coln's term as President. The law says that the Secretaries shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed. Mr. Lincoln's term commenced on the 4th of March, 1865. Mr. Stanton was appointed by Mr. Lincoln; he was in office in Mr. Lincoln's term, when the act regu lating the tenure of certain civil offices was passed; and by the proviso of that act he was entitled to hold that office until one month after the 4th of March, 1869, unless he should be sooner removed therefrom, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The act of March 1, 1792, concerning the succession, in ease the office of President and Vice President both became vacant, recognizes the presidential term of four years as the constitutional term. Any one can understand that in case of vacancy in the office of President and Vice President, and in case of a new election by the people, that it would be desirable to make the election for the remainder of the term. But the act of 1792 recognizes the impossibility of this course in the section which provides that the term of four years for which a President and Vice President shall be elected (that is, in case of a new election, as stated,) shall in all cases commence on the fourth day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors shall have been given.

It is thus seen that by an election to fill a vacancy the government would be so far changed in its practical working that the subsequent elections of President.except by an amendment to the Constitution, could never again occur in the years divisible by four, as at present, and might not answer to the election of members of the House of Repre sentatives, for the Presidential elections might occur in the years not divisible by two. The Congress of 1792 acted upon the constitutional doctrine that the Presidential term is four years and cannot be changed by law.

On the 21st of February, 1868, while the Senate of the United States was in session, Mr. Johnson, in violation of the law-which, as we have already seen, is in strict harmony in this particular with the Constitution and with the practice of every governmentissued an order for the removal of Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary for the Department of War. It, however, it be claimed that the proviso does not apply to the Secretary of War, then he does not come within the only exception made in the statute to the general provision in the body of the first section already quoted; and Mr. Stanton having been appointed to office originally by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, could only be removed by the nomination and appointment of a successor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Hence, upon either theory it is plain that the President violated the Tenure of Office act in the order which he issued on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, for the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, the Senate of the United States being then in session. In support of the view I have presented. I refer to the official record of the amendments made to the first section of the tenure of office act. On the 18th of January, 1867, the bill passed the Senate, and the first section thereof was in these words:

"That every person [excepting the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General] holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided."

On the second day of February, the House passed the bill with an amendment striking out the words incl ded in brackets. This action shows that it was the purpose of the House to include heads of departments in the body of the bill, and subject them to its provisions as civil officers who were to held their places by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and subject, during the session of the Senate, to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate only; but subject to suspension under the second section during a recess of the Senate as other civil officers, by virtue of the words at the close of the section, "except as herein otherwise provided." At the time the bill was pending between the two Houses, there was no proviso to the first section, and the phrase "except as otherwise herein provided," related necessarily to the second and to the subscquent sections of the bill. On the 6th of February the Senate refused to agree to the House amendment, and by the action of the two Houses the bill was referred to a committee of conference. The conference committee agreed to strike out the words in brackets, agreeably to a vote of the House, but as a recognition of the opinion of the Senate, the proviso was inserted which modified in substance the effect of the words stricken out, under the lead of the House only in this, that the Cabinet officers referred to in the body of the section as it passed the House were to hold their offices as they would have held them if the House amendment had been agreed to. without condition, with this exception, that they were to retire from their offices in one month after the end of the term of the President by whom they might have been appointed to office. The object and effect of this qualification of the provision for which the House contended was to avoid fastening. by operation of law, upon an incoming President the Cabinet of his predecessor, with no means of relieving himself from them unless the Senate of the United States was disposed to concur in their removal.

In short, they were to retire by operation of law, at the end of one month after the expiration of the term of the

President by whom they had been appointed, and in this particular their tenure of office was distinguished by the proviso, from the tenure by which other civil officers mentioned in the body of the section were to hold their offices, and their tenure of office is distinguished in no other particular.

The counsel who opened the cause for the President was pleased to read from the Globe the remarks made by Mr. Schenck, in the House of Representatives when the report of the Conference Committee was under discussion. But he read only a portion of the remarks of Mr. Schenck, and connected with them observations of his own, by which he may have led the Senate into the error that Mr. Schenck entertained the opinion as to the effect of the proviso which is now urged by the respondent; but so far from this being the ease, the statement made by Mr. Schenck to the House is exactly in accordance with the doctrine now maintained by the managers on the part of the House of Representatives. After Mr. Schenck had made the remarks quoted by the counsel for the respondent, Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, rose and said:

"I would like to inquire of the gentleman who has charge of this report whether it becomes necessary that the Senate shall concur in all appointments of executive officers, and that none of them can be removed after appointment without the concurrence of the Senate ?" Mr. Schenck says, in reply:

"That is the case; but their terms of office are limited (as they are not now limited by law), so that they expire with the term of service of the President who appoints them, and one month after, in case of death or other accident, until others can be substituted for them by the incoming President."

Mr. Le Blond, continuing, said:

"I understand, then this is to be the effect of the report of the Committee of Conference; in the event of the President finding himself with a Cabinet officer who does not agree with him, and whom he desires to remove, he cannot do so, and have a Cabinet in keeping with his own views, unless the Senate shall concur."

