counsel in this case come in and plead that Andrew Johnson is insane, and we shall go into all the conversation to see if they were the acts of a sane man, not otherwise.

The counsel then went into the Lord William Russell case. That case was one of those so eloquently denounced by the gentleman who opened for the President yesterday, as one of the cases of the Plantagenets and Tudors, which he would appeal to for authority, and they have to prick into these cases, which yesterday they were to lay aside. The question then was, what was Lord William Russell's character for loyalty? The answer was, good. How long have you known him? A. 1 have known him for a long time. Did you ever hear him express himself against the King and against the government? A. No. Did you ever hear him express himself in favor of insurrection? No. Just precisely as evidence, and the man's character is given. They are not arguing as to what Lord Russell said, but they were often told that the he did not say anything treasonable. Again, let me call your attention to another point on which this is pressed, and it seems to be the strong point in the case, because my friend says it is vital, hoping, I suppose, to affright you from your propriety. While it is a very important matter, you must pardon me for arguing it at some length.

Mr. STANBERY-The gentleman has fallen into error in referring to my citation.

Mr. BUTLER I cannot allow you to interpolate any remarks.

Mr. STANBERY-One moment, if you please, Mr. BUTLER-I cannot spare a moment for that purpose.

Now, then, Senators, what is the other point? and that is the only one I feel any trouble about. It is that some gentleman may think that this question comes within the ruling of the Senate yesterday. Yesterday we objected to the President's declaration after he said the conspiracy had culminated, but the Senate decided that it should be put in. Now, however, they propose to go a month prior to that time. We offered to prove who Mr. Cooper is, and what Mr. Cooper was doing in December, in order to show the President had intent at that time, but the Senate of the United States rules it out; and now the counsel for the President propose to show what he said to General Sherman in December.

It has been remarked that I have said that the President was seeking for a tool, I have said so. At the same time I said he never found one in General Sherman. What I do say is this, and what I will say to you and the country, that Mr. Johnson was seeking for somebody by whom he might get Mr. Stanton out. First he tried General Grant; then he wanted to get General Sherman, knowing that General Sherman, not wishing to have the cares of office, would be ready to get rid of them at any time, and then the President should get in somebody else. He began with General Grant, and went down through Grant and Sherman, and from Sherman to General G. H. Thomas-anything, down, down, down, until he got to General Lorenzo Thomas.

Now they want to prove that because the President did not find a tool in General Sherman, he therefore did not find one in General Thomas. These two things do not hold together. Does it convince you that because he did not find a proper man to be made ad interim Secretary, and to sit in his Cabinet ad interim, in General Sherman, that therefore he did not find the proper man in General Thomas. Then as to the vehicle of proof. They do not propose to prove this by his acts. I am willing that they should put in any act of the President about that time, or prior to it, or since, although the Senate ruled out an act which I offered to prove. But how do they propose to prove it? By a conversation between the President and General Sherman. I know, Senators, that you are a law unto yourselves, and that you have a right to admit or reject any testimony: but you have no right to override the principles of justice and equity, and to allow the case of the people of the United States to be prejudiced by the proof of the criminal made in his own defense before the acts done which the people complain of. If they have a right to put in evidence a conversation with General Sherman, have they not a_right to put in evidence of the conversations of the President with reporters and correspondents, and call Mack, and John, and Joe, and J. B. S. as witnesses. I think there is no law which makes the President's conversations with General Sherman any more competent than his conversations with any other man; and where are you going to stop, if you admit it? They will get the

forty, the sixty, the ninety, or a hundred days that they asked for, by simply reporting the President's conversations, for I think I may say, without offense, that he was a great conversationalist.

He will have reporters and everybody else to tell us about what he said. Allow me to say one thing further; I stated that I did not think it right for the learned counsel to state what he expected to prove; and in order to prevent his statement I said he might imagine any possible conversation. I thought it an unprofessional thing that he should go on and state what he expected to prove, and I said if he would ex amine the book he held in his hand he would find that in Hardy's case the Attorney-General of England offered to read a letter found in Hardy's possession, and began to read it, when Mr. Erskine objected, and said, "You must not read it until it is allowed and given in evidence." The Attorney-General said he wished the court to understand what the letter was. Mr. Erskine said it could not be read for that pur pose.

