LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES FROM

To the Editor:

PHILIP NOEL-BAKER

[From the New York Times, Dec. 9, 1969]

PROTOCOL ON C.B.W.

What does the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare really mean? Does it allow the use in war of tear gas and herbicides?

When I hear this question, I recall a talk I had in Geneva while the Conference of 1925 was going on. It was with a young French colleague, Henri Bonnet, later a long-term and well-trusted Ambassador to the United States.

"Oh, yes," he said, "the form of words they've got is good. It prohibits every kind of chemical or bacterial weapon that anyone could possibly devise. And it has to. Perhaps someday a criminal lunatic might invent some devilish thing that would destroy animals and crops."

In 1925 everyone in the Conference agreed with Henri Bonnet. It was their purpose to ban all C.B. weapons; and they were satisfied that the Protocol would do that.

In 1930, Hugh Gibson, the U.S. delegate to the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission, questioned whether the Protocol prohibited the use of tear gases.

In Britain we then had a Labor Government. Arthur Henderson was our Foreign Secretary, I was his Parliamentary private secretary; our delegate to the League Commission was the great Lord (Robert) Cecil.

BANNED BY PROTOCOL

Cecil was anxious that all doubt should be settled without delay. Henderson agreed, and instructed me, in cooperation with the legal section of the Foreign Office, to prepare a memorandum setting out the British view that "tear gases," like all other C.B. weapons, were forbidden by the Protocol, and calling on all other members of the Preparatory Commission to state their view.

Cecil laid the memorandum before the commission on Nov. 18, 1930. Only Gibson voiced his doubt; no one opposed Cecil's arguments; every other member of the commission who spoke-representing France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Japan-confirmed that the tear gases were banned.

This view was accepted without any question throughout the Disarmament Conference of 1932-3, and during its later stages, a new U.S. Delegate, Hugh R. Wilson, declared that the U.S. Government agreed that use of all tear gases was banned by international law.

In the light of these facts, I find it difficult to understand how anyone can argue that the Protocol permits the use of "harrassing" gases and herbicides.

PHILIP NOEL-BAKER
London Dec. 4, 1969

The writer served in the League of Nations Secretariat and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959.

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1

ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AND REPLIES ON CBW FROM DEPARTMENTS
AND AMBASSADOR YOST

(By Hon. Richard D. McCarthy)

Early in February of this year the activities of the United States in chemical and biological warfare were brought to my attention by a disturbing documentary shown on NBC television. I recognized that I knew almost nothing about this aspect of our military capability and decided to inform myself. My main interest was in the public policy questions relating to chemical and biological warfare. Why do we need a capability? What sort of capability do we have? What are our policies governing the use of these weapons? What do these activities cost us each year? What are the safety precautions taken to protect the public against accident? Are our academic and private institutions being improperly involved in chemical and biological research?

In order to inform myself about our CBW program I asked the U.S. Army to brief those Members of Congress who were interested in this field. On March 4, 1969, the Army presented a briefing, most of which they insisted on classifying. I did not find that briefing satisfactory; it did not answer the public policy questions. So I then prepared a comprehensive set of policy questions which I sent to Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of State Rogers, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith, Ambassador to the United Nations Yost, and Dr. Henry Kissinger of the White House staff. While waiting for replies I have made a rather extensive study of the information that is available in public; I have received assistance from several organizations that are involved in a study of chemical and biological warfare, and I have consulted a number of individuals who are very knowledgeable in the field.

I have now received replies from all of the departments and agencies that I contacted with the exception of Dr. Kissinger. His office said that they had hoped to prepare a reply to my March 20, 1969, letter by last Friday but had not had time to do so, which is perhaps as much a comment on the priority placed on CBW policy in relation to other matters as it is on the pressures of the Executive Office. I would like to comment at this time on the nature of the information that I have received.

