Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, you had no jurisdiction in cold war seminars then, you have no jurisdiction in that field now, is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Correct, sir; right.

Senator THURMOND. Then why did you intervene in this cold war seminar?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say to you, Senator, that I did not intervene, but I do have a very great responsibility in the public affairs field. When a cold war seminar in any part of the country in any city becomes a fight between-a fight within a city in which the Defense Department is appealed to, and in which the 4th Army is in the middle of a conflict, and in which various factions appeal to us for this or that, are we supporting this or that, then the Public Affairs Department does come in, because it becomes a very keen public affairs part of the picture.

Senator THURMOND. Earlier, I asked you about cold war seminars, and you said it was not part of your jurisdiction. Now you are putting yourself into the picture.

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I am not, because the part that you gave me as to quality control, an undefined word which is rather meaningless, but let us assume it has a meaning, that a person was referring to the organization of the seminars, the participation, the subject, the groups, all the material that goes in; this I do not have.

SYLVESTER MEMORANDUM OF AUGUST 5, 1961, ON PUBLIC INDOCTRINATION

Senator THURMOND. Now, the reason I am bringing this up, this memorandum of yours to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 5, 1961, is that the Air Force accepted at face value paragraph 4, which you lifted from this inapplicable 1955 directive and placed in the memo of August 5, 1961. You see here that this paragraph, which originally was among the instructions for bands, troops, exhibits, and so forth, now stands by itself and becomes your ironclad policy on cold war seminars. Paragraph 4 of that 1955 directive was never intended to apply to seminar programs. I just wondered why you attempted to use that.

The 4th Army had used as authority for cooperating with the Jaycees of San Antonio the following letters:

The Department of the Army AG letter date October 13, 1960. You are familiar with that.

Justification for support of seminar at San Antonio, Tex.this is the 4th Army

September 22-23, 1961, is contained in AR 515-1, JCS directives as apply to Department of the Army conduct of seminars at the NWC and followup activities. DA DCSOPS OPS PL SP-1, September 1959 and OPS PL SP-4, 17 September 1960, subject: "Defense Strategy Seminars" (u) and UCONARC letter ATTNGRC 357, same subject, October 12, 1960. Fourth U.S. Army support consists of planning guidance, obtaining suitable hand-out material and providing a USAR officer on a short tour of active duty to assist the seminar planning committees. The seminar support from 4th U.S. Army was requested by the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce who is the sponsoring agency. The Army's support does not directly or indirectly benefit or favor any private individual, commercial venture or political or fraternal group. Conduct of this seminar and other

similar seminars is in furtherance of the national objectives in the cold war effort.

The 4th U.S. Army was queried on reference seminar and has stated that to the best of their knowledge and belief, none of these speakers scheduled for presentation will discuss subjects which will reflect discredit upon the service. The following speakers have accepted, Mr. Skousen, formerly with FBI now chief police, Salt Lake City, Utah; Mr. Thieme, minister from Houston, Tex.; General Wedemeyer; Prof. Gerhart Niemeyer, University of Notre Dame. Mr. Frank Barnett, of the Richardson Foundation, has been invited but acceptance not determined.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you see the confusion caused by these conflicting instructions on the one hand, your memorandum of August 5, 1961, emanating from the public relations element in the Department of Defense, and on the other hand a formally established directive emanating from J-5 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from Operations in the three services concerning the support of cold war seminars. What action did you take prior to the release of the August 5, 1961, memorandum to rescind the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers and Department of the Army, Air Force, and Navy directives to avoid the clash of conflicting instructions in the field?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, I do not think there is any clash here whatsoever. The directive you cited from Joint Chiefs of Staff does not direct the 4th Army or any Army, Corps, or group to get themselves enmeshed in a fight with a city. It does not direct them to bring back on active duty reservists and put them on the public payrolls to handle private operations. This is a matter of their own choice.

As this developed and became public affairs, the Army appealed to me for help and support on it.