The counsel for the President stated in the case that he wanted to show that the President had tried to get this officer of the army to take possession of the War Department so that he could get Mr. Stantonjout. That is what we charge. We charge that he would take anybody or do anything to get Mr. Stanton out. That is the very thing we charge. He would be glad to get General Sherman in, or glad to get General Grant in, and failing in both, and failing in Major-General George H. Thomas, the hero of Nashville, he took Lorenzo Thomas to get Mr. Stanton out. What for? In order, says the Attorney-General, to drive Mr. Stanten into the courts. He knew what his counsel knew, that Mr. Stantou would not go into the courts to get back the office. There is no process by which Mr. Stanton could be, through the courts, reinstated in his office. I think they wlil find it difficult to show that where a general law applies to States and territories of the United States, it does not also apply to the District of Columbia.

Now, then, the simple question, and the only one on which you are expected to rule, is whether the conversations of the President with General Sherman are evidence, and if they are evidence, why are not all the conversations which he had at any time, with anybody, evidence? Where is the distinction to be drawn?

Mr. EVARTS-Mr. Chief Justice and Senators:-As questions of ordinary propriety have been raised and been discussed at some length by the learned manager, allow me to read from page 165 of the record of this trial, on the question of stating what is intended to be proved.

Mr. Manager BUTLER-The object is to show the intent and purpose with which General Thomas went to the War Department on the morning of the 22d of. February; that he went with the intent and purpose of taking possession by force; that he alleged that intent and purpose; that, in consequence of that allega tion, Mr. Burleigh invited General Moorhead and went up to the War Office. The conversation which I expect to prove is this:-After the President of the United States had appointed General Thomas and given him directions to take the War Office, and after he had made a quiet visit there on the 21st, on the evening of the 21st he told Mr. Burleigh that the next day he was going to take possession by force. Mr. Burleigh said to him

Mr. STANBERY-No matter about that; we object to that testimony.

Mr. Manager BUTLER-You do not know what you object to, if you don't hear what I offer.

Mr. BUTLER made some remark to the effect that Mr. Evarts was misrepresenting him.

Mr. EVARTS-In the case of Hardy, stated by my learned associate, I understand the question related exclusively to introduction of conversations between the accused and the witness, professedly antecedent to the period of the alleged treason, and even that was allowed. And now, Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, as to the merits of this question of evidence, this is a very peculiar case. Whenever evidence is stated to be made applicable to it, then it is a crime of the nar rowest dimensions and of the most puny proportions. It consists for its completeness, for its guilt, in the delivery of a written paper by the President to General Thomas, to be communicated to the Secretary of War, and that offense, in these faded proportions, if contrary to a valid law, and if done with intent to violate that law, may be punished by a fine of six cents. That is the naked dimensions of a mere technical statutory offense, and if it

concluded within the mere act of the delivery of paper, unattended by grave public consequences which should bring it into judgment here. But when we come to magnificence of accusation, as of the accusation as founded on page 77, we will see what it is:"We suggest, therefore, that we are in the presence of the Senate of the United States, convened as a constitutional tribunal, to inquire into and determine whether Andrew Johnson, because of malversation in office, is longer fit to retain the office of President of the United States, or hereafter to hold any office of honor or profit." On page 97 we come a little nearer, and I beg the attention of Senators to what is said there bearing upon this question:-"However, it may be said that the President removed Mr. Stanton for the very purpose of testing the constitutionality of this law before the courts, and the question is asked, will you condemn him as for a crime for so doing? If this plea were a true one, it ought not to avail, but it is a subterfuge. We shall show you that he has taken no step to submit the question to any court, although more than a year has elapsed since the passage of the act." Then on page 108 we are told:-"Upon the first reading of the articles of impeachment the question might have arisen in the minds of some Senators-Why are these acts of the President only presented by the House when history informs us that others equally dungerous to the liberties of the people, if not more so, and others of equal usurpation of powers, if not greater, are passed by in silence! To such possible inquiry we reply, that the acts set out in the first eight articles are but the culmination of a series of wrongs, malfeasances and usurpations committed by the respondent, and therefore, need to be examined in the light of his precedent and concomitant acts to grasp their scope and design." Then common fame and history are referred to, confirmed by citations of two hundred and forty years old from the British courts to show that there are good grounds to proceed проп.