Chemical and biological warfare activities are shrouded in secrecy, unnecessarily so in my view. The Army's unclassified briefing was perfunctory at best; the classified presentation was not much better. I get the impression that the security curtain is parted only when it serves the interests of the advocates of the program. I found the replies from the departments heartening in some respects, but more deeply disturbing in most others. By far the most revealing information appears in sources available to the public such as occasional statements by public officials, open publications, and press reports, both domestic and foreign

Perhaps the most immediately disturbing aspect of the replies that I have received from the departments is the contradiction between some of the replies and the information that is available to the public. These contradictions should be resolved; both the Congress and the American public deserves a full explanation if the credibility of our public officials is to be maintained. Some of these contradictions are

First. Defense states that we maintain a limited offensive capability in chemical weapons; that the carefully controlled inventories are adequate for tactical response.

Yet we have in storage about 100 million lethal doses of nerve gas at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Tooele Army Depot. Col. S. J. Efnor stated that the gas from a single bomb the size of a quart fruit jar could kill every living thing in a cubic mile. The inventory of nerve gas seems to be more than that required for an adequate tactical response.

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Second. General Hebbeler in the unclassified briefing stated that biological warfare is generally considered to have strategic implications rather than tactical.

Yet Defense says:

"Although the employment of biological weapons against U.S. population centers cannot be ruled out entirely."

There appears to be a contradiction between the Army's estimate of the threat and that of Defense.

Third. Defense states that the U.S. Armed Forces have the equipment to protect themselves against CB attack with the exception of a biological warning and detection device.

Yet I am informed that the Navy only purchases one-tenth of the quantity of atropine, the nerve gas antidote, needed for their total number of personnel. Fourth. State and Defense say that review has shown that there is no evidence of substantial permanent or irreparable damage, no significant permanent damage, to the ecology of Vietnam due to defoliation. Both Departments cite the work of Dr. Fred H. Tschirley as an authority; Defense cites a report prepared by Midwest Research Institute.

Yet Dr. Tschirley's report itself says that the mangrove tree, a source of food in Vietnam, is particularly susceptible to damage from herbicides and that he had seen quite a few dead mangroves, a tree taking about 20 years to grow. He goes on to say that a single treatment with the defoliants orange or white would not be expected to have a lasting effect but that a second application during the period of recovery would have a wholly different effect. Press reports state we spray more than once in the same growing system.

Even more damaging, Dr. Tschirley, their authority, reviewed the Midwest Research Institute report for Ecology, a professional magazine, and said: "Reading the MRI Report before visiting Vietnam left me with the feeling of having read a literature review that resulted in accurate general conclusions, but told me nothing about the ecological consequences of using herbicides in Vietnam. In summary, the MRI Report is a literature review of a subject for which there is a great deal of literature relating to temperate zones, but little relating to tropical vegetation. The FRI Report is disappointing because its direct applicability to Vietnam is so tenuous."

Similarly, Profs. Egbert W. Pfeiffer and Gordon H. Orians, professor of zoology at the University of Montana and professor of zoology at the University of Washington, respectively, made the following report on April 3, 1969, after a 2-week visit to Vietnam.

They described in grim terms the effects of leaf-killing chemicals on Vietnamese plant and animal life. They made a 65-mile trip by armed boat down the waterway linking Saigon with the sea. They scarcely saw a living plant. Bird life, apart from fish-eating birds, has virtually disappeared. The justification for the program, one reminiscent of the colonel's remark at the time of the Tet offensive last year that "we had to destroy the village in order to save the village," was also given by Professors Pfeiffer and Orians. They said that it was completely unrealistic to expect military commanders to forgo such measures. There is no question about it; they save American lives.

Fifth. Defense states that each use of herbicides or defoliants is approved by the U.S. Embassy and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Yet this must be a recent policy change if it is true because in February 1967. Secretary McNamara told congressional committees that the decision on when and where to use chemicals had been turned over to commanders in the fields. Commanders in the area of South Vietnam can defoliate any time they think it will open up avenues of fire that are otherwise unavailable to them. Unless there has been a change in policy, this is a direct contradiction.

