Admiral LEMOS. Yes, sir.

VERIFICATION OF CROP USE IN VIETNAM

Mr. FRASER. How are we able to verify adequately whether or not the crops are in fact aimed just for the fighting units or may not in fact be intended for noncombatants-I know this is a difficult problem in this kind of war.

Admiral LEMOS. It is very difficult.

Mr. FRASER. We are still bound by the Hague Convention, are we not?

Admiral LEMOS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. How do we determine that under these circumstances? Admiral LEMOS. As I indicated, we take extensive aerial photographs of every area where such a proposal is made and those aerial photographs are very carefully analyzed by a broad spectrum of people and if the crops are close to populated areas, they are not subjected to herbicides.

Mr. FRASER. What do you mean by "populated areas"? Do you mean close to a district town, to a real concentration of people?

Admiral LEMOS. I can't give you the specific cutoff, but the crop destruction program is associated with enemy camp areas and not the villages and hamlets.

Mr. FRASER. The crops that are grown by those friendly to the Vietcong I suppose become a source of food for the Vietcong?

Admiral LEMOs. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Simply because it is a friendly area?

Admiral LEMOS. That is right. There is no question that the Vietcong does get a substantial amount. They are being shut out of a great number of areas where they used to be able to get rice quite freely from the village and hamlet residents. It is becoming much more difficult and that is one of the reasons why the Chieu Hoi rate is up so much. They are not able to get through.

Mr. FRASER. How can we be sure?

Admiral LEMOS. All you can do is do the best possible.

Mr. FRASER. Let's say there are hamlets around and that the area is generally friendly to the Vietcong. Does that qualify the crops for destruction?

Admiral LEMOS. It does not.

Mr. FRASER. You have to determine it in order to employ the herbicides.

Admiral LEMOS. There has to be substantial evidence that the crops are being grown specifically for the use of Vietcong troops and North Vietnamese troops.

Mr. FRASER. And nobody else?

Admiral LEMOS. And nobody else.

Mr. FRASER. Isn't that a very high standard to impose?,

Admiral LEMOS. Yes, sir, and that is why the percentage of crop destruction is a note just handed to me says: "Every year since we began the program crop destruction has been less than 1 percent of the total South Vietnamese food production." It is not a large program.

38-044 0-70-17

POLICY ON BOMBING DAMS AND DIKES

Mr. ZABLOCKI, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. When we are talking of crop destruction, of course, that brings up the question of bombing and destroying dams. From what you say as a matter of fact, then, at no time had there been a policy either under consideration or in effect by the United States or South Vietnam's Government, for the bombing of the dams and dikes in North Vietnam because of the Geneva Convention, is that correct! Admiral LEMOS. I would hesitate to say such things are never even under consideration because of the range of contingency plans

Mr. FULTON. My point is really that the Geneva Convention has a restraint that, if the Geneva Protocol is lived up to, it completely forbids either the use or the contemplated use or consideration of the bombing of dams and dikes for the raising of food. If we are going to live up to the Geneva Convention, why then you just can't even consider it. If it comes out that you are not going to live up to it under the military, then you do consider another course of action. So my question is, has that been the policy, as what I had said, is that accurate?

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN FORMAN, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. FORMAN. My name is Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel for International Affairs.

I had assumed from your question, as originally stated, and from the admiral's reply, that you were talking in the broad sense and not limiting yourself to the small dam or dike.

Mr. FULTON. NO; I am talking of the broad policy.

Mr. FORMAN. I think the admiral was talking in a larger context that might well, for example, be large power dams, related to the production of armaments, of utilities, electricity, and that might be considered as a possible target.

Mr. FULTON. I specifically limited it. I didn't mean the destruction of a dam edging a rice paddy. I am not talking about that. I am talking of the dams of North Vietnam which, if broken, would really stop food production. Therefore, I had said, what has been the policy of the U.S. Government and South Vietnam under the Hague Convention? How has the military approached the prohibition of the Hague Convention, if it has even thought of it?

Admiral LEMOS. I think the clearest answer to that is that we have never done it in North Vietnam.

REASON FOR RESTRAINT: LAW OR CUSTOM?

Mr. FULTON. Well, I might say I was once being complimented by one of the members of the clergy on my having been good all week and done well. I said: "Well, Your Excellency, I shouldn't get too much credit for not having done certain things because I really was too busy even to think of a good sin."

Is that the case here, that you are too busy doing other things that, while this was possible, you never really had an intention under

all circumstances to live up to the Geneva Convention if it didn't prove convenient, satisfactory, or necessary?

Admiral LEMOS. All I can say is that all of the efforts against North Vietnam, including our planning of it, were subjected to the very highest review in all responsible agencies of the Government. I cannot conceive of the approval of plans in direct violation of that convention.

Mr. FULTON. But you also said, when I brought up the word "consideration," that there may have been alternative plans under consideration although not used for the bombing of North Vietnam dikes that are for the main purpose of food production.

Admiral LEMOS. Mr. Forman correctly analyzed my problem when he said I misinterpreted what you are saying. There are a number of dams in North Vietnam not directly related to the problem you propose.

