the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of that act, it ought not to control a co-ordinate authority of the government. I want you, continued Mr. Nelson, to notice these assertions, for you will see that Buch great men as Jefferson and Jackson went beyond the present President of the United States in their assertions, because they denied the right of the Supreme Court even to adjudicate the question. Mr. Nelson went on to quote from General Jackson's veto on the Bank bill, to the effect that the lawyers, the Executive and the Supreme Court must each for itself be guided by its opinion of the Constitution; that every public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears to support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others; that it is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to decide upon the constitutionality of a bill or resolution that may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is for the Supreme Judges when the case is brought before them for judicial decision. That the opinion of the judges has no more authority upon Congress than the opinion of Congress has upon the judges; that upon that point the President is independent of both, and that the Supreme Court must not, therefore, undertake to control either Congress or the President. We have had a good deal of talk here about prerogative. That was the prerogative which General Jackson asserted, that he had a right to construe the Constitution of the United States for himself, independent of the judicial tribunals of the country. If General Jackson and Mr. Jefferson asserted such executive power, how much more might Andrew Johnson, the present President? He says, here is a question about which there is some difference of opinion between the Congress of the United States and myself; here is a question which has distracted and divided the country. I desire to have this question settled. I do not wish to settle it by my own right. I desire to submit to the judicial tribunals of the country, and in order to do that, I will exercise power which has been exercised from the foundation of the government. I will remove Mr. Stanton, and I will put this case in a condition in which it can be settled by the judicial tribunals of the country. I will invoke the action of the highest judicial tribunal of the country, and if the Supreme Court of the United States decides this question in favor of the views which Congress has presented, I will acquiesce in and submit to the decision. If the Supreme Court of the United States decides the question in the other way, I will persevere in the determination to appoint some one in the place of an officer of my Cabinet] who is obnoxious to me. Now, I maintain, Senators, that there was nothing wrong or illegal in that. But it is argued on the other side that after the President of the United States has vetoed a bill, and after it has been passed over his veto by twothirds of both Houses, it is then placed in such a situation that he has no right to put any construction upon it different from that which Congress has put upon it. 1 cannot see the logic of the argument; a law passed by Congress and approved by the President and pit upon the statute book, is nothing more than a law. If the Presi dent of the United States exercises his veto power, and attempts to prevent the passage of the law, by refusing that assent which the Constitution empowers him to give, or withhold, and if the Congress of the United States passes it over his veto, and it comes on the statute book, is it anything more than a law? Has it any greater or more binding force in the one care than the other? If the President of the United States has any power or judgment at all, may he not exert it in the one case just as much as he may exercise it in the other? I cannot, for the life of me, see the force of the definition which the honorable managers are attempting to make. No, Senators, there are questions peculiarly belonging to the Executive Department which the President must, of necessity, have the right to determine for himself, and specious and ingenious as the argument of the honorable manager (Mr. Boutwell) was, that there may be an implication in favor of Congress as to the right of powers enumerated in the Constitution, and that there is no implication in favor of the President as to the duties which are imposed upon him by the same instrument. that argument has no foundation in sound reasoning, or in any authority known to the law. The very term "executive power," like most of the other terms employed in the Constitution, is technical. I have shown you how Mr. Madison understood it, in the debate of 1789. I have shown you what a wide latitude he took in dealing with the words "executive power," and in arguing that the President was responsible for the action of the Cabinet, which he called around him. scribe how much tonnage they shall have; all these and a thousand other things are left to the discretion of Congress. Congress derives the power, as a necessary incident, under the general provisions of the Constitution, to do anything that may be necessary and proper to carry all the foregoing powers into effect. If this doctrine of implication, which is absolutely necessary and essential to the legitimate and proper exercise of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, has been acquiesced in from the foundation of the government by Congress, why may it not be acquiesced in as well for the President of the United States? There is no force, as I contend, in the distinction which the honorable manager insists upon. The court here, at a quarter before two o'clock, took a recess for fifteen minutes, After the recess Mr. NELSON continned his argument, and referred again to the debate on the removal of Mr. Duane by General Jackson, and to the part which Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster took in the debate. He also referred to a letter written by Mr. Madison, and to be found in the fourth volume of Madison's Works. The argu ment on the other side, he continued, is that the President of the United States is, under the Constitution, a mere man in buckram; that he has no power or authority to decide anything; that he can do nothing on the