Then, bringing this to a head, he says:-"Who does not know that from the hour he began these, his usurpations of power, he everywhere denounced Congress, the legality and constitutionality of its action, and defied its legitimate powers, and for that purpose announced his intentions and carried out his purpose as far as he was able, of removing every true man from office who sustained the Congress of the United State; and it is to carry out this plan of action that he claims this ultimate power of removal, for the illegal exercise of which he stands before you this day."

Now these are the intentions of public inculpation of the Chief Magistrate of the nation, which are of such great import from their intent and design, and from their involving the public interests and the principles of government, that they are worthy of the attention of this great tribunal. If this evidence be pertinent under any one of the eleven articles, it is pertinent and admissible now.

The speech of August 18, 1866, is alleged as laying the foundation of the illegal purpose which culminated in 1868. The point of criminality which is made the subject of the accusation in these articles is the speech of 1868.

So, too, a telegram to Governor Parsons, in January, 1868, is supposed to be evidence as bearing upon the guilt completed in the year 1868. So, too, an interview between Mr. Wood, an office-seeker, and the President in September, 1866, is supposed to bear in evidence upon the question of intent in the consummation of a crime alleged to have been committed in 1868, and I apprehend that in the question of time this interview between General Sherman and the President of the United States on a matter of public transaction of the President, changing the head of the War Department, which was actually completed in February, 1868, is near enough to that intent, and to show the purposes of the transaction.

There remains, then, but one consideration as to whether this evidence is open to the imputation that it is a mere proof of declaration on the part of the President concerning his intentions and objects in regard to the removal of Mr. Stanton. It certainly is not limited to that force or effect. Whenever evidence of that character is offered that question will arise, to be disposed of on the very point as to what the President's object was. What we propose to show is a consultation with the Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States to induce him to take the place.

On the other question, as to whether his efforts were to create violence, civil war, or bloodshed, or even a breach of the peace in the removal of the Secretary of War, we propose to show that in that same consulta

tion it was the desire of the President that the Lientenant-General should take the place, in order that by that change the Judiciary might be got to decide be tween the Executive and Congress as to the constit tional powers of the former.

If the conduct of the President in reference to the matters which are made the subject of inculpation and, if the efforts and means which he used in the selection of agents, are not to rebut the intentions of presumption sought to be raised, well was my learned associate justified in saying that this is a vital question-vital in the interest of justice at least, if not vital to any important consideration of the case. It is vital on the merest principles of common juetice that the Chief Magistrate of the nation is brought under inculpation, and when motives are assigned for his action, and presumptions raised and inuendoes urged, we should be permitted, in the presence of this great council sitting this day and doing justice to him as an individual, but more particularly doing justice in reference to the office of the President of the United States, and doing justice to the great public questions proposed to be affected by your judgment, to have this question properly decided.

I apprehend that this learned court of lawyers and of laymen will not permit this fast and loose game of limited crime for purposes of proof, and of unlimited crime for purposes of accusation.

The Senate here, at 2:40, took a recess of fifteen minutes.

After the recess, Mr. WILSON, of the managers, took the floor and said, I will claim the attention of the Senate for minds of Senators the truth in the Hardy case as it fell but a few minutes. My present purpose is to get before the from the lips of the Lord Chief Justice who passed upon the question which had been propounded by Mr. Erskine, and objected to by the Attorney-General.

Mr. Wilson's Argument.

Mr. WILSON read from the State Trials the decision by the Lord Chief Justice to the effect that declarations ap plying even to the particular case charged, though the intent should make a part of the charge, are evidence against the accused, but are not evidence for him, because the principle upon which declarations are evidence, is that no man would declare anything against himself unless it were true, but any man would, if he were in difficulty, make declarations for himself.

He also read the subsequent proceedings affected by that decision and continued:-Now, what is the question which has been propounded by the counsel for the President to General Sherman? It is this:-In that interview what con versation took place between the President and you in that calls for just such declarations on the part of the Pre regard to the removal of Mr. Stanton? Now I contend sident as fall within the limitation of the first branch of the rules laid down by the Lord Chief Justice in the Hardy case, and therefore must be excluded. If this con versation can be admitted, where are we to stop? Who may not be put on the stand and asked for conversations had between him and the President, as my associate suggests, at any time since the President entered upon pos session of the Presidential office, showing the general intent and drift of his mind and conduct during the whole period of his official career? and why, if this be competent and may be introduced, may it not be followed by an attempt here to introduce conversations occurring between the President and his Cabinet and General Grant, by way of inducing the Senate, under pretense of trying the President, to try a question between the General of the Army and the President of the United States?

