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Senator STENNIS. There is on file with the subcommittee a number of prepared statements which should be placed in the record before it is closed. Some of these were requested by the subcommittee and some by individual Senators. Some were voluntarily filed with us without being requested. While it would have been preferable to have placed these statements in the record earlier, several of them were filed only recently. All of these statements will be placed in the record at this point.
(The statements referred to are as follows:)
NEW YORK, January 31, 1962. Hon. JOHN STENNIS, U.S. Senate, Chairman, Special Preparedness Subcommittee, Committee on
Armed Services, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You have requested me to furnish my views in writing to this Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services appointed to study and appraise the use of military personnel and facilities in cold war education activities. I welcome an opportunity to comply with this request.
The questions to which you have suggested I particularly address myself are comprehensive and profound. Many of them have been studied and debated throughout history.
I am confident, therefore, I cannot do justice to the detail without some months of research, consultation, and reflective thought. Only then could I be satisfied that I was making a well informed contribution toward a solution of these difficult questions. Many of them have no clear answer, but depend on relationships and judgments developed over years of experimentation in the great adventure of our American system of Government.
In order to reduce the magnitude of the problem, as I see it, and be able to state something meaningful, I have confined my statement to certain fundamental points. These bear on the subject of your review and come within the range of my experience. This treatment of the issues before you is not precisely in the form requested, but I trust it will be acceptable and helpful.
I shall state certain convictions I hold important and shall comment in more detail on each point. In my judgment, these cannot be discussed separately, but are completely interrelated. 1. The U.S. military establishment must be kept out of partisan politics
(a) There can be no argument about the preservation of the nonpolitical character of the military. Partisan politics are not their business. Their involvement would be against the national tradition and interest. Our wise forefathers established the President also as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Officers are selected for rank and are promoted in accordance with established selection processes, not on a political basis, but in competition with their contemporaries, based on their professional competence.
(6) The military continue their responsibilities regardless of a political change of Administration. I have never inquiried into the politics of an active duty officer or enlisted man and I have never known any other civilian in authority to do so.
(c) However, since Korea, a new difficulty has developed. Under another heading, I discuss the vast size of the Department of Defense and the impact it now has on all our citizens. This has produced a circumstance where in a sense politics has come to the military. Whatever they say and w ever they do can inadvertently cause them to be exploited politically. Military people have and must have full knowledge of political issues and of our political institutions. Now more than ever, they must act in a disciplined manner and with restraint.
(d) Personally, I would encourage the appointment of a nonpolitical civilian staff within the Department of Defense. I would hope that the Secretary of Defense, the service Secretaries, and their appointed assistants would themselves become nonpolitical. Of course, they must support the Administration and give absolute loyalty to the President under whom they serve. They will be obliged to defend approved programs in Congress and publicly. Normally they would be of the same political party. However, I believe they should remove themselves from direct political activities, or public appearances which are under strictly partisan auspices. In June 1960 I testified to this general effect before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, of which Senator Henry M. Jackson was Chairman. II. The U.S. military must carry out national policy, not create it
(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are by law also military advisers to the President. Under the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services engage in continuous long-range planning which is in great detail and most thorough and provides for every conceivable contingency. The resulting plans, when approved, shape the extent of military requirements and provide the tools for foreign policy.
(6) In cold war, or what Gen. George Marshall called "a prolonged test of endurance," there is an indivisible partnership between the Departments of State and Defense, especially in the planning cycle. Position papers are debated and minority points of view are reflected. Ultimately the Secretary of Defense is injected into this process. With support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his own office, he originates drafts for policy papers and does not merely react to preliminary proposals of the State Department. His department carries responsibility for the Armed Forces and the mission of execution. He can accept, change, or disagree completely with his planners. If his position is at variance with that of the Secretary of State, the question will go to the President for decision. The military play a vital role in this process all the way to decision. Often the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sit in meetings of the National Security Council when policy questions involving or related to military matters are under discussion. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attends all meetings and the Secretary of Defense is a statutory member of the National Security Council, which advises the President on national policy.