To this Mr. Schenck replies:

The gentleman certainly does not need that information from me, as this subject has been fully debated in this House.

Mr. Le Blond said, finally:

"Then I hope the Honse will not agree to the report of the Committee of Conference,

This debate in the House shows that there was there and then no difference of opinion between Mr. Schenck, who represented the friends of the bill, and Mr. Le Blond, who represented the opponents of the bill, that its effect was to confirm the Secretaries who were then in office, in their places, until one month after the expiration of Mr. Lincoln's term of office, to wit, the 4th day of March, 1869, unless, upon the nomination of successors, they should be removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Nor does the language used by the honorable Senator from Ohio, who reported the result of the conference to the Senate, justify the inference which has been drawn from it by the counsel for the respondent. The charge made by the honorable Senator from Wisconsin, which the honorable Senator from Ohio was refuting, seems to me to have been in substance, that the first section of the bill and the proviso to the first section of the bill had been framed with special reference to Mr. Johnson as President, and to the existing condition of affairs. In response to this, the honorable Senator from Ohio said:

"I say that the Senate have not legislated with a view to any persons or any President, and therefore he commences by asserting what is not true. We do not legislate in order to keep in the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of State."

It will be observed that this language does not indicate the opinion of the honorable Senator as to the effect of the bill; but it is only a declaration that the object of the legislation was not that which had been intimated or alleged by the honorable Senator from Wisconsin. This view of the remarks of the honorable Senator from Ohio is confirmed by what he afterwards said in reply to the suggestion that the ne abers of the Cabinet would hold their places against the wishes of the President, when he declares that under such circumstances, he, as a Senator, would consent to their removal at any time, showing most clearly that he did not entertain the idea that, under the Tenure of Office act, it would be in the power of the President to remove a Cabinet officer without the advice and consent of the Senate. And we all agree that, in ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances, it would be just and proper for a Cabinet officer to tender his resignation at once, upon the suggestion of the President that it would be acceptable, bat that it would be the height of personal and official indecorum if he were to hesitate for a moment as to his duty in that particular. But the justification of Mr. Stanton, and his claim to the gratitude and the encomiums of his countrymen, is, that when the nation was imperilled by the usurpations of a criminally-minded Chief Magistrate, he asserted his constitutional and legal rights to the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and thus, by his devotion to principle, and at great personal sacrifices, he has done more than ony other man since the close of the Rebellion to protect the interests and maintain the rights' of the people of the country.

But the strength of the view we entertain of the meaning and scope of the Tenure of Office act is nowhere more satisfactorily demonstrated than in the inconsistencies of the argument which has been presented by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of the President's positions. He says, speaking of the first section of the act

regulating the tenure of certain civil offices:-"Here is a section, then, the body of which applies to all civil officers, as well to those then in office as to those who should thereafter be appointed. The body of this section contains a a declaration that every such officer is,' that is, if he is now in office, and 'shall be,' that is, if he shall hereafter be appointed to office, entitled to hold until a successor is appointed and qualified in his place. This is the body of the section." This language of the eminent counsel is not only an admission, but it is a declaration that the Secretary for the Department of War, being a civil officer, as is elsewhere admitted in the argument of the counsel for the respondent, is included in and covered and controlled by the language of the body of this section. It is a further admission that in the absence of the proviso, the power of the President over the Secretary for the Department of War would correspond exactly to his power over any other civil officer, which would be merely the power to nominate a successor, whose confirmation by the Senate, and appointment, would work the removal of the person in office, When the counsel for the respondent, procceeding in his argument. enters upon an examination of the proviso, he maintains that the language of that proviso does not include the Secretary for the Department of War. If he is not included in the language of the proviso, then, upon the admission of the counsel, he is included in the body of the bill, so that for the purposes or this investigation and trial it is wholly immaterial whether the proviso applies to him or not. If the proviso does not apply to the Secretary for the Department of War, then he holds his office, as in the body of the section expressed, until removed therefrom by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. If he is covered by the language of the proviso, then a limitation is fixed to his office, to wit:-That it is to expire one month after the close of the term of the President by. whom he has been appointed, subject, however, to previous removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

I have already considered the question of intent on the part of the President and maintained that in the willful violation of the law he discloses a criminal intent which cannot be controlled or qualified by any testimony on the part of the respondent.

The counsel for the respondent, however, has dwelt so much at length on the question of intent, and such efforts have been made during the trial to introduce testimony upon this point, that I am justified in recurring to it for a brief consideration of the arguments and views bearing upon and relating to that question. If a law passed by Congress be equivocal or ambiguous in its terms, the Executive, being called upon to administer it, may apply his own best judgment to the difficulties before him, or he may seek counsel from his official advisers or other proper persons; and acting thereupon, without evil intent or purpose, he would be fully justified, and upon no principle of right could he be held to answer as for a misdemeanor in office, But that is not this case. The question considered by Mr. Johnson did not relate to the meaning of the Tenure of Office act. He understood perfectly well the intention of Congress, and he admitted in his veto message that the intention was expressed with sufficient clearness to enable him to comprehend and state it. In his veto message of the 2d of March, 1867, after quoting the first section of the bill to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices, he says:-

"In effect the bill provides that the President shall not remove from their places any civil officers whose terms of service are not limited by law without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. The bill, in this respect, conflicts, in my judgment, with the Constitution of the United States."

