by not knowing whether they are testing or not testing, and when you do not know that, then you have to proceed, I think, on two assumptions.

You have to proceed on the assumption they are not testing or you have to proceed on the assumption that they are testing. Senator SYMINGTON. Troika.

Mr. McCLOY. What is that?

Senator SYMINGTON. Sort of Troika.

Senator HUMPHREY. Duet.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes. It is a two, whatever the name is for twohorse vehicle in Russia.

If they are testing, and we know we are not testing, then there comes a point where the security of the country becomes impaired. I do not believe that you can go forever on the assumption that they are testing and we are not testing and not be deeply concerned with the security, perhaps even the survival, of the country.

If, on the other hand, we feel they are not testing and we are not testing, other consequences flow.

I think this is the crux of the matter, and I know that the President of the United States is giving it very great study and thought. He is going to ask Mr. Dean to go back to Geneva very soon to see if he cannot accomplish the completion of the treaty.

I do not believe anyone is keen to test for testing sake, but there is a reality there, or there is a situation where I think that anyone responsible for the security of the country must contemplate, and I am sure the President of the United States is giving it most careful consideration.

ADVANTAGES COUNTRY TESTING WILL ENJOY OVER COUNTRY NOT

TESTING

Senator SYMINGTON. From a study of our weapons technology, as we know it from air sampling and so forth, in case they are not living up to their agreement, could it not be correctly concluded, that a series of underground and outer space tests by them would vastly improve the yield ratio of their weapons?

Mr. McCLOY. I think whoever experiments as against the one who does not experiment, whether it is in the laboratory or whether it is in medicine or whether it is in weapons of war, that one has an advantage over the other.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the answer to my question would be "Yes"?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And make it possible for them to develop a neutron bomb?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, a scientist would have to answer that. Certainly testing would be an advantage in the development of any type of new weapon.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would it be important to them in their effort to make progress on antimissile technology?

Mr. McCLOY. This is again a scientific question.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you are closely connected with all of it, and we have respect for your opinion.

Mr. McCLOY. My opinion, I will give it to you for what it is worth, let me state this: Some scientists have stated to me they do not feel they could clandestinely in underground testing get very far in that field. This is a subject I am not really equipped to state. I would just like to rest on the thought that anyone who was testing, trying something out, experimenting, is in a better position, better off than a fellow who is not.

Senator SYMINGTON. When we first started on this in 1956, the idea was we could detect any violation. Then what we could not detect went up to 5 kilotons, then 20, then 50, then 100, then 500. In the questions I asked you some months ago, which you were kind enough to answer for the record, you mentioned a fact I thought quite pertinent, namely, that if the Soviets made an effort, with relatively little expense, as I remember, $10 or $11 million, and utilized a salt mine, plus decoupling, the ratio of what could not be detected would jump to 300 to 1. That would get us into the megaton range from the figure you gave me. That was one of the reasons I asked you the question.

DILEMMA RESULTING FROM CERTAIN NONDETECTABLE NUCLEAR TESTS

Are we not, perhaps, in a paradoxical situation that, on the one hand, with the British we are talking about complete test suspension by agreement; on the other hand, scientific studies and all of that indicate a very definite threshold below which no detection is possible.

We are told there is hope that further research will improve detection methods. It will never produce a system which can detect and identify small explosions.

In other words, is it not true that complete suspension, on the one hand, and the suspension of tests which can be verified, on the other hand, are two opposing objectives?

Mr. McCLOY. You said the suspension of tests that can be verified, on the one hand

Senator SYMINGTON. And complete suspension, on the other.

Mr. McCLOY. I think perhaps I lost the sense of the question as you read it. It is a pretty long question. You do not think I have already answered that by saying

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me phrase it again.

Mr. McCLOY. Put it in your own way.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I may, yes.

Mr. McCLOY. You got me into the English and everything else, and I did not quite follow it.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is all right.

At one time, at one point, we say we are going to reach a complete test cessation agreement.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. On the other hand, we say now that the scientists all say studies show some tests you could not detect. Don't the two read against each other?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; somewhat. We did at one time think, as I understand it, or some of the scientists thought, that you could detect in all explosions. This has been exploded itself now.

So we have moved to the threshold concept, with the idea of trying to fill that threshold as best we could by mutual studies.

I do not believe-I do not know enough about it to, perhaps, express an opinion, but I doubt whether we will ever get to the point where there can be confidence that no explosion can take place without being detected.

You have pointed out that one might, perhaps, be exploded in a salt mine which had deep significance.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was quoting your

Mr. McCoy. Yes, in a sense they are mutually contradictory, the idea of the absolute against the nonabsolute.

I would myself say I think we could arrive at a position where we could take some reasonable chances, and we ought to be prepared to take those chances.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would not imply that we have not taken any in the last 3 years?

Mr. McCLOY. I think we have taken chances, and I think we are taking chances right now.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we found out a year from now or a month from now or a week from now that they had been testing over the last 3 years, then it would be too bad that we had not started some time ago, would it not?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

MR. M'CLOY'S GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Mr. McCloy for coming down here. He is a great public servant. He has my complete respect. I have asked these questions in an effort to make the record clear as we pursue this all-important subject. It is a privilege to discuss any matter pertinent to the future of the United States with him.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much, Senator, very warmly.

