Senator STENNIS. Just a minute, if you will. I suggest that we might run until 1 o'clock. Senator Thurmond, you wish to go to that Armed Services Committee meeting at 2:30, do you not?

Senator THURMOND. I can continue right on, if you want me to. Senator STENNIS. I think I ought to go around there at 2:30 for 30 minutes, anyway. We shall run until 1 o'clock and then recess until 2:30.

Is that all right with you, Mr. Sylvester?

Mr. SYLVESTER. May I interrupt-yes, Senator, it is perfectly all right with me.

Senator STENNIS. Very well.

SYLVESTER EXPLANATION ON SAN ANTONIO SEMINAR

Mr. SYLVESTER. May I get the record straight on the San Antonio setup? I would like to add to my answer the following:

The first OSD contact with this matter was received by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) starting in July of letters and press inquiries concerning the seminar. These inquiries particularly sought information regarding the temporary active duty assignment of the Army Reserve officer, Captain Lunz. During this period, the Air Force request for guidance, dated July 20, was received. On August 1, John E. Carland, Deputy Director of Special Activities (OASD-Pa), replied by requesting the Air Force's recommendation as to the desirability of Air Force participation in the seminar. Prior to the receipt of any recommendation, however, and because of indications that all four services had been contacted with respect to what appeared to be a highly controversial situation, it was determined to answer the Air Force request by means of a memorandum to all the services providing general guidance to the seminar. The result was the memorandum dated August 5, 1961to which Senator Thurmond has referred

thereafter, aside from the processing of correspondence and press inquiries, OASD had no further involvement with the matter.

FIRST ARMY'S EVALUATION OF NEED FOR MILITARY COLD WAR TRAINING

Senator THURMOND. Well, for the purpose of completing the record on cold war seminars, I recommend the inclusion of the U.S. 1st Army's evaluation of the need for this type of training in the continental U.S. armies.

I would like to read a brief comment concerning the urgency of this type of training:

(a) There have been a variety of Army moves to generate a better comprehension of Soviet bloc espionage, subversion, and propaganda directed against the Armed Forces. None of these were totally effective.

(b) The first positive step to create greater awareness, throughout the Army at all levels of command, of the problem at hand, came as a result of the implementation of AR 381-12, Soviet bloc espionage and subversion directed against the Armed Forces. This Army regulation requires periodic intelligence briefings of all Active Army and Reserve personnel. U.S. Continental Army Command requires status reports from all armies on the implementation of the first series of briefings by December 31, 1958. U.S. 1st Army met the target date established by U.S. Continental Army Command with the exception of the U.S. Military Academy, which completed these briefings in February 1959. Army regulation 381-12 was implemented in U.S. 1st Army area through U.S. 1st Army Circular 60, 58(C) widely distributed to all Active and Reserve Army activities in the Army area.

(c) The above action, originating in intelligence channels, was reinforced by Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Department of the Army, who initiated

Army regulation 515–1, Army activities in the cold war, received by this headquarters in March 1959. This program focused continental U.S. Army attention on integration of instruction in cold war concepts and doctrine in normal Army training. Army regulation 515-1 was not widely disseminated. A special Deputy Chief of Staff Operations unclassified publication, entitled "Guide to Anti-Communist action" dated April 15, 1959, which made reference to Army regulation 515-1 as the basis for further guidance, was received by this headquarters in May 1959.

Mr. Secretary, you will notice that there is no mention here of Public Affairs or of PIO direction of these programs. The 1st Army considered them an essential part of intelligence and security training to maintain an alert posture in cold war preparedness. What are your comments?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have no comment, no, Senator.

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION ON SAN ANTONIO SEMINAR

May I make an addition to this report on the San Antonio seminar? The Army report on it does not accept in toto or completely the findings which you read from the 4th Army. On the contrary, it finds in its report several things which it criticizes in the operation of that seminar. So while it is an interesting statement by the G-2 colonel down there, he did not sell it to his service up here completely.