His statement of the meaning of the bill relates to all civil officers, to the members of his Cabinet as well as to others, and is a declaration that, under that bill if it became a law, none of these officers could be removed without the advice and consent of the Senate. He was, therefore, in no doubt as to the intention of Congress as expressed in the bill submitted to him for his consideration, and which afterwards became the law of the land. He said to the Senate, "If you pass this bill I cannot remove the members of my Cabinet." The Senate and House in effect said, "We do so intend," and passed the bill by a two-thirds majority.

There was then no misunderstanding as to the meaning or intention of the act. His offense, then, is not that upon an examination of the statute he misunderstood its meaning and acted upon a misinterpretation of its true import, but that understanding its meaning precisely as it is understood by the Congress that passed the law; precisely as it is understood by the House of Representatives to-day; precisely as it is presented in the articles of impeachment, and by the managers before this Senate, he, upon his own opinion that the same was unconstitutional, deliberately, wilfully and intentionally disregarded it. The learned counsel say that he had a right to violate this law for the purpose of obtaining a judicial determination. This we deny. The constitutional duty of the President is to obey and execute the laws. He has no authority under the Constitution, or by any law, to enter into any schemes or plans for the purpose of testing the validity of the laws of the country, either judicially or otherwise. Every law of Congress may be decided in the courts, but it is not made the duty of any person to so test the law. It is not specially the right of any person to so test the laws, and the effort is especially offensive in the Chief Magistrate of the country to attempt by any process to annul, set aside, or defeat the laws which by his oath he is bound to exe-. cute.

Nor is it any answer to say, as is suggested by the counsel for the respondent, that there never could be a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it is only by disregarding a law that any question can be raised judicially under it." If this be true, it is no misfortune. But the opposite theory, that it is the duty or the right of the President to disregard a law for the purpose of ascertaining judicially whether he has a right to violate a law is abhorrent to every just principle of government, and dangerous to the highest degree to the existence of free institutions.

But his alleged purpose to test the law in the courts is shown to be a pretext merely. Upon this theory of his rights, he could have instituted proceedings by informa tion in the nature of a quo warranto against Mr. Stanton on the 13th of January, 1868. More than three months have passed, and he has done nothing whatever. When by Mr. Stanton's action Lorenzo Thomas was under arrest, and proceedings were instituted which might have tested the legality of the tenure of office act, Mr. Cox, the Presi dent's special counsel, moved to have the proceedings dismissed, although Thomas was at large upon his own recognizance. Can anybody believe that it was Mr. Johnson's purpose to test the act in the courte? But the respondent's insincerity, his duplicity, is shown by the statement which he made to Gen. Sherman in January last. Sherman says: "I asked him why lawyers could not make a case, and not bring me, or any officer, into the controversy? His answer was that it was found impossible, or a case could not be made up; but,' said he, if we can bring the case to the courts, it would not stand half an hour."" He now says his object was to test the case in the courts. To Sherman he declares that a case could not be made up, but if one could be made up the law would not stand half an hour. When a case was made up which might have tested the law, he makes haste to get it dismissed. Did ever auda city and duplicity more clearly appear in the excuses of a criminal?

This brief argument upon the question of intent seems to me conclusive, but I shall incidentally refer to the evidence on this point in the further progress of my remarks.

The House of Representatives does not demand the conviction of Andrew Johnson unless he is guilty in the manner charged in the articles of impeachment; nor does the House expect the managers to seek a conviction except upon the law and facts considered with judicial impartiality. But I am obliged to declare that I have no capa city to understand those processes of the human mind by which this tribunal, or any member of this tribunal, can doubt, can entertain a reasonable doubt, that Andrew Johnson is guilty of high misdemeanor in office, as charged in each of the first three articles exhibited against him by the House of Representatives.

We have charged and proved that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, issued an order,in writing for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War while the Senate of the United States was in session, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of his oath of office, and of the provisions of an act passed March 2, 1867, entitled, "an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," and that he did this with intent so to do; and thereupon, we demand his conviction under the first of the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representa tives.

We have charged and proved that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, violated the Constitution and his oath of office, in issuing an order for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, during the session of the Senate, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, and this without reference to the Tenure of Office act; and thereupon we demand his conviction under the first articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Re presentatives.

We have charged and proved that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas, a letter of authority in writing, author izing and empowering said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, there being no vacancy in said office, and this while the Senate of the United States was in ses sion, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, of his oath of office, and of the provisions of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," and all this with the intent so to do; and, thereupon, we demand his conviction under the second of the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representa tives.

We have charged and proved that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, in the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas to the office of Secretary of War ad interim acted without authority of law, and in violation of the Constitution and of his oath of office; and this without reference to the Tenure of Orice act; and thereupon we demand his conviction under the third of the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives. At four o'clock Mr. Boutwell, at the suggestion of Mr. CONKLING, yielded to a motion to adjourn the court stating that he would occupy about an hour and a half to-mor? row, and accordingly the court adjourned.

