The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness." The discussion centered on future arms control measures and the order in which these measures should be taken up by the ENDC. A provisional agenda was adopted on August 15 which will provide the basis for the Committee's work when it meets again in 1969.1

This summer session of the ENDC adjourned on August 28 in order that its members could attend the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which opened the next day. This conference was called by a U.N. Resolution and was attended by 92 nonnuclear nations. The nuclearweapon powers were invited to participate, although they were not given a vote, and all did with the exception of Communist China, which continued to belittle and boycott international conferences on arms control and disarmament. This conference ended on September 29.

The twenty-third session of the U.N. General Assembly began on September 24 and continued until December 21. The discussion on arms control and disarmament matters related largely to the seabed, chemical and biological warfare, suspension of nuclear testing, and limitations on strategic offensive and defensive missiles.

1 See Appendix VIII.

The Director and other senior officials of ACDA represented the United States in these international forums.

ACDA was responsible for initiating and coordinating the U.S. Gov

ernment's careful consideration of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The treaty has two protocols, the first designed for extracontinental states having territories within the proposed Latin American nuclear-free zone and the second for states that have developed nuclear weapons. On April 1, 1968, the United States signed Protocol II, with the statement set forth in Appendix X. This protocol has not yet been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Before multilateral or bilateral negotiations on an arms control measure are begun, exhaustive work must be done to insure that the security interests of the United States, both immediate and long-range, are fully protected, and that necessary consultations with our allies have been undertaken.

The formulation of U.S. policy on arms control is the result of extensive coordination and consultation within the Government. ACDA has maintained day-to-day contact with the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other executive departments and agencies engaged in national security affairs. Congressional Committees, such as Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, have been kept currently informed on policy and negotiating developments.

In 1968, as in previous years, the primary device for the review and coordination of such recommendations was the Committee of Principals, composed of the Secretaries of

State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Negotiations were not undertaken on any arms control measure until the Committee of Principals had been consulted, and as appropriate, the President had given his approval.

ACDA has planned and managed an integrated research program in

support of its policy formulation and its conduct of international negotiations. The research has been carried out by internal staff analysis and by outside contractors. The field of inquiry ranged from the complex technology of strategic missile systems, to political and social science factors bearing on negotiating positions of our adversaries, to the economic impact of defense and disarmament expenditures in our society.

This report describes the efforts that have been made in the past year by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency toward solving some of the major problems which stand as obstacles to peace and progress for the United States, and indeed, for the other nations of the world.

Introduction

3

THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC) reconvened on January 18, 1968, after a month's recess. On that day, the United States and the Soviet Union, as Co-Chairmen of the conference, tabled separate but identical drafts of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This step was made possible as a result of their agreement on the text of an article III, the safeguards provision, disagreement on which held up the entire project until that time.

The basic provisions of the treaty

contained in articles I and II had been submitted to the ENDC the previous August when the United States and the Soviet Union tabled identical treaty texts, with only article III left blank. The treaty commits nuclear powers

not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclearweapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Nonnuclear-weapon parties are committed not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or devices.

Agreement on article III came only

after extensive consultations with our NATO allies-part of the process of continuous consultation with them on all aspects of the treaty. The discussions on the safeguards provision, which took place in the capitals of alliance members, in the North Atlantic Council, and in EURATOM, resulted in a compromise draft which was given the "green light" by the North Atlantic Council as a basis for further negotiations. It was this language which the Soviet Union agreed to accept.

The January 18 draft also amended certain parts of the August 24, 1967, draft to reflect suggestions put forth by the ENDC members and our allies during the debate which followed tabling of that draft.

a point would soon be reached when international cooperation in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy could be seriously inhibited. The safeguards established by the nonproliferation treaty would eliminate that hindrance to cooperation.

The problem lay in finding an acceptable formula for the administration of the safeguards procedures. The issue was resolved by working out language which stipulates that nonnuclear parties would conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (an organization already operating, with headquarters in Vienna), either individually or together with other states in accordance with IAEA's statute and safeguards system.

In explaining the draft article III to the ENDC, the U.S. Representative, Adrian S. Fisher, stressed it was based on several guiding principles. First, the safeguards should be of such a nature that all parties could have confidence in their effectiveness. The agreements to be concluded with IAEA must enable that agency to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion is taking place.

The second principle is that nonnuclear parties could negotiate safeguards agreements with IAEA individually or together with other parties; specifically, an agreement covering such obligations could be entered into between IAEA and another international organization, the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned.

Third, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards procedures, provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements, IAEA can satisfy itself

that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

These principles would permit the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), an organization established by the six Common Market countries, to enter into agreement with the IAEA on a mutually satisfactory safeguards arrangement.

The safeguards provisions contained in the January 18 draft serve two beneficial purposes: By verifying a crucial obligation of the treaty-not to divert fissionable material to nuclear weapons-they will strengthen trust among the parties, and thus will make the treaty a more effective instrument. Secondly, they will provide an impetus for accelerated cooperation among all parties in the development of peaceful nuclear research and industry since possible reluctance to provide source and special fissionable material, specialized equipment and information on peaceful nuclear applications to nonnuclear states will be removed by the extensive application of treaty safeguards.

Some of the nonnuclear countries expressed the view that the safeguards provisions were discriminatory since they apply only to them and not to the nuclear powers. Others also felt that the safeguards might place them at a commercial disadvantage in comparison with nuclear powers. To help allay these misgivings, President Johnson, on December 2, 1967, offered to place all nuclear activities in the United States under IAEA safeguards, excluding only those with direct national security significance, when the treaty safeguards become operative.

Some ENDC members, as well as some other potential signatory nations, wished to insure that continuing efforts would be made to improve the safeguards techniques applied

under the treaty. This led to the inclusion of a preambular paragraph expressing the support of the parties to the treaty for "research, development and other efforts to further the

application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points."

The United States has underway a research program designed to help make the safeguarding process as unobtrusive and inexpensive as possible. Although the major U.S. research effort is now being undertaken by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency has initiated, in coordination with the AEC, several research projects directed toward the solution of some of the technical problems that are being encountered in the development of a credible, relatively nonintrusive, instrumented international safeguards system.

ACDA's research is currently directed toward two different aspects of the safeguards instrumentation problem. The first is the development of portable instruments for use in verifying inventories of uranium and plutonium. Two prototype instruments for the field assay of uranium and plutonium have been designed and constructed, and were made available to the IAEA in September for testing and evaluation. The initial reports on the performance of the plutonium instrument, a neutron coincidence detector, have been very encouraging. IAEA tests of the uranium instrument, a modified commercial multichannel analyzer, have not been started, but preliminary U. S. tests suggest that it may be particularly useful in verifying the inventory of nuclear fuel elements containing highly enriched U-235.