Senator THURMOND. He was on the ground there, and supposedly knew what was going on, and you in the Pentagon were a long way away. The commanding general of the 4th Army, General Booth, supported the G-2 in that position too, did he not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you will find the Army sent people down there to headquarters at that time.

Senator THURMOND. You had intervened, then, though, and a controversy was underway?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I had not intervened; as I just read, it came

to us.

FIRST ARMY REPORT ON MANHATTAN COLD WAR SEMINAR

Senator THURMOND. I would like this evaluation to be put in the record here.

Senator STENNIS. Did you not read it? Is that not what you read? Senator THURMOND. I read a portion from it, yes. I did not read it all. It is the 1st Army's evaluation of the cold war seminars, which I think is important.

Senator STENNIS. I am just trying to hold down these pages. They cost us money. If the part that you read was only a small part of it

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. It will go in the record at this time.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY MANHATTAN "COLD WAR" SEMINAR, 9-10 OCTOBER

1959

1. ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF MANHATTAN "COLD WAR" SEMINAR

a. There have been a variety of Army moves to generate a better comprehension of Soviet-bloc espionage, subversion and propaganda directed against the Armed Forces. None of these were totally effective.

b. The first positive step to create greater awareness, throughout the Army at all levels of command, of the problem at hand, came as a result of

the implementation of AR 381-12, Soviet-bloc Espionage and Subversion Directed Against the Armed Forces. This AR requires periodic intelligence briefings of all active Army and Reserve personnel. USCONARC required status reports from all Armies on the implementation of the first series of briefings by 31 December 1958. First United States Army met the target date established by USCONARC with exception of the United States Military Academy which completed these briefings in February 1959. AR 381-12 was implemented in First United States Army Area through FUSA Cir 60,58 (C) widely distributed to all active and reserve Army activities in the Army

area.

c. The above action, originating in intelligence channels, was reinforced by Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, who initiated AR 515-1 Army Activities in the Cold War, received by this headquarters in March 1959. This program focused CONUS Army attention on integration of instruction in Cold War concepts and doctrine in normal Army training. AR 515-1 was not widely disseminated. A special DCSOPS unclassified publication, entitled "Guide to Anti-Communist Action" dated 15 April 1959, which made reference to AR 515-1 as the basis for further guidance, was received by this headquarters in May 1959.

d. First United States Army publicized the latter program through lectures provided by G2 and CIC personnel at all of the major troop installations and headquarters. Lectures were given at this headquarters, XIII Corps, II Corps, Fort Dix, West Point, Fort Hamilton. Brooklyn Port of Embarkation, Boston Army Base, Army Pictorial Center and many other installations.

2. NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR

a. DCSOPS during Spring of 1959 helped to generate a special two week seminar at the National War College designed to reach the large Army, Air Force and Navy Reserve Community. This was a coordinate, inter-service program which developed voluntary partnership with a number of non-governmental institutions interested in national security. The National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers was jointly sponsored by ROA and the Institute for American Strategy. The curriculum designed to expose machinations of Soviet-bloc agencies and their fronts in the United States and on the international scene was prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania under the direction of Dr. Robert StrauszHupe and Colonel William R. Kintner. Funds were provided by the Richardson Foundation.

b. Of the 200 graduates of the National War College Seminar, 42 Army, Air Force and Navy Reserve Officers were from the seven states comprising the First United States Army area. These officers are a nucleus for develop. ment into a broader program in support of AR 381-12 and AR 515-1. Each of these men were carefully chosen by USCONARC in order to expose qualified Military Reserve personnel in key civilian jobs to the general understanding of the threat of Communist subversion and propaganda.

3. FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY MANHATTAN "COLD WAR" SEMINAR

a. The objective of the First United States Army Manhattan "Cold War" Seminar on 9-10 October 1959 was in support of AR 381-12 and 515-1 and an extension of the National War College Seminar objectives into First United States Army Area. We are capable of reaching a large number of Military Reserves through creating sensitive awareness to the United States National Security aspects in regard to Soviet-bloc subversion and propaganda. Military personnel in Intelligence, Information, Public Relations, Special Services, G3 Staff, Special Forces, Psychological Warfare Augmentation Groups of Army and Corps have particular "need-to-know" details of Soviet-bloc subversive and propaganda warfare. As a result of interservice coordination some 500 military personnel are scheduled to attend the seminar.

b. Specific Objectives of the seminar are:

(1) To improve the recognition by military personnel of Communist Cold War techniques insofar as these affect the United States Military Forces.

(2) To outline courses of actions for active and reserve Army personnel when confronted with specific subversive and propaganda action

by Soviet-bloc agencies or "fronts" working against the United States military.

(3) To improve training of active and Reserve Army personnel in aggressive intelligence objectives thereby improving security consciousness and the sense of urgency in attaining greater Reserve and active military mobilization readiness.

c. First U.S. Army has the support of local Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard and key private concerns in generating the objectives outlined in paragraph b above. Of particular note is the coordination effected by the Richardson Foundation, which on sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided the funds needed to prepare the curriculum for the National Strategy Seminar. The Richardson Foundation, specifically Mr. Barnett (Director of Research, Richardson Foundation), was one of the principal speakers at the First U.S. Army Seminar. The arrangements for attendance of some of the other key speakers was effected through Mr. Barnett for example, Colonel William R. Kintner and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, who were the Deans of the Faculty at the National Strategy Seminar in Washington, D.C.

d. Program of Industrial College of the Armed Forces.-The First U.S. Army effort is being made in coordination with a series of lectures by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces which deals with specific aspects of subversion, espionage and propaganda directed against U.S. Industry and business by the Soviet-bloc agencies, the Communist Party and their "front" organizations. Selected Military Reserve personnel will attend the seminars. Monthly lectures will culminate in a final two week course for key industrial and business leaders. Portions of the National Strategy Seminar will be presented at Town Hall, 113 W. 43d Street, NYC, this winter. Plans are to produce many of the key lecturers, who appeared at the Washington seminar, on dates as follow: Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 2, 23; March 15, 22, 1960. The Town Hall Strategy Series will be on active duty basis for point credits. It will be open to civilian guests of the various Reserve groups.

4. EVALUATION OF MANHATTAN "COLD WAR" SEMINAR

a. 250 Army personnel (Active, USAR and NG), 25 Navy (including Marine Corps); 15 Air Force; 22 Coast Guard attended. Also represented were: J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff; TIE, Department of Defense, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; TI, Department of Army; Comptroller, Department of Army; ACSI, Department of Army; ACSI, Continental Army Command; Richardson Foundation; Radio Free Europe; Troop Information School, Fort Slocum; Observers from Air Force and Navy. Commands located in First U.S. Army Area; Reserve Officers Association; Association of the Army of United States.

b. Evaluation of audience reactions showed that some of the students listened to the first lecturers with a "tongue in cheek" attitude. After they began to have a feeling of the scope of objective of the seminar, interest and response sky-rocketed. By the time of the coffee break at 1500 hours, Friday, comments ran in the vein of "I had no idea of the scope of Communist subversion and propaganda," and "what can I do about this problem." Most of the students came to G2 Staff personnel with specific statements of the high quality of the lectures and with complimentary comments concerning the handling, scheduling and processing of students. By early afternoon an initial poor reaction to the social gathering scheduled for 1730 Friday evening had been overcome and some 200 persons attended. Most indicative of the effect of the seminar was the manner in which members of all services mingled and with spontaneity and absorption discussed the highlights of the conference. The presence of representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Department of the Army and Congress, who had mutual objectives in attending or observing the Seminar created an entirely tomogeneous and sympathetic group.

