Art. 10.-THE NEW PACIFICISM.

1. The Great Illusion. By Norman Angell. London: Heinemann, 1911.

2. Memories and Studies (Essay on Peace and War). By William James. London: Longmans, 1911.

3. The Passing of War. By the Rev. W. L. Grane. London: Macmillan, 1912.

4. War and its Alleged Benefits. By J. Novikow. London: Heinemann, 1912.

5. Modern Wars and War Taxes: a manual of military finance. By W. R. Lawson. Edinburgh: Blackwood,

1912.

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WHEN a book, which was first published in November 1909, has already gone through five editions and been translated into ten languages, it might be regarded as unnecessary to restate at length its author's thesis before examining his contentions. The Great Illusion,' however, has suffered so much from friends and enemies through misunderstanding and misstatement both of its theory and of its conclusions that perhaps it is as well to set forth briefly Mr Norman Angell's point of view, before proceeding to appraise his exposition of a subject of such importance as the place of war in the modern world, and his judgment on a question so momentous. Mr Angell tells us that

...

'he sets out to prove that military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage; that it is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjugating another. The idea that addition of territory adds to a nation's wealth is an optical illusion of like nature, since the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. ... International finance has become so interdependent and so interwoven with trade and industry that the intangibility of an enemy's property extends to his trade.

'In the second part-"The Human Nature of the Case the author shows that human nature is not unchanging ; that the warlike nations do not inherit the earth; that warfare does not make for the survival of the fittest or virile; that the struggle between nations is no part of the evolu

tionary law of man's advance . . . that physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs, and that this diminution carries with it profound psychological modifications; that society is classifying itself by interests rather than by State divisions; that the modern State is losing its homogeneity; and that these multiple factors are making rapidly for the disappearance of State rivalries' (pp. vi, viii). These theories Mr Angell supports with a wealth of closely reasoned argument, which makes his book one of the most damaging indictments that have yet appeared of the principles governing the relations of civilised nations to one another. We have been taught to believe that it is good for a country to be powerful; that success in war adds to a nation's strength; that defeat may mean ruin; that patriotism is a virtue deep-rooted in the best instincts of man; that man's nature is, and always will be, such that on certain questions of prime importance he can only admit the final arbitrament of force. To a Europe which for generation after generation has paid homage to the God of Battles till war-at least the preparation for war and the avoidance of war-has become the first preoccupation of its statesmen and the weightiest burden laid upon its peoples, there comes Mr Angell with the pronouncement that on these questions all our ideas are based upon illusions-the illusion that victory is more profitable than defeat, and the illusion that patriotism has a place in the modern world.

Even from the brief presentation of Mr Angell's thesis given above it is clear that in his hands the conduct of 'the war against war,' which was one of the salient characteristics of the later years of the nineteenth century and is even more so that of the early years of the twentieth, is taking a new form. With the old Pacificism, the Pacificism of the Quakers, of Tolstoi, and of all those who hold that war must not be tolerated because on the one hand it is a crime against Humanity and on the other an outrage on the God of Love, the world has long been familiar, without however becoming convinced either of the truth of its contentions or of their practical applicability to the affairs of nations. Mr Angell recognises this fact, and attributes the failure of the old Pacificism to the admission, expressed or implied in the writings of its exponents, that material gain does ensue from

successful war, and that national strength and prestige derivable from such strength do enhance the prosperity and well-being of the inhabitants of powerful nations. In short, the old Pacificism has failed because it admits the premise of the old Diplomacy, and has confined itself to an attack on the ultimate method of expression of that old Diplomacy, i.e. war. The new Pacificists, if we may so describe Mr Angell and his followers, accept the truth of Clausewitz's fundamental proposition that 'war is the continuation of policy by other means.' By implication they realise that, since it is illogical to attack the idea of war while admitting the validity of the policy of which war is the natural continuation, they can only eliminate from the world war and preparation for warwhich in common with the older Pacificists they hold to be evils-by undermining the foundations of national policy upon which ultimately rests the resort to force among the nations. To make war impossible, the older Pacificists appealed to the heart and soul of man; the new Pacificists make their appeal to his pocket. For the dictum 'war is wrong' is substituted the phrase war does not pay.' For a moment there prevailed among the Pacificists of Europe another aphorism, of which we have not heard much since the recent great struggle in Manchuria, an aphorism which may be traced to M. de Bloch. It may be summarised as the proposition that science has endowed combatants with weapons so potent that war must kill itself, since no modern attacking force could hope to force its victorious way through the storm of fire which an improved armament had placed in the hands of the defender; and that, attack being no longer possible, war itself would cease to be. But the events of the Russo-Japanese War speedily dispersed this 'illusion.' From the Yalu to Mukden, by way of Port Arthur and Liao Yang, the Japanese army showed that, whatever be the armaments of the defence, the fear of death will not keep brave men from the attack, or from winning battles when they are led with skill and resolution and are animated by a pure and exalted patriotism.