(c) At the time of decision, the role of the military ceases. Their contribution is never ending as advisers and planners, and their opinions are important and should be heard. They may influence policy, but decision is not theirs and they ought not create policy. Rather, they must execute loyally the decisions made by the civilians responsible. III. Civilian control of the military is essential and must be effective and real
(a) Civilian control, in a historic sense, is not debatable. I have never heard it questioned. Military men respect it and believe in it. There have been occasions when a weak appointee has forced some temporary internal management by military officers, but this has invariably been corrected and it has rarely applied.
(b) No military man nor military group wants political control. I have no fear whatsoever in this regard. "The man on the white horse” is no more real than Don Quixote tilting at windmills and is a foolish worry of some ex. tremists. This will not and cannot happen under our system and it would never be accepted by responsible officers.
(C) The definition of civilian control is a little obsolete and somewhat dated. It brings to mind a small elite military group of whom political leaders were fearful one hundred years ago. Now the Department of Defense includes more than four million persons, military and civilian, and employs many more millions indirectly. The Department of Defense originates a high percentage of all research. It spends over half of the Federal budget. In one way or another it touches every family and every home. The forces in being are the largest peacetime forces in history. It has become truly a civilian-military force presently engaged in a cold war, but alert and prepared, if called upon, for any military action. Essentially it is a civilian force trained and commanded by military professionals. Many of the officers and a high percentage of the men are short-time soldiers, sailors, and airmen who hopefully will return to their civilian occupations. All over the world, technicians, scientists, management experts, and the military work side by side throughout the establishment, even on active military operational sites. One can seldom distinguish between them. To refer continuously to the words “civilian control,” under modern circumstances, can have an adverse effect upon the morale and dignity of the Regular officer who not only has never questioned it, but who now lives in an environment which encompasses a vast part of the daily life and business of the country. Perhaps in the future we shall establish a new term to describe the civilianmilitary relationship and more accurately define their respective roles. We need it.
IV. The U.S. military must be completely informed on all issues and on all
aspects of threat, real or potential, against the United States (a) The entire Military Establishment must be as completely informed as possible on any threat to our national security in order to perform its mission. For intelligence reasons, they all do not need detail, but they must have available to them agreed upon facts or best estimates. Only with full information can planning and military effectiveness be intelligent.
(6) Regular officers are highly educated professional men and many hold graduate degrees in a great number of specialities. Their educational process continues throughout their active careers. They are and should be exposed to a variety of points of view. In this belief, I have supported defense strategy seminars along with other lectures, printed material, and meetings which presented opportunities to broaden and sharpen thinking. Education of the military is no longer restricted to military subjects or war games. The threat posed by the U.S.S.R. is far broader and on every front. Today our military must have a solid understanding of international politics, scientific trends and advances, economic forces, and of a wide variety of social problems. Education of selective officers in these areas has been carried on at the War College and in the universities of our country so that these officers, like all students, have been exposed to every sort of idea, whether or not it conformed to current Administration policies.
(c) There should be no restrictions on what is available to the military. As citizens, they read everything anyone else does and are exposed to all sides of all issues. Their lives are spent thinking ahead and they are disciplined for possible action. They should, therefore, be given unrestricted access to all information which will aid and guide them in their work. V. Public statements by active duty officers must be coordinated in advance
within the Administration (a) Unadvoidably, statements and public speeches by senior military officers involve questions of foreign policy. It never occurred to me, as either Secretary of the Navy or Secretary of Defense, to make a public statement which was uncoordinated. At best, communications are difficult within a government as large as we must have and which deals with the ever changing world complexion. It would be entirely possible that I might not have been immediately informed of a pending negotiation, important conversation, or imminent decision by the President or the Secretary of State, either bilaterally with one of our allies or in the discussions at an important international conference. Therefore, as a measure of guidance, all senior officials of the Department of Defense must coordinate their public statements under some formal system. I realize this is difficult to do by directive, equally difficult to administer, and certainly a censorship group should not be established for this purpose per se. A channel for coordination must exist, however, apart from the standard review for security measures.