That interview occurred about the same time, and I suppose the next offer will be the conversations occurring between the President, his several Secretaries and the General of the Army in order that the weight, the preponderance of testimony submitted thereon, this trial may weigh down the General of the Army. I say that that may occur because it was a conversation which transpired about that time.

Mr. BUTLER-Only the day before.

Mr. WILSON-Yes, only the day before. We certainly must insist upon this well-known rule being applied to this particular objection for the purpose of ending forever, so far as this case is concerned, the introduction of the de clarations of the President, made, it may be, for the pup pose of meeting this impeachment.

It is offered to be proved, as the counsel inform us, that the President told General Sherman that he desired him to take possession of the War Department in order that Mr. Stanton might be driven to the courts of law for the purpose of testing his title to that office, and inasmuch as the counsel have referred to the closing argument of my associate manager, seemed to delight in reading therefrom applying to this pretended purpose of the President of let me read a brief paragraph or two from that opening driving the Secretary of War to the courts to test his title on that occasion. The manager said: "The President knew or ought to have known his official adviser who now appears as his counsel could and did tell him, doubtless, that he alone as Attorney-General could file an infor mation in the nature of a quo warranto, to determine this question of the validity of the law."

Mr. Stanton, if ejected from office, was without remedy,

The Chief Justice submitted the point to the Senate, and the question was admitted.

Sherman Offered the War Office. M

Mr. STANBERY to witness.-Q. Answer the queston, if you please? A. The President tendered me the office of Secretary of War ad interim on two occasions; the first was on the afternoon of January 25 and the second on Thursday, the 30th of January, in his own usual office between the library and the clerk's room, in the Executive Mansion; Mr. Stanton was then in office, as now.

Q Was any one else present then? A. I think not; Mr. Moore may have been called in to show some papers, but I think he was not present when the President made me the tender; both of them were in writing; I answered the first one on the 27th of January: I did not receive any commu nication in writing from the President on that subject; the date of my first letter was the 27th of January. (Another question was answered here inaudibly to the reporters.)

Another Question Objected To.

Q. Now referring to the time when the offer was first

ing question; but was it intended to be a leading qustion? Was it intended to draw General Sherman to say something which he would otherwise not have said?

The learned manager says:-Oh, no; it was not intended so far as General Sherman was concerned; but that so far 88 counsel was concerned the purpose was to put it in that form so that counsel might have another opportunity of putting it in a legal form. He charges that it was deliberately manufactured, in a leading form, knowing that it would be rejected, for the purpose of getting ten or fifteen minutes time. A leading question, sir; will the honorable manager read over the record of this case and see hundreds of leading questions, put by him, until we got tired of objecting to them? I may, of course, ie permitted to disclaim any intention; this is a matter of great impor tance; the interests of our client are in our hands, and we are to defend them in the best way we can.

The question was modified at Mr. EVARTS suggestion go to read as follows:-"Was anything said at either of these interviews by the President as to any purpose of getting the question of Mr. Stanton's right to the office before the courts?"

The Chief Justice put it to the vote of the Senate, and the question was overruled without a division, and Senator HENDERSON sent up in writing the following question to be put to the witness?

"Did the President, in tendering you the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim, express the object or purpose for so doing?"

Mr. BINGHAM-I object to that question as being within the ruling. It is both leading and incompetent. The Chief Justice said he would submit the question to the Senate.

Senator DOOLITTLE arose and said-Mr. Chief Justice, I arose for the purpose of moving that the Senate should go into consultation on this question, (cries of "no! no!"), but there might not be time to-night to go into consultation, and I, therefore, move that the court adjourn.

The motion was rejected without a division.

The vote was then taken on admitting Senator Henderson's question, and it was rejected. Yeas, 25; nays, 27, as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis. Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill (Me.), Morton, Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Ross, Shernian, Sprague, SumDer, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey-25.

NAYS.-Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, ConkMng, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Harris, Morgan, Morrill (Vt.), Nye, Patterson (N. H.), Pomeroy, Ramsey, Stewart, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson and Yates-27.

Senator TRUMBULL, at half-past three, moved that the court adjourn. The question was taken by yeas and nays, and resulted-yeas, 25; nays, 27.

Mr. STANBERY sent to Mr. Butler another form of question.

After reading it, Mr. BUTLER said:-We object to this, both as a leading question and for substance. It has been voted on three times already.

