The issue here raised is closely related to the previous issue as to the degree of control that is to be exercised over the activities of agency representatives by the chief of the diplomatic mission. If the chief of diplomatic mission, for example, were to have full administrative and substantive control over the activities of agency representatives, it might be assumed that he should also have full control over their communications. But even this would not be agreed by the program agencies, where the point of view would undoubtedly be found that if their representatives are to be supervised abroad in ways beyond the control of the agencies, at least the agencies should be able to ascertain what is going on through free communication with their own people.

The three main alternatives to be considered are as follows: (1) full freedom of communication; (2) full freedom to send and receive communications, but with provision for informing the Department of State and the chiefs of diplomatic missions of the content of all communications, and the right on their part to comment and to register objections without delaying the communications; (3) full control of communications by the Department of State and the chiefs of diplomatic missions.

Alternative 1 is full freedom of communication without provision for informing the Department of State or the chiefs of diplomatic missions of the content of communications.

This alternative parallels alternative 1 under the preceding issue, which proposed no direct control by the chief of the diplomatic mission over the activities of representatives of agencies other than the Department of State. If no such direct control exists, it would be natural to assume that there should be full freedom of communication between the representative and his Washington principal without provision being made for copies of communications to be furnished for substantive purposes either to the Department of State or the chiefs of the diplomatic missions. Communications would enjoy administrative privacy and copies would not ordinarily be seen by persons other than those engaged in controlling administratively the facilities for transmission and in the physical task of handling messages.

The argument for this alternative is to the effect that if neither the Department of State nor the chief of the diplomatic mission is to exercise control over the activities of the agency or its overseas representatives, the latter should have full freedom of communication, since there would be no substantive reason why arrangements should be made to furnish copies of communications to the Department of State or the chief of the diplomatic mission.

The argument against this alternative is that it involves on the part of an individual agency and its overseas representatives almost complete irresponsibility in relation to the Department of State and the

ambassador, inevitably leading to uncertainties and confusion in interagency relations and in the relations of the United States with the given country. Even in the absence of authority to control the activities of the agency and its overseas representatives, knowledge of the content of communications would permit advice being given by the department or the chief of mission in order to avoid inopportune action by agency representatives which might prejudice not only the attainment of an agency objective but over-all United States Government objectives.

Alternative 2 is full freedom to send and receive communications but with provision for informing the Department of State and the chiefs of diplomatic missions of the content of all communications, and the right on their part to comment and to register objection without delaying the communications.

This alternative, its proponents claim, affords the maximum control of communications that should be exercised, if an agency other than the Department of State is to have representatives abroad for any purpose. If the creation of communication bottlenecks and resulting injury to the execution of programs is to be avoided, authority to delay transmission of communications cannot be agreed to, they assert. The right accorded to the ambassador and the Department of State to comment or register objections without delaying the transmission of communications, the argument continues, adequately safeguards the interests of the embassy and the Department of State, and over-all foreign policy considerations.

Proponents of this view contend that the success of the Economic Cooperation Administration country missions was in no small measure due to the freedom from Department of State and embassy control over communications and the consequent speed with which communications between the field offices and Washington were handled. Such freedom and speed were necessitated, it is alleged, by the urgency of the job, as well as by the fact that technical knowledge available in the Economic Cooperation Administration in general was not to be found in the Department of State or the diplomatic missions. The independent status accorded the Economic Cooperation Administration and the lack of such technical knowledge in the Department of State and the diplomatic missions ruled out any proposal to give control of communications to them. The embassy was kept informed of the content of communications and the ambassador had the power of the suspensory veto if he wished to exercise it.

It is pointed out that freedom of communication is something distinct from administrative or substantive control discussed under the preceding issue. If the ambassador were given control of action in the country, he could direct nonaction by the agency representative,

even while forwarding the latter communications to the contents of which he objected.

The argument against this alternative asserts that while the furnishing of information to the Department of State and the chiefs of diplomatic missions concerning the contents of all communications is in itself desirable, it does not go far enough. The right to withhold or delay transmission is necessary, it is claimed, in order that the chiefs of the diplomatic missions and the Department of State, who are more fully aware of the details of intercountry relations than other agencies, may by withholding transmission prevent possible errors of commission or omission with regard to substantive matters or timing.

Alternative 3 is full control of communications by the Department of State and the chiefs of diplomatic missions-communications to be subject to review by them, with authority on their part to delay or withhold transmission, on the understanding that notification of such action will be furnished the originator.

