeed.

Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate danger. Nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have some common characteristics arising from their profession and there are numerous military "fingers on the trigger" throughout the world. While this danger may appear very remote, contrary to American tradition, and even American military tradition, so also is the "long twilight struggle," and so also is the very existence of an American military program for educating the public.

This memorandum has not attempted to deal with the basic traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to propagandize the public-although the violation of these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the National Security Council policy, and its implementation.

Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather, the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction of the public's present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the menace tword support of the President's own total program for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need,

beyond their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958, suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is excerpted:

"President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort."

This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.

2. The White House and the Defense Department should cease treating propaganda activities of military personnel as problems of discipline in individual cases or of coordination of such cases from a press or public relations standpoint, and begin the process of formulating directives which will bring such military activities under effective civilian control.

So long as the cases are treated individually as disciplinary cases, there may well be considerable public sympathy with the individual concerned, as a person, or with his expressed viewpoint. However, if appropriate directives are established, as general propositions, without reference to specific cases, the broad principle of civilian control should be accepted-or, to take the converse, dis agreement with the principle would be difficult to sustain.

3. The organization, mission, and operation of the National War College should be reviewed in the context of the cold war, and the limitations on the role of the military in the President's program. If its function is, as stated, "to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces and the State Department for the exercise of joint and high-level policy, command and staff functions and for the planning of national strategy," the questions arise whether it should operate under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if its administration should be so largely dominated by the military, as at present.

4. The relationships between the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Institute for American Strategy, the Richardson Foundation, the National War College, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reexamined from the standpoint of whether these relationships do not amount to official support for a viewpoint at variance with that of the administration. These relationships may give one particularly aggressive view a more direct and commanding influence upon military and civilian concepts of strategy than is desirable.

5. Long-range studies, preferably dominated by a board of civilian educators, should begin the development of a program for exposure of promising military officers to broader educational opportunities, perhaps requiring completion of graduate studies in history, government, and foreign policy, at universities as a condition to high ranks.

6. With respect to the problem illustrated by the case of General Walker, it is suggested that a civilian committee be appointed to review troop education activities of military personnel from the standpoint of their necessity and, if found to be, to develop procedures for bringing the content of such programs, and, if possible, their actual operation, under civilian control.

INSTANCES OF EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 1. On April 14 and 15, "strategy for survival" conferences were held in Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little Rock, Ark. The printed program for these conferences indicated their sponsorship by local organizations to "provide an open forum for a frank analysis and discussion *** of the threats the free world faces from world communism and the strategy that must be used successfully against it."

An Arkansas lawyer wrote as follows: "The thing that concerns me most was the prominent part played by the Army in planning and promoting these meetings. General Bullock [Maj. Gen. William C. Bullock], the area commander, went all out and personally persuaded the Armed Services Committee of the

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