WARSAW BLOC DRAFT PROPOSAL-REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION-CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND ON THE DESTRUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS

Letter dated 19 September 1969 from the representatives of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from the Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we request that an item entitled:

"Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons" should be included in the agenda of the twentyfourth session of the United Nations General Assembly as an important and urgent matter.

In proposing that this item should be considered by the United Nations General Assembly, the Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are proceeding from the position that the complete elimination from the arsenals of States of such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons would be in the interests of the preservation and consolidation of peace and the security of peoples. The Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics believe that there is a pressing and urgent need to solve this problem, particularly in present-day circumstances when a number of countries are continuing to perfect, produce and stockpile chemical and bacteriological weapons. This creates a potential threat that mankind may become the victim of a chemical and bacteriological war which would have grave consequences on the entire process of the development of civilization and on the future of all mankind.

The efforts which have been made within the framework of the United Nations and the Disarmament Committee in regard to chemical and bacteriological weapons have so far produced certain encouraging results. General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) and 2454 A (XXIII), which were adopted by an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, confirmed the great importance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies important and generally recognized rules of international law. These resolutions also reflect the interest of States in the adoption of further measures which would help to remove the danger of a chemical and bacteriological war.

The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use," which was prepared on the initiative of the Disarmament Committee, also demonstrates that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would have catastrophical consequences for all mankind. This document has help to produce awareness of

the need to take steps which would outlaw not only the use but also the very existence of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

Guided by the desire to contribute to the achievement of this objective, the Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics call upon the Governments of all States to give due attention to the consideration of the question of the "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological_(biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons." The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are submitting a draft of such a convention for consideration by the General Assembly. The adoption by the General Assembly of a decision supporting the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons would, we are convinced, be an important contribution to the cause of peace and would be in the interests of all mankind.

We should be grateful if you would consider this letter as an explanatory memorandum as provided for in rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, and if you would arrange for it to be circulated, together with the attached draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS AND ON THE DESTRUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Guided by the desire to facilitate progress in the achievement of the objectives of general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of chemistry and bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use of War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2162 (XXI) and 2454 A (XXIII) which condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Expressing their desire to contribute to the implementation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

ARTICLE 2

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of -----observing all the necessary precautions-or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated chemical an bacteriological (biological) weapons in its possession.

ARTICLE 3

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations to develop, produce or otherwise acquire and stockpile chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

ARTICLE 4

Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal and physical persons exercising their activities in its territory, and also by its legal and physical persons outside its territory.

ARTICLE 5

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy such weapons.

ARTICLE 6

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 7

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before it enters into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of which are hereby designated the depositary Governments.

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3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by a Government, including the instruments of ratification of the Governments of States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of other Governments designated as depositaries of the Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the Convention enters into force, the Convention shall enter into force on the date on which their instruments of ratification or accession are deposited.

5. The depositary Governments shall promptly inform all States which have signed and acceded to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date on which each instrument of ratification or accession is deposited and the date on which the Convention enters into force, and shall transmit other notifications to them.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary Governments in ac cordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 8

This Convention, of which the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the depositary Governments to the Governments of States which have signed the Convention and acceded to it.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Convention. ___ copies at

DONE in

this

day of

APPENDIX C

CBW AND NATIONAL SECURITY-NOVEMBER 3, 1969

This is a study of the strategic and tactical implications of chemical and biological weapons. While an analysis of this length cannot be exhaustive, the sponsors of this study group paper believe that it contains perspectives and recommendations worthy of consideration by this Congress and the Administration.

The sponsors of this study group paper are Congressmen: John Dellenback, of Oregon; Charles A. Mosher, of Ohio; Howard W. Robison, of New York; and Fred Schwengel of Iowa.

Additionally, the following Members of Congress have joined this study group in encouraging, through the release of this paper, a re-examination of the strategic and tactical purposes served by chemical and biological weapons.

Marvin L. Esch of Michigan

Joseph M. McDade of Pennsylvania

Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen of New F. Bradford Morse of Massachusetts Jersey

Gilbert Gude of Maryland

Frank Horton of New York

Paul McCloskey of California

Ogden R. Reid of New York

Philip E. Ruppe of Michigan

Herman T. Schneebeli of Pennsylvania

Robert T. Stafford of Vermont
Charles W. Whalen, Jr. of Ohio

INTRODUCTION

The recent concern about safety procedures in the handling of chemical and biological weapons has caused us to re-examine the purposes for which we have these weapons. Our effort has necessarily involved analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of CBW in each of the situations our country faces or might face. Accordingly, we have considered chemicals and biologics as deterrents to all-out war and as tactical weapons in limited wars. It stands to reason that the judgment of the Congress concerning the future of these weapons must be based on this kind of analysis.

We need to determine whether these weapons are valuable additions to our already impressive arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons. It is not justifiable to continue developing, producing and testing chemical and biological weapons simply because we can develop safe testing and storage procedures for them. Also, we cannot logically accept the rationale that we need chemical and biological weapons simply because some other country is engaged in CBW production. Similarly, it is not enough to say that they enhance "flexibility": one must analyze their specific advantages. Only weapons which add a positive measure to our overall national security deserve support.

As a result of our inquiry, we question whether chemical and biological weapons add significantly to our security. The risks we run by using and maintaining secret stockpiles seem to outweigh the dubious advantages offered by these weapons.

On this page and the next page, we will present a few of our concerns, highlighting rationales which are elaborated in the main body of the paper. Here we will also offer some recommendations.

As deterrents to all-out war, chemical weapons are neither more cost-effective nor certain than our nuclear deterrent. Biological weapons are doubly uncertain as mass killers. On the one hand, their effectiveness can be blunted by extreme weather conditions or unpredictable biological reactions. On the other hand, a successful attack by us could initiate an epidemic that might spread to infect our own population. When a weapon is potentially dangerous to both the attacker and the attacked, retaliatory threats lack sufficient credibility.

Although many have accepted the notion that CB weaponry is humane, we are dubious. Many of these weapons are naturally inhumane, while others which