face of the earth except it is nominated in the bond; that he must be the passive instrument of Congress, and that he must be subject to the government and control of the other departments. The argument which we make is, that under the Constitution there are many powers and duties vested in and imposed on the President of the United States, and that he must of necessity have a right, in cases appropriately belonging to his department, to exercise something like judicial opinion; that he must act upon his own authority and upon his own construction of the Constitution; and whether he does that in reference to the removal of an officer, or in reference to anything else, I maintain that it is different from the action of a private individual A private individual, if he violates the law of the land, is amenable for its violation under the principle that iguorance of the law excuses no man; but the President of the United States, having the Executive power vested in him by the Constitution, has a right to exercise his best judgment in the situation in which he is placed; and if he exercises that judgment honestly and faithfully, and not from corrupt motives, then his action cannot be reviewed by Congress or any other tribunal except the tribunal of the people in the Presidential election, should he be a candidate before them again. That is the only place where it can be reviewed. Mr. NELSON proceeded to quote from another speech of Mr. Madison, to the effect that the co-ordinate depart ments of the government have a right, each for itself and each within its appropriate sphere, and in reference to its own appropriate duties, to construe the Constitution. If this view be right, then the President of the United States had the right to construe the Constitution for himself, notwithstanding the passage of the Civil Tenure act, and he had the right to act upon it in the manner in which he did and you cannot make a crime, you cannot make an offense out of such an action, you cannot justify it in the view of the American people, you cannot justify it to the civilized world. Senators, I maintain that you cannot justify it to your own consciences, to put such a construction as that upon the act of the President and to deny him the power which he has attempted to exercise in this case. Mr. Nelson then referred to the famous protest of General Jackson, claiming the rights of the President to remove officere, and said:-You will see that General Jack son, with characteristic energy and courage, stood up faithfully in vindication of the executive power, while he was Pre ident of the United States. Now, Senators, at the risk of some repetition, allow me at this point, to sum up as far as I have gone. I have shown you that in the debate in 1789, some of the ablest men whom this country has ever produced, and some of the very men who had an agency in forming the Constitution, conceded the power of removal as claimed by the President. I have shown you that for eighty years, with the single exception of the struggle which took place in General Jackson's time, that power has been acquiesced in. I have shown you that two of the most eminent writers in American jurisprudence, Kent and Story, have regarded the question as settled. I have shown you, from the opinions of some of the ablest attorney-generals who have ever been in office in this country, that the power of removal exists in the manner in which it was exercised by the President. I have shown you that during the long period of time to which I have adverted, it was conceded that the power of removal belonged to the President, in virtue of the Constitution, and that the Senate had no constitutional right or power to interfere with it. Hving shown you all that. I have now a few words to say in relation to the President's action in removing Mr. Stanton, and in further answer to the first article against him. Well, if you can get from the Constitution an implication to be derived from the words "Executive power," or from the words that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," or from some other words in his oath, or from some other words in the Constitution, relating to that power; if, I say, you can derive any power in the one case, then the doctrine of implication arises as to all the other powers that may be conferred upon him, and I can see no reason why you may not imply anything that is necessary to be done as much in favor of the President as you may imply it in favor of Congress. By the Constitution Congress may create a navy, declare war, may levy taxes; but the Constitution does not say whether it is to do that particular act by taxation or not; it does not prescribe whether the vessels are to be iron-clad or wooden-clad, whether they are to be steam vessels or sailing vessels; it does not pre-fairs. But the other view in which I wish to argue the Yes, you have observed the first proposition that I have endeavored to demonstrate is, that the Civil Tenure bill is unconstitutional and void, for if the doctrines be correct, which I have endeavored to maintain before you, and if this long chain of authority is entitled to the slightest degree of respect, then it follows inevitably that Congress had no power to pass the law, and it follows, furthermore, that the President had the right to exercise a judgment in reference to retaining or removing one of the counsellors. whom the Constitution had placed around him for the purpose of aiding him in the administration of public af case is this. It has already been indicated in various statements from time to time made by me in the progress of my remarks. Suppose that the proposition which I have endeavored to maintain before you is erroneous; suppose that Congress is right and the President is wrong; suppose that Congress had the power to pass the Civil Tenure bill; suppose that the President had no right to act contrary to it-again the question comes up whether or not he is guilty on any of these articles of impeachment. The first eight articles charge in different forms an intent to violate the Constitution, or violate the Civil Tenure bill, or violate the act of 1862; every one of them contaiuing a charge of an unlawful intention. Now, referring to what I have already said on the subject, I