375. The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines. Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability. A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.

376. The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. Their use, which could cause an enormous loss of human life, has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and hence for peace throughout the world, would brighten significantly if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents intended for purposes of war were to end and if they were eliminated from all military arsenals.

377. If this were to happen, there would be a general lessening of international fear and tension. It is the hope of the authors that this report will contribute to public awareness of the profoundly dangerous results if these weapons were ever used, and that an aroused public will demand and receive assurances that Governments are working for the earliest effective elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

PROCOTOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE; SIGNED AT GENEVA, JUNE 17, 1925

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, the name of their respective Governments: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world;

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare:

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.

The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear today's date.

The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding Powers.

The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic. The present Procotol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Procotol. Done at Geneva in a single copy, the seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

RESOLUTION 2162 B (XXI)

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,

Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization.

Affirming that the strict observance of the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare is in the interest of maintaining these standards of civilization.

Recalling that the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925, has been signed and adopted and is recognized by many States.

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference.

1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Aspyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives; 2. Invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

1484th plenary meeting, 5 December 1966.

The General Assembly,

RESOLUTION 2454 A (XXIII)

Reaffirming the recommendations of its resolution 2162 B (XXI) calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to that Protocol,

Considering that the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind,

Believing that the people of the world should be made aware of the conse quences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Having considered the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which recommended that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of such weapons,

Noting the interest in a report on various aspects of the problem of chemical, bacteriological and other biological weapons which has been expressed by many Governments and the welcome given to the recommendation of the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee by the Secretary-General in his Annual Report for 1967-68.

Believing that such a study would provide a valuable contribution to the consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons,

Recalling the value of the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report in accordance with the proposal in Part II of his Introduction to the Annual Report for 1967-68 and in accordance with the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee contained in paragraph 26 of its report (document A/7189):

2. Recommends that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the SecretaryGeneral taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made dur ing the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.

3. Calls upon Governments, national and international scientific institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report;

4. Requests that the report be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the Security Council and the General Assembly at an early date, if possible by 1 July 1969, and to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

5. Recommends that Governments give the report wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

6. Reiterates its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and invites all States to accede to that Protocol.

1750th plenary meeting, 20 December 1968.

Baroian, O. V. * * *

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HEALTH EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REPORT OF A WHO GROUP OF CONSULTANTS

1. INTRODUCTION

On 29 January 1969, the Secretary-General of the United Nations requested the Director-General of the World Health Organization to co-operate with the United Nations Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons in the preparation of a report on this subject. WHO was asked to provide such information as the Organization considered useful for the United Nations report, which was to be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,' the Security Council and the General Assembly, if possible by 1 July 1969, as requested in Resolution 2454 A (XXIII) adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1968. .

In order to help WHO in this task, the Director-General appointed a number of consultants. In addition, liaison was maintained with the Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations (which serviced the Group of Consultant Experts appointed by the Secretary-General), the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Pugwash Organization, in order to avoid unnecessary overlap in their respective contributions.

The possible development and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their destructive potentialities have been matters of concern to WHO for several years. In 1967, the Twentieth World Health Assembly, on a recommendation of the WHO Executive Board, adopted a resolution .... welcoming Resolution 2162 (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly and calling upon all Member States of WHO to exert every effort to implement it. The DirectorGeneral was therefore glad to meet the request to assist the United Nations in this matter, and in late May 1969 an interim report was completed and forwarded to the Secretary-General. Some of the information contained in the WHO submission was incorporated into the final report of the United Nations Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (hereafter referred to as "the United Nations report"), which was released to the public on 2 July 1969 and transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for discussion during the summer of 1969 before being considered at the Twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly later in the year.

The relatively short period of time available for the preparation of the WHO submission to the United Nations did not permit the health and related scientific aspects of chemical and biological warfare to be covered to the extent and in the depth merited by the importance of the subject. For this reason and in pursuance of resolution WHA22.58 . . . . adopted by the Twenty-second World Health Assembly in July, 1969, a further study of the problem was undertaken with a view to expanding and revising certain sections of the interim report. 2. COMPARISON OF THE WHO AND UNITED NATIONS REPORTS AND THEIR CONCLUSIONS The United Nations report presents a comprehensive review of the problem, and includes consideration of military aspects, plant and animal diseases, ecology, and economic and security aspects, along with implications to human health. The report was intentionally written in a style that would be easily understood by governments and by the lay non-specialist reader, and it does not attempt to present highly technical information or to provide a detailed analysis of public health considerations and medical effects.

1 Renamed on August 26, 1969, the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.” United Nations (1969), Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use. Report of the Secretary-General, New York (United Nations Publication, Sales No: E.69.1.24).

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