Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSCStanford University Press, 1999 - Всего страниц: 336 In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth. Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did. Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus. Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years i.e., throughout the Cold War and the CIA s pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so. |
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... Armed Services , 1951-1985 25 118 124 154 5. Disparity Between Shares of U.S. Military Budget Allocated to the Three Armed Services , 1951-60 to 1971-80 154 6. Distribution of Defense Contract Dollars Awarded to States , FY 1996 157 ...
... Armed Services , 1951-1985 25 118 124 154 5. Disparity Between Shares of U.S. Military Budget Allocated to the Three Armed Services , 1951-60 to 1971-80 154 6. Distribution of Defense Contract Dollars Awarded to States , FY 1996 157 ...
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Содержание
Introduction I | 1 |
Propositions | 5 |
Propositions | 7 |
Propositions ΙΟ | 10 |
Toward a Theory of National Security Agencies | 12 |
Proportion of Interest Groups in Eight Issue Areas | 23 |
Transforming New Institutionalism into a National Security Agency Model | 41 |
Explaining a Specific Agencys Developmental Trajectory | 44 |
From Kings Ministers to Palace Guard | 76 |
PreKennedy and Modern Security Council Systems | 88 |
Number of Interest Group Witnesses Appearing | 118 |
Average Shares of U S Military Budget Allocated | 154 |
Defense Contracts Awarded in FY 1994 by Region | 156 |
Conclusion | 223 |
The Bureaucratic Spectrum | 233 |
Policy Interest Groups | 239 |
Ideal Preference Points in the Unification Debate | 71 |
Locating the National Security Act Among Actors Ideal Preference Points | 73 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 273 |
303 | |
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Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC Amy B. Zegart Недоступно для просмотра - 1999 |
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administration agency design agency's Air Force Armed Services Army bill Brent Scowcroft budget bureaucratic Caraley Carter Central Intelligence Agency Chiefs of Staff CIA's covert civilian clandestine Cold War command Committee Congress Congressional Quarterly coordination covert activities covert operations covert side Defense Department domestic policy agencies Donovan Eberstadt Eisenhower executive branch foreign affairs foreign policy Forrestal Goldwater-Nichols incentives institutionalism institutionalist interest groups interview by author issues Joint Chiefs Joint Staff Kennedy legislators major McGeorge Bundy ment national interest National Security Act national security adviser national security agencies National Security Council naval Navy departments Navy's NSC staff NSC system officers organization oversight Pentagon political actors postwar president presidential proposals Reagan reform role secretary of defense Security Council system Statutes at Large statutory structure tion Truman U.S. House U.S. Senate U.S. Statutes unification University Press War Department Washington White House York