mandate, the Department of State has attempted to use private agencies wherever possible.

Under the officially sponsored programs there are four broad categories of persons involved in the exchanges: students, professors and specialists, teachers, and leaders. The last category includes political leaders, labor leaders, and others. Exchanges conducted by private agencies, however, comprise the overwhelming majority in total numbers of persons.

Private agencies in the exchange program are used in two types of relationships: contract and voluntary. The Department of State contracts with such agencies as the Institute of International Education and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils to administer the exchange of students, research scholars, and teachers. On a voluntary basis, the Department cooperates with various binational commissions and other private groups that may be interested in exchanges.

Other functions of the Department of State

Although this chapter is concerned primarily with the major foreign programs of today, other functions of the Department of State should be pointed out. These functions may be divided into two groups.

The first group clusters around the role of the Department as the principal adviser to, and representative of, the President for foreign affairs. Advice is given to the President either directly or through such organs as the National Security Council. Advice is also given to other executive departments and agencies on the foreign affairs aspects of their responsibilities. The amount of staff work that is involved in preparing such advice constitutes a significant part of the Department's work, and particularly in terms of the demands on the time of higher officials. The work of the Department in the field of economic analysis and research and intelligence, as well as that carried forward in the regional bureaus, supports these functions. The relations with foreign governments on behalf of the President are often concerned with matters of the highest political importance, such as relations with the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and others, and the negotiations that led to the North Atlantic Treaty. Such negotiations require careful briefing and instructing of representatives. Supplying instructions for representatives in countries all over the world and in international organizations is a large-scale operation.

It is also the duty of the Department to provide information and interpretation of events to the Congress and to prepare proposals to it. It carries on many activities to inform the public about foreign affairs. These are necessary and desirable activities.

The second group of functions consists of the miscellaneous activities that are carried on by the Department and the Foreign Service

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because no other appropriate place for them has been found. These are such matters as the issuing of passports and visas, maintaining coding and communications facilities, purchasing and maintaining foreign buildings for the use of United States personnel abroad, providing services to United States seamen in foreign ports, and numerous similar activities. If the Department of State were to concentrate solely on matters of foreign policy, some other agency would have to concern itself with many routine activities that have been the responsibility of the Department since 1789.

These two groups of functions are noted here merely to emphasize the variety and complexity of the work of the Department of State as it is at present organized. The decision as to the role the Department of State should play in the administration of foreign programs must be made, in part, in the light of its other responsibilities. Administrative doctrine of the Hoover Commission

The most significant postwar study of the general role of the Department of State is found in the report of the Hoover Commission on foreign affairs. In presenting the recommendations quoted in chapter III of the present report, with their emphasis on foreign policy planning and their opposition to program operations by the Department of State, the Commission stated that

the State Department is cast in the role of the staff specialist in foreign affairs, and, pursuant to Presidential delegation, its role will involve leadership in defining and developing United States foreign policies. * Furthermore

these responsibilities necessarily will mean that, except for coordination in crucial areas where Cabinet-level committees are involved, the State Department will be the focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the Government.

This was not an unqualified statement, however, for the Commission went on to say that—

the State Department is not * the sole unit of the executive branch for determination of the objectives of the United States in world affairs or for formulating and executing foreign policies to achieve those objectives * *. The State Department should consult with and advise other departments and agencies for the purpose of bringing their experience to bear in the formulation of foreign policies * * *. [However, an agency charged with responsibility for action] should not * obtain the concurrence of other agencies prior to taking action.

be required to

The precedent of the Economic Cooperation Administration appears to have carried great weight with the Hoover Commission in making its recommendation against placing program operations in the Department of State. Relating this precedent to the question of occupied areas, the Commission recognized the "serious friction" that existed in the administrative arrangements at that time, and the

"frequent consideration" that had been given to the possibility of transferring responsibility for the civil aspects of occupied areas administration from the Department of the Army to the Department of State. In this case, the Commission found no circumstances that warranted such a transfer. It said that

it is wholly consistent with the concepts underlying this report that this administrative machinery be located outside the State Department, as, for example, in the military establishment or in a new administration of overseas affairs

The Commission set forth the general principle that the Department of State should "not undertake operational programs unless unusual circumstances exist." The context of the report would seem to justify the substitution of the words "overriding circumstances" for "unusual circumstances."

The main outlines of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission on the role of the Department of State, then, would endow it with the position of a staff aide to the President in the formulation of objectives and policy, and in the coordination of other departments and agencies participating in foreign affairs, but it would also retain responsibility for routine diplomatic and consular functions.

