Treaty Is Opened for Signature

The way was now clear for the treaty to be opened for signature. Arrangements were made to hold simultaneous ceremonies in the capitals of the three depositary governments (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) on July 1. In Washington, the ceremony was held in the East Room of the White House. President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin made statements at the signing ceremony. Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster signed the treaty for the United States. Representatives of a total of 61 nations signed for their Governments during the ceremonies in Washington, London, and Moscow. The treaty will come into force when the three depositary governments and 40 other nations have ratified it.1

Senate Action on the Treaty

The treaty was forwarded to the United States Senate on July 9 for its advice and consent to ratification. Hearings were held before the Foreign Relations Committee, which was joined by Senate Members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Executive branch witnesses testifying in support of ratification were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ACDA Director Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler, and Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission.

On September 17 the Committee voted 13 to 3, with 3 abstentions, to recommend Senate consent to ratification. The second session of the Ninetieth Congress subsequently adjourned, however, without having taken up the treaty on the floor.

THE PRECARIOUS PEACE which has existed for the past two decades has rested on mutual deterrence-a 'mutual balance of terror." Both the United States and the Soviet Union have long-range strategic armaments capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the other, even after absorbing the devastation of a full-scale nuclear attack. This is generally referred to as a "second-strike" capability. Put conversely, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a "first-strike" capability; i.e., one that could destroy the other side's ability to retaliate with unacceptable damage. Most authoritative analysts are agreed that neither power can hope to achieve such a capability.

The commitment which would be undertaken by the United States pursuant to article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race was a reflection of official U.S. policy which has been stated since 1964.

During the ceremony marking the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty, on July 1, 1968, President Johnson announced that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to enter into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

Exchanges regarding talks were carried on at the highest levels of the

Nuclear Arms Race

two governments. Moreover, Secretary of State Rusk and ACDA Director Foster stressed the importance and urgency of the talks numerous times with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and with the Soviet Co-Chairman of the ENDC, and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson periodically raised the matter with the Soviet Government in Moscow. It appeared that the Kremlin began to reassess the Soviet position following the Glassboro summit meeting in 1967, but it was not until June 27, 1968, that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet, "One of the unexplored regions of disarmament is the search for an understanding on mutual restriction and subsequent reduction of strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons-offensive and defensive including anti-missile. The Soviet Government is ready for an exchange of opinion on this question."

Agreement was about to be reached on the date and place for the talks when the Soviets began their invasion of Czechoslovakia. In those last days of August, the impending missile talks fell victim to the invading tanks.

Yet the dynamics of the strategic arms race remained a reality, and the need to seek limitation of nuclear arms remained the urgent task of the nuclear giants. It is also the earnest hope of the waiting world. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear States in Geneva in September and again at

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the United Nations General Assembly in December, a resolution was adopted without a dissenting vote urging the United States and the Soviet Union to commence the talks as soon as possible.

Controlling the strategic arms race is an extremely complex problem requiring the application of the best resources available within the U.S. Government, supported by selected external contract research activities. ACDA's research program has concentrated on the problems involved in the strategic area since the beginning of the Agency. During the last 2 the years, pace and range of research activities have greatly increased, within both ACDA and the other key Government agencies involved. This research has been aimed primarily at defining the precise terms and scope of the basic U.S. position for entering the talks. This task was greatly facilitated by the existence of the extensive data base which had been built from the continuing research program. Nevertheless, extremely difficult problems involving detailed analyses had to be resolved.

To supplement and support its internal research and analytical capabilities, ACDA has external contracts directed to the technical aspects of the arms control implications of both defensive and offensive strategic weapons systems. In addition, ACDA has worked closely with other Government agencies to assure that all pertinent information is brought to bear on specific strategic arms control considerations. External contractors normally perform technical research in depth on specific tasks; however, in each case, arrangements have been made whereby the contractor's resources are made immediately available for assistance in the solution of various problems which could arise during the preparation of U.S. positions or during the negotiations themselves.

