ROLE OF DOD IN CBW DECISION Mr. FRASER. I hope that you people assert yourselves. I am very pleased with the decision of the President, and it is my understanding that this position generally was taken against the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't believe that that was wrong, and I believe that in this area the President made a very sound judgment. Mr. PICKERING. Secretary Laird did play an extremely important role in the decisions that were taken and the policy decisions that resulted, and I think any statement disparaging the military in this regard should take full cognizance of the fact that he did take a role of leadership in the study. Mr. FRASER. The military has a role to play and a responsibility. The civilian leadership enters into it with other larger considerations. I hope that whole operation gets coordinated. Mr. PICKERING. I certainly concur. I definitely take the same attitude. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen. Again, we appreciate your coming here and giving so much of your time. Mr. Pickering, Mr. Furnas, we appreciate you and your associates being here this morning. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10a.m., when we hear the DOD. (Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, December 19, 1969.) CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS FRIDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1969 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:17 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order. Today marks the final scheduled session of hearings by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments into international aspects of chemical-biological warfare. Today we are pleased to have as our witness a representative of the Department of Defense. He is Rear Adm. William E. Lemos, the Director of Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. With Admiral Lemos today as backup witnesses are: Mr. Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel, International Affairs, Department of Defense; Col. George W. Connell, Jr., Deputy Director, CBR and Nuclear Operations, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army; Albert E. Hayward, Assistant Director, Chemical Technology, Defense Research and Engi neering, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. David W. Einsel, Jr., Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our ground rules today are that we will operate at least initially in open session. If questions from the subcommittee touch on classified matters, we will ask the witnesses to withhold their answers. As soon as all unclassified answers have been given, we will clear the room of all visitors and go into executive session. Admiral Lemos, if you will begin. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM E. LEMOS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS Admiral LEMOs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee, this briefing is in response to your request for information on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam. It is my understanding that testimony on the scope of the Geneva Protocol and the ramifications of arms control measures in the chemical warfare and biological research fields was given on Thursday by representatives of the State Depart ment and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The United States has consistently maintained that the use of riotcontrol agents and herbicides is not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Further, as a White House official explained following the President's statement on November 25 this year, the term, "incapacitating chemicals," does not include riot-control agents or herbicides. We define Incapacitating agents as those producing symptoms that persist for hours or days after exposure to the agents has ceased. Riot-control agents-as those which are widely used by governments for domestic law enforcement purposes, and which produce transient effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. THE USE OF RIOT-CONTROL AGENTS IN VIETNAM The first part of my discussion will address the use of riot-control agents in South Vietnam. I will discuss why and how this material is being employed. First, why. Simply stated, riot control agents are used to save lives-American lives, lives of our allies, civilian lives, and enemy lives. Unfortunately, much that we hear discounts the fact that riot-control agents have saved many American and Vietnamese lives. My purpose is to set the record straight by citing specific examples. The riot-control agent being used in South Vietnam is CS (orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile). This agent, a modern tear gas, causes such fast reaction for those exposed to it that some have complained that it must be somehow more dangerous than the older and better known tear gas, CN. Actually CS is not a gas; it is a solid which is used as a finely divided particulate or dust cloud. The fact is that CS is less likely to cause harm to those exposed to it than the other agent that has been classed as a riot control agent, CN. Up to 1964, riot control agents were developed and packaged as hand grenades which disseminated CN and CS as a smoke cloud for use in civil disturbances. Riot-control munitions of this type were then and still are used by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States and many other countries for riot control purposes. In Vietnam, in addition to their riot-control function, these agents were initially conceived as being useful primarily to prevent casualties in the clearing of tunnels, caves, and underground shelters. In such cases their use leads to fewer casualties and lesser loss of life than would the combat alternatives of other weapons. These other alternatives include the use of HE (high explosive) and flame. A key factor in the selection of riot-control agents (RCA) over these other alternatives is the reduction in casualties to civilians, frequently hostages, who often are intermingled with hostile military elements as a result of Viet Cong tactics. The Department of Defense with the concurrence of the Department of State obtained Presidential approval in November 1965 for the use of CS and CN in Vietnam. COMUSMACV delegated to his subordinate commanders authority to use these agents in military operations against the enemy. These commanders were authorized to further delegate this authority to the extent deemed suitable for insuring both timely employment and proper control. COMUSMACV stated that "consistent with tactical requirements, hazard to noncombatants will be reduced as much as possible." Further, COMUSMACV directed that these materials not be employed by U.S. elements in situations involving civil demonstrations, riots, or similar disturbances of concern to the civil government until clearance has been obtained from him. This was not because these agents were thought to be ineffective, but because such action was conceived to be the province of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. As the effectiveness of these riot-control agents in reducing casualties became increasingly evident in such situations as suppression of hostile firepower and clearance of fortified positions and underground facilities, American commanders at all levels began to see other ways in which the use of the riot-control agents, particularly the new agent CS, could save many American and allied lives. As a result its applicability to other types of operations spread among U.S. units in Vietnam. Since they save lives, riot-control agents have been treated as normal components of combat power. They add to a commander's flexibility and give him additional means of devising the best method of accomplishing his mission with minimum loss of life. It is difficult to deny a commander the authority to use riot-control agents when it is considered to be one of the most effective means available for saving lives. EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CS I would like now to cite some specific examples which demonstrate the effectiveness of CS and the flexibility it has given our commanders in different combat situations. I. ATTACK OF OCCUPIED POSITIONS Commanders have found CS to be highly effective against occupied positions. Such operations fall into several categories: assault against point targets; assault against area targets: clearing of bunkers, caves, and other structures; suppression of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones or downed aircraft; and reduction of enemy resistance to facilitate the taking of prisoners. In all of these situations, CS has proven effective in temporarily reducing the effectiveness of enemy-aimed fire, thereby reducing casualties and facilitating rescues. A favorite tactic of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army is to enter towns or villages and use the occupants as hostages. The normal employment of fire and maneuver against such an objective could result in numerous civilian casualties and considerable damage to their homes. The VC/NVA turn incidents such as this to propaganda use and tell the South Vietnamese people that the United States is there only to destroy them and their homes. MACV has directed that CS be considered for use in such situations in order to hold to an absolute minimum any danger of civilian casualties and property damage. |