I believe that public statements involving national policy, domestic or foreign, should be confined to very senior officials and should be reviewed on a case by case basis by persons of similar rank and responsibilities within the Executive Department. After this review, an individual must use his own judgment as to the way he states his subject in order to conform to policy and still not withhold important facts or suggestive ideas from his fellow citizens who require a better understanding of national defense. As Secretary of Defense, I established the principle that Service Secretaries, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four-star officers could use their own judgment in public statements. However, I urged them to use the coordination process as a service for guidance. To the best of my knowledge, they all chose to use this service. Every officer always has the right of appeal to his Service Secretary, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or to the Secretary of Defense. If there was a real issue about a proposed statement, and I agreed with the position of the officer involved, I would have had no hesitancy about bringing it up with the Secretary of State or the head of any other Executive Department for mutual resolution. VI. Officers on active duty must be free to express informed, factual views on
the military aspects of issues (a) The citizens of the United States certainly expect military officers to discuss the military interpretation of national issues and to inform those under their command—and, in fact, all citizens—of any threat we face as a nation. Military officials live today in a continuous alert status. They are responsible for national security and are deeply involved in all phases of it. They are its heart and soul. They must be permitted to speak freely and disclose truthfully and factually everything they can.
(6) It is often difficult for them to avoid a service influence and sometimes there has been an inclination to push a personal opinion rather than stick strictly to subjects that have been decided already and are embodied in current United States or Defense policy. This accent on a particular aspect is natural, but it is harmful. Such views should be expressed within the Department of Defense or, if called for, before Congressional Committees, and should not be exploited in the public domain. There is a growing tendency to talk too much and too often.
(c) Military officers must control and confine their remarks consistent with the discipline under which they live, relate facts, and not reargue decisions. On the other hand, as professional individuals and important citizens, they have a responsibility to inform the Nation and to create a better understanding about the state of our national defense and its capabilities in relation to the Communist threat. And, as stated before, they must avoid the danger of being drawn into political debate. VII. Officers on active duty must train, indoctrinate, and inform those under
their command on our national values, our democratic system, on the reasons for military service, oversea deployment, family separation, or civilian
career interference, and set an example of leadership (a) I have listed my seventh point because I consider that it has been somewhat unclear and is interwoven with the subjects now being reviewed by the Committee. A great many of the problems under discussion can be resolved by judgment and leadership. There has been some public misconception of the issues because the importance of responsible leadership has not been accented. An officer must be a leader, bear the mantle of leadership, and always carry the burden of command. As Secretary of the Navy, I found that leadership could be improved, and I instituted a new General Order with the hope that it would improve. It is understandably difficult, with present-day continuous rotation and the induction into the service of many nonprofessional individuals who must, after a reasonably short time, undertake noncommissioned officer and officer responsibilities. To me, it is vital that all officers and senior civilians of the Department of Defense pay great attention to questions of morale and devote a large part of their time to informing the men and women, some of whom are under their control only temporarily, about the reasons for their service.
I believe the seven points listed above are agreed to by most Americans.
The difficulties arise in their execution, in an imbalance between them, in their administration, and in the frailty of human nature which sometimes succumbs to pressures or self-interest or a first-class lack of judgment.
To a major degree, these fundamental concepts are indivisible. Accent on any one to the exclusion of the others can bring only difficulties, half-truths, and misunderstanding. In my opinion, the whole represents our national philosophy and our best interests.
In all walks of life, personal ambition, misguided enthusiasm, or a lack of understanding of the meaning of leadership can reduce or even ruin the effective ness of an individual. When this occurs in the military, however, it can be harmful to far more than the person. It can have an effect on one of our great military services, on our overall military posture, or on United States policy. The United States military has to have the confidence of all citizens. If this confidence falters, we are in serious trouble.
