Another reason alleged was, that the United States had a sort of political supremacy over the whole continent. This could not be sustained. The principle itself, was still a matter of controversy between Great Britain and this country; and if we pledge ourselves to sustain it, we probably rush into an actual war. This is not a mere question of boundaries. No person will believe, that the president meant that we should pledge ourselves to maintain our territorial boundaries as we claimed them. The fact is, it is a controverted question between ourselves and Great Britain, and it was unwise in us to give such a pledge. We had no motive for it. We want no aid from these states to vindicate our own boundaries; and if we did, we could not obtain it in the mode proposed. Mr. Rives also objected to this fraternal system, which, he said, seemed to have been lately adopted towards the South American states. All its consequences were to be referred to the secretary of state. The present executive, whatever was his original bias, has become a proselyte. The cabalistic phrases of this system, "sister republics," "new-born nations," &c. recurring in his message, show that the president had adopted it. to do away, the application of He differed with the executive on this point. He thought the advice even more applicable now, than when delivered. Then we were in a state of infancy, and it might have been desirable to have had the aid of older powers. Now, we are strong enough to defend ourselves. He considered the government to have pledged itself by this mission on two points, viz. to resist any farther colonization of this continent; and the interference of any European powers in the contest between Spain and her former colonies; and that the house was bound to step in, and release them from the dilemma in which it had involved itself. In reply, Mr. Webster said, that in his opinion these amendments presented two questions; the first, whether the house of representatives will withhold the ordinary appropriation, for carrying into effect an executive measure, which the executive department has constitutionally instituted? The second, whether, it will take the responsibility of interposing, with its own opinions, directions or instructions, as to the manner in which this particular executive measure shall be conducted? He was in the negative, on both these propositions. He was neither Another evidence is. the attempt willing to refuse the appropriation. nor to limit the discretion of the executive, beforehand, as to the manner in which it shall perform its own appropriate constitutional duties. And, those who hold these opinions have the advantage of being on the common highway of our national politics. We propose nothing new; we suggest no change; we adhere to the uniform practice of the government. It is for those, who are in favor of either, or both, of the propositions, to satisfy the house and the country, that there is something in the present occasion which calls for such an extraordinary and unprecedented interference. "The president and senate have instituted a public mission, for the purpose of treating with foreign states. Such appointment is, a clear and unquestionable exercise of executive power. It is, indeed, less connected with the appropriate duties of this house, than almost any other executive act; because the office of a public minister is not created by any statute or law of our own government. It exists under the law of nations, and is recognized as existing by our constitution. The acts of congress, indeed, limit the salaries of public ministers; but they do no more. Every thing else, in regard to the appointment of public ministers, their number, the time of their appointment, and the negotiations contemplated in such appointments, is matter for executive discretion. Now the question is, whether the president and senate,having created this mission, or, in other words, having appointed the ministers, in the exercise of their undoubted constitutional power, this house will take upon itself the responsibility of defeating its objects, and rendering this exercise of executive power void? "By voting the salaries, in the ordinary way, we assume, as it seems to me, no responsibility whatever. We merely empower another branch of the government to discharge its own appropriate duties, in that mode which seems to itself most conducive to the public interests. We are, by so voting, no more responsible for the manner in which the negotiation shall be conducted, than we are for the manner in which one of the heads of department may discharge the duties of his office. "On the other hand, if we withhold the ordinary means, we do incur a heavy responsibility. We interfere, to prevent the action of the government, according to constitutional forms and provisions. It ought constantly to be remembered that our whole power, in the case, is merely incidental. The constitution vests the power of appointment in the president and senate; the law gives to the president even the power of fixing the amount of salary, within certain limits; and the only question, here. is upon the appropriation. There is no doubt that we have the power, to break up the mission, by withholding the salaries; we have power also to break up the court, by withholding the salaries of the judges, or to break up the office of president, by withholding the salary provided for it by law. But, then, can we rightfully exercise this power? These officers do, indeed, already exist. They are public ministers. If they were to negotiate a treaty, and the senate should ratify it, it would become a law of the land, whether we voted their salaries or not. "The gentleman from Delaware says, that the source from which the measure springs, should have no influence with us whatever. I do not comprehend this. This measure comes from the executive, and it is an appropriate exercise of executive power. How is it, then, that we are to consider it, as if it were a legislative measure originating with ourselves? In deciding whether we will enable the executive to exercise his own duties, are we to consider whether we should have exercised them in the same way ourselves? And if we differ in opinion with the president and senate, are we on that account to refuse the ordinary means? I think not; unless we mean to say that we will exercise, ourselves, all the powers of the government. "But the gentleman argues, that in the present case, the president has especially referred the matter to our opinion; that he requests our advice. This appears a very mistaken view of the subject; but if our advice and opinion had thus been asked, it would not alter the line of our duty. We cannot take, though it were offered, any share in executive duty. The president cannot properly ask, and we cannot properly give, our advice, as to the manner in which he shall discharge his duties. He cannot shift the responsibility from himself; and we cannot assume it. Such a course, would confound all that is distinct in the constitutional assignment of our respective functions. It would break down all known divisions of power, and put an end to all just responsibility. 