(The document referred to follows:) STATES PARTIES TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE, Done at GENEVA, JUNE 17, 1925 States which have deposited instruments of ratification, accession, or continue to be bound as the result of succession agreements concluded by them or by reason of notifications given by them to the Secretary General of the United Nations: 1 With reservation. Zambia 2 By virtue of agreement with former parent State or notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations of succession to treaty rights and obligations upon independence. Applicable to all French territories. Applicable to Surinam and Curacao. 5 With declaration. It does not bind India or any British Dominion which is a separate member of the League of Nations and does not separately sign or adhere to the protocol. It is applicable to all colonies. TEAR GAS A CAUSE OF CASUALTIES? Mr. ZABLOCKI. You note, and I quote from pages 2 and 3 of your written statement, that there are no weapons which can incapacitate without causing casualties. Would you include tear gas in that category? Mr. FRASER. Well, tear gas is being used in Vietnam to flush out the Vietcong, in order that our bombs and other weaponry can reach them. And in that sense it is being used to increase their casualties. It apparently is being used to drive them out of caves and other protective areas, where they might be immune from artillery or bombard ment. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, flame throwers have been used in warfare, which I think are much more inhumane. Would you agree? Mr. FRASER. Well, this is the problem, I think, that one gets into. If one is trying to determine what is humane and what isn't, I think it turns out that in a war Mr. ZABLOCKI. At best, war is inhumane. Mr. FRASER. And the name of the game in a war is to inflict casualties on the other side. The point I am trying to make is that tear gas is being used in support of that effort. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Could you clarify your statement on page 1 where you say that U.S. policy with respect to the use of chemical and biological weapons has changed. You follow that up with a statement that the U.S. initiated chemical warfare operations in Vietnam. Do you mean chemical warfare other than the use of tear gas? Mr. FRASER. Yes, we are using herbicides for the destruction- Mr. FRASER. And the destruction of food, the destruction of crops. Now, the question of whether herbicides come under the protocol, I think, is probably more arguable. But most nations, I think, at the moment take the view that-and they certainly did in the United Nations report, the 14-member report that tear gas came within the prohibition of the 1925 protocol. ALLEGED DEVIATIONS FROM NO-FIRST-USE POLICY Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would like to develop that point and obtain your views. Even though the United States has not ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925, it was my understanding that our policy has been one of no-first-use of chemical-biological warfare materiel. Have we deviated from this policy, and to what extent? And, thereby, to what extent are we in violation of the protocol, although the United States is not a signatory? Mr. FRASER. Well, I think that if one accepts the interpretation of most of the nations, that then we are in violation, when we employ tear gas in Vietnam. We may be in violation when we employ herbicides to destroy food supplies, crops. Congressman McCarthy has reported-and as I understand it, without contradiction-that we had contingency plans to use biological weapons in Cuba and that we have contingency plans of that kind with respect to other countries, well, other theaters of possible conflict. But in Vietnam, accepting the interpretation that most nations give to the protocol, we would appear to be in violation of it already. PROHIBITION OF TEAR GAS IN VIETNAM Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would you advocate the prohibition of tear gas in Vietnam for all purposes? Mr. FRASER. Well, I personally would accept the prohibition of the use of tear gas in connection with war, as a general proposition. Now we are in the middle of a war in Vietnam, and whether at the time we let me put in this way: I wouldn't like to see this issue become a major obstacle to the ratification of the protocol itself. And if it were necessary for us to adopt some kind of reservation or statement about its use, either with a limited time period, or even an open-ended time period, I would prefer to see that done than to have the protocol itself delayed in its ratification. As the chairman knows, I would like to see the United States disengage from Vietnam, in any event, so that I perhaps have a different view about what the necessities may be over the next few years in Vietnam. But I would not like to see that issue become the obstacle to ratification. LOGIC IN TEAR GAS USE DOMESTICALLY BUT NOT IN WAR Mr. ZABLOCKI. This is a very delicate and difficult subject. However, where would the logic lie, if we would permit the use of tear gas in nonwarfare situations, and prohibit it in warfare if it was intended for the same purposes? We use it in our own country for riot control. It logically could be used in Vietnam for similar purposes. Mr. FRASER. Yes, it could be, and, of course, this is the argument that is commonly advanced in favor of having tear gas not come under the operation of the ban. When you do use tear gas, however, to drive the enemy out, in order that they are then more susceptible to other weapons, then it seems to me it becomes a use intended to increase fatalities. I don't think that is a humane use of tear gas. I am not trying to be moralistic about it, because once we are in a war, obviously, we are trying to do our best. But the point is that a chemical substance is being used in a theater of operations in order to inflict or increase the number of casualties on the enemy. BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN U.S.S.R. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Soviet Union ratified the protocol in 1928. Since that time, has not the Soviet Union entered into research or development of chemical-biological warfare? Do they have an establishment similar to our Pine Bluff, Ark., establishment, to your knowledge? Mr. FRASER. My understanding is that the Defense Department claims that the Soviet Union has been doing work in both chemical and biological areas. But thus far they have been unable, the intelligence sources have been unable to identify any facility that would be a counterpart to the facility we have in Arkansas, namely, a production facility of bacteriological agents. So it raises the question, I think, as to how far the Soviets really are into it. I suppose the answer is that we probably don't know for sure, but at least to my understanding, there has not been brought forward any information that could confirm the existence of such a facility. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to make it clear, so far as I am concerned, even if the Soviet Union did have a production facility similar to or even greater than our Pine Bluff, Ark., facility, it does not necessarily mean that we should do likewise. Mr. FRASER. Right. Mr. ZABLOCKI. However, under our system of government, such facilities have become known very easily, while the Soviet Union, operating in a closed society, may be in more extensive production. There is no way we can tell. I agree with the gentleman's aspirations. I wish we could now find the system, the key or the formula by which we could stop wars: disengage ourselves from present conflicts, and prevent future conflicts. But until mankind finds that solution and formula, we do face difficult problems ahead. I want to join with my colleague from Minnesota in the sincere hope that we can find some way to bring humanity back to its senses. THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, I am not an outspoken enthusiast about the possibilities of arms control acrossthe-board. I am frankly fairly skeptical, based on past history, of the ability to bring conventional arms under effective control, if one just looks at the history of arms-control negotiations and the way nations will flip-flop their position when they begin to get too close to agreements. One has only to remember the thirties and what happened in that period. I say that because I think in the case of chemical and biological warfare, and in the case of nuclear weapons, we are dealing with weaponry which is quite a different matter. Nuclear weapons, of course, is a different subject. But I just want to make clear that I think that a fairly healthy skepticism needs to be maintained about our ability to deal with the problems of war, through an effort to limit conventional arms. I think that is in a way dealing with the wrong end of the problem. I think you have got to deal with the causes that give rise to international conflict. But I say that just so that you will understand that when I talk about the desirability of imposing or agreeing to the same restraints on CBW as other nations are prepared to agree to, and in the nuclear field. I do so in the light of this other belief that I hold. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Broomfield. Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. USE OF TEAR GAS BY NORTH VIETNAM What is the situation in North Vietnam? What are they doing in this particular field? Are they using any of these chemical or biological weapons against the United States, or troops fighting in South Viet nam? Mr. FRASER. Well, I can only say that I know of no report that the other side has used either chemical or biological weapons. Mr. BROOMFIELD. How about tear gas? Are they using that? Mr. FRASER. I am not familiar with any report that they are. And I don't want to suggest that if they are not, that it is out of any sense of humanity. It may just be that they lack the capability or the technical competence, or the stockpiles to do it. But I am not aware of any reports of that kind. Mr. BROOMFIELD. On page 1 of your statement you say that U.S. policy with respect to the use of chemical and biological weapons has changed. Would you explain that further? STATUS OF NO-FIRST-USE POLICY And one final question. Do you mean that the United States has abandoned the no-first-use policy on these weapons? Mr. FRASER. Well, I suppose that the question is, Where do we start from in identifying our policy? We were the authors, as I understand, of the 1925 protocol, even though we subsequently failed to ratify it. We did sign it. We were the authors. We signed it, but didn't ratify it. Even on the issue of tear gas, I might say that I understand that in 1932, at a disarmament conference, we were prepared to exclude that, in a disarmament treaty that never went anywhere. But, in any event, my understanding was that generally we took the view that we would not be the first to employ these kinds of weapons. Now, as I told the chairman, in Vietnam, we are using tear gas, in a way that goes beyond the civil-strife control type of use. We are using herbicides. And as I indicated, there is some reason to believeat least Congressman McCarthy understands this-that we did have contingency plans in Cuba, and have them for other nations. Now, contingency plans always are subject to the question, you know, what contingency? Does that really involve a first use? But with respect to Cuba, and with respect to our present activities in Vietnam, it would appear that we are now using them without the other side having used them first. DETERRENT VALUE IN CB WEAPONS Mr. BROOMFIELD. One argument used in favor of having the CB weapons is a deterrent against the possible use by an enemy. Do you see any deterrent value in our stockpiles? The mere fact that we have apparently a large supply, does this Mr. FRASER. Well, I see very little value in biological stockpiles. For one thing, one of the problems involved in germ warfare is identifying |