Using computer techniques which

ACDA has now developed into an effective tool, significant inhouse studies have provided insights into the effects of various concepts for limitation or reduction of strategic nuclear armaments.

One such study evaluated the effects on the U.S. and Soviet strategic deterrent of an agreement to freeze the numbers and certain characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery systems on both sides. Another major study was made of the military implications of agreements which would either freeze, reduce or permit limited increases in certain strategic nuclear armaments. This study yielded important information on the effects on assured destruction capability, and therefore the stability of the strategic military balance, of possible agreements to fix strategic arms at various levels.

Work was begun on an internal research project, assisted by an interagency working group, to evaluate the cost implications of several strategic force assumptions.

During the year, the question of further limitations on nuclear weapons testing continued to hold the attention of the ENDC and the U.N. General Assembly. A draft resolution was introduced in the twenty-third ing for the suspension of all nuclear session of the General Assembly, calltests, and elaboration by the ENDC of a treaty banning underground tests. In addressing the U.N. First Committee on this resolution, Mr. Foster reiterated U.S. support for a verified comprehensive test ban. He said, "We remain convinced that if we are to reach such an agreement, we must continue to work toward a treaty providing for adequate verification."

The draft resolution included a recommendation for international exchange of seismic data. The United States has long advocated such an ex

change, as well as technical discussions relating to identification of seismic events. In keeping with the now widespread desire for further advancement in seismic technology and increased international exchange of information in this field, especially in connection with possible limitations on underground testing, Mr. Foster presented a U.S. proposal that some underground nuclear explosions be conducted with the collateral objective that they serve as explosions for worldwide seismic investigations. He emphasized that the nuclear explosions the United States would carry out in connection with this proposal would be those conducted as a part of research into peaceful applications and would not involve development or testing of nuclear weapons.

The success of the proposal would depend in large measure on the extent of worldwide participation in the collection and evaluation of seismic data. Such underground explosions could provide, among other things, a means of determining important seismological characteristics of the explosions, the geological media in which they were conducted, and the worldwide transmission paths of the seismic signal. Furthermore, implementation of the proposal would systematize, in a most valuable manner, worldwide use for seismic purposes of information released on certain underground nuclear explosions, as well as worldwide evaluation of seismic information gathered on such explosions.

BEGINNING WITH THE FALL 1967 SESSION, the U.N. General Assembly has given considerable attention to the possibilities of insuring that the seabed is reserved for peaceful purposes. The approach of the General Assembly followed the pattern of its earlier successful effort to establish a legal regime for outer space and to insure that that environment would remain "off-limits" to nuclear and other of mass destruction. The hisweapons tory of arms control achievements has shown that it is easier to prohibit weapons from an area where they have not been introduced than it is to restrict or eliminate them once they exist.

The U.N. discussion has pointed up the complexities involved, and it is apparent that answers must be found to many legal, economic, and technical questions before an rangement can be devised which would realize the peaceful objective while preserving the sovereign rights and interests of nations.

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A resolution was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1967 which established an Ad Hoc Committee to study the scope and various aspects of the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction. Working sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee were held in June and in August 1968. In view of the growing interest in the seabed and the many unresolved questions, the General As

sembly voted in December 1968 to establish a permanent Seabed Committee composed of 42 nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union. During the deliberations on this resolution, U.S. Ambassador Wiggins stated:

The U.S. strongly feels that the seabed and deep ocean floor should not become an area for an armaments race. We must work toward effective action, in condition of mutual confidence, to enable states with the potential capability of emplacing weapons of mass destruction on the deep ocean floor to refrain from doing so in the secure knowledge that they will not thereby be placed at a military disadvantage.

The new committee was instructed, among other things, "to study further

...

the reservations exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor . . . taking into account the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament."

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency first became directly interested in arms control prospects for the seabed in 1966. The first ACDA study in support of an arms control measure to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed was undertaken in April 1967. There followed extensive interagency consultations, principally among ACDA, the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Among the questions raised by the draft proposal, the following were found to