become necessary that the IAEA have available, for meeting these requirements, safeguards procedures and equipment which are effective, tamper-resistant, nonintrusive, and economical in manpower. There are two field tests underway in this area.

Field Test-45, Tamper Proof Data Link, is being conducted to determine the limitations of a data link concept and to point the way for further development of the link and associated sensor system.

The use of unattended sensors for arms control inspection has considerable appeal from the point of view. of reducing the cost and intrusiveness of inspection. A complete sensor system might include a number of sensors of different types, each gathering its own form of information and transmitting this through a data link to a central recording unit. There the information would be stored for later use by the inspectorate who, presumably, would visit the site at infrequent and irregular intervals for the purpose of picking up the sensor records, servicing the sensor system, checking for evidence of tampering, and conducting any additional inspection of the facility called for under the agreement. Unattended sensor systems should be tamper-resistant to the extent that they would reliably detect and reveal any efforts to insert false information. An application of such a system would be the inspection of nuclear reactors under IAEA control.

A concept for a generalized version of such a sensor system has been developed under two ACDA contracts. The concept envisions a number of sensors carefully located throughout an installation under surveillance; each sensor furnishing an electrical signal to a data link. The data link would transmit the sensorderived information to a nearby central location where it would be recorded for eventual examination by a visiting inspector or inspectors.

Field Tests, Arms Control Verification

The data link, which utilizes a novel tamper-prevention and detection scheme, forms the major component of the suggested system and a component which can be standardized for use with a variety of sensors. A laboratory version has been. constructed by the ACDA contractor for use in the development field test.

Field Test-62 is the Development of Safeguards Inspection Techniques for Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Facilities. Because of the large number of civilian power plants operating throughout the world, one of the most vulnerable stages for fissionable materials diversion occurs during reactor fuel element reprocessing. The need for safeguarding the byproducts including the residual fuel and plutonium has been well recognized by the AEC, IAEA, and ACDA. The reprocessing in 1969 of Yankee Power Reactor cores 5 and 6 presents a timely opportunity to evaluate new safeguards techniques for application to fuel reprocessing plants. The test will be conducted at the Nuclear Fuel Service, Inc., West Valley, N.Y., plant where the Yankee Reactor cores are scheduled for reprocessing. This planned field test is unique in that it has the direct financial support not only of ACDA, but of the AEC and the IAEA.

The problem of verification of compliance with a comprehensive test ban has also been addressed by ACDA. Field Test-1A, On-Site Inspection for the Identification of Underground Nuclear Tests, was a test of the principal techniques of on-site inspection: reconnaissance, visual search, and radioactive gas sampling. Teams using jeeps, trucks, and helicopters conducted on-site inspections in search of simulated underground nuclear tests. Operations took place near Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and Mercury, Nev., between October 1966 and May 1967. The recorded data was analyzed and evaluated during 1968. The test produced results on the effective

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ness of ground and air search for detecting visual evidence of underground nuclear testing and the effectiveness of atmospheric and soilgas sampling in detecting radioactive gases. It also produced results, described in the final classified report, on the effects of several factors on inspection operations and logistic support.

The basis for Field Test-34, Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, was the U.S. offer made in connection with the cutoff proposal to obtain fissionable material for transfer to peaceful uses by destroying nuclear

weapons.

This test consisted of an investigation of the demonstration of the destruction of nuclear weapons by visual observation, use of radiation detection equipment, inspection of X-ray plates of weapons, and laboratory analyses of the resulting fissionable material. The test was conducted from June through October 1967 at the following U.S. Atomic Energy Commission plants: the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Tex., where the initial receipt and disassembly of weapons and disposition

of high explosives took place; the Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colo., where recovery and processing of plutonium occurred; the Paducah Plant, Paducah, Ky., where processing and disposition of nonnuclear components were performed; and the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tenn., where recovery and processing of uranium and lithium compounds took place.