Pacificism has thus passed through two phases: the appeal to the soul-'war is wrong'; and the appeal to fear-war is dangerous.' Now Mr Angell ushers in the last phase with the final appeal to the pocket—'war is

expensive, since whether you win or lose there is no money in it.' If we may judge by the reception accorded to 'The Great Illusion,' even by sections of the Press of all countries not altogether pacificist, the general consensus of opinion would seem to be that the appeal to the pocket may succeed where the appeals to fear and to altruism are acknowledged to have failed; and that love of money will in the end bring about that change in the attitude of mankind to war which could not be effected by such motives as love of right and love of life. Whether or not it is a sign of 'progress' that the advocacy of peace should have shifted its ground from the idealistic standpoint of the seventeenth century Quakers to the essentially material position in which in the twentieth century Mr Angell places it, is an arguable proposition; it depends on the nature of the change we are prepared to admit to be progress. Here it will be sufficient to note the fact of change, before we examine briefly the position adopted by Mr Angell.

In the first part of his book, on the economics of the case, Mr Angell argues that the close financial relations between nations, brought about by the present development of credit resulting in a synchronised Bank Rate, makes conquest economically futile; that, under modern conditions, confiscation of an enemy's property, and still more so of his trade, is an economic impossibility; while the imposition of a war indemnity is no profit to a nation, since, to whatever extent that indemnity injures the beaten nation, to the same extent will the victor injure himself through diminution of his trade with a customer and client whose credit and purchasing power he has reduced. The chapters in which Mr Angell developes and supports this, his main thesis, deserve to be pondered because they contain an admirable presentment of his case; and yet, since they do not cover adequately the whole economic aspect of war, they are apt to leave an undiscriminating reader with the impression that Mr Angell's case against war is stronger than it is. The fact is that the economic aspect of war is so intimately engaged with its moral aspect that the attempt to consider it as a thing apart leads directly to false inferences, logically deducible from a presentation of the case which is in fact not impartial, since an essential element in the matter

is omitted. True, Mr Angell omits it in order to consider it later; but this postponement still further confuses the issue, since in his chapters on the human nature of the case the reaction on economics of a national moral enhanced by successful war is by no means adequately dealt with.

Although we are not prepared to follow Mr Angell on to such ground of his own choosing as is implied in the statement (p. 132) that, in the last resort, the economic question lies at the bottom of the sentimental question,' we are ready to admit that, if he can prove that successful war does injure the victorious nation to an extent which will vitally cripple its national activities, he has gone far towards proving his thesis, since the object of war is either to preserve or to enhance national life in every sphere of human endeavour, of which one-and that not the least important-is commerce. We find that Mr Angell is quite ready to appeal to history to confirm his verdict on the economic futility of war, and by so doing he has unquestionably strengthened his case; but sometimes the very instances he adduces to prove his point appear to us to indicate conclusions which are not those at which he has arrived. This is not because Mr Angell has not faced facts honestly-no unbiased reader of his book will ever venture to suggest that Mr Angell is disingenuous-but solely because he has committed the initial error of endeavouring to disengage the moral and economic aspects of war, and has set himself to consider each without taking sufficiently into account the action and reaction upon it of the other.

As an example of what we mean, we will take Mr Angell's analysis of the economic position of Germany after the Franco-German war. With justice he points. out that one effect of the war, and of the receipt of the great indemnity paid by France, was to disorganise the finances of Germany, with the result that it was not for some years that German industry began to prosper. He admits that after the first decade Germany's trade has shown an expansion which has not been shown by that of France,' but he continues (p. 86):

'Those who are hypnotised by this quietly ignore altogether one great fact which has marked both France and Germany, not since the war but during the whole of the nineteenth century; and that fact is that the population of France, from