The protracted contest between Spain and her former colonies now constituting seven independent states, all having the same relation to the mother country and contending for similar objects, had been continued on the part of the Spanish crown for many years without much activity; but still with a pertinacity which denied all expectation of peace, except in the entire predominancy of the new republics and the humiliation of Spain. This conviction induced many of the leading statesinen of the South American states, to propose a union of their arms to bring the war to a close, by the entire expulsion of the Spanish forces from the American continent. This suggestion, natural as it was, was not immediately reduced to practice. The rising states, were for years suffered to struggle alone with the armies of Spain, amidst all the horrors of a civil war. Assistance was indeed occasionally rendered by one republic to another, and the western states of South America may be truly said to owe their independence, to the unpurchased aid of their contiguous

sister republics bordering on the Atlantic. Still there was no general plan of joint co-operation, for the common object of their wishes. The want of this unity of effort and council, was acknowledged; but no remedy was offered.

The first approximation to it, was in a treaty between Colombia and Peru in 1822, providing among other things for a general meeting of the American states, for the purpose of cementing their friendly relations, to serve as a common council in the existing conflict; and as an umpire in their differences.

Treaties for the same purpose were in that and the three succeeding years, concluded between Colombia, Chili, Guatemala, Mexico; and the Isthmus of Panama was designated, as the place of meeting of the great American congress.

The threatening aspect of the holy alliance towards the free governments of the new world, having induced the late president, Mr. Monroe, to declare that the United States would not view with indifference any interference on their part, in the contest between Spain and her former

colonies, the governments of these new republics were naturally led, to regard this country as having in a measure adopted their cause; and to suggest to the government of the United States, that the attendance of its ministers at the proposed congress would be desirable, and that if agreeable to the United States, an invitation would be given to them to that effect. The subjects of its deliberations, it was stated, would consist of two classes; viz: matters exclusively concerning the belligerents; and matters between the belligerents and neutrals.

It was also suggested, that this assembly of the representatives of the independent states of this hemisphere, would present a proper opportunity, to discuss and establish many principles of international law; the unsettled state of which, had given rise to disputes, and even hostilities, between the maritime powers of Europe and America. Other topics of discussion were also mentioned; as, the abolition of the slave trade; the future colonization of the American continent; and the basis upon which Hayti should be placed. In certain official conversations had in the spring of 1825 with the ministers of those powers; invitations were given on the part of Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, to the United States to send commissioners to Panama. Mr. Clay, the secretary of state, answered

that those communications were received with proper feelings of the friendly motives, which dictated them; but that the United States could not take any part in the existing war with Spain, nor in councils for deliberating on its farther prosecution: though the president believed such a congress, might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public law; and in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American continent; and strengthening the bonds of friendship between the American powers; that it appeared to him, however expedient before such a congress met, to adjust as preliminary matters, the precise objects to which the attention of the congress would be directed, and the substance and form of the powers of the ministers, representing the several republics. In reply to this suggestion, notes were received from them, stating the objects of the assembly, and formally renewing the invitation. The answers were not considered as sufficiently precise; but still to manifest the sensibility of the United States to what concerns the welfare of America, and to the friendly feelings of the Spanish American states; the president determined to accept their invitations, and to send ministers, should the senate consent to the measure.

This determination he mentioned in his opening message to congress,

and on the 26th of December, he sent to the senate a confidential message setting forth the objects of the Panama congress; his reason s for accepting the invitation to send commissioners; and nominating Richard C. Anderson, and John Sergeant as ministers on the part of the United States, and William B. Rochester, of New-York, as secretary to the mission.

This message, with the accompanying documents, was referred to the committee on foreign relations; where it remained until January 16th, when a report was made condemning the mission and ending with a resolution, declaring it to be inexpedient to send ministers to Panama.

The opposition to this mission, was justified on the following grounds. That it was a departure from the settled policy of the government, adopted by Washington, and conformed to by his successors to enter into alliances with other powers, which should entangle our foreign relations, or prevent the United States from acting with a sole view to their own interests; and no sufficient reason, it was urged, had been offered for this departure.

The uncertainty, too, of the powers of the commissioners; and of the subjects of their deliberations, was also urged as a motive for this government, acting for a people peculiarly jealous of undefined power, to abstain from becoming a party

to the congress. To guard against the evils feared from this source, the supervising power of the senate over any compacts made there, was not considered sufficient. After a treaty had been once made, it was difficult to reject it without giving offence to the other party; and much embarrassment is occasioned in giving explanations, to which the other party, who has sanctioned the treaty conceives he has a right. In this case, if the measures agreed upon in congress, should be such as the senate could not sanction, great inconvenience, it was feared, would result from its refusal, and probably, an entire alienation of the friendly feelings of the new republics.

To such objects of the mission as were stated by the president, or the ministers of the Spanish American republics, specific objections were

made.

To that prominent subject which Mr. Monroe had alluded to in his message of 1823, viz: opposition to the interference of any other power, in the conflict between Spain and the new states; it was objected, that it would at once compromit our neutrality and involve us in a war for objects, which the people of the United States would not regard, as worth the expense and danger of the contest. The opposition to any farther colonization on this continent, was also set forth as an inadequate

motive for such a mission. If it was intended to prevent any violation of our own territories, no aid would be required from any other American state; and if to guaranty the integrity of the dominions of the other powers, it would be an agreement, to which the people of this country would refuse their consent.

The abolition of the slave trade, which the Colombian minister had enumerated among the subjects likely to come under examination; the committee stated had already been effected, so far as our laws could do it, and they did not 66 the propriety of insulting other states by ascending the moral chair, and proclaiming mere abstract principles, of the rectitude of which, each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself."

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Objections were also made, to any consideration of the basis, upon which the relations of Hayti should be placed. Of the propriety or impropriety of connexion with people, situated like the Haytians, every state should be permitted to judge for itself. At one time, and to one community, that connexion may be desirable, which under different circumstances, would be highly injuri

ous.

The United States should not, therefore, place themselves in a situation; where they could not regulate their relations with Hayti, according to their own views of their interests.

To an idea suggested by the Guatemalian minister, "that as Europe had formed a continental system, America ought also to form one," the committee objected that it was not in the power of the government of the United States to become a party to such a compact : nor was it in its power, to enter into any negotiation, for the purpose of settling either principles of internal policy; or mere abstract propositions, as parts of the public law.

So far, too, as these changes in national law were beneficial to this continent; the committee feared that they would be regarded by other civilized nations, as prejudicial to the interests of the old world, and that deplorable results might happen from their adoption : the committee also made objections to the subjects of discussion set forth by the president.

Any effort on the part of the United States, to establish the principles of free trade to the injury of the new republics, they said, would be contrary to that spirit of comity by which this government was actuated; and if their establishment would conduce to their benefit, the end could be attained, better in separate negotiations, than in a general congress. So, too, with regard to the adoption by consent, of the principles of maritime neutrality. These had already been adopted by some of the states, and