The analysis phase of the test was carried out during 1968. The test objectives, which have been met, were to determine the extent to which the proposed method of demonstrating nuclear weapons destruction reveals classified weapon information; to evaluate the effectiveness of the tested procedures in terms of convincing the Test Inspection Force that nuclear weapons are being destroyed; to evaluate the practicability and effectiveness of the proposed methods and to suggest and develop possible improvements during the test; and to identify operational, technical, classification, safety, and security problems which arise. The final report has been issued, and because of the nature of the test, its contents are classified.

Organization

THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT assigns to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the primary responsibility within the U.S. Government for searching out ways to put an end to the arms race. The Act provides that the Agency "must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the executive branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy."

In addition to being the principal adviser on arms control and disarmament to the President and the Secretary of State, ACDA's Director is also the chief U.S. negotiator in the field of arms control. He, or his Deputy Director, has served as head of the U.S. delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva and as a member of the American delegation to the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

During 1968 the Geneva Conference met from January 18 to March 14 and again from July 16 to August 28. The twenty-second session of the U.N. General Assembly resumed on April 24 and continued to June 12. The twenty-third session of the General Assembly convened on September 24 and adjourned December 21.

In addition, the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States met in Geneva from August 29 to September 29.

To carry out the functions assigned to it by the Congress, ACDA has an organizational structure which, in addition to the Offices of the Director and Deputy Director, includes four bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Director. These are the International Relations Bureau, the Science and Technology Bureau, the Economics Bureau, and the Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau. Supporting the Director, Deputy Director, and the four bureaus are the Office of the General Counsel, the Public Affairs Adviser, and the Office of the Executive Director.

The ACDA staff is comparatively small-slightly more than 200-and is drawn from a variety of disciplines-military, political, scientific, legal, behavioral, and economic. The work of the Agency falls primarily into two categories: formulation of arms control and disarmament policy recommendations, including preparation for and management of international negotiations, and research into the many complex problems related to arms control and disarmament. In addition to ACDA's extensive internal research and analysis, research projects are conducted by outside contractors, with ACDA officers acting as monitors. ACDA also maintains a list of consultants whose expertise is drawn upon by the Agency for special projects or other problems.

Formulation and
Coordination of

Policy Recommendations

It has been the practice for the Director to make policy recommendations to the President through the "Committee of Principals" whose members in addition to the Director of ACDA are the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Infor

mation Agency. As a committee these top-ranking officials review and coordinate arms control recommendations for the President. It is the President who must give final approval for any measures to be set forth in negotiations.

In 1968 the Committee addressed itself to such questions as the nonproliferation treaty, the strategic arms limitation talks, and arms control measures for the seabed.

General Advisory Committee

An advisory group, made up of prominent citizens appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, provides valuable advice to the Agency on its programs and objectives. They come from private life, from the business, labor, academic, military, and scientific fields. The group met four times in 1968, each time for a 2-day session (Jan. 8–9, April 8-9, August 1-2, and Nov. 11– 12). As in previous years, the timing of the meetings permitted the Agency

to benefit from the advice and counsel of this influential group in the preparation and conduct of the international negotiations.

Officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency joined ACDA officials in briefing the General Advisory Committee on the latest information bearing on the arms race and on U.S. arms control policies and objectives. The sessions are characterized by a free and lively exchange of comment and opinion. The assistance of this group is an invaluable contribution to the formulation of policy in arms control and disarmament and in planning for its execution.

Planning and

Coordination of Research

The Research Council, which reviews and makes recommendations to the Director on all proposed external research projects, is made up of the Assistant Directors who head the four bureaus, the General Counsel, and Executive Director. The last is Chairman of the Research Council.

ACDA operates a Reference Information Center as a central point for the development, implementation, execution, and coordination of information service. The Center continues to build a storehouse of information on arms control and disarmament, aimed toward the maximal utilization of the information derived from the Agency's research program. This information retrieval effort is now partially, machine supported; complete mechanical processing and computer assistance are envisioned for the future, as the needs of the Agency expand.

In order to eliminate the problem of duplication of research within the Government, the Congress charged