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duty training units had been receiving detailed orientation on Communist subversion, propaganda, and infiltration in their military Reserve training program in 1959 and 1960 and were switched to instruction given by the State Department, USIS, and CIA in 1961.

Did you know that?
Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I am not familiar with that.



Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, it would seem to me that in a cold war the Department of Defense needs to keep completely current on the latest propaganda and subversive pressure groups whose apparent purpose is to undermine our military strength, interfere with military education and downgrade morale and dedication in our services.

The Communist-inspired "bring our boys home” propaganda campaign following World War II was identified too late to keep the Department of Defense mobilization policy on a reasonable basis.

The American “Save Our Sons” campaign by the “SOS Committee” was belatedly identified in 1957, several years after it had served its usefulness, as a vehicle for subversion of our own men in North Korean POW camps. DOD learned too late of the methods used by American “SOS” Communists to help the Communist break our men under brutal physical, mental, and moral pressures.

The campaign against the film ''Operation Abolition” and against military cold war seminars for the active services, Reserves, and National Guard also will be documented some day as forming a link in the chain to enslave us.

We are too slow in our reactions to Communist plots of subversion. They are masters of changing their approach the moment they suspect identification of their schemes of molding, influencing, and twisting the opinions of our people against patriotism, loyalty, and pride in our services.

I am wondering if the Department of Defense is doing the job that needs to be done, a thorough job of educating our men as to the techniques of communism.

This is the first step toward understanding the enemy. If the services neglect such training, the cold war could be won by the Communists.

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FORT BRAGG REPORT ON "MULTIPLE DISCIPLINARY REPORTS" I listened intently as some of the more knowledgeable witnesses told us of the indications of lack of discipline, even during the recent callup of the Reserves. We tend to shy away from such things as this report from Fort Bragg. Yet, it reveals the pattern of defiance of our way of life. This report is:


Fort Bragg, N.C., January 12, 1962. Subject: Multiple Disciplinary Reports. To: Commanders, all units assigned or attached XVIII Airborne Corps (Fort

Bragg) and Fort Bragg. 1. Repeated emphasis has been placed on the necessity for aggressive action by commanders to eliminate undesirables from the service. Delinquency re

ports continue to list offenders with numerous previous violations. It is desirable that a reasonable effort be made to salvage the individual and convert him into a good soldier. However, after a commander has made a reasonable but unsuccessful effort to rehabilitate the individual, elimination action should be initiated without further delay.

That is signed for the commander, William J. Cullen, first lieutenant, Adjutant General's Corps, Assistant Adjutant General.

The subcommittee wrote a letter to the Department of Defense inquiring into this situation. Insofar as I have been able to learn, we have received no answer from the Department of Defense.

Mr. Kendall, do you remember receiving any answer to that?

Mr. KENDALL. I would have to check, but I have no independent recollection.

Senator THURMOND. This letter was dated February 6, 1962.
Mr. KENDALL. I will be glad to check the files.

Senator THURMOND. The staff, I believe, checked it, and I understood it had not been received, but you might check it again.

Mr. KENDALL. All right, sir.


Senator THURMOND. The answer is all too clear that we cannot fight back against communism with only bigger and better provost marshalls, bigger and better jails, bigger and better public relations.

This is a conflict of ideas, a battle for basic allegiances, loyalties, and dedications. It takes basic knowledge of our goals and the goals of the enemy. Education in the nature of freedom is essential, but, more important for the military, especially, is the knowledge of our enemy, communism, its exact techniques and methods used in a type of warfare new to us.

It is clear that we in the United States are in need of a new order of battle, this one for the cold war.

Without it we are fighting in the dark against an enemy who has become accustomed to this type of warfare. In addition to strategic, technical, air and combat intelligence, we must place great emphasis upon troop intelligence to provide for Americans an understanding of the varied maneuvers, deployments, identifications, and dialectics which are being used so effectively against us by our Communist enemy. Americans must be made aware of the exact nature of our Communist enemy in this worldwide conflict being waged in the fourth dimension. This is the battle for the minds of men, and knowledge is the weapon which must be used.

One of the most basic techniques engaged in by our enemy to undermine our military preparedness is full use of antimilitary propaganda, or “revolutionary antimilitarism,” as the Communists prefer to call it.

The efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1959 to generate the education of the military on all phases of the conduct of the cold war was implemented by directives and regulations in all three branches of the services. These were well conceived, effective, and hard-hitting. Regrettably, much of their beneficial impact has been undone by witting or unwitting obstruction to the education programs which the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated. It does not matter whether the obstruction came about intentionally or unintentionally, for the end result has been the same. I believe that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should have knowledge in the techniques and effects of antimilitary propaganda.



Let me read from the magazine published by the Air Force Association in November 1961:

Possibly the most revealing thing Mr. Sylvester said before the Newark TV camera was that he thinks "there are times when the newsman's interest and the official's interest must inevitably conflict."

The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs further says, in the TV interview, that “we are trying to reduce the public relations aspect of new weapons."

One of Mr. Sylvester's favorite approaches to his consecrated task of smashing what he sees as a misalliance of the military defense industry and the press is the bypassing or sidetracking of the existing machinery for doing what should be his job. Military information services, industry information offices, and the regular Pentagon press corps are somewhat consistently shunted aside in one of Washington's most efficient utilizations of "controlled news.”