Sixth. Defense and State say that the only gas used in Vietnam by U.S. forces is CS, a powerful teargas: Defense says that CN, a milder teargas was also authorized some years ago. Both Departments justify its use by pointing out, that it is often used as a riot control agent, State saying:

"The fact that teargas is used for the control of riots by governments responsible to their people provides an objective standard for differentiating it from other chemical weapons."

Yet in 1965 Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance and Secretary McNamara said that South Vietnamese forces had been equipped with three gases which they had used, CN, CS, and DM. DM, otherwise known as Adamsite gas, was

not classified as an incapacitating gas but rather as an irritant gas until relatively recently by the Army. Both Defense and State point out this gas often allows the Army to accomplish its aims with the minimum violence required, citing the case of civilians mixed with Vietcong that are subdued with gas rather than with explosives. Secretary Rusk spoke of the use of this gas as the attempt to use the minimum level of violence required.

Most disturbing, the New York Times reports that in 1966 helicopters dropped hundreds of teargas grenades on a fortified Vietcong area in preparation for a B-52 bombing raid. Defense spokesmen are then quoted as saying that the purpose of the gas was to drive the Vietcong out of their fortifications so that they could be killed with bomb fragments. Gas has also been dropped prior to artillery attacks according to press reports. This clear use of gas in conjunetion with lethal conventional weapons is chemical warfare. The extent of the use of this technique can be speculated upon when we find Defense procuring $81 million worth of riot control munitions-teargas-in 1969.

Seventh. Defense states that strict safety practices are enforced at laboratories which work with CBW agents.

Yet Defense's overall safety record during the past two decades is poor. Fort Detrick, the Army's biological warfare research center has one of the poorest records among major biological institutions for infections. There were 3,300 accidents at Detrick between 1954 and 1962 according to the Phillips report. Half of these occurred in the laboratory, involving broken test tubes, accidental scratches from needles, and so forth. About 400 men were infected as a result of these accidents. And infections among its workers pose some danger to neighboring communities. In 1959 one worker caught pneumonic plague, a highly infectious disease. He also happened to be a lifeguard at a swimming pool and had been in contact with many people. Local residents that might have come in contact with Detrick personnel who could have been infected were not warned of the danger. Nor did the Public Health Service promptly report this to the World Health Organization as required by agreement. In 1951 an Army bacteri ologist working at Detrick became ill at his home in Frederick, Md. He was placed in the local hospital where his disease went unrecognized. He was taken to the base hospital shortly thereafter and died of deadly anthrax. The dangers of failing to warn local populations so that the most careful observation can be made is clear to any health authority.

At another installation, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where chemical agents are stored and produced, the Army has failed to prevent accidents. In the early 1950's leakage of toxic material from the arsenal began to kill crops and animals on surrounding farms. Vigorous complaints led the Army to drill a deep disposal well to store waste products from their activities. This resulted in the first series of earthquakes that Denver had experienced in 80 years. In the immediate period after the well was drilled and used for storage, there were over 1,500 earth tremors in the Denver area, some reaching up to 6 on the Richter scale. Some tremors destroyed property. As a result, the Army discontinued using the deep well and began pumping material out.

At the Dugway Proving Grounds, used for chemical and biological warfare testing, despite a recent order emphasizing the importance of safety, more than 6,000 sheep in nearby Skull Valley were killed when nerve gas was carried from the testing grounds onto their pastures. I am informed that tests of sheep in a number of areas around Dugway showed low-level exposure to nerve gas. In another disturbing report, I learned that the local sheriff is occasionally asked by Dugway authorities to patrol the roads that pass the proving grounds to insure that motorists don't slow down or stop beside the road. Candor is not the mark of the Army's treatment of these problems; they have refused to confirm that the sheep died of nerve gas although they paid over $300,000 to the farmer for his loss and only last Thursday, awarded him an additional $198,309 in damages.