This alternative proposes that, in conferring over-all responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations on the Secretary of State in Washington and the chiefs of diplomatic missions abroad, authority also be conferred on them to review communications between Washington agencies and their field representatives, including in appropriate circumstances, authority to delay or withhold transmission. The argument in favor of this alternative asserts that such authority is necessary in order to assure full coordination of policy and operations. Without such authority mistakes and misunderstandings are inevitable. The Department of State and the embassies are better grounded than other agencies in matters pertaining to the foreign relations of the United States generally, as well as relations with particular countries. Review, involving possible delayed transmission or nontransmission of communications by the Department of State and the diplomatic mission, will frequently prevent the transmission of inaccurate, incomplete, improper, or misleading information and instructions. This will be beneficial not only to over-all intercountry relations but to the execution of individual agency programs.

Opponents of this proposal assert that it is important to program agencies in Washington to have full and frank statements of fact and opinion from their overseas representatives; that equally the Washington agency should be able to send its views and instructions without interference by the Department of State or the chiefs of the diplomatic mission in order that agency representatives on the spot may know accurately the views, desires, and reactions of the agency. They contend that the proposed control would often delay and hamper program operations. The furnishing of information copies of all communications, they assert, would adequately safeguard the interests of the

Department of State and the diplomatic missions. It would afford later opportunity for discussion and agreement at a top level without delays at an intermediate level. While properly preoccupied with problems falling in the policy area, Department of State and embassy personnel, if given the opportunity, would inevitably tend to intervene in operational problems which in the final analysis would not be their responsibility.

FURTHER ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The facts brought together in earlier pages of this chapter are an indication of the wide variety of existing arrangements for carrying on the work of the United States in other countries. It seems clear that so much variation is neither necessary nor desirable. It probably impedes efficiency in the conduct of the public business, and it appears to lend itself to confusion on the part of foreign governments as to the intentions and desires of the United States.

We believe that positive changes in the present situation are necessary, and make suggestions to that effect in the following pages. general comment, however, it seems appropriate to remark that the more basic aspects of existing difficulties will not be met merely by formal changes in organization or operating directives. The major difficulties arise not only from awkward organizational arrangements, but also from failure on the part of the personnel to adapt fully to the requirements of the situations in which they find themselves. The cure must be found through a variety of means, but possibly the most important is through a greatly increased emphasis upon measures of personnel indoctrination and training. That is probably the most important way by which responsible officials at home can seek to expedite the adaptation of agency staffs abroad in a rapidly changing situation.

The training problem exists both for new staffs and old staffs, although the nature of the problem is strikingly different in the two cases. The new staffs obviously require far more extensive indoctrination and briefing before they are sent abroad than they have been receiving, together with a continuing emphasis upon training after they arrive at their posts. That is needed for many purposes, but not least in order to provide a greater understanding of appropriate relationships in each case with the diplomatic mission and the chief thereof.

On the other hand, the senior diplomatic personnel abroad and particularly the ambassadors need and are entitled to a more adequate briefing with respect to each new program and program change than they have often received in the past. Frequently new programs and new staffs have been thrust upon the missions abroad with a minimum

of explanation in usable form as to the purposes and intent of the new programs or of the means by which it was proposed to carry them out. Recently there have been concerted efforts to improve the flow of organized information to the field, and the view abroad is that some improvement has occurred. The practice of holding regional meetings of ambassadors at which several major officials are present from Washington to exchange information and to assist in organizing the discussion also appears helpful.

Such measures are particularly necessary because of the broad and increasing responsibilities of the ambassadors. Each ambassador has always served as the representative of the President and as head of a diplomatic mission, but many of them now find themselves acting as heads of large administrative establishments numbering employees in the hundreds and serving as leaders of a team of agency representatives. The matters for which any ambassador to a major country is currently responsible reflect in their number and variety the bewildering range of almost the entire Federal Government, with the additional complexities of a foreign setting and the idiosyncrasies of the other government.

The diplomatic missions of the United States typically have great prestige and local influence in the countries where they are located. They can be helpful in the conduct of almost every activity involving relations with the country. They can be left aside in the administration of particular programs only at considerable hazard to the programs themselves as well as to the national interest generally.

Separate versus integrated foreign field services

The first issue discussed in this chapter is essentially the question of whether there should continue to be a multiplicity of separate foreign field services or whether some or all of the existing separate services should be consolidated and brought under the Department of State, as was done with the foreign reporting staffs of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce in 1939. Four alternatives were discussed in a previous section. The first and fourth alternatives offer a choice between continuance of the existing situation and the creation of an inclusive general purpose civilian staff operating under the supervision and control of the Secretary of State. Neither seems desirable.

To leave things as they are would be to continue a situation which is highly unsatisfactory in many respects, while to consolidate all civilian staffs abroad into the Foreign Service along its existing organizational lines or even into an inclusive general service under the Department of State would unquestionably create as many problems as it would solve, if indeed such a proposal could be considered in any way practical for many of the overseas staffs.