pates through the Secretary of Defense in the conduct of negotiations in the North Atlantic Council and is also represented in various subordinate bodies of that organization through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies of the Department.

The Department of Defense also has an active partnership at the present time with the principal economic agencies of the Government in the work of the defense mobilization organization. Many of the policies formulated in these bodies, notably in regard to the export of raw materials and manufactured products and the stockpiling of strategic materials, have important implications for foreign military affairs. Certainly these policies directly affect the ability of the United States to furnish aid to foreign countries.

In arguing against this alternative, it could be pointed out that the basic functional responsibilities of the Department of Defense and of the Department of State are quite different-one is charged with military matters; the other with foreign affairs. The fact that both participate in the National Security Council does not prove that they have identical responsibilities. The council simply provides a place where the two responsibilities may be brought together and woven into a balanced pattern for presentation to the President.

Equal partnership in foreign policy would mean that the Department of State would have a right to an equal voice in military policy, and thus it would tend to defeat the whole administrative theory of division of work according to training and specialization. The principle of organizing the agencies of the Government according to major function has long been accepted. This clearly implies that each agency should have a distinct major function as the basis of its organization.

Rejection of equal partnership for the Department of Defense in foreign policy may turn on the word "equal" rather than on partnership. This, at least, would be the position of those who would argue that the primary responsibility for the formulation of foreign policy should be vested in the Department of State and that the Department of Defense should not have an equal share in those responsibilities even if permitted to participate actively.

Issue 2: Administration of the foreign military aid program

What authority and responsibility should be assigned to the Department of Defense with respect to the administration of mutual defense assistance?

It is inconceivable that the military aid program could be carried on without placing large operational responsibility in the Department of Defense and the three armed services, in view of the many strictly military aspects of the program. Nevertheless, the basic objectives of the program are such that the Department of State must also have a close and detailed interest in many aspects of program policy and

operations. It would therefore be undesirable to place the military aid program completely under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, and none of the alternatives considered under this issue proposes such a course. Moreover, as noted in the last chapter, mutual defense assistance has come to include a significant element of economic aid, and other forms of economic assistance are being increasingly directed to the support of military aid. The interrelationships between military and economic aid and the problems of coordination that arise in consequence will be the subject of further discussion in the next chapter.

Here we are concerned primarily with the responsibilities of the Department of Defense in relation to those of the Department of State, and the alternatives to be discussed should all be understood as referring primarily to aid in the form of military equipment and training. Supporting economic aid is excluded even though financed from mutual defense funds. In defining responsibilities between the two departments within these terms of reference, the problem is to establish clear organizational relationships for handling military aid while at the same time maintaining equally clear channels for determining and communicating the policies under which the program as a whole should operate.

The major alternatives which will be discussed are (1) delegation on a day-by-day basis, (2) delegation on an approved program basis, and (3) full delegation of authority and operational responsibility with the Department of State furnishing only general foreign policy guidance.

Alternative 1 is delegation of responsibility for operations to the Department of Defense on a day-by-day basis with fiscal and operational controls retained in the Department of State.

This alternative assumes that complete fiscal and operational controls for all parts of the program would be retained in the Department of State, which would merely delegate responsibility on a day-by-day basis to the Department of Defense. The defense establishment would act as the administrative agency for the Department of State in providing items of military equipment to aided countries as directed.

The presumed advantage of this arrangement would be that one agency alone would have the predominant responsibility for all program operations. It would center responsibility and insure that funds provided by Congress for foreign aid were used for the purposes for which appropriated. It would also insure close coordination of the program with major foreign policies.

There are disadvantages, however, in this alternative. It would require both the Department of State and the Department of Defense to process a great quantity of routine work through channels within both Departments. This would cause delay because of the number

of persons involved and also because the technical nature of most of the work would be completely unfamiliar to the Department of State. The decisions as to the weapons to be supplied should be based upon strategic and tactical considerations, as well as upon availabilities. Such technical questions by their nature would be beyond the competence of Department of State personnel.

It might be argued further that the maintenance of effective controls would not require such detailed processing of individual items through the Department of State. Foreign policy governing relations with each of the countries receiving military aid can be broadly conceived. The attainment of foreign policy objectives on a countryby-country basis does not require such detailed control of operation. Alternative 2 is delegation of operational responsibility on an approved program basis with fiscal controls retained by the Department of State.

Substantially this arrangement is in effect at present. Its continuation would assume that within the authorized appropriation, the Department of Defense would have the responsibility for preparing a detailed military aid program for each country based upon strategic plans and broad objectives. Once the Department of State approved these programs the Department of Defense would have the responsibility for carrying them out with little day-to-day oversight by the Department of State. This alternative would involve a post audit to determine whether the operating agency had indeed fulfilled its programs. Fiscal control would be retained by the Department of State.