At the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, production center for biological weapons, contamination of a local stream leading into a nearby river with toxic material led the Army to buy up the land along the stream. Presumably the toxic material is diluted when it weeds into the river.

I do not find this safety record very reassuring.

Eighth. Defense states that gases are transported according to rules established by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the U.S. Public Health Service: that an underlying layer of sand is used to reduce vibration and absorb

any leakage; that all shipments are accompanied by a trained escort; that routes are planned to avoid populated areas and to minimize time in populated areas; and that transported agents are not volatile.

Yet in the incident reported in the Denver railyards, these statements appear to be contradicted. I rechecked the facts with Dick Kruse, the reporter for KBT-TV/KBTR in Denver and found that the gondola cars carrying large tanks of nerve gas that he filmed in the Denver railyards on a siding had no sand under them; they were on a siding in the center of Denver for most of the night; that he had spent about 11⁄2 hours filming the tanks both from the ground and upon the gondola cars and had seen no guards. General Hebbeler also stated that GB, presumed to be the agent in the tanks, is relatively volatile. The movement of these agents by rail is fraught with danger; the Transportation Safety Board of the Department of Transportation has reported on the alarming increase in derailment and other forms of railroad accidents, up 85 percent between 1961 and 1967. As the Dunreith accident illustrated, the accident need not occur to the train carrying the gas; it might be caused by a passing train. If the accident were similar to that which occurred in Laurel, Miss., the explosion of the adjoining train might scatter nerve gas over a 10-block area of a city. Furthermore, the Transportation Safety Board will shortly announce some major revisions in transportation safety regulations because of their inadequacies, I am led to understand.

I also do not find Defense's reply that the statistical probability of a gas transportation accident is very difficult to determine because we have never had one. Certainly the art of safety and reliability analysis, as practiced by NASA and the AEC for example, has proceeded far enough to give some fairly good indications of the dangers involved.

I have also come across information available to the public on the transportation of biological agents that causes me grave concern. In a December 1967 publication issued by Fort Detrick, procedures for the careful packaging of biological agents were described, including a crash of an aircraft with biological agent containers aboard. The packages are designed to protect the biological agents that are being shipped; the report concludes:

"Any number of such packages is now acceptable in one aircraft for shipment by commercial airlines under the Official Air Transport Restricted Articles Tariff No. 6-D. Technical escort is not required. However, current regulations of the Armed Services require technical escort for any shipment in which the total volume of etiologic agent in all packages in one conveyance exceeds 3 gallons."

Although the containers survived a crash of an aircraft going 120 knots from about 40 feet up onto desert soil, it is highly questionable whether they would have survived a midair explosion with metal fragments being blown about or a crash at greater speeds into a mountain cliff. The biological agent might well have been vaporized, wind conditions might carry the vapor to a nearby community with disastrous results. As one expert has said, a fraction of a gram of purified bacteria or virus in aerosol form could be sufficient to infect anyone in a square kilometer.

The publication goes on to indicate that agents may be shipped to Fort Detrick, Md.; Pine Bluff, Ark.; Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; Dover, N.J.; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Dugway, Utah; Deseret Test Center, Utah; Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; Oakland, Calif.; China Lake, Calif.; U.S. Naval Base, Brooklyn, N.Y.; Crane, Ind.; Fort McClellan, Ala.; and possibly to Canada, Britain, and Australia.

Ninth. Defense states that we have a CBW budget of $350 million for 1969. That budget includes $139 million for napalm, incendiary weapons, and the like, weapons that I will accept as not normally falling in the definition of CBW. It contains $81 million for tear gas or riot munitions. It contains $5 million for herbicides.

Yet I find it difficult to accept this budget figure. It is generally admitted that the United States spent about $100 million for defoliants and herbicides last year. I cannot believe that we will buy only $5 million this year. A McGraw-Hill investment newsletter states that Edgewood Arsenal would spend about $420 million in 1969 for CBW materials. And this is only one center.

Tenth. Defense states that the Army does use discretion in placing CBW research contracts with academic and private institutions.