PROCEEDINGS OF THURSDAY, APRIL 23.

The Senate reassembled at 11 o'clock, and the court was opened in the usual form.

Mr. GRIMES submitted the following:Ordered, That hereafter the hour for the meeting of the Senate, sitting on the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, shall be 12 o'clock meridian each day, except Sunday.

Mr. SUMNER and several others objected, and the order was laid over.

At 11-20 o'clock Mr. BOUTWELL resumed his adaddress.

The learned counsel for the respondent seems to have involved himself in some difliculty concerning the articles which he terms the conspiracy articles, being articles four, five, six and seven. The allegations contained in articles four and six are laid under the act of July 31, 1861, known as the conspiracy act. The remarks of the learned counFel seem to imply that articles five and seven were not based upon any law whatever. In this he greatly errs. An examination of articles four and five shows that the substantive allegation is the same in each article, the differences being that article four charges the conspiracy. with intent, by intimidation and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton from holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War. The persons charged are the respondent and Lorenzo Thomas. And it is alleged that this conspiracy, for the purpose set forth, was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the provisions of an act entitled "An act to punish certain conspiracies," approved July 31, 1861.

The fifth article charges that the respondent did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons, to prevent the execution of the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," and that in pursuance of that conspiracy, they did unlawfully attempt to prevent Edwin M. Stanton from holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War. It is not alleged in the article that this conspiracy is against any particular law, but it is alleged that the parties charged did unlawfully conspire. It is very well known that conspiracies are of two kinds. Two or more persons may conspire to do a lawful act by unlawful means; or two or more persons may conspire to do an unlawful act by lawful means. By the common law of England such conspiracies have always been indictable and punishable as misdemeanors.

The State of Maryland was one of the original thirteen States of the Union, and the common law of England has always prevailed in that State, except so far as it has been modified by statute. The city of Washington was originally within the State of Maryland, but it was ceded to the United States under the provisions of the Constitution. By a statute of the United States, passed February 27, 1801 (Statutes at Large, vol. 2, p. 103), it is provided:

That the laws of the State of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said District which was ceded by that State to the United States, and by them accepted as afroesaid."

By force of this statute, although probably the law would have been the same without legislation, the English common law of crimes prevails in the city of Washington. By another statute, entitled "An act for the punishment of crimes in the District of Columbia," Statutes at Large, vol. 4. page 450), approved March 2, 1831, special punishments are affixed to various crimes enumerated, when committed in the District of Columbia. But conspiracy is not one of the crimes mentioned. The fifteenth section of that act provides:

"That every other felony, misdemeanor, or offense, not provided for by this act, may, and shall be punished as heretofore, except that in all cases where whipping is part or the whole of the punishment, except in the cases of slaves, the court shall substitute there for imprisonment in the county jail, for a period not exceeding six months." And the sixteenth section declares:

"That all definitions and descriptions of crimes, all fines, forfeitures, and incapacities, the restitution of property, or the payment of the value thereof, and every other matter not provided for in this act, be and the same shall remain as heretofore."

There can then be no doubt that, under the English common law of crimes, sanctioned and continued by the sta tutes of the United States in the District of Columbia, the fifth and seventh articles set forth offenses which are punishable as misdemeanors by the laws of the District,

Article sixth is laid under the statute of 1861, and charges that the respondent did unlawfully conspire with Lorenzo Thomas, by force to seize, take and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, and this with intent to violate and disregard the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices." The words used in the Conspiracy act of 1861 leave room for argument upon the point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. I admit that the District of Columbia is not included by specific designation, but the reasons for the law and the natural interpretation of the language justify the view that the act applies to the District. I shall refer to a single authority upon that point,

The internal duties act of August 2, 1813, (Stat., vol. 3 p. 82) subjects, in express terms, the "several Territories of the United States and the District of Columbia," to the payment of taxes imposed; upon which the questio arose whether Congress has power to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in view of the fact that by the Constitution "representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within the Union, according to their respective numbers.' In the case of Loughborough ve. Blake, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously decided, in a brief but well written opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, that although the language of the Constitution appa rently excepts the District of Columbia from the imposi tion of direct taxes, yet the reason of the thing requires us to consider the District as being comprehended, in this respect within the intention of the Constitution. (Lough vs. Blake, 5 Wheaton, p. 317.

The reasoning of the Supreme Court and its conclusion in this case were satisfactory to the bar and the country, and no person has deemed it worth while to raise the question anew under the direct tax act of August 5, 1861 (Sts. xii., 296), which also comprehends the Territories and the District of Columbia.

But the logical rules of construction applicable to an act of Congress are the same as those applicable to the Constitution. An act of Congress and the Constitution are both laws, nothing more, nothing less, except that the lat ter is of superior authority. And, if in the construction of the Constitution, it may be satisfactorily maintained that the District of Columbia is to be deemed, because of the reason of things, to be comprehended by a provision of the Constitution, which in words, and in their superficial con struction, excludes it, must not the same rule of construc tion produce the same result in the determination of the legal intent and import of an act of Congress, when an ob scurity exists in the latter for the same cause?

