the source of the germs. At least if you are hit with a missile, you can usually figure out, or you hope you can figure out, where it came from. Mr. BROOMFIELD. But you are just as much dead.

Mr. FRASER. Maybe just as much dead, but if the plague breaks out in New York City, you are going to be hard put to know where that came from. And so it seems to me that that is one problem with biological weapons.

Secondly, if you did know where it is coming from, it seems to me that our ability to retaliate is really much greater in our existing weaponry, including our nuclear missiles. And I suppose one can argue the relative degrees of humaneness.

If you infect a population with some of these fatal diseases, these people are just as dead as though they had been hit with a nuclear weapon.

So the point I am trying to make is that if a biological or germ attack were carried out by another power, in such a way that we could identify the source, it would seem to me that our ability to retaliate is abundant already, without our having to maintain stocks, the delivery of which is still an uncertain proposition. I mean, there are lots of technical problems involved in the delivery of germ weapons. I think this has been noted a number of times. We really don't know exactly what would happen.

CREDIBILITY OF CONFORMANCE TO PROTOCOL

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Suppose the Senate goes ahead with the ratification of this protocol. What gives you any feeling that the enemy, whoever it might be, is going to abide by it any more than they have on the Geneva Accords on the prisoners of war?

Mr. FRASER. Well, I think one has to look at the practical side of it. In the protocol, we are talking about the ban of its use.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Right.

Mr. FRASER. Now there is a British treaty that was tabled at Genera which goes further and would require all stockpiles in bacteriological fields to be destroyed, I think, in 3 months.1

But let's deal just with this protocol, for the moment; that is, a

ban on use.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Right.

Mr. FRASER. It does not mean, standing alone, that we can't have stockpiles. It simply says that we won't be the first to use them.

Now, I think one has to raise the question of whether it is useful from the practical point of view, in terms of the total weaponry and power that we possess, whether it is useful to maintain a stockpile separate from that. But the protocol, I don't believe, raises the issue of stockpiling.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I congratulate you on a fine statement this morning, Congressman Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I am sure you can learn a lot more from subsequent witnesses.

1 This document may be found in the appendix, p. 276.

38-044-70

THE MEANING OF "OTHER GASES" IN PROTOCOL

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Don, the protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Now, in your interpretation, would tear gas come under the category of "other gases"?

Mr. FRASER. I haven't really sought to make an independent judgment, Mr. Chairman. When I was in Geneva, talking with some of our disarmament people, they commented to me then that the 14-Nation Report on Chemical and Biological Warfare took that position. And this apparently has been the position historically of most of the signatories to the protocol.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That tear gas would be included.

Mr. FRASER. Would be included. And I think, in fairness to their point of view, that, when tear gas is used as an adjunct to other weaponry, so that its use has the effect of increasing fatalities, that their case becomes much stronger.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, we conceivably could use water, in the form of steam, instead of tear gas, as an adjunct to war. Would that be prohibited? Instead of using tear gas in flushing out VC's in caves, then water would become a weapon.

Mr. FRASER. Except that water doesn't come under the ban, I don't believe.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Yes, but it would be used in war.

Mr. FRASER. Right. But my point is that the protocol deals with chemical substances. Water, I suppose, could be considered a chemical substance, but tear gas is clearly aimed to produce a reaction on the part of the person who is exposed to it. And in this case it is a chemical, then.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Of course, it is not poisonous.

Mr. FRASER. In and of itself.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Yes. It does have certain reactions, if administered too closely to the body, of course, including asphyxiating a victim. It can burn the flesh.

But I think we are getting into technicalities far removed from the point.

Mr. FRASER. And I don't intend to give you an independent legal judgment. I am just trying to tell you what I understand the international viewpoint is on it.

DUMPING NERVE GAS INTO THE OCEAN

Mr. ZABLOCKI. A final question, Don.

In your statement, page 3, you say:

We also appear to have so many chemical stocks on hand that the Pentagon last summer wanted to dispose of tons of modern nerve-gas weapons by dumping them at sea.

It was my understanding that the surplus was pre-World War I vintage.

Mr. FRASER. Well, some of it, I think, was mustard gas. But, also, some of it was nerve gas, more modern nerve gas, if I remember the

testimony correctly. There were several kinds of chemicals involved, not just the old mustard gas.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Of course, the Pentagon's decision to dispose of them by dumping in the sea was a poorly conceived idea. But if we have such stockpiles, there must be some way of getting rid of them by chemical processes, returning them to inactivity and possible peaceful

use.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I understand that while the Army had testified how difficult and expensive and prolonged the process would be of detoxifying them, that, in fact, they are doing this, and it is turning out not to be so expensive, or such a long process.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Again, I want to congratulate you on a very fine statement and for your presentation before the committee this morning. Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Dellenback.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DELLENBACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

Mr. DELLENBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say, if I may, as a preliminary, that I appear before you as a Congressman who is deeply concerned. I don't want to mislead you or anybody else into thinking that I am an expert on this subject. But I have some deep concern, and I will make reference at least in the course of the testimony to some involvement that we have had in this. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to express my views on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Certainly, these hearings will be very informative to the Congress. It is my hope that they will mark the beginning of a reexamination in depth by the Congress of our Nation's chemical and biological warfare policies.

As we all realize, the Geneva Protocol prohibits the first use of chemical and biological weapons by protocol adherents against other ratifying parties. It is thus appropriate to decide whether a no-firstuse CBW policy is in our national interest. I think it is.