desire to sustain what I have already said, by reference to some of the opinions contained in law books, and to ask the question. how can any unlawful intent be predicated on this act of the President? According to Foster, Hall and other writers on the subject of criminal law, every crime must have these marked characteristics, it must be an act forbidden by the law, and must be intentional. That is as applicable to high misdemeanors as it is to high crimes. The act is innocent or guilty, just as there was or was not an intention to commit crime. For example, a man embarks on board a ship in New York for the purpose of going to New Orleans; if he went with the intention to perform a legal act he is perfectly innocent, but if his intentions were to levy war against the United States, then he is guilty of an overt act of treason. Chitty says that "intent is not always inferrable from the act done," and I maintain that if there was intention, there can be crime or misdemeanor. In continuation of this line of argument Mr. Nelson referred to Wharton, Roscoe, and other writers on criminal law.and continued:-How can it be said that the President had any wrong or unlawful intent, when the Constitution gives him the power to judge for himself in reference to the particular act charged? How can it be said that he had any wrong or unlawful intent, when the prac tice of the government for all the periods of time of which I have referred was sufficient to justity him in exercising the powers which he attempted to exerci-e? How can it be said that he had any wrong or unlawful intent, when he had all these opinions of the AttorneyGeneral to guide, lead and direct him? How can it be said that there was any unlawful intent on his part, when he had the opinions of the very Senators and Representatives, at the time when the law was passed, as a guide to lead and direct him in the performance of his duty? It does seem to me that it beggars all belief, to say that the President intended anything wrong. It outrages all our ideas of comm.on justice and of common sense, to say that there was any purpose or intent on his part either to violate the Constitution. or to violate the Civil Tenure bill. If Chitty's view is correct, and it the cther writers are correct, and the President believed the law was unconstitutional then, at least until the question was adjudicated in the highest court in the United States, the President has a right to exercise his judgment, and You cannot hold that he was guilty of any criminal Intent. Was there ever such a case presented? How bold how naked does this charge appear when you look at the principle involved. I will not take up time to turn to the evidence of the witnesses which you all have fresh in your recollection. Was there ever such a scene in the history of the world, among men claiming to have intelligence, among persons in the exercise of ordinary reason and judgment as the scene which occurred in reference to Mr. Stanton's removal, and the attempt to bring this question before a court of justice. There was old General Thomas, who has been stigmatized a good deal on the other side, but whom I take to be a plain, simple-hearted, honest old man. He has been forty years in the military service of the country. I have no suspicions such as the gentleman (Mr. Boutwell) alInd d to yesterday, as to whether he was in favor of the Rebellion or against it. If he was in favor of it, it was very extraordinary in Mr. Stanton to send him into the Southern States, and that he should organize sev nty or eighty thousand negroes to fight the battles of the country. He appears to be a plain, simple-hearted old man, whose very countenance is a recommendation of him. Perhaps he was a little vain at the idea of being appointed Secretary of War ad interim, but who that heard his testimony here in this court doubts for a moment his intention to spe k the truth in everything he said. He goes there, and you have that wond rful scene that takes place when he attempts to get possession of the oflice of Secretary of War. Was there ever such a thing seen since the world began? Was there ever such an act of force as that which took place between Mr. Thomas and Mr. Stanton while this proceeding was going on? They meet together like twin brothers, they almost embrace each other. I believe he said that Mr, Stanton did hug him, or s.mething like that. (Laughter.) If he did not hug him he came very near it. (Laughter.) And in the fullness of his heart, Mr. Stanton became exceedingly kind and liberal, and called for liquor, and had it brought out. The little vial contained only about a spoonfull, but it was fairly, honestly and equally divided between these two aspiring Secretaries. (Laughter.) It was done in a spirit of fraternity and love such as I suppo.ews never Lefore witnessed in any forcible contest. (Loud laughter.) Mr. Stanton says to him in effect,This is neutral ground, Thomas, between you and me; there is no war here while we have this liquor on hand." (Laughter.) Not only did Mr. Stanton divide that spoonful, but he felt so good that he sent out and got a bottle full more; and I suspect, Senators, that our old friend General Thomas not only felt a little elevated about the idea of being appointed Secretary of War ad interim, after having served the country in inferior positions, for a considerable length of time, but I imagine that the old man took so much of that good liquor en that occasion that he felt his spirits very much elevated, and that he was disposed to talk to Mr. Karsener and the other men a3 he did. But they tell you he was to take the office by force. Oh yes, force! He was forcibly to eject Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War by drinking a spoonful of liquor with him, and then dividing a bottle. (Laughter.) Was there ever such a farce before? Was there ever such a lame and incompetent conclusion as the testimony on the other side? and then Mr. Stanton goes out that night, or somebody else for him, and awakens up Mr. Meigs in the dark hours of the night; they go and arouse up Mr. Meigs as if felony was about to be committed; they go there as if they were attempting to raise a hue and cry. They awaken him from his slumbers and require him to go to his