Senator THURMOND. Who came to you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The Chief of Information of the Army.

Senator THURMOND. The Chief of Information of the Army?
Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN SAN ANTONIO

SEMINAR

Senator THURMOND. Did you not say here, prior, that the matter of these seminars was a command responsibility down there, and did you not say to me that 4th Army commander assumed that responsibility, and in this directive in which he has explained his support in this matter, does he not show that he has discharged his responsibilities in that connection?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you would look at the correspondence back and forth, or if you had participated at the time, you would find that the commander of the 4th Army, I am sure, had no intention of getting in the mess that they had gotten into.

Senator THURMOND. What mess? Who said there was a mess? Mr. SYLVESTER. The conflict between the two elements of the San Antonio

Senator THURMOND. Who said that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I said it.

Senator THURMOND. You said it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. The commander of the 4th Army did not say that, did he?

80752-62-pt. 634

Mr. SYLVESTER. I suspect he did.

Senator THURMOND. You, sitting up here in the Pentagon, overruled the judgment of the commanding general of the 4th Army, whose responsibility it was?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The reports that came up from the city very clearly delineated the conflict going on in the city, the public affairs conflict, having nothing to do with the right the commander of the 4th Army to set it up. But the activities they engaged in produced a result completely contrary to what I presume they wanted. At that point, the Defense Department heard from both sides in San Antonio quite loudly. At that point, when it came to my office, I consulted with the Chief of Information of the Army and over a number of months, advised him that the thing looked to me as if it were going to get into a meaner and meaner situation, and it might be well for them to consider that.

The commander of the 4th Army, within his complete rights, went ahead. Nobody prevented him. He went ahead with it, but the end result, I think, was quite different from his intent when he started out.

SOURCES OF COMPLAINTS ON SAN ANTONIO SEMINAR

Senator THURMOND. Was not the complaint you had from some official down there, and did not the 4th Army commander, in his discretion, consider that and go ahead and hold the seminar?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The 4th Army did.

Senator THURMOND. And this paper, La Prensa, this EnglishSpanish language paper, is not that the only opposition that you received to it? If not, can you tell us what other opposition you

received?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot tell you off the top of my head, but I think the record will show.

DISCUSSION ON EFFECT OF SYLVESTER MEMORANDUM ON SEMINARS

Senator THURMOND. What authority did you have to intervene down there when this was the responsibility of the 4th Army commander?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Again, Senator, I do not think you are standing on the facts. I made it quite clear that I did not intervene down there. My whole dealing with it was with the Army here in Washington. I had no communication with them down there. The request came from the Chief of Information of the Army, where it belongs. My dealings were with people here. I had no dealings with them in the 4th Army, and no interference, no operation on my part in the Army chain of command.

I am sure you understand this, being a military man.

Senator THURMOND. Well, you issued statements about it, and you issued this directive of August 5, 1961, that went to all the Secretaries. That went to the Army and the rest of them right down the line. It was sent down the echelons of command.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not sure that is a fact. You know more about it than I do. I am not sure it was.

Senator THURMOND. The evidence we have in this subcommittee shows it was. You do not deny that; do you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am saying I have no knowledge what they did with it. But this is a function of the military operations, not mine. They could have thrown it in the wastebasket, as far as I would know.

Senator THURMOND. The effect of your memorandum of August 5, 1961, in the field commands was devastating. The Air Force immediately backed out of the planned participation in the San Antonio Seminar, as did the Navy. The 4th U.S. Army had committed itself and maintained it had authority to participate in the Jaycees seminars. Here is a copy of a letter dated October 20, 1961, from Colonel Blythe, G-2, of the 4th Army to an officer in the Pentagon:

DEAR COLONEL ROSE: Thank you for the newspaper article and your appropriate remarks about seminar activities.

Our modus operandi regarding future seminars has been established by the attached message from CONARC. In essence, the new policy, to all practical purposes, reduces our participation in future seminars to nil.

