missions themselves is an indicated next step. The proponents of this alternative point also to the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee in favor of greater delegation of personnel authority to the managers of programs as an essential part of their responsibilities.

The proponents of this alternative concede the greater difficulty of decentralizing overseas personnel administration as compared to personnel administration for staffs at home. They maintain, however, that substantial delegations of personnel authority can be made. The most difficult problem is that of initial recruitment of staff, since the field mission is remote from the source of supply; but, it is argued, the missions can and should be given the initiative in stating their recruitment needs and be made, to the maximum extent possible, full partners in the final stages of the selection process. In all other personnel areas, it is claimed, decentralization encounters fewer barriers. Initiative and the authority to make individual personnel decisions, it is asserted, can be effectively and desirably made in connection with position classificaton, in the transfer of personnel, in promotions and other forms of advancement, as well as initiative and discretion in training programs and in the settlement of employee grievances. The fact that each of these delegations must be limited to preserve basic personnel policy and because of the special factors of overseas administration, it is explained, does not invalidate the great values of decentralization. In addition, it is pointed out, the possibilities of delegation are greatly increased wherever the agency concerned has a regional overseas center, because such a center can provide technical personnel guidance not available in small missions and because a regional center can supervise a sufficiently large segment of the agency staff to permit orderly administration of such personnel decisions as transfers and promotions. Finally, it is argued, the delegation of personnel authority to the missions in respect to local (i. e., alien) employees can and should be very broad since this aspect of personnel administration is in most respects (except for security) a matter of local concern only.

The arguments against this course of action are those in favor of an alternative one.

FURTHER ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The goals of an effective personnel administration for foreign affairs agencies are prompt and adequate staffing of the agencies, mobility and interchangeability in the staffs, adequate specialization and training of the personnel, preindoctrination for overseas service, continuing development of potential leadership personnel, and the progressive adaptation of personnel policies and techniques to the chang

ing managerial necessities of the foreign affairs programs. The importance of these objectives must be measured by the crucial role of foreign affairs administration under present conditions.

The prompt and effective staffing of foreign affairs agencies will be insured only by a system of personnel administration that gives high priority to this objective. In such a system of personnel administration certain features of doctrine and practice will be paramount. These features will include the basic doctrine that personnel administration is not an end in itself but that, on the contrary, the function of personnel administration is to assist the administrators and the managers of the substantive programs in the accomplishment of their assignments. This doctrine requires in practice a set of organizational arrangements for personnel administration that, while giving appropriate attention to security measures, will result in the expert and rapid handling of personnel actions rather than in subjecting them to inhibitions and tight controls unrelated to program objectives. Flexibility rather than red tape is the desired result. Simplicity, foresight, skill, and requisite speed in the recruitment, appointment, and transfer processes are indispensable requirements of such a personnel system.

Mobility and interchangeability in foreign affairs staffs can be realized only in a personnel system that minimizes the barriers interposed by traditional personnel practices. The multiplicity of personnel systems in foreign affairs agencies adds to these barriers. Differences in the appointment process, in the acquisition of status or tenure, in retirement systems, in compensation schedules, and in leave and other allowances-specially when these have statutory origins, but also when they are embedded in rigid procedural requirements— contribute heavily to the immobility of foreign affairs staffs. These are the results of a personnel doctrine which has placed little emphasis upon staff mobility and flexibility. The present and future needs of foreign affairs administration, however, require maximum mobility in foreign affairs staff. Transfers from one assignment to another, from headquarters to overseas, from overseas to home staff, from agency to agency, from domestic civil service to foreign service, are increasingly important for the most effective use of specialized personnel and the prompt and effective execution of programs. But these are difficult and time-consuming processes under current personnel systems.

In chapter I of this study we have argued that the United States has a new and difficult set of responsibilities in foreign affairs, of such an order of magnitude as to be unmatched, at least in our history if not in all history. This new position of the United States in foreign affairs has a special relevance to foreign affairs personnel administration: it helps to explain why existing personnel systems have revealed

such sharp limitations. The importance of this position underscores the need for basic rather than superficial modifications in the traditional approaches; it emphasizes the urgent need for solution of the personnel problems in foreign affairs. In the context of this new position of the United States in foreign affairs, we have also identified in chapter I the elements of the administrative process which take a special importance in foreign affairs: specialization, adaptation, anticipation, equalized attention, coordination, and policy control. All of these elements are important in foreign affairs personnel administration; several of them have crucial significance for the personnel process.

For example, foreign affairs staffs must be built upon adequate specialization. This is a foundation difficult to establish in personnel systems where the great emphasis upon the career service concept has limited the opportunities to recruit laterally in order to obtain mature, highly trained, and experienced specialists. Specialization of staff becomes, therefore, an administrative necessity which points strongly toward the greater use of the program staffing concept and toward the concept of decentralized personnel administration.