office and make out a warrent against the old man Thomas, for trying to violate the Civil Tenure Bill. Mr. Meigs arises and goes to his office in hot haste, with something like the haste with which these impeachment proceeding were gotton up. He goes to his office and issues a warrant with all proper gravity and decorum; it is put in the hands of an officer, and poor old Thomas is sized before he had got his whisky in the morning (laughter). and is to be tried for this great offense of violating the Civil Tenure bill. But lo and behold, when the old man gets counsel to defend him, and goes before the judge, and lawyers get to discussing the question, this terrible offense, which it took the midnight warrant to meet-this terrible offense which it required a sheriff with his tip-staff, to take care should not be com mitted, begins to sink into insignincance. When the lawyers got up and argued it before the judge they began to find out that there was some idea of taking the thing up to the Supreme Court, and then, all at once, the offense which two hours before was so terrible, sunk into insignificance, and the old man Thomas was dis charged on his own recognizance. No cause is to be made out for settlement or adjudication in the Supreme Court of the United States. It reminds me of an anecdote which I used to hear in Tennessee about two Irishmen who came to this country. They were walking along one day, when they saw a little ground squirrel run up a stump and run down the hollow of the stump. One of the Irishmen concluded that he would catch him to see what kind of a baste it was; so he put his hand down in the hole. "Have you got him, Pat?" said the one. "No," says Pat: "but by the powers he has got me." (Laughter.) That was just exactly the way in which Mr. Stanton and his friends waged war upon General Thomas, Instead of catching General Thomas, they found that he was likely to catch them, and therefore he was discharged on his own recognizance. Whoever did hear of such proceedings as that intended to be converted into a great and terrible charge against the President of the United States -or any other man? (Laughter.) I shall not repeat what I esteem to be the unanswerable argument of Judge Curtis, that the case of Mr. Stanton is not embraced, or intended to be embraced, within the Tenure of Office bill. It is enough for me to refer to that argument, without attempting to repeat it. Having concluded the third proposition, with which I set out: having endeavored to demonstrate, first, that the law was unconstitutional; second, that the removal of Mr. St nton was not a violation of the Tenure of Office will, because it is manifest from the discussion that took place, that it was not intended to embrace the Secretary of War; and third, that if both of these proposition be incorrect, still there was no intent, so as to main. tain the accusation made in the first asticle. Mr. Nelson then proceeded to recapitulate briefly the charges made in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh articles, and the answers of the President to each of them. Mr. NELSON read a portion of the eighth article of the auswer, and continued: I remark that there is nothing in the Tenure of Civil Office act against the intent lawfully to control the disbursement of the moneys appropriated for the military ser vice in the War Department, and no pretense can be lawfully imputed of such an intent. Under the Constitution the President is to take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed. The President is to make army rules and regulations, there being no limitation on the subject, He may lawfully exercise control over the acts of his subordinates, as was determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the United States against Ellis." (16 Peters, 291; 14 Curtis, 304.) The precedents have been declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be such as we maintainthat no offense can be predicated from such acts. Wilcox vs. Jackson. J. B. Peters, 498-where it is said that the President acts in many cases through the heads of departments, and the Secretary of War having directed the sale of a section of land reserved for military purposes, the court assumed it to be done by direction of the President, and held it to be by law his act; which, by the way, would be a very good anthority in answer to the honorable managers, that no implication results in favor of the powers claimed by the Pre-ident under the Constitution. here is a case where the Supreme Court of the United States enforced the doctrine of implication in his favor, and held that it would be presumed that the Secretary had acted by direction of the President of the United States, and that that would be sufficient. Mr. NELSON read the ninth article, charging the President with endeavoring to induce General Emory to violate the provisions of the Tenure of Office act, &c., and also the President's answer thereto, and continued:-You will see that there is no substantial difference, as I understand it, between the conversation as set out in the President's answer and the conversation as stated by General Emory himself. He says that he did not request General Emory to disobey any law; that he merely expressed the opinion that the law was in conflict with the Constitution, and General Emory sustained that to all intents and purposes, for when the subject was introduced General Emory interrupted the President and called his attention to this Appropriation act. Now, I have to say, in reference to this ninth article, that the Constitution, article two, section two, with which you are all familiar, provides that the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States. The object of this was as stated in 1 Kent, 283; 3 Elliot's debates, 103; Story on the Constitution, section 1491: 92 Marshall, 583-8. The object was to give the exercise of power to a single hand. In the Meigs case, Mr. AttorneyGeneral Black (and I presume, from the eulogy passed on Attorney-General Black by the honorable member yesterday, his opinion ought to be a very authorative opinion) in Captain Meigs' case, Attorney-General Black says:--"As Commander-in-Chief of the Army it is your right to decide according to your own judgment what officers