c. Of forty-two National Strategy Seminar graduates, twelve attended the Manhattan Seminar. This included most of the personnel from the New York Metropolitan area with exception of some of the Air Force Reserve personnel. Several Air Force Reserve Officers contacted First U.S. Army directly, but apparent administrative difficulties precluded their official attendance. All of the twleve NSS graduates who attended the Manhattan seminar had taken positive action to propagate objectives of the National Strategy Seminar. This action ranged from lectures in their military Reserve groups to dissemination of material (reproduced at their own expense in two cases) of training aids provided at the National Strategy Seminar. One of the twelve NSS graduates, a Naval

Reserve Officer, had spent considerable time and effort to have Bankers Trust in NYC with whom he banks, withdraw a newspaper advertisement and NY subway posters, which showed a concealed Communist hammer and sickle emblem. Another officer had been active to have a local military community ban the Communist inspired film "The Defiant Ones." All of these twelve officers showed keen comprehension of subversive propaganda, its application and effect.

d. Three Reserve Officers, offered monetary support of "Cold War" projects, such as the reproduction and dissemination of handouts, slides and booklets. Arrangements are being made to channel these funds to the Fourth Dimensional Warfare Committee of ROA. One project will be to reprint fifty sets of slides identical to those handed out in the instructors package to students at the National Strategy Seminar. This project will cost approximately $500 which has been subscribed to by one of the Reservists.

e. The evaluation of the National Strategy Seminar by DCOPS, DA which was received during the planning phase of the First U.S. Army Seminar showed that additional examples of actual examples of propaganda and subversion would have been welcome. To satisfy this requirement the FUSA Seminar included one entire period of examples of propaganda as seen in entertainment, newspapers, movies, TV, etc., directed against the U.S. Military. In addition several reels were shown of a Red Chinese propaganda film entitled "The Battle for China" made in Red China in 1950 by Soviet film producers, using East German AGFA Technicians. Many of the students commented favorably on the inclusion of these practical examples of Communist propaganda and infiltration of mass media of communication and subversion.

f. A total of seven key speakers were heard during the two-day seminar and comments from students indicated that they considered this "just enough and not too much."

g. Handouts included those listed at enclosure 1.

h. It is felt that of particular value was a display area, a reference library and bookstore set up in a building adjacent to the Fort Theatre (in which the seminar was held). Coffee breaks and intermissions found the students using these facilities to very good advantage. Arrangements had been made to have prominent authors autograph their books as they were sold to seminar personnel. This included Dr. R. Colegrove (Democracy versus Communism); Mr. Edward Hunter (Black Book on Red China) and others. Also displayed were samples of Communist propaganda slogans, photo and copies of Lenin's "My Life" and Hitler's "Mein Kampf" with references to key similarities in propaganda and subversive objectives of these "bibles" of the totalitarian dictatorships.

5. CLASSIFICATION OF SEMINAR

With the exception of General Willems and Admiral Ward's speeches as well as portions of the panel discussion, which were confidential, the material presented to the audience was unclassified. For the purpose of keeping this document unclassified no further discussion will be made of the areas of discussion which were security information except that the audience readily realized that questions bordering on confidential portion of AR 515-1 and 381-12 would be discussed only on a "need to know" basis with qualified intelligence officers.

6. CONCLUSIONS

a. The Manhattan "Cold War" seminar was a step toward filling a crucial need for realistic, aggressive and overt measures by U.S. Military personnel (active and reserve) to counter-Communist propaganda and subversion. No apparent conflict exists between objectives of U.S. Security agencies, having a mission of dealing with covert espionage and subversive agents, and the interests of dedicated, patriotic citizen-soldiers who are exposed to overt application, in their own home communities, of subverision and propaganda directed toward undermining military preparedness, a "will to fight" and moral stamina of our Armed Forces.

b. The Manhattan "Cold War" Seminar created positive reaction toward and identification of Communist-subversive efforts and materially improved the intelligence collection effort in military communities. In recognizing the true nature of the enemy a greater mobilization and combat readiness should be realized not only in intelligence but in other branches as well.