The seventh article is laid upon the common law, and charges substantially the same offenses as those charged in the sixth article. The result, then, is that the fifth and seventh articles, which are based upon the commou law, set forth substantially the same offenses which are set forth in the fourth and sixth articles, which are laid upon the statute of July 31, 1861; and as there can be no doubt of the validity of the fifth and seventh articles, it is practically immaterial whether the suggestion made by the counsel for the respondent, that the conspiracy act of 1861 does not include the District of Columbia, as a valid ob jection or not. Not doubting that the Senate will find that the charge of conspiracy is sufficiently laid under existing laws, I proceed to an examination of the evidence by which the charge is supported.

It should always be borne in mind that the evidence in proof of conspiracy will generally, from the nature of the crime, be circumstantial; and this case in this particular is no exception to the usual experience in criminal trials. We find, in the first place, if the allegations in the first, second and third articles have been established, that the President was engaged in an unlawful act. If we find Lorenzo Thomas or any other person co-operating with him upon an agreement or an understanding, or an assent on the part of such other person to the prosecution of such un lawful undertaking, an actual conspiracy is proved. The existence of the conspiracy being established, it is then competent to introduce the statements of the parties to the conspiracy, made and done while the conspiracy was pend ing, and in furtherance of the design; and it is upon this ground that testimony has been offered and received of the declarations made by Lorenzo Thomas, one of the parties to the conspiracy, subsequent to the 18th day of January, 1868, or perhaps the 13th of January, 1868, the day on which he was restored to the office of Adjutant General of the Army of the United States by the action of the President, and which appears to have been an initial proceeding on his part for the purpose of accomplishing his unlawful design-the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of the Secretary for the Department of War. The evidence of agreement between the respondent and Thomas is found in the order of the 21st of Febuary, 1868, appointing Thomas, and in the conversation which took place at the time the order was placed in Thomas' hands The counsel for the respondent at this point was involved in a very serious difficuity. If he had admitted (which he took care not to do) that the order was a military one, he saw that his client would be involved in the crime of having issued a military order which did not pass through the General of the Army, and thus would be liable to impeachment and removal from office for the crime of violating the law of the 2d of March, 1867, entitled "an act making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes." If he had declared that it was not a military order, then the transaction confessedly was in the nature of an agreement between the President and Lorenzo Thomas; and if the act contemplated by that agreement was an unlawful act, or if the act were lawful, and the means employed for accomplishing it were unlawful, then clearly the charge of conspiracy would be maintained. Hence he was careful to say, in denying that the order was a military order, that it nevertheless invoked that spirit of military obedience which constitutes the strength of the service."

And, further, he says of Thomas, that as a faithful Adjutant-General of the Army of the United States, interested personally, professionally, and patriotically to have the office of Secretary of the Dpartment of War performed in a temporary vacancy, was it not his duty to accept the appointment unless he knew that it was unlaw. ful to accept it? The admissions and statements of the

learned counsel are to the effect, on the whole, that the order was not a military order, nor do we claim that it was a military order, but it was a letter addressed to General Thomas, which he could have declined altogether, without subjecting himself to any punishment by a military tribunal.

This is the crucial test of the character of the paper which he received, and on which he proceeded to act. Ig norance of the law, according to the old maxim, excuses no man; and whether General Thomas, at the first interview he had with the President, on the 18th of January, 1868, or at his interview with him on the day when he received the letter of appointment, knew that the President was then engaged in an unlawful act, is not material to this inquiry. The President knew that his purpose was an unlawful one, and he then and there induced General Thomas to co-operate with him in the prosecution of the unlawful design. It General Thomas was ignorant of the illegal nature of the transaction, that fact furnishes no legal defense for him, though morally it might be an excuse for his conduct. But certainly the President, who did know the illegal nature of the proceeding, cannot excuse himself by asserting that his co-conspirator was at the time ignorant of the illegal nature of the business in which they were engaged.

It being proved that the respondent was engaged in an unlawful undertaking in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, that by an agreement or understanding between General Thomas and himself they were to co-operate in carrying this purpose into execution, and it being proved, also, that the purpose itself was unlawful, all the elements of a conspiracy are fully established; and it only remains to examine the testimony in order that the nature of the conspiracy may more clearly appear, and the means by which the purpose was to be accomplished may be more fully understood.

The statement of the President in his message to the Senate under date of 12th of December, 1867, discloses the depth of his feeling and the intensity of his purpose in regard to the removal of Mr. Stanton. In that message he speaks of the bill regulating the tenure of certain civil offices at the time it was before him for consideration. He says: "The bill had not then become a law; the limitation upon the power of removal was not yet imposed, and there was yet time to make any changes. If any of those gentlemen (meaning the members of his Cabinet) had then said to me that he would avail himself of the provisions of that bill in case it became a law, I should not have heɛitated a moment as to his removal."