shall perform any particular duties, and as the supreme Executive magistrate you have the power of appointment, and no one can take away from the President, or in anywise diminish the authority conferred on him by the Constitntion." Mr. Nelson quoted from Story's Commentaries, vol. 3, 1485, and from the commentaries of Chancellor Kent to the same effect. He proceeded:--Now, in the case of The United States against Ellis, 16 Peters, 291, it is said that the President has unquestioned power to establish rules for the government of the army, and the Secretary of War is his regular organ to administer the military establishment of the government, and rules and orders promulgated through him must be made as the acts of the Executive, and as such are binding on all within the sphere of his authority; and now, I ask, is there any proof shown here, in the first place, that there was any unlawful or improper conversations between the President and General Emory? Mr. Manager Butler, with that fertility of invention which he has so eminently displayed at every stage of this proceeding, argues that it was either to bring about a civil war, by resisting a law of Congress by force, or to recognize a Congress composed of Rebels and Northern sympathizers, that this conversation was had. Let us look at the circumstances under which it took place. The correspondence with General Grant occurred between the 25th of January and the 11th of February, 1868, and the President had either charged or intimated in the course of that correspondence that he regarded General Grant as having manifested a spirit of insubordination. The suspension or removal of Stanton took place on the 21st of February. The Senate's resolution of the 21st February disapproved of the removal of Stanton, and the President's protest occurred on the 22d of February. I have not brought any newspapers here, Senators, and I do not intend to bring any, because these facts, which I am about to state, are so fresh in your recollection, that without going into the minutiae or detail, it is enough for me to state in general terms, that when this unfortunate difference of opinion, for no matter who is right or who is wrong about it, it is an unfortunate thing that there is a difference of opinion between the Chief Executive of the nation and the Congress, or any part of the Congress of the United States, it is a matter of regret that such a differ ence of opinion exists; but when this correspondence occurred, when these resolutions were offered in the Senate and in the House within the short period of time that had elapsed, there was telegram upon telegram, offer upon offer, made on the one side to Congress to support them, and on the other side to support the Preside.... The Grand Army of the Republic-the G. A. R.-seemed to be figuring upon a large scale, and but for the exercise of very great prudence on the part of Congress, and very great prudence on the part of the President of the United States himself, we would have had this country lit up with the flames of civil war; but I do hope, Senators, that no matter what opinion you may entertain on that subject, and no matter who you may think was the strongest, and God forbid that the country should ever have any occasion to dis. cover which has the greatest military power at command, the Congress of the United States or the President of the United States, I say, without entering upon such a ques tion, which we all ought to view with horror, to give the President of the United States the credit of believing that he has some friends in this country, he has persons in the different States who would have been willing to rally around him. How, if an unfortunate military contest had taken place in the country, it would have resulted, God in his wisdom only knows. All that I have claimed for him is that, whether he had few or many forces at his command your President has not told you. From the first day of your session here your President has manifested a degree of patriotic forbearance for which the worst enemy he has on the face of the earth ought to give him credit. If he is a tyrant or usurper, if he has the spirit of a Cæsar or Napoleon, if his object if to wrest the liberties from this country, why your President could very easily have sounded the tocsin of war, and he could have had some kind of a force, great or small, to rally around him. but instead of doing that, he comes in here through his counsel before the Senate of the United States. Although he and his counsel (or at least I, for one of them, would not undertake to speak for the others) honestly and sincerely believe that under the Constitution of the United States organizing the Senate and the House of Representatives, the House of Representatives as at present constituted, with fifty representatives from the Southern States absent, have no power to present articles of impeachment, and although he believes that the Senate, as at present constituted, with twenty Senators absent from this Chamber who have a right to be here, have no right to try this impeachment, yet I shall not argue this question, for, in view of the almost unanimous vote cast against the resolution of Senator Davis, recently, I think it would be an idle consumption of time to do it, and I only advert to it so as to place it on the record. I say that the President, and at least one of his counsel, entertain this opinion. We think it has no right to present these charges and try them under the Constitu tion, which says that no State shall be deprived of equal representation in the Senate, yet the President, instead of resorting to war or arbitrary tyranny, which was resorted to by the ambitious men that have been described in this Chamber, he submits this: question in a peaceful and quiet manner, to be adjudged and determined by the Senate of the United States of its present organization; and now will you not at least give him credit for some degree of forbearance? When gentlemen talk of his trying to turn usurper, and his having a pur pose in sending for General Emory, do they prove any improper design on his part? None on the face of the earth. Was it not natural in this state of things, when the whole country was agitated and excited, when men's minds were aroused