The risks that we are taking in not disarming are far, far greater than the risks which we will incur by a successful armaments effort. Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Eaton, the testimony that you have given as to the timeliness of proceeding will be very helpful. I can assure you that many Members of the Congress have spoken to me privately about this measure and have indicated that this does not seem to be the right time to discuss this kind of a measure. As I understand your testimony now, without drawing any value judgment on it, while you are one who believes that we should reinstitute nuclear weapons testing because of the failure of the conference to provide any agreement, you believe that at the same time we should prepare ourselves for the moment that you hope will come of some profitable and fruitful discussions in the field of disarmament.

You are emphasizing the importance of preparedness in the disarmament field, just as you are emphasizing the importance of preparedness in the defense field; is that a simple way of putting your very profound statement on this matter?

Mr. EATON. That is correct, Senator Humphrey.

To put it in short form, I believe action is demanded today in the test field and in the weapons field. Action is demanded today to put ourselves in position to talk disarmament at the earliest moment that is fruitful. S. 2180 would put our Government in that position.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have indicated from your testimony that you feel that in the past, despite the determined efforts of many competent people and I surely want to include you, my friend, as a very competent man in this area-we have found ourselves at disarmament conferences lacking preparation in depth on disarmament matters. Is that your testimony?

Mr. EATON. That is correct, without going into any detail. Our delegation at the end of our conferences in Geneva was still without adequate backup of papers on our position.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Eaton, for your testimony. Coming from a man who has conducted negotiations for this Government in our most sensitive field in government, your testimony is very helpful.

Mr. EATON. Thank you, Senator.

(Mr. Eaton's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY FREDERICK M. EATON

My name is Frederick M. Eaton. I live in New York City and am a partner in the law firm of Shearman & Sterling, 20 Exchange Place, New York City.

I am glad to have the opportunity to testify before your committee today on S. 2180, the disarmament bill. My interest stems both from my position as U.S. representative to the 10-nation disarmament conference during several months of negotiation in Geneva, Switzerland, last year, and from my conviction of the importance of disarmament to every American today.

It is important that the committee act favorably upon a disarmament bill containing, in substance, the provisions of S. 2180. I urge such action although it may be argued that the present international tension makes untimely the subject of disarmament.

The executive branch has never been adequately organized or staffed to handle the complicated problem of disarmament. From firsthand experience I know that there are extremely competent personnel in the departments and agencies of the Government which are concerned with the problem. But their number is inadequate, their authority undefined, and their effectiveness severely limited by lack of any central direction.

The decision of S. 2180 to establish a semiautonomous agency within the general jurisdiction of the Department of State is a wise one. As a matter of organization it would normally be preferable to place the proposed Agency solely under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. Because of the concern of the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission with the subject of disarmament, however, it is probably well that the Director of the Agency derive certain responsibilities from the President.

As the bill provides, the Agency should have its own employment procedures, and its own budget, for many of its activities will be entirely foreign to the normal operations of the Department of State. To operate successfully, it should also be exempted within proper limits from the usual statutes setting up procedures for contracting and preventing conflicts of interest.

The provisions of the bill relating to the coordination of activities in the disarmament area of the various departments and agencies of the Government are essential and appear adequate. The proposed Agency should be capable of conducting its own research and studies. As provided, the Agency should in all cases utilize existing personnel and facilities of the Government where they are available. Where existing facilities are not adequate the Agency should encourage the other departments and agencies to improve them rather than establish duplicate facilities of its own.

. 2180 would establish the necessary authority to develop policies, plans, and programs for disarmament, as well as suitable procedures to assure coordination between departments and agencies concerned. Absence of one central authority is a serious failure at present.