When, in the summer of 1867, the respondent became satisfied that Mr. Stanton not only did not enter into the President's schemes, but was opposed to them, and he determined upon his suspension and final removal from the office of Secretary for the Depaptment of War, he knew that the confidence of the people in Mr. Stanton was very great, and that they would not accept his removal and an appointment to that important place of any person of doubtful position, or whose qualifiations were not known to the country. Hence he sought, through the suspension of Mr. Stanton and the appointment of General Grant as Secretary of War ad interim, to satisfy the country for the moment, but with the design to prepare the way thereby for the introduction into the War Department of one of his own creatures.

At that time it was supposed that the suspension of Mr. Stanton and the appointment of General Grant were made under and by virtue of the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices; and although the conduct of the President during a period of nearly six months in reference to that office was in conformity to the provisions of that act, it was finally declared by him that what he had done had been done in conformity to the general power which he claims, under the Constitution, and that he did not in any way recognize the act as constitutional or binding upon him. His message to the Senate of the 12th of December was framed apparently in obedience to the Tenure of Office act. He charged Mr. Stanton with misconduct in office, which, by the act, had been made a ground for the suspension of a civil officer; he furnished reasons and evidence of misconduct which, as he alleged, had been satisfactory to him, and he furnished such reasons and evidence within twenty days after the meeting of the Senate next following the day of suspension.

All this was in conformity to the statute of March 2, 1867. The Senate proceeded to consider the evidence and, reasons furnished by the President, and in conformity to that act passed a resolution, adopted on the 13th of January, 1868, declaring that the reasons were unsatisfactory to the Senate, and that Mr. Stanton was restored to the office of Secretary for the Department of War. Up to that time there had been no official statement or declaration by the President that he had not acted under the Tenure of Office act; but he now assumed that that act had no binding force, and that Mr. Stanton was not law. fully restored to the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

Upon the adoption of the resolution by the Senate, General Grant at once surrendered the office to Mr. Stanton. This act upon his part filled the President with indignation both towards General Grant and Mr. Stanton, and from that day he seems to have been under the influence of a settled and criminal purpose to destroy General Grant and to secure the removal of Mr. Stanton. During the month following the restoration of Mr. Stanton the President attempted to carry out his purpose by various and tortuous methods. First, he endeavored to secure the support of General Sherman. On two occasions, as is testified by General Sherman on the 27th and 31st of

January, tendered him the position of Secretary of War au interim.

It occurred very naturally to General Sherman to inquire of the President whether Mr. Stanton would retire voluntarily from the office; and also to ask the President what he was to do, and whether he would resort to force it Mr. Stanton would not yield. The President answered, "Oh, he will make no objection: you present the order and he will retire." Upon a doubt being expressed by General Sherman, the President remarked, "I know him better than you do; he is cowardly." The President knew Mr. Stanton too well to entertain any such opinion of his cour age as he gave in his answer to General Sherman; the secret of the proceeding, undoubtedly was this:

He desired, in the first place, to induce General Sherman to accept the office of Secretary of War ad interim upon the assurance on his part that Mr. Stanton would retire willingly from his position, trusting that when General Sherman was appointed to and had accepted the place of Secretary of War ad interim, he could be induced, either upon the suggestion of the President or under the influ ence of a natural disinclination on his part to fail in the accomplishment of anything which he had undertaken, to seize the War Department by force. The President very well knew that if General Sherman accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim he would be ready at the earliest moment to relinquish it into the hands of the President, and thus he hoped through the agency of General Sherman to secure the possession of the department for one of his favorites.

During the period from the 13th day of January to the 21st of February he made an attempt to enlist General George H. Thomas in the same unlawful undertaking. Here, also, he was disappointed. Thus it is seen that from August last, the time when he entered systematically upon his purpose to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, he has attempted to secure the purpose he had in view through the personal influence and services of the three principal officers of the army; and that he has met with disappointment in each case. Under these circumstances nothing remained for the respondent but to seize the office by an open. wilfull, defiant violation of law; and as it was necessary for the accomplishment of his purpose that he should obtain the support of some one, and as his experience had satisfied him that no person of capacity, or respectability, or pa triotism would unite with him in his unlawful enterprise, he sought the assistance and aid of Lorenzo Thomas,

This man, as you have seen him, is an old man, a broken man, a vain man, a weak man, utterly incapable of performing any public service whatever in a manner credit able to the country; but possessing, nevertheless, all the qualities and characteristics of a subservient instrument and tool of an ambitious, unscrupulous criminal. He readily accepted the place which the President offered him, and there is no doubt that the declarations which he made to Wilkeson, Burleigh and Karsner, were made when he entertained the purpose of executing them, and made also in the belief that they were entirely justified by the orders which he had received from the President, and that the execution of his purpose to seize the War Department by force would be acceptable to the President. That he threatens to use force there is no doubt from the testimony, for he has himself confessed substantially the truth of the statements made by all the witnesses for the prosecution who have testitied to that fact.