Mr. Secretary, could you explain just what the author of this article had in mind when he said that you see a misalliance of the military defense industry, and sidetracking the existing machinery for doing what should be done?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have not any idea what was in his mind, Senator, but if he had anything in his mind, he was out of his mind. He was talking through his hat.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, that completes my examination.

Senator STENNIS. All right, thank you, Senator.
Mr. Kendall, do you have any questions!
Mr. KENDALL. No, sir, Mr. Chairman.



Senator STENNIS. Mr. Sylvester, there is one question I have that might have been touched on to some extent.

Senator Thurmond referred to it then. You might have covered it at some other time today. But, go over again the reasons for shelving this film "Operation Abolition." You did not prohibit it.

As I remember, Secretary McNamara said that he thought the film was all right except that the time could be better used with some other film or the lesson could be made more vivid. What do you say on that?

I never have understood it. That is a very impressive film to me. I never have understood the downgrading of it. Now, you give us your opinion on that again, will you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator.

To begin with, Mr. Chairman, I have no power to remove that film from anything

Senator STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. SYLVESTER. And did not exert

any When I first went to the Pentagon in January, January 21, 1961, there was starting a controversy over that film. The controversy was

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originally initiated by the groups such as the AFL-CIO, Norman Thomas, and I suppose groups you would call liberal.

It seemed to me very evident that the supporters of the film were going to come back and support what they believed was the value of that film, particularly in view of the violence of the attack on one side was obviously going to bring an equally violent defense of the film.

I saw the film. I was also informed by Mr. Broger that he was then making a film from the original material for the Defense Department, and all I could foresee was that the Defense Department was in the middle of a very vicious controversy over a film (1) which it did not make, (2) which it was not responsible for, and (3) for which it had its own substitute.

Furthermore, the film itself, without any regard to its merit or demerit, was from secondary sources, and so that the Defense Department, when I talked to Mr. Broger, January-February, I suggested that in his film he return to the original sources; that is to say, the two television films from which the film was cut; and that he make it, as he said he was doing, from the point of view of the needs of informing the troops, which is his function.

Senator STENNIS. You suggested that he go back, now, to the original filming of this activity, as I understand it.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely.
Senator STENNIS. And make another film?

Mr. SYLVESTER. He said he was making one and was going to make one to replace that, and this would be a film which, since it was our own production, tailored to our own needs, made by our own people, from the original material, not from a secondary source; as I saw it then and as I see it now, it would be as if I, as a reporter, had quoted you on the basis of what somebody else said and you would say to me, “ Sylvester, if you had come to me, I could have told you."

" İt seemed to me that any film we were using for our instruction, we should go to the original film source, and this is what was my idea.

In the meantime, it seemed to me very clear that we would only be in the midst of a storm that we alone could lose from. We could win nothing.

Senator STENNIS. Did you finish this film that you were talking about?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The film was made. Again, this is not in my bailiwick.

We do not make these films. It was made.

As these training films are made, it was made in the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower).

Senator STENNIS. Was it made and used ? Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I am sure it was. As a matter of fact, it was highly recommended by the American Legion at their convention last year.

Senator STENNIS. What was the name of that film? I forgot to ask

you that.

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Mr. SYLVESTER. “Communist Target-Youth."
Senator STENNIS. And that is the film, then, I suppose, that Secre-

tary McNamara referred to in his testimony last September?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am quite sure it must be.

Senator STENNIS. That was coming out about that time?
Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

Senator Thurmond had brought out earlier in a response I made to a letter, I think it was to Senator Javits, I had said on the basis of the information furnished by the people making it, that it was to be ready in October.

The fact was that it was not so ready and eventually, when it came to Mr. McNamara after his appearances here that this had been delayed and delayed, he simply laid the law down that this film was to take priority and they were to get it out in a very short time. They then went to work on it.

Senator STENNIS. Did that new film carry the actual pictures, at least some of them, that were in the other one?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Definitely.

Senator STENNIS. Actual pictures of the youth demonstrations there against the congressional committee? Mr. SYLVESTER. Correct.

Senator STENNIS. I thought that was one of the great strengths of it; that the American people would be impressed. It was so real. It was true. Here was a demonstration against an arm of the Government.

Mr. SYLVESTER. And the film also, I think, Senator, takes a wider angle, and it shows that San Francisco is one in a pattern, and that this emphasis and this drive by the Communists to infiltrate youth was obvious in Venezuela and elsewhere, as shown in the film.

Senator STENNIS. I think that the moderate and more conservativethinking people of the Nation were naturally shocked and surprised, and properly surprised, too, when that film was taken off the prescribed list.

I would like to see that second film that you mentioned. I have not

Mr. SYLVESTER. We can certainly very easily make arrangements for showing it.

Mr. KENDALL. We have a copy of it.
Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I think you have.

seen it.


Senator STENNIS. We certainly thank you.

You have been accommodating to the subcommittee by coming here so early this morning on such very short notice, and you have the thanks of the subcommittee.

Mr. SYLVESTER. At any time, Senator, I am always at your disposal
Senator STENNIS. Senator, do you have anything else?
Senator THURMOND. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator STENNIS. All right, Mr. Sylvester.
Thank you very much.
We appreciate your attention.


The statement of Mr. James 0. Atkinson, by the consent of the subcommittee is hereby made a part of the record.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Atkinson appears as an addendum to the record.)

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