Nil means nothing. Now, that was the effect of your memorandum. It goes on to say:

I am also including for your use a sample of publicity in favor of the San Antonio Seminar and a San Antonio Junior Chamber of Commerce fact sheet. The fact sheet was produced and distributed by the San Antonio Junior Chamber of Commerce to newspapers and individuals to clarify and thereby reduce some of the controversy that has been generated locally and nationally relative to the conduct of this seminar.

Thank you again for your kind letters.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM J. BLYTHE, Colonel, GS, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

If anybody down there knew what was going on, he did. If anybody down there knew what effect the memorandum had, he did. He was the intelligence officer of the 4th Army. That was his letter, his evaluation as written to an officer in the Pentagon. Do you deny that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; I do not deny it. It is the first I have seen it. Senator THURMOND. Will there be any reprisals against Colonel Blythe for writing that letter?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Do I what?

Senator THURMOND. I say, will there be any reprisals against Colonel Blythe for writing the truth as he saw it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. You would have to ask the Army about that, Senator. I am at somewhat of a disadvantage, since our own presentation on this is not immediately available. We have made a rather complete presentation to the committee.

FIRST ARMY TOWN HALL SEMINARS

Senator THURMOND. In almost all other commands, seminars were canceled, plans for others were scrapped, and communism became a topic not to be discussed by staffs and troops. It is my estimate that as a result of your action, 150 cold war programs in various stages of planning were not finalized. Cold war seminars and the mere mention of them became the kiss of death in many commands.

A real exception was the 1st U.S. Army, which had planned the town hall series of seminars in January, February, and March of 1962, which, as you know, were successfully completed. A member of our subcommittee staff was told by the commanding general in October

of last year that the 1st Army considered the conduct of the cold war education, especially in the New York metropolitan area, an essential part of maintaining up-to-date information on Communist subversion and propaganda and an integral part of the 1st Army educational and security program.

What are your comments on the 1st Army town hall seminars?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is very good. We cooperated with them. They talked to us about it and we cooperated in every way.

Senator THURMOND. Who did, if you had no jurisdiction in the field of seminars?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It came in through the Chief of Information, as I recall.

Senator THURMOND. Why did that come to you? Was there a controversy there? You say you entered the other because you were asked to because of a controversy. How did you enter the town hall seminar situation? How did you cooperate and why? Under what conditions?

Mr. SYLVESTER. May I answer?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. SYLVESTER. The answer is they came to me for forward-looking guidance to see whether it seemed likely or unlikely that they would get into the sort of thing they did in San Antonio. They wanted the best judgment I could give them on the public affairs impact of their seminars. I gave it to them. I thought it would be good.

From what you have there, it appears that it was very good. It was a well-balanced program, well run, it looked as if it were going to be very good.

Senator THURMOND. That is the reason you intervened there, was it? Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I think you have perverted what I said. Senator THURMOND. I did not mean to pervert anything.

Mr. SYLVESTER. You said "intervene," Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Well, interjected yourself, since you had no responsibility.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Either way, you are misstating the facts, Senator. Senator THURMOND. Suppose you state the facts correctly, because I did not mean to misstate them.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I shall try to again.

They came to me for the public affairs impact, and I gave it to them. I thought it would be a very good program, I told them, and it turned out to be that way. This is the sort of cooperation we usually give.

FIRST ARMY'S EVALUATION OF NEED FOR MILITARY COLD WAR TRAINING

Senator THURMOND. Well, they have the experience at 1st Army. This was their third townhall seminar. For the purpose of completing the record on cold war seminars, I would recommend the inclusion of the U.S. 1st Army's evaluation of the need for this type of training in continental U.S. armies. I would like to read a brief comment concerning the urgency of this type of training:

(a) There have been a variety of Army moves to generate a better comprehension of Soviet bloc espionage, subversion, and propaganda directed against the Armed Forces.