These statements were made by Thomas on or after the 21st of February, when he received his letter of authority, in writing, to take possession of the War Department. The agreement between the President and Thomas was consummated on that day. With one mind they were then, and on subsequent days, engaged, and up to the present time, they are engaged in the attempt to get possession of the War Department. Mr. Stanton, as the Senate by its resolution has declared, being the lawful Secretary of War, this proceeding on their part was an unlawful proceeding. It had in view an unlawful purpose; it was therefore in contemplation of the law a conspiracy, and the President is consequently bound by the declarations made by Thomas in regard to taking possession of the War Department by force.

Thomas admits that on the night of the 21st it was his purpose to use force; that on the morning of the 22d his mind had undergone a change, and he then resolved not to use force. We do not know precisely the hour when his mind underwent this change, but the evidence disclosed that upon his return from the Supreme Court of the District, where he had been arraigned upon a complaint made by Mr. Stanton, which, according to the testimony. was twelve o'clock, or thereabouts, he had an interview with the President; and it is also in evidence, that at or about the same time the President had an interview with General Emory, from whom he learned that the officer would not obey a command of the President unless it passed through General Grant, as required by law.

The President understood perfectly well that he could neither obtain force from General Grant nor transmit an order through General Grant for the accomplishment of a purpose manifestly unlawful; and inasmuch as General Emory had indicated to him in the most distinct and em phatic manner his opinion that the law requiring all orders to pass through the headquarters of the General commanding, was constitutional, indicating, also, his pur pose to obey the law, it was apparent that at that moment the President could have had no hope of obtaining posses sion of the Department of War by force. It is a singular coincidence in the history of this case that at or about the same time, General Thomas had an interview with the

President, and came to the conclusion that it would not be wise to resort to force.

The President has sought to show his good intention by the fact that, on the 22d or the 24th of February, he nominated the Hon. Thomas Ewing, Sr., as Secretary for the Department of War. Mr. Ewing is not an unknown man. He has been a member of the Senate and the head of the Treasury Department. His abilities are undoubted, but at the time of his nomination he was in the seventy-ninth year of his age, and there was no probability that he would hold the office a moment longer than his sense of public duty required. It was the old game of the President-the office in the hands of his own tool, or in the hands of a man who would gladly vacate it at any moment. This was the necessity of his position, and throws light upon that part of his crime which is set forth in the eleventh article.

For, in fact, his crime is one-the subversion of the government. From the nature of the case we are compelled to deal with minor acts of criminality by which he hoped te consummate this greatest of crimes.

In obedience to this necessity he appointed Grant, hoping to use him and his influence with the army, and failing in this, to get possession of the place and fill it with one of his own satellites; foiled and disappointed in this scheme, he sought to use, first, General Shermen, then General George H. Thomas, then Hon. Thomas Ewing, Sr., knowing that neither of these gentlemen would retain the office for any length of time. There were men in the country who would have accepted the office and continued in it, and obeyed the Constitution and the laws. Has he named any such person? Has he suggested any such person? His appointments and suggestions of appointment have been of two sorts-honorable men, who would not continue in the office, or dishonorable, worthless men, who were not fit to hold the office.

The name of General Cox, of Ohio, was named in the public journals; it was mentioned, probably, to the Presi dent. Did it meet with favor? Did he send his name to the Senate? No.

General Cox, if he had accepted the office at all, would have done so with the expectation of holding it till March, 1869, and with the purpose of executing the duties of the trust according to the laws and the Constitution. These were purposes wholly inconsistent with the President's schemes of usurpation. But is it to be presumed or imagined that when the President issued his order for the removal of Stanton, and his letter of authority to Lorenzo Thomas, on the 21st of February, he had any purpose of appointing Mi. Ewing Secretary of War? Certainly not. On the afternoon of the 21st he informs his Cabinet that Stanton is removed, and that Thomas has possession of the office. He then so believed. Thomas had deceived or misled him. On the 22d inst, he had discovered that Stanton held on to the place, and that Emory could not be relied upon for force.

What was now his necessity? Simply a resort to his old policy. He saw that it was necessary to avoid impeachment if possible, and also to obtain the sanction of the Senate to a nomination which would work the removal of Mr. Stanton, and thus he would triumph over his enemies and obtain condonation for his crimes of the 21st of February. A well laid scheme, but destined to fail and to furnish evidence of his own guilty purposes. With the office in the possession of Mr. Ewing, he foresaw that for the prosecution of his own plans the place would always be vacant.

Thus has this artful and criminal man pursued the great purpose of his life. Consider the other circumstances. On the 1st of September last General Emory was appointed to the command of the Department of Washington. He has exhibited such sterling honesty and vigorous patriotism in these recent troubles and during the war, that he can bear a reference to his previous history. He was born in Maryland, and in the early part of the war the public mind of the North questioned his fidelity to the Union. His great services and untarnished record during the war are a complete defense against all suspicion; but it is too much to believe that Mr. Johnson entertained the hope that General Emory might be made an instrument of his ambition.

Nobly has General Emory undeceived the President, and gained additional renown in the country. In General Lorenzo Thomas the President was not deceived. His complicity in recent unlawful proceedings justifies the suspicions entertained by the country in 1861 and 1862 touching his loyalty. Thomas and the President are in accord. In case of the acquittal of the President they are to issue an order to General Grant putting Thomas in possession of the reports of the army to the War Depart

ment.