Mr. FULTON. We are really trying here to get the basis for the policy that is in effect and the limitations on the policy under international law. So my question is based really on finding out whether the policy just "growed" like Topsy or it was an express fitting the policy in, the U.S. military, under the Geneva Convention.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral LEMOS. I don't know how to answer that question except to say that the military do not of themselves do things in violation of U.S.policy.

Mr. FULTON. No, I agree with you thoroughly, but that's the other side of the coin. I am saying, how did we in the United States as a military decision, arrive at this particular policy? How was the policy arrived at?

Admiral LEMOS. The policy not to bomb?

Mr. FULTON. The dikes of North Vietnam that have to do with food production?

Admiral LEMOS. I am very certain it was arrived at on the basis of consideration of this convention.

Mr. FULTON. So then there were no plans ever as an alternative, by the U.S. military, even considered for the bombing of dikes of North Vietnam that are used primarily for food production?

Admiral LEMOS. In my capacity I can say clearly that I am unaware of any such plans

Mr. FULTON. May we have the information supplied for the record, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Very well.

(The information follows:)

Question. History of plans for bombing of dams in North Vietnam as an anticrop operation?

Answer. (Statement for record). The Department of Defense policy is not to divulge details of military plans.

HOW MANY DEFOLIATION CLAIMS?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would like to clarify something. On page 10, Admiral, you list the procedure under which herbicide spray is used. I refer again to the payment of legal claims. "The province chief will see that claims are paid for unjust and illegal damage."

I am not sure when you answered my question earlier, you understood what I meant to ask. On whose behalf was he making that pledge? His Government? Our Government?

Admiral LEMOS. His Government.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I believe I did ask whether you would supply for the record, Admiral, how many claims have been made.

Admiral LEMOS. I don't recall.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. And what will be the procedure for paying them? I am personally satisfied that if the claims are made to the province chief he will somehow get it to the Saigon Government and they will get to the U.S. Government and we will be picking up the tab. Please supply for the committee this particular answer. It may be a very controversial issue some day.

Admiral LEMOS. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Question. Number of claims submitted for damage from herbicide and crop damage? Procedures for paying these claims?

Answer (statement for record). The US Foreign Claims Commission in RVN has received 49 claims from residents of the RVN in the amount of $66,816 (US dollars) for herbicide damages. The 43 claims adjudicated so far have been denied either because such damage was combat related or damage observed was not caused by defoliants. Claims against the US Government may be payable for certain accidental defoliation damage resulting from a spray aircraft mishap.

Herbicide claims from Vietnamese and foreign nationals residing in the RVN are normally made against the GVN and are handled in GVN channels. Prior to the initiation of herbicide operations, the respective GVN province chief requests such operations and pledges indemnification for accidental damage to crops and trees of friendly citizens. Procedures require that such claims be initiated at District level and processed to Province headquarters for adjudication up to an amount of 100,000 piasters. (One US dollar equals 118 piasters). Claims of an amount greater than 100,000 piasters are processed to Headquarters, Joint General Staff and the Ministry of Defense for adjudication on a case by case basis. Maximum compensation payment is 500,000 piasters. The GVN programs handle the great bulk of crop damage claims in RVN; however, if a local national insists on filing a claim against the United States because of defoliation damages to his property, his claim is accepted and investigated. The claim and report of investigation are referred to a US Foreign Claims Commission appointed by COMUSMACV for adjudication under the authority of the Foreign Claims Act, 10 USC 2734 and PL 90-521.

Since the defoliation claims program is being kept in GVN channels and an active claims program is being kept in operation by the GVN, an influx of compensable claims against the US Government generated by the potential termination of hostilities is not expected.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If there are no further questions, on behalf of myself and the entire subcommittee, Admiral, I want to thank you for your excellent presentation and for the direct answers you have given to the questions that were asked of you.

In view of the fact that certain matters are classified which you will supply to the committee for the record, I see no reason to go into executive session.

Therefore, this concludes the hearings of the subcommittee on the international aspects of chemical-biological warfare. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until further notice.

Thank you, Admiral.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned until further notice.)

APPENDIX A

STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, NOVEMBER 20, 1969, IN SUPPORT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 490, URGING THE PRESIDENT TO RESUBMIT FOR RATIFICATION THE GENEVA PROTOCOL TREATY OF 1925

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to state my unequivocal support for a Resolution which I have cosponsored with many of our colleagues, which would urge the President to resubmit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, banning the first use of gas and bacteriological warfare, to the United States

Senate for ratification.

The issue of chemical and biological warfare has long been a subject of concern. It would be in the best interests of the United States to have a full-scale debate on what this nation's policies should be toward the use of chemical weapons. Resubmission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate would provide an opportunity for formal discussion on this most important issue.

The United States Senate evidenced their interest in this subject when on August 11, 1969, by a 91-0 vote they agreed to institute guidelines and controls over chemical and biological agents.

It is proper that we urge the President to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. Our traditional policy of no first use of gas and bacteriological warfare can then be reaffirmed through ratification of this treaty by the Senate. The ideals embodied in the Geneva Protocol confirm a position to which the U.S. has long been in accord. Now is the time to act to demonstrate our good faith.

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