The analysis presented in this chapter, together with the consideration developed in chapter I and throughout this study, demonstrate the central importance of an adequate personnel administration for foreign affairs agencies. The discussion also, despite the complexity of the subject, indicates the immediate goals as well as the main longrange objectives toward which foreign affairs personnel administration should proceed.

Perhaps the widest agreement prevails upon the concept of greater decentralization of personnel administration as a goal. There is a common emphasis on the values of greater delegation of personnel authority in recent studies of Federal personnel administration, beginning with the Brownlow Committee report in 1937 and reaffirmed by the Hoover Commission reports on personnel administration and on foreign affairs as well as by the Rowe Committee. Centralization of controls has long been a strong tradition of personnel administration; in the administration of overseas staffs, centralization has been especially pronounced. It is recognized that decentralization encounters special difficulties in overseas situations, but it seems clear that decentralization of personnel authority to the program agencies is now both feasible and necessary. The desirable range of such delegation of authority is suggested by the amount of discretion in personnel administration granted to the Economic Cooperation Administration, if that delegation were accompanied by the general policy supervision of a central personnel agency. This general pattern of decentralization is especially important if the objectives of specialization, adaptability, and mobility of staff are to be realized.

Within particular agencies, the delegation of personnel authority and responsibility to overseas chiefs of mission or heads of overseas establishments presents some additional administrative difficulties, as outlined in the earlier discussion of issue 5, but there is widespread agreement that there should be greater delegation than is now the prevailing pattern. The successful experiment with decentralized personnel administration carried out by the Economic Cooperation Administration through its personnel delegations to the regional Office of the Special Representative in Paris has demonstrated some of the practical possibilities in overseas personnel management. More willingness to work out the arrangements necessary for successful delegation is necessary if overseas managers are to have the authority they need to direct their staffs.

Decentralized personnel administration, that is, greater delegations of personnel authority to the foreign affairs agencies and, within agencies, to the overseas managers, is accordingly both an immediate and a long-range goal. The trends toward such decentralization now embodied in the legislation for emergency programs, as in the statutes governing Economic Cooperation Administration and point 4 operations, should be retained and the trends now reflected in the administrative practices of these programs should be encouraged. The further development of decentralization is an important continuing objective.

There is also substantial agreement upon the importance and the desirability of an expanded foreign affairs personnel system. The Hoover Commission recommendation for a new service which would combine the departmental and the overseas staffs of the Department of State has been reaffirmed by the findings of the Rowe Committee. As the discussion in this chapter has indicated, these are recommendations which in our opinion move in the right direction.

The most practical approach to the establishment of an expanded and more flexible foreign affairs personnel system would seem to fall into two parts: (1) the steps which may be taken by administrative action, and (2) the steps which require substantial revision of existing legislation.

A substantial amount of the program of personnel improvement recommended by the Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee can be accomplished by administrative action under present legislative provisions, if the program is undertaken by determined leadership. For example, the interchangeability of staffs between the State Department and the Foreign Service can be simplified and the practice of actual exchange of personnel between staffs at home and abroad greatly expanded. The broader use of the Foreign Service Reserve as a method for increasing the adaptability of the present personnel system provides an opportunity of equal value. Perhaps of greatest importance are the neglected possibilities for the lateral recruitment

of significant numbers of experienced and mature persons from the permanent civil service and elsewhere into the middle and upper brackets of the Foreign Service Officer Corps. This use of section 517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 could provide a supply of the experienced specialists so necessary to the new programs and responsibilities of the Foreign Service.

The Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee recommendations for improving the personnel arrangements between the Foreign Service and such Departments as Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor having responsibilities overseas can also be accomplished in considerable measure by administrative action. Thus, for example, the proposal that such Departments designate personnel for assignment within the Foreign Service and obtain the appropriations for their work overseas could be worked out within the terms of the present statute. A further important step can also probably be taken within present statutory provisions. This would involve the progressive absorption into the Foreign Service of the experienced overseas staff of the Economic Cooperation Administration and the staff of the Technical Cooperation Administration now being recruited. This program would require administrative arrangements between the Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administration which would provide for the lateral entrance of the Economic Cooperation Administration staff into the officer or reserve categories of the Foreign Service, and for similar arrangements within the Department of State for the Technical Cooperation Administration staff. Such a program for increasing the strength and the specialization of the Foreign Service would be consistent with the objectives set forth by the Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee.

These immediate and practical objectives, which can be accomplished by administrative action, need to be accompanied by the prompt development of a long-range program providing for the creation of a new foreign affairs personnel system in which eventually all, or nearly all, civilian foreign affairs staffs at home and abroad would be included. This program clearly involves the preparation and enactment of new basic personnel legislation, a matter which may involve cooperation between the foreign relations and civil service committees of each house of Congress. It requires also the development of administrative plans for the various stages by which the new foreign affairs personnel system will be extended to include various groups of personnel. The first stage in such a program would most appropriately provide for the immediate inclusion of the home personnel of the Department of State and the personnel of the Foreign Service, as recommended by the Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee; the staffs of the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Technical Cooperation Administration; and the civilian per