The question was read, as follows:-"At either of those interviews was anything said in reference to the use of threats, intimidation or force, to get possession of the War Office, or the contrary?"

The Chief Justice submitted to the Senate the admissibility of the question, and without a division it was ruled to be inadmissible.

The Chief Justice asked the counsel for the President whether they had any other question to put to the witness. Mr. STANBERY replied that connsel were considering that point.

Senator ANTHONY moved that the court adjourn. Senator CONKLING inquired whether the managers meant to cross-examine the witness?

Mr. BUTLER replied that they did not.

The vote was again taken by yeas and nays on the question of adjournment, and it resulted-yeas, 20; nays, 32. So the court refused to adjourn.

Stanbery Discomfited.

Mr. STANBERY then arose and said:-Mr. Chief Jus tice and Senators:-I desire to state that under these rulings we are not prepared to say that we have any further questions to put to General Sherman, but it is a matter of so much importance that we desire to be allowed to recall General Sherman on Monday if we deem it proper to do so.

Mr BUTLER rose and commenced to object, saying, we are very desirous that the examination of this witness should be concluded, but before he could conclude the sen"tence,

Mr. BINGHAM rose and said:-We have no objection. The court then, at a quarter of five, adjourned, and the Senate immediately afterwards adjourned.

PROCEEDINGS OF MONDAY, APRIL 13.

The court was opened in due form, and the managers were announced at 12:05, Messrs. Bingham, Bu ler and Williams only appearing. Mr. Stevens was in his chair before the court was opened. The other managers entered shortly afterward.

The Twenty-first Rule.

The Chief Justice stated that the first business in order was the consideration of the order offered by Senator Frelinghuysen, amendatory of Rule 21. as follows:-Ordered, That as many of the managers of this court and the counsel for the President be per. mitted to speak on the final argument as shall choose to do so.

Mr. SUMNER-I send to the chair an amendment to that order to come in at the end.

It was read as follows:

"Provided, That the trial shall proceed without any further delay or postponement on this account."

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN accepted the amendment. Mr. Manager WILSON rose and asked the indulgence of the Senate for a moment. He said he did not propose to contest the right of the Senate to adopt a rule reasonably limiting debate on the final argument of this question, in conformity with the universal rule in the trial of civil actions and criminal indiotments. He was not here to oppose such a reasonable limitation as the interests of justice may require, as may be necessary to facilitate a just decision. He thought, however that the rule was calculated in some degree to embarrass the gentlemen sent here to conduct this case on the part of the people.

The House having devolved the duty upon seven of its members, in which they had not departed from the ordinary course, the effect of the rule would be to ex clude from the final debate on the articles submitted by them at least four of the managers. He was not opposed to a reasonable limit. It would have been in accordance with the rule in regard to interlocatory questions, and would have avoided diffuseness.

The Senate had said that the public convenience and the interests of the people required that a certain limit of time should be divided among the managers. The rule did not meet with the approbation of the managers in the first instance. They thought it unnsual, and they had directed their chairman to make this application. There had been five cases of impeachment before the Senate of the United States.

Mr. WILSON recited the circumstances attending each of the impeachments of Blount, Pickering, Chase, Peck and Humphreys, claiming that all these cases were analagous to the present. All the managers were allowed to speak on the final argument, save in one instance, where there were seven managers, and one of them failing to speak, Mr. Randolph, their chairman, spoke twice. He (Mr. Wilson) might be mistaken, but thought the right of the House of Representatives to be heard through all its managers had never been questioned. One case in British history was familiar to the school-boy recollections of every man in this nation, or who is familiar with the English language-a case made memorable not as much by the great interests involved as by this fact, that it was illustrated by the genius of the greatest men that England had ever produced, and that it continued for seven years.

In the latter respect he hoped this would not resem ble it; but it would be remembered that the labor in that case was distributed amongst all the managers. The present case was not an ordinary one. Nothing in our history compared with it. They were making history to-day, and they should show that they ar preciated the magnitude of the interest involved. He felt the difficulty of realizing the magnitude rising to the height of this grea, argument. It was not the case of a district judge or custom-house officer, but the Chief Magistrate of a great people, and its importance. was felt from sea to sea, with millions of people watching for the verdict. Such a limitation should be accounted for in only one way, namely, that the case was of small consequence, or that it was so plain that the