everywhere in the unfortunate con dition of parties in the United States to such an extent as that they were offering troops, on the one hand, to sus tain Congress, and on the other to sustain the President, and when the Lieutenant-General of the Army and the President had differed in their opinions. I maintain that the very fact that he has done nothing of a military character, shows that he had no intention to do the acts which are imputed to him. But it was right. It was natural when he saw these despatches; when he knew that there was a difficulty between General Grant and himself; when he knew that there were persons sending despatches through the newspaper governors, and prominent men in various States in the Union; sending despatches stating how they were to stand up for the Congress of the United States. In that controversy, it was natural and right, and within the legitimate scope of the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution, that he should send for this officer, that he should inquire what was the meaning of these new troops that were brought into the Department of Washington. He had a right to do it, and the fact that he did it is no evidence of an unlawful design on his part, but it proves that he was endeavoring to understand, as it was his duty to understand as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, what was the meaning of the introduction of these forces. What did he know but what General Grant in the progress of this quarrel might assume the power of a military dictator? How did he know but what General Grant might be endeavoring to surround him with troops to have him arrested? Had not he a right to send for an officer and inquire if he knew of the introduction of here, these military forces and when he found that it was only a trivial force; when he found that there was no expressed design on the part of anybody to violate the Constitution of the United States, didn't he stop? No effort was made on his part to manage the army or to persuade the army to go to war with the Congress of the United States, but he retained his counsel, and, in a peaceful manner, submits himself to the judg ment of the Senate; and I stand here in the face of this Senate and say that the history of the whole world does not furnish anything in moral sublimity and grandeur surpassing the triumphant spectacle which we now behold. I was delighted and rejoiced to see that this unfortunate controversy was taking this turn. I regretted that any such controversy had origi nated that any such difference of opinion had occurred between Congress and the President; but in view of those red-hot despatches which were pouring in on both sides, from every quarter of the United States, I felicitated my country and you upon the thought that the President of the United States had come here through his counsel and was willing to abide the arbitrament of the American Senate, and as one man at least let them judge of their own constitutional power--judge as does every other court of justice does in determining the question of jurisdictionto let you judge for yourselves whether you had the constitutional power to try it. He comes in this peaceful and quiet mode, and I maintain that he is not justly chargeable with the imputations that are made against him and his conduct in the argu ments that are made by gentlemen on the other side. They may impute motives as much as they please by the conver sation with General Emory or anybody else. The President has brought no force here; he has not attempted, in any manner whatever, to overawe Congress or to plunge this country into a revolution, He has acted peaceably and quietly, and the charges that are made against him are wholly without foundation. In fact, all the testimony shows that the President of the United States had it in view to have this question settled in a peaceful and amica ble mode, intending that it should go before the Supreme Court. Mr. Nelson quoted the tenth article in regard to the President's speeches at the Executive Mansion, at Cleveland, and at St. Louis, and continued:-A great deal of testimony has been taken about this. I might make an argument as to whether they are faithful representations of what the President said or not, but I shall not worry your patience, after having delayed you so long with my argu ment, on that point. Mr. Nelson then quoted from the answer. He proceeded:-We say, therefore, that this is a personal right in the President and in the citizen. I say, further, that these speeches were not official like his communications to Congress, but mere private and personal, and in answer to the call of his fellow-citizens. Why, ten years ago, it would have struck the American people with astonishment that such a charge should be preferred against the President of the United States. Why, almost from my boyhood, down to the commencement of the war, I had talked time and again about what was known as the old seldition laws, and if there was anything that stunk in the nostrils of the American people, it was that. The oblect of that was to prevent the publication of matter that might affect the President or the Government of the United States. We, in this country, like to exercise the freedom of speech which our fathers guarantced to us in the Constitution, and like the liberty of the press, which is also another cherished right of every American citizen. We look to have the largest liberty in the exercise of that right. The American people have been accustomed to it ever since they were a nation, and it is a great deal better to tolerate even impropriety and indecency of speech, and to tolerate the licentiousness of the press, than it is to impose such restrictions as are imposed in other countries upon these things. Public opinion, as a general rule, will regulate the indecency of speech, as it will regulate and control the licentiousness of the press. If public opinion does not do it, why, as a general rule in a great many cases, the arm of the law is long enough and strong enough to apply any corrective that may be necessary, but the American people will suffer no restriction of the freedom of speech. Let it be known and remembered always that powerful as Congress may be, great as the powers of