Too much stress cannot be placed on the importance of research and studies in the area of disarmament. A year ago, and I doubt that the situation has changed today, the lack of adequate backup papers to support our positions was one of our greatest failings. Their absence leaves any U.S. delegation in a very insecure and uncertain position. Although in every disarmament plan advanced over the past 10 years. we have proposed a gradual reduction of arms, we have never had an acceptable program as to what weapons should be scrapped, let alone an agreement with our allies in this area. The same failure exists as to the definition of what constitutes forces to be reduced. We have never had adequate support papers on our proposal for the monitoring of weapons in outer space, the launching of missiles, the monitoring of the production of plants producing fissionable materials, although we have strenuously advanced the position that we would be willing to stop production of fissionable materials for military purposes. I use these only as examples of the necessity of giving to this Agency the authority to direct and coordinate studies and research in these areas, and where necessary, to conduct such on its own.

There will undoubtedly be opposition to the adoption of a Disarmament Act by those who believe the continuation of disarmament discussions is neither appropriate nor fruitful in the present international atmosphere. Although I share their concern in this regard, this should not deter us from strengthening our own disarmament establishment against the day when negotiations may be more useful.

I firmly believe that we should renew underground atomic tests for weapon purposes immediately. I also believe it is harmful and confusing to continue to advance new general disarmament plans with further concessions in multination forums at the present time.

I emphasize "at the present time" as I believe that we should be willing to take substantial risks to obtain a reduction or stabilization of armaments at the earliest moment. The risks of continuing the present arms race, even though we are successful in our effort to keep ahead, are too great not to warrant the taking of considerable risks to arrest it. Security does not lie on the course which we are pursuing.

For reasons not apparent, the Soviets do not now appear willing to work out any satisfactory agreement. Khrushchev's insistence that the United States must first agree to discard all weapons before he will discuss specific proposals or procedures for inspection, demonstrates his unwillingness even to discuss workable proposals let alone reach an accord.

It is a mistake publicly to advance new overall general disarmament proposals until such time as it is apparent that the Soviets would be in a mood seriously to consider them. Such proposals involve most difficult and upsetting negotiations within our own Government and more particularly with our allies. Each of our allies has its own problems and national aspirations. Thus, it is a mistake to endeavor to obtain their approval to advance a general disarmament plan unless it is more apparent than now that there is some chance of the Soviets giving it serious consideration. The problems of France with a material reduction of forces, in the light of its heavy north African commitments, is quite different from that of Great Britain. In certain countries there is a growing neutralist group which favors unilateral disarmament. In other countries the mere suggestion of any reduc tion of U.S. forces in their areas presents very real internal political problems. West Germany is an example today.

Therefore, it is important that the new Agency work privately within our own Government establishment and with our allies on every conceivable approach to disarmament, but that we keep our plans in reserve until there appears to be some chance of successful negotiation with the Soviets. The Agency should develop plans, conduct the necessary research, and prepare the necessary backup papers to support our positions when the time for negotiations is propitious. Through diplomatic channels, the Agency should keep the Soviets advised of our desire to sit down with them at the earliest time that they indicate that discussion would prove useful.

Again in the nuclear test field, it is time for action rather than continuing negotiation, not only in the interest of our security, but in furtherance of our negotiating position with the Soviets generally.

Atomic weapons are still in their infancy. We have designed many weapons and are relying on unproven scientific conclusions to estimate

their effectiveness. Furthermore, we may be on the threshold of discoveries which will make obsolete the fusion weapon-as fusion did fission. Science does not stand still. The jump from the laboratory to White Sands, to Hiroshima took but a few days. How much worse would be our position today had we a decade ago followed the advice of those who urged against the development of the hydrogen weapon. Viewed in this light, the argument over whether or not the Soviets are testing is beside the point. Certainly they will test whenever it is in their interest. At this stage we must assume that they are-failing reasonable assurance to the contrary. It has been stated by those in opposition to renewing tests that inasmuch as the United States is way ahead of Russia in respect to the design of nuclear weapons, "the possible disadvantage in not resuming the tests would be outweighed by the sure disadvantage of giving Russia time to catch up with us as well as a decisive victory in the crucial battle for men's minds."