Is there not in all this evidence of the President's criminal intention? Is not his whole course marked by duplicity, deception, and fraud? "All things are construed against the wrong-doer," is the wise and just maxim of the law. Has he not trifled with and deceived the Senate? Has he not attempted to accomplish an unlawful purpose by disingenuous, tortuous, criminal means?

His criminal intent is in his wiltull violation of the law, and his criminal intent is moreover abundantly proved by all the circumstances attending the violation of the law. His final resort for safety was to the Senate, praying for the confirmation of Mr. Ewing. On the 21st of February he hoped that Stanton would yield willingly, or that Emory could be used to remove him. On the 22d he knew that Stanton was determined to remain, that Emory would not furnish assistance, that it was useless to appeal to Grant. He returns to his old plan of filling the War Office by the appointment of a man who would yield the

place at any moment; and now he asks you to accept as his justification an act which was the last resort of a criminal attempting to escape the judgment due to his crimes. Upon this view of the law and the facts, we demand a conviction of the respondent upon articles four, five, six and seven exhibited against him by the House of Representatives.

The evidence introduced tending to show a conspiracy between Johnson and Thomas to get possession of the War Department tends also, connected with other facts, to show the purpose of the President to obtain possession of the Treasury Department. Bearing in mind his claim that he can suspend or remove from office, without the advice and consent of the Senate, any civil officer, and bearing in mind also that the present Secretary of the Treasury supports this claim, and every obstacle to the possession of the Treasury Department is removed.

There is no reason to suppose the present Secretary of the Treasury would not yield a cordial support to any scheme which Mr. Johnson might undertake; but if the Secretary should decline to co-operate it would only be necessary for the President to remove him from office and place the Treasury Department in the hands of one of his own creatures.

Upon the appointment of Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim, the President caused notice to be given thereof to the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanied with the direction, under the President's own hand, to that officer to govern himself accordingly. It also proved that on the 22d day of December Mr. Johnson appointed Mr. Cooper, who had been his private secretary and intimate friend, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

The evidence fully sustains the statements made in the opening argument of Manager Butler, in support of article nine. The facts in regard to General Emory's interview with the President were then well known to the managers, and the argument and view presented in the opening cont in all that is necessary to be said upon that article. It may be added, however, that although the President on the 22d had obtained from General Emory what he now says was the purpose of this interview, a knowledge of the number and assignment of troops in the city of Washington, yet on the following day, Sunday, the 23d of February, he had an interview with General Wallace, apparently for no other purpose than to get from him the same informa tion which, on the preceding day, he had received from General Emory.

The learned counsel who opened the case for the President seems not to have comprehended the nature of the offense set forth in the tenth article. His remarks upon that article proceeded upon the idea that the House of Representatives arraign the President for slandering or libelling the Congress of the United States. No such offense is charged; nor is it claimed by the managers that it would be possible for Mr, Johnson or any other person, to libel or slander the government. It is for no purpose of protection or indemnity of punishment that we arraign Mr. Johnson for words spoken in Washington, Cleveland and St. Louis. We do not arraign him for the words spoken; but the charge in substance is, that a man who could utter the words which, as is proven, were uttered by him, is unfit for the office he holds. We claim that the common law of crimes, as understood and enforced by Parliament in cases of impeachment, is in substance this:-That no person in office shall do any act contrary to the good morals of the office; and that, when any officer is guilty of any act contrary to the good morals of the office which he holds, that act is a misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment and removal from office.

Judge Chase was impeached, and escaped conviction by four votes only, for words spoken from the bench of the Circuit Court, sitting in Baltimore; words which are decorous and reputable when compared with the utterances of Mr. Johnson. Judge Humphries was convicted and removed from office for words spoken, treasonable in character, but not more calculated to weaken and bring the government of the United States into contempt than were the words uttered by Mr. Johnson in his speech of the 18th of August, 1866. Judge Humphries was convicted by the unanimous vote of the Senators, nineteen of whom sit on this trial. If a magistrate can ever be guilty, for words spoken, of an impeachable misdemeanor, there can be no doubt that Mr. Johnson is so guilty.

I ask you to consider in comparison, or in contrast, the nature of the language used by Chase Humphreys and Johnson, as set forth in the articles of impeachment preferred in the several cases.

The eighth article in the case of Chase, is in these words:

"And whereas, mutual respect and confidence between the Government of the United States and those of the individual States, and between the people and those governments, respectively, are highly conducive to that public harmony, without which there can be no public happiness, yet the said Samuel Chase, disregarding the duties and dig. nity of his judicial character, did, at the Circuit Court for the District of Mary land, held at Baltimore, in the month of May, 1803, pervert his official right and duty to address the Grand Jury then and there assembled, on matters coming within the province of the said jury, for the purpose of delivering to the said Grand Jury an intemperate and inflammatory harrangue, with intent to excite the fears and resentment of the said Grand Jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against their State government and Constitution, a conduct highly censurable in any, but peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States: and, moreover, that the said Samuel Chase, then and there, under pretense of exercising his judicial right to