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF CLANDESTINE TESTING BY THE SOVIET UNION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. McCloy, as you know, this matter of test suspension has been, and is, of the most vital importance to all of us. I appreciate very much your comment upon it. I gather what you are saying is that the President has this whole matter under review. If he feels that our national security is in any way threatened or jeopardized because of the continuation of this moratorium, which has within it, as you so properly indicated, risks, obviously a change in policy would be in order.

But, just so the record is not distorted, do you have any evidence that the Soviets are conducting clandestine testing?

Mr. McCLOY. No; I do not have any convincing evidence. Senator HUMPHREY. Does anybody in the Government have any - ? Mr. McCLOY. All I can say is that I have never seen any evidence which is convincing to me, and I think I have seen it all.

CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN U.S. RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

Bear in mind that the President has a lot of considerations that he has to bring to bear on this: the security of the country, which is also to an extent dependent upon world opinion, as well as in the actuality of a particular weapon.

There are all kinds of nuances and considerations which he has to give to this very difficult problem, and I am not trying to convey by anything I say today what his state of mind' is, or what indeed mine is in regard to this very difficult question he has to deal with.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, there are other considerations besides those which are merely scientific?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. There are certain political considerations. Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

AGENCY'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN FIELD OF DETECTION

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not a fact that the disarmament agency, as it is suggested in the bill, particularly with responsibilities that the agency would have in its functions under title III, could accelerate research, exploration, and development in this field of detection? Mr. McCLOY. Oh, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And control?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes. It would be one of the purposes; yes.

I think an interesting thing, Senator, maybe we would hope that with such an organization as this, and with continuity of study, you might perhaps avoid the situation that developed when we set about with ad hoc scientists and brought out a result which turned out later not to be as solid or was not as fully supported by other evidence which was adduced, and, at least, you would then know who was responsible. You would have an agency here with a director that you would know was charged with responsibility, and you would know where the fault lay.

DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING FUNDS FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES

Senator HUMPHREY. I have been conducting some hearings, Mr. McCloy, in the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. I want the record to be clear and I shall make it clear by certain documents that I will place in the record later on-that the coordination in the field of disarmament research is not without some limitations.

For example, the National Bureau of Standards has some responsibilities, at least some competence, let us say, in the field of acoustical research and certain electromagnetic research projects. When they sought congressional authority to carry out this work, it was denied. Authority for the Coast and Geodetic Survey to carry out research in the field of seismology was granted. And yet I think it is fair to say that acoustical, electrical, magnetic, and seismological research are integrated matters, and must be, in a balanced program, in order to have any kind of effective inspection. Isn't that right? ... Mr. McCLOY. That is about right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Therefore, if you are having separate agencies coming up here

Mr. McCLOY. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY, I happen to be on the Appropriations Committee and I want to tell you that it is easier to get money for research in connection with corn than it is to get money for research for disarmament. We appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars for research

in the field of outer space with scarcely a hearing, because none of us wanted to be in the position of denying money for something that was as critical as that matter. Yet while we are anxious to explore outer space to the tune of $1.3 billion, and I voted for the measure and make no apology for doing so, it is very difficult to find people who will vote the adequate money that we ought to have in the field of seismological research.

Until the Berkner report came out we were doing little or nothing in that area.

Mr. McCLOY. This is very true.

Senator HUMPHREY. I threatened to read the Berkner report on the floor of the Senate until we got some money because the information it contained was being kept secret. I was going to use a certain rule of the Senate which requires the clearing of the gallery, and the closing of the doors, and read it until some money could be obtained for this purpose. We found out the Soviet Union was investing 10 times as much on seismology as we were.

Now, this agency could have the responsibility, and could be able to center attention upon these fundamental areas of research; is that not correct?

Mr. McCLOY. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Therefore, it seems to me that the argument that runs about the fears that we have as to Soviet cheating are best answered not by giving speeches about Soviet cheating but by doing something to find out if they really are cheating.

I have a feeling that if we can get to the moon, we might even be able to find out whether they are exploding bombs. I do not know. Maybe that is just a simple thought on my part.

BYPRODUCTS OF DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

One final question: Do you think there are any byproducts of disarmament research that might be helpful other than in the field of disarmament?

Mr. McCLOY. I would imagine, yes, I suppose any form of research might very well lead to, even in disarmament, may lead to, other benefits. I do not know that I can think of any at the moment.

There is one field of research that I think is extremely important here that is, in effect, more than disarmament, and may affect the whole world relations, and that is related to a study of the means by which we can improve the operation of institutions, or create new institutions that will really deal with this problem of international disputes without resort to threats or threats of force, without force or threats of force.

I think this is a study that is again overdue, the question of peacekeeping machinery. Until we have some substitute for the arbitrament of arms, we probably have not much hope of getting to general and complete disarmament. But I think that this subject needs reexploration and a careful study.

A lot of work has been done in this field. It presents problems to any sovereign country. It present problems to the Soviet Union as well as to ourselves, but unless we look at that problem straight in the face and do give it some thought and consideration I do not believe it

74094-61- 5