Previous American policy concerning CBW has been one of possible swift retaliation, not one of initiation. President Roosevelt made a landmark statement to that effect on June 8, 1943, in the midst of World War II. President Eisenhower reaffirmed this position in one of his last press conferences as Commander-in-Chief. Other official pronouncements have accorded with these Presidential declarations. There are both sound military arguments and laudable humanitarian reasons why the United States should continue to avoid initiating chemical or biological warfare. Militarily, our considerable conventional firepower advantage is neutralized when gas is introduced into the battlefield. When pondering the human costs of war, we should be well aware that chemical and biological weapons can be extremely destructive and almost invariably will involve considerable civilian casualties.

URGES RATIFICATION OF GENEVA PROTOCOL

Some may ask why I urge ratification of the Geneva Protocol if the United States is already, in effect, committed to a CBW policy of no-first-use. Several arguments for ratification seem persuasive

to me.

First, it was the United States which originally proposed the protocol in 1925. Our failure to ratify it has been a constant source of embarrassment to our diplomats. When we encourage others to ratify it during discussions at the U.N. we appear highly inconsistent. When we support moves to clarify or strengthen bans on chemicals or biologics, our representatives appear to be intruders telling other countries how to improve a protocol which they have ratified while we

have not.

Second, a solemn national pledge will seem more firm and more permanent than a Presidential declaration, since the question repetitiously arises as to whether the latter will expire as each administration. leaves office. Possible adversaries will feel more assured after the protocol is ratified that they will not be subjected to a surprise CBW attack. Contingency planners in Washington will be alerted that the United States cannot rely on any contingency plan that calls for the initiation of chemical or biological warfare.

Third, the overall strength of the protocol will be reinforced when the world's greatest military, industrial and economic power ratifies it. The worthwhile goal of eliminating chemical and biological warfare altogether could be significantly promoted if we added our influence to the prestige of this long-standing protocol.

PROBLEM OF RESERVATIONS TO PROTOCOL

Undoubtedly, there will be reservations offered to the protocol when it is resubmitted to the Senate. It is my hope that no substantive reservations will be attached. One which will almost certainly be offered would specifically exclude the use of tear gas for military purposes from the first-use prohibition.

Let me point out that no one seriously contends that the protocol outlaws tear gas in riot situations when police or soldiers are restoring civil order. It would not prohibit nonmilitary use of any gas, lethal

or nonlethal.

While the protocol language itself might be considered unclear on the question of the use of tear gas for military purposes, there have been attempts to resolve the issue among protocol adherents.

Britain announced in 1930 that it felt the agreement prohibited such use of tear gas, and 11 other Nations quickly agreed. Both Russia and Red China subscribe to this broad reading of the agreement. Although Belgium has agreed with the United States in one international conference that such use of tear gas is not prohibited, no ratifying party has submitted a formal reservation to this effect.

It should be clear from the virtually complete abstinence since 1925 from the use of tear gas in war that most countries do, in fact, believe it to be outlawed by international law. If the United States, as the most recent and most powerful ratifier of the protocol, were to attach such a reservation, the force of the agreement would be significantly

weakened. For our ratification to be reciprocally binding with the other parties, each country would have to specifically accept our reservation. Some nations have already indicated that they will not countenance substantive changes in the protocol. Thus, an American reservation on tear gas could well mean a significant weakening of the protocol rather than a significant strengthening of it.

TEAR GAS RESERVATION UNWISE

There are additional reasons why a tear gas reservation is unnecessary and unwise. I do not feel that such a reservation would preserve a valuable military option for the United States. Tear gas is only effective against troops lacking simple gas masks. In addition, it could probably only be used in operations where the United States is not an ally of a protocol adherent which feels that the use of tear gas for military purposes is prohibited. Both allies would want to follow similar weapons policies, and the use of tear gas by the United States could easily lead to gas retaliation by our common enemy against both the United States and its allies. This would certainly be completely unacceptable to any ratifying ally. Thus, realistic opportunities for using tear gas may be quite rare.

Where tear gas is used for military purposes, and where the enemy has the potential for retalitation, there is a constant danger of rapid escalation to more destructive chemical and biological weapons. World War I saw escalation from tear gas to chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gases. The dangers involved in rapid CBW escalation outweigh any advantages of using tear gas for military purposes in those rare instances where it could be effective.

CONSIDERATION OF TIMING

The final consideration in resubmitting the protocol is one of timing. It might seem wise to delay consideration until the Vietnam war is over and tear gas is no longer being actively employed by our military. I agree that the protocol should not be reviewed while we are using chemicals in Vietnam, but the solution which I would propose would be to end chemical warfare in Vietnam, not to wait until the war is over to resubmit the protocol.

Chemical weapons may well cause permanent damage to the environment the Vietnamese must live in long after the fighting is over. These weapons are associated, at least psychologically, with an aggressively offensive strategy rather than the strategy of steady deescalation and of protective reaction toward which we are apparently moving in Vietnam.

Finally, there is a danger that chemical weaponry will be used indiscriminately or inhumanely, particularly if our own military commanders lose control of the weapons. We should have discontinued the use and supply of these weapons prior to the time that Vietnamization of the conflict has been completed.

The soundest time to begin such a move is immediately. Stopping chemical warfare now could be a qualitative reduction in the level of fighting and a clear indication of our desire for peace which could not be ignored at home or abroad.