The concept of the Department of State as a staff aide to the President, and as a leader in defining and developing foreign policies, is consistent with the recommendation that the Department should not engage in program operations. It is a generally accepted belief that a staff agency should not participate in "line" activities.

These conclusions of the Hoover Commission left it in something of a dilemma as to how overseas program operations should be organized, as noted in chapter III. Only three members of the Commission supported establishment of the proposed Administration of Overseas Affairs. The Commission as a whole was apparently well disposed toward the existence of the Economic Cooperation Administration as a temporary agency for a special purpose and did not favor any transfer of administration of occupied areas to the Department of State even though it was dissatisfied with the manner in which the administration of occupied areas had been handled. Nevertheless, when confronted with a definite proposal for a new general purpose agency to administer overseas activities other than diplomatic and consular affairs, a majority of the Commission was prepared only to recommend that the problem be studied further.

The Hoover Commission did not recommend that the Department of State be given a veto power over the activities of operating agencies. The Commission stated that an agency charged with responsibility for action should not be required to obtain the concurrence of other agencies prior to taking action. This was an attempt to avoid divided authority and responsibility in administration, which was

one of the primary concerns of the Hoover Commission. This solution of the problem, however, would appear to place all action on a plane of equality. It gives little leverage to a department that is supposed to exercise a leadership role. Instead, it would appear to give a clear initiative in action matters to agencies that are to be led, according to the Commission's recommendations, by the Department of State.

In point of fact, however, decisions as to responsibility for foreign program administration since 1949 have not been made primarily in the light of the Commission's recommendations. As noted earlier, the Department of State has been given increasingly heavy responsibilities in program operations since that time.

MAIN ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES

The question of the role of the Department of State in a program operation and coordination involves various issues, some general and some specific. The first general issue is whether the Department should be a program operator. In the past, there have been occasions when the assignment of program operating responsibilities to the Department has been opposed on grounds that it was administratively unable to handle them; on some of those occasions, for example in the case of occupied Germany in 1945, when the War Department was unwilling to provide logistic support if the transfer was made, the Department has in effect agreed with that contention. It has also frequently been argued, from points both inside and outside the Department, that it cannot assume major program operating responsibilities without impairing its functioning as a policy agency and as an adviser to the President. This appears to have been the principal basis for the views of the Hoover Commission.

Closely related to this first general issue is that of whether there should be a general purpose foreign program operating agency other than the Department of State, an Administration of Overseas Affairs, as recommended by a minority of the Hoover Commission. While this is a separate issue to some extent, it is also in part simply a statement of the first general issue in converse form. It arises clearly as a separate issue only if the Hoover Commission's view on the general issue is accepted. Accordingly, it will not be treated as a separate issue at this point, but will be considered further in the concluding part of the chapter.

The second general issue is the nature of the Department's functions in securing the coordination of the foreign programs that it does not operate, or for which it has only a limited operating responsibility. Under any tenable concept of the Department's functions, it must have some concern for the manner in which any program is carried

on that involves relations with another government or operations on foreign territory. Does such concern mean that it should have a total responsibility for all foreign relations and operations? If not, where is the line to be drawn and on what basis? And what are the means by which the Department is to carry out effectively whatever responsibility for coordination is assigned to it?

The specific issues arise with respect to particular programs. They arise in part because the general issues are unsettled, and also because the possibility of making an exception would inevitably be considered in any important case even if the general issues could be considered settled for most purposes.

Specific issues as to the economic programs have been considered in chapter IV, while issues relating to military aid and occupied areas administration were taken up in chapter V. In the present chapter, the first specific issue to be considered is that of the responsibility of the Department of State in the administration of a unified program of military and economic aid. Some aspects of the administration of occupied areas require further attention, as well as the issue with respect to the information program. The two general issues are taken up after the argumentation on the specific issues has been completed. Issue 1: Administration of military and economic aid

What would be the appropriate responsibility of the Department of State in the administration of a unified program of military and economic aid on the assumption that the facilities of the Department of Defense and of the Economic Cooperation Administration should continue to be utilized to the maximum extent?

A unified program of military and economic aid, involving the core of United States relations with its principal allies, would obviously be so central in the entire field of foreign affairs under present conditions that the Department of State could not play merely a passive role in it. Accordingly, the alternatives to be considered under this issue include as a minimum the type of responsibility carried by the Department in connection with the European recovery program. Alternative 1 is the type of relationship that existed between the Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administration during the first 2 years of the European recovery program, extended to the Department of Defense and any other participating agencies. The advantages and disadvantages of this type of relationship have been discussed in chapter IV. In general, the argument is that this relationship was used with success for the European recovery program, that a combined military and economic aid program has much in common with the European recovery program, and that similar administrative arrangements could be extended to all participating