66 But, sir, I see no evidence whatever, that the president has asked us to take this measure upon ourselves, or to divide the responsibility of it with him. The senate having concurred in the mission, the president has sent a message, requesting the appropriation, in the usual and common form. Another message is sent, in answer to a call of the house, communicating the correspondence, and setting forth the objects of the mission. It is contended, that by this message he asks our advice, or refers the subject to our opinion. I do not so understand it. Our concurrence, of the other powers. This is not he says, by making the appropria- a general expression of opinion. tion, is subject to our free determination. Doubtless it is so. If we determine at all, we shall determine freely and the message does no more than leave to ourselves to decide how far we feel ourselves bound, either to support or to thwart the executive department, in the exercise of its duties. There is no message, no document, no communication to us, which asks for our concurrence, otherwise than as we shall manifest it by making the appropriation. "Mr. Chairman: I will here take occasion, in order to prevent misapprehension, to observe, that no one is more convinced than I am, that it is the right of this house, and often its duty, to express its general opinion in regard to questions of foreign policy. On those great subjects, for instance, which form the leading topics in this discussion, it is not only the right of the house to express its opinions, but I think it its duty to do so, if it should think the executive to be pursuing a general course of policy which the house itself will not ultimately approve. But that is something entirely different from the present suggestion. Here it is proposed to decide, by our vote, what shall be discussed by particular ministers, already appointed, when they shall meet the ministers It is a particular direction, or. a special instruction. Such a thing, sir, is wholly unprecedented. The course of the house, hitherto, has not been such. It has expressed its opinions, when it deemed proper to express them at all, on great, leading questions, by resolution, and in a general form. These general opinions, being thus made known, have doubtless always had, and such expressions of opinion doubtless always will have, their effect. This is the practice of the government. It is a salutary practice; but if we adopt a very different practice, and undertake to prescribe to our public ministers what they shall discuss, and what they shall not discuss, we take upon ourselves that which, in my judg ment, does not at all belong to us. 66 It is obvious to remark, Mr. Chairman, that the senate have not undertaken to give directions or instructions in this case. That body is closely connected with the president in executive measures. Its consent to these very appointments is made absolutely necessary by the constitution; yet it has not seen fit, in this or any other case, to take upon itself the responsibility of directing the mode in which the negotiations should be conducted. "For these reasons, Mr. Chair man, I am for giving no instructions, advice, or directions, in the case. I prefer leaving it where, in my judgment, the constitution has left it-to executive discretion and executive responsibility. "But I think there are other objections to the amendment. There are parts of it which I could not agree to, if it were proper to attach any such condition to our vote. As to all that part of the amendment, indeed, which asserts the neutral policy of the United States, and the inexpediency of forming alliances, no man assents to those sentiments more readily, or more sincerely, than myself. On these points, we are all agreed. Such is our opinion; such, the president assures us, in terms, is his opinion; such we know to be the opinion of the country. If it be thought necessary to affirm opinions which no one either denies or doubts, by a resolution of the house, I shall cheerfully concur in it. But there is one part of the proposed amendment to which I could not agree, in any form. "That part of the amendment to which I now object, is, that which requires, as a condition of the resolution before us, that the ministers shall not be authorized to discuss, consider, or consult upon any measure which shall commit the present or future neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European nations, or between the several states of Mexico and South America.' "I need hardly repeat, that this amounts to a precise instruction. It prescribes to public ministers the precise manner in which they are to conduct a public negotiation; a duty manifestly and exclusively belonging, in my judgment, to the executive, and not to us. to "But if we possessed the power give instructions, this instruction would not be proper to be given. Let us examine it. The ministers shall not discuss, consider, or consult,' &c. "Now, sir, in the first place, it is to be observed, that they are not only not to agree to any such measure, but they are not to discuss it. If proposed to them, they are not to give reasons for declining it. Indeed they cannot reject it; they can only say they are not authorised to consider it. "But again they are to discuss no measure which may commit our neutral rights or duties. To commit, is somewhat indefinite. May they not modify, nor in any degree alter, our neutral rights and duties? If not, I hardly know whether a common treaty of commerce could be negotiated; because all such treaties affect or modify, more or less, the neutral rights or duties of |