If the Soviets have this disadvantage, which no one knows, is it in character for them to permit it to continue? Did world public opinion stop them from moving into Hungary or from barricading West Berlin? If we are looking for arguments to sustain the theory that the Soviets are testing today, this would be among the more persuasive.

An agreement to discontinue nuclear tests cannot be obtained by unilateral action on our part. In the present posture the Soviets have no incentive for any agreement. They are receiving all of the benefit of inaction on our part without any attendant burden. Why should they seriously consider agreement while this condition persists? We will for the first time know whether they want a test ban agreement, when we commence testing. Not before.

"Action to change the mind" of the Soviets is required at this time. Such action is required also to revive our own confidence and the confidence of those in the world on whom we must rely.

For 3 years we have proclaimed that we would not continue a ban on testing, failing an agreement for prompt and reasonable inspection. Khrushchev has now announced that the Soviets will not sign such an agreement and asked that the test talks be merged with the general disarmament talks. This, of course, would result in an indefinite extension of our moratorium on testing. It would seem that the Soviets have become convinced that we are so concerned with world public opinion that we are unwilling to commence testing even though it is in the interest of our security. Unless we test, and promptly, the Soviets may well conclude that they are right.

Such a conclusion is dangerous, not only in the test and disarmament field, but perhaps more important in their appraisal of our intentions on other and immediately more vital issues.

If we start testing there will be an outcry against us, even among our principal allies, perhaps a vote of censure in the United Nations, but there will be a sigh of relief. There will be a sudden realization that we have again resumed our leadership; that our word can be relied on; that we will go to great lengths to obtain a reduction in tension, but that there is a point at which our own security and that of the free world is involved, beyond which we cannot be pressed.

In summary, we should conduct and announce our underground test at the earliest time feasible. We should indicate a willingness to go on with the nuclear test talks in Geneva if the Soviets wish. We

should make clear that we will not merge these talks with general disarmament negotiations.

Our position has always been that we will not agree to any disarmament measure without an agreement for adequate inspection to verify compliance. In spite of this we have for 3 years accepted a test ban moratorium without any assurance of compliance by the Soviets, except their word. In the light of this, and the recent Khrushchev pronouncements, our position on verification in any general disarmament talks would lack all force and tend further to confuse ourselves and our allies as to our intentions.

Only after we have tidied up our position in connection with the test ban negotiations can we again take up the general question of disarmament with any hope of success.

To this end, we must promptly establish a Disarmament Agency with adequate authority to coordinate and direct the activities of the numerous Government agencies involved, so that we may be in a position to advance and consider every proposal in this critical area-this, as insurance against the day when negotiations with the Soviets will appear more fruitful. If we wait until the opportunity arises, we will be ill prepared and at a great disadvantage in our future negotiations.

Senator HUMPHREY. We will now recess until 2:30. Our first witness will be the former Secretary of State, Mr. Christian Herter, and he will be followed by Dr. Herbert York.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. on the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator HUMPHREY (presiding). We will resume the hearing. We are very pleased to have as our witness this afternoon the former Secretary of State and, may I add, with equal distinction, a former Member of Congress, Mr. Christian Herter.

Mr. Herter, I want to apologize on behalf of the committee for this delay, but we took two flying starts over here only to be recalled by the bells that reminded us that duty is to be performed in the Senate chamber on a bill that is very important to you and to the country, the foreign aid bill.

Some of my colleagues will be here very shortly, and I was able to get my name on the rollcall out of order, so I could come over here ahead of time.

So if you will just bear with us, we will appreciate it.

Mr. Herter, I understand you want to testify without a prepared statement, so why don't you just proceed and give us the benefit of your advice and counsel ?

STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. HERTER. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity of being allowed to testify here on behalf of S. 2180 because I believe it is an important bill, and one which, I hope, the Congress can act on during the present session.