A distinction would be made between policy determination and policy execution. The Department of State would have primary responsibility in determining policy with the participation of the Department of Defense, but the execution of the program would rest with the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense would be restricted within a comprehensive policy framework which it had helped devise, but within that framework it could apply its resources to the problem of efficiently and effectively translating the program into operation.

The disadvantages of this alternative are that it would divide administrative responsibility between two agencies, the Departments of State and Defense. It might be argued that there is a certain risk in permitting the Department of Defense so much operational freedom once a program has been approved. This disadvantage would have to be weighed against the advantages of flexibility.

Alternative 3 is full delegation of authority and operational responsibility with the Department of State furnishing only general foreign policy guidance.

Funds for aid in the form of military equipment and training would go directly to the Department of Defense, with no fiscal control on the

part of the Department of State. The Department of Defense would be in a position of administrative autonomy similar to that of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the European recovery program.

It has been argued that the Department of Defense should program and administer all parts of military aid (other than supporting economic aid), with the Department of State furnishing only general foreign policy guidance. Under this alternative the Department of State would establish and set forth policies under which the military assistance program could operate. The Department of Defense would have full authority to determine the type, character, and extent of the military equipment and training to be furnished to meet approved policies. It would have complete administrative and operational control consistent with the foreign policy fixed by the Department of State.

The advantages are put forward in terms of maximum program flexibility. It is suggested that conditions both internationally and within a given foreign country change quickly, and the Department of Defense ought to have the authority to adjust the military assistance program with a minimum of red tape to meet these changing needs. Rearmament of the free world already has been overlong delayed. Speed is of the utmost importance. The military problems inherent in rearmament are in themselves numerous and complicated. The purely administrative aspects of the program, consequently, should be kept as simple as possible. Full delegation of authority to the operating agency is the best means to this goal.

Such an arrangement, it might be argued, would have a number of disadvantages. The Department of Defense is far from certain that it wishes complete responsibility or that it would be able to operate effectively under this alternative. Military assistance is not purely a defense problem. It is one of executing policy to attain national objectives. Foreign policy is not a static body of doctrine, either in general or for particular countries. It changes with the times and may require constant adjustment in varying degrees in the operation of foreign aid programs. Like the first alternative, this one seems to have the advantage of simplicity since substantially all authority and responsibility would be lodged in one department. Such a pattern, however, may seem to reflect an oversimplication of the problem that would place responsibilities in a department unable to fulfill them effectively.

Issue 3: Participation in the administration of occupied areas

What should be the responsibility of the Department of Defense and the armed services for the government and administration of occupied areas?

An examination of this issue must be conducted in the light of a variety of problems that have arisen in the administration of occupied areas since the Second World War. The nature of the occupation in both Germany and Japan has been tempered to a great extent by the international, multilateral cooperation required, the personalities involved, the absence of predetermined courses of action, and the lack of experience in conducting large-scale nonmilitary operations abroad on the part of the United States Government. The policies followed may not necessarily have been the most desirable solutions to the problems faced.

The present issue is closely related to the parallel issue in the next chapter on the responsibilities of the Department of State for administration of occupied areas. The treatment in both chapters recognizes that the total job of administration of occupied areas, as stated in chapter II, is in part military, in part diplomatic, and in part governmental in the general sense. Because of the nature of the total job, parts of it must inevitably be performed by the military agency, the Department of Defense, and parts of it by the diplomatic agency, the Department of State. It does not follow that either Department should necessarily be responsible for those parts of the job that are analogous, for example, to state and local government within the United States, although at present responsibilities of that nature are assigned to the Department of Defense for Japan and to the Department of State for Germany.

In the present chapter, the preoccupation is with the responsibilities of the Department of Defense. The principal objective here is to clarify the line between the parts of the task that should be under the military agency and the parts that should be assigned to a civilian agency or agencies, including the Department of State. In the next chapter, attention will be devoted to the distinctions between those parts of the task which would appear necessarily to be the business of the Department of State and those that might alternatively be assigned elsewhere if it is concluded that they should be administered under civil auspices.

So far as the possible responsibilities of the Department of Defense are concerned, the main alternatives would appear to be three in number, namely, (1) the principal responsibility for a limited time, (2) a limited responsibility throughout the period of the occupation, and (3) the principal responsibility throughout the period of the occupation.

Alternative 1 is to limit all responsibilities of the Department of Defense to the period during and immediately following hostilities and to transfer those responsibilities as soon as possible to a civilian administrative agency.