the President of the United States are, in a technical sense, it has always been admitted by all politicians and public men in the United States that there is a power in which is the sovereign and master of both: that is the people. They are the constituency of Congress and the President. Members of Congress have the right to speak, and to speak with perfect freedom of the conduct of the President; and the President, in turn, has a right to carry the war into Africa, and speak about Congress when he is assailed. Aud. if he does this, he has just the same right to do it as any other citizen in ur government. And, when you destroy the right of the President of the United States to defend himself against charges made against him, either in Congress or out of Congress, why then you put the President at the feet of Congress, and you destroy that independence which was intended by the Constitution to be secured to each of the co-ordinate departments of the government in their appropriate spheres. It was intended that the legislative department should be independent in its sphere and within the circle of its appropriate duty; and that the judicial department in a like manner should be independent in the function appropriately belonging to it, and that the President should be equally independent both of the judiciary and of Congress, and to hold otherwise, if you had Congress to be able to monopolize all the powers of the Constitution, it becomes ultimately a despotism, such as was never contemplated by the fathers nor Senators. I do not intend to go further into this discussion, and I shall close my remarks very soon. I do not intend to go minutely into the discussion of this question, but I have to say in regard to the President of the United States, just as I have said in regard to the House of Representatives, he is a mortal man-he is made of flesh and blood. The President has a temper and passion, just as any other man, and when he is attacked in Congress, or anywhere else, why may he not defend himself? We all know when the venerable leader of the House of Representatives, who had opposed the President's nomi nation at Baltimore, and who, if I am not much mistaken, just a few days before the President made one of his speeches which he has made in the cause of this controversy, spoke in the House of Representatives about Charles I. The President made a speech in the Executive Mansion on the 22d of February, in which he noticed that speech, treating it as a sort of irritation to assassination. That irritation, so far as I know, was never noticed by the managers of the House of Representatives; he had a perfect right to say anything he pleased about the President of the United States, but when these things were done by members of Congress, and circulated all over the land, published broadcast in the newspapers, what is there in the situation of the President of the United States that prevents him from exercising the ordinary right of selfdefense that belongs to every citizen of the land. I admit that the President of the United S ates in a communicatian to you officially as members of Congress, ought to preserve a proper decorum; that amenity of expression-if I may use such a term-which should be employed in the intercourse between one department and the other. But I mention that when Andrew Johnson took his tour from Washington City to Chicago, and St. Louis, and Cleveland, and Cincinnati, and returned to the City of Washington, he was nothing but a private citizen; to be Bure he is President of the United States, but nothing in the Constitution, nothing in the laws authorizes any one to regulate his movements. He goes as a private citizen, and if he is called to make a speech and he chooses to respond to it, and some severe phillippics have been hurled against him by members of Congress, and he chooses to answer them, and members of Congress have insisted in the strongest terms on their right to hold this, that or the other doctrine, cannot the President answer the charges in the same way Appealing, as he does, to the people to judge between them, who would deny to any Senator or Representative either, in what is ordinarily called a stump speech, or in any other mode of communication, to assail the conduct of the President of the United States? Why, Senators, it is the very life and salvation of our republic, although party spirit seems to have culminated to an extraordinary degree within the last four or five years. It is the preservation of the liberties of the American citizen. When parties are equally balanced they watch each other, and they are sedulously cautious in regard to anything that might violate the Constitution of the United States. I believe it has been proved in regard to every one of those occasions that it was sought, not by the President, but by others; as when Senator Johnson and others called upon the President at the Executive Mansion, they called upon him in their character as citizens, and he replied to them as he had a right to reply to them. When he went to Cleveland it is shown that he did not desire to do anything more than to make a salutation to the people, but he was urged by his friends to do more, and I think it very likely, from the circumstances which were detailed here in evidence, that in all probability there was a mob there in Cleveland, ready, cut and dried to insult and abuse the President in the manner they did, so as to prevent him, if possible, from ep aking, and when there, gave him provocation. He replied just as any other man should do, and had a right to do; and if he used strong expressions in regard to Congress, they were not stronger than he had a right to use. I tell you, Senators, he has a right to speak of any act of Congress, in any mode that he sees proper-there is no law and nothing in the Constitution to prevent it. One of the greatest rights secured to the people under the Constitution would be invaded if this privilege was denied. Mr. Nelson then quoted from the eleventh article and from the President's answer, and continued:-Time and time again the President in his veto messages has asserted these views and opinions as to the rights of the Southern States, now excluded from representation; and although the phraseology is