These things are easy to say but difficult to practice or administer. They are truisms built on faith and experience. They do not sharpen into rules or the language of orders. Rather, they are a part of us all, of our check and balance system, and are fundamental to our ideals and our way of running our society.
I have great respect for and confidence in the officers and men of our Armed Forces. I have served with them in several capacities under various conditions for twelve years of my life. I admire their integrity and their strong convictions, and treasure the friendships and the support they have always given me. Very respectfully,
THOMAS S. GATES.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ROBERT GOLDTHWAITE, U.S. NAVY, TO THE SENATE
SPECIAL PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE
It is a privilege and pleasure to submit to the committee the following state ment concerning the leadership program of the Naval Air Training Command during my tenure as Chief of Naval Air Training.
The mission of the command was threefold :
(1) To train all the new naval aviators and naval aviation officers required by the Navy and Marine Corps ;
(2) To train the aviation technicians of those services; and (3) To train and maintain a ready Naval Air Reserve.
To carry out this mission the command was organized into four functional subordinate commands, namely:
(1) The Naval Air Basic Training Command; (2) The Naval Air Advanced Training Command ; (3) The Naval Air Technical Training Command; and (4) The Naval Air Reserve Training Command. Each of these functional commanders was headed by a flag officer with staff. The first two of the above functional commands were responsible for training the new naval aviators (pilots) and naval aviation officers (nonpilots) required by the Navy. These programs were conducted at eight naval air stations three each in the Pensacola, Fla., and Corpus Christi, Tex., areas, and one each in Mississippi and Louisiana.
The Naval Air Technical Training Command was located, in large part, at the Naval Air Station Memphis, Tenn., with other units at Philadelphia ; Lakehurst, N.J.; and Glynco, Ga.
The Naval Air Reserve Training Command was spread throughout the United States at naval air stations located near major population centers such as South Weymouth, Mass.—which is the Greater Boston area; New York; Lake hurst; Willow Grove, Pa., near Philadelphia ; Washington, D.C.; Norfolk, Va.; and Jacksonville, Fla. Other units cover the Deep South at Memphis, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Dallas, Tex. Olathe, Kans.; Grosse Ile, near Detroit; Chicago; and Minneapolis are the areas in the Midwest. Seattle; Naval Air Station, Oakland-now the Naval Air Reserve Training Unit, Alameda; and Los Alamitos, near Los Angeles, cover the west coast area.
In 1957 when I took over, the command consisted of some 75,000 officers and men, the students of the pilot training program being 2- to 4-year college students, and those at the technical schools with a minimum of high school education. The ages of the students in these two groups range from approximately 17 to 28 years of age. The Naval Air Reserve, better known as "weekend warriors," are veterans who have served in the active Navy for some time and have gone back to civil life for their vocation. Many of them are prominent in business and in the social structure of their communities. Although the naval air stations are located near the large population centers, these patriotic citizens come from as far away as some 250 to 300 miles from their assigned stations to perform their weekend training.
Now, while keeping in mind the age groups of these personnel, and the wide spread areas from which they are drawn, I would like to relate a little of the history of the leadership program of the Naval Air Training Command. A few months after I took command in August of 1957 an officer from the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington came down to brief me on some of the delinquency problems of the Navy as a whole, relating them to similar problems of the youth of the United States.
At this briefing I was informed that from 1950 to 1957 the population growth of the United States was up about 13 percent, while crime of all sorts increased some 56 percent. The worst part of this was that 47.2 percent of all major crimes were committed by youngsters 17 years of age or younger and 39 percent of the major crimes were committed by youngsters 14 years of age or younger. During the years covered by these statistics, a major crime took place in some part of the United States every 11 seconds. At the rate of increase in crime, 20 percent of all youngsters soon would have juvenile court records. The Navy at that time was rejecting some 43 percent of all applicants for enlistment because of mental, moral, or physical reasons.
These are rather startling crime statistics and according to the FBI the trend has been upward in recent years. The last indication I have seen was that the