a little more courtly and elegant in the messages than in the speeches, yet substantially the President has in almost every one of these communications inFisted that these States are entitled to representation in Congress. The gentleman who last addressed you (Mr. Boutwell) said that the President wished to obtain control of the army and navy, and to control the elections of 1868-69, allowing Rebels to exercise the elective franchise, and excluding negroes from voting. What authority did the honorable manager get in this case to make that assertion? He says that the South has been given up to bloodshed. I live in the South, and have not the slightest doubt that although there has been a bad state of things in some por. tions of the South, nine-tenths of the murders and assssinations were sensation stories, made with a view to excite men. As to the President assuming powers not warranted by the Constitution, I have endeavored in a feeble way to show you that he is not guilty. I say to you, Senators, that you have a solemn responsibility. I have the same faith now that I have had ever since I undertook this case; the same confidence which ought to be reposed in the American Senate. I do believe that men of your character, of your position in the world, have the ability to decide this cause impartially, and to set aside all party consideration in its determination. Every lawver knows of cases where men, especially upon circumstantial evidence, have been tried and executed, when it afterwards appeared upon more careful investigation that they were not guilty. I think that even the Senate of the United States may look at the history of the world for the purpose of deriving the lesson intended to be impressed upon courts and juries by the books. So, without going over these things again, I can say that I think even the Senate of the United States may look back to the history of the world for the purpose of deriving some instructive lessons. Without undertaking to travel along the whole course of history, some three or four examples have occurred in the history of the world that are not unworthy of a passing notice. The account which has been transmitted to us of the murder of Caesar by Brutus, has raised the question for nearly twenty centu ries whether that act was an act of patriotism, and whether it was justified or not. The execution of Charles I is another of the historical problems which has never been, and never will be settled. In the opinion of mankind, some regard Cromwell as a patriot, animated by the purest motives, others as an ambitious man craving for power and property. That question still remains open, but the deeds of violence committed in the world have not always been fol lowed by peace and quiet to those who have done them. A few short years after the execution of Charles I, and the bodies of Cromwell and Bradshaw, and one or two others who were concerned in his execution, were, in conse quence of a change in public opinion, taken from their graves, and hung by the party that came into power. Louis XVI was executed by the people of France. Did that act give peace and quiet to the French Kingdom? No! It was soon followed by deeds of bloodshed such as the world has never seen. The guillotine was put in motion, and the streets of Paris ran with human gore. Those deeds that are done in times of high party and political excitement are deeds that should admonish you as to the manner in which you discharge the duty that devolves upon you. I have no idea that consequences such as I have described will result, but yet deeds that are done in excitement often come back in after years and cause a degree of feeling. I will not attempt to describe; that has been done a great deal better than I can do by a master hand, who tells us "Forever and anon of griefs subdued. There comes a token like a scorpion's sting, scarce seen but with fresh bitterness imbued, and slight withal may be the thoughts which bring back to the heart, the weight of which it would fling away forever." "It may be a sound, a line of music, summer eve or spring, the wind of the ocean which shall sound striking the electric chain wherewith we are darkly bound, and how or why we know not, nor can trace home to its cloud this lightning of the mind, nor can efface the blight and blackening it leaves behind." God grant that the American Senate may never have such feelings as these. God grant that you may go act in the discharge of your duty that there shall be no painful remembrance, Sena tors, to come back upon you in a dying hour. God grant that you may so act that you will not only be able to look death and eternity in the face, but feel that you have discharged your duty and your whele duty to God and your country. If so, you will receive the approbation of men and angels and the admiration of posterity. I do not know, Mr. Chief Justice and Senators,that it is exactly in accordance with the etiquette of the court of justice for me to do what I propose to do now, but I trust the Senate will take the will for the deed, and if there is anything improper in it you will overlook it. I cannot close the remarks I have made in this case without stating my profound thanks to the Chief Justice and the Senators for the very kind and patient attention with which you have listened to me on this occasion, imperfect and lengthy as has been the argument I have offered. You have submitted with a patient attention which I had little reason to expect, and I cannot take my seat without extending to you my thanks, whether it be in accordance with the usage or not. Mr. NELSON having concluded his argument at fifteen minutes past four o'clock, the court adjourned until twelve o'clock to-morrow. PROCEEDINGS OF SATURDAY, APRIL 25. Admission of Official Reporters. After the opening of the court, the Chief Justice stated that the first business in order was the order offered by Senator Edmunds yesterday to admit the official reporters to report the proceedings in secret session on the final question. Mr. EDMUNDS, at the suggestion, he said, of several Senators, moved to postpone the consideration until Monday. Senator DRAKE-I move that that order be indefinitely postponed, and on that I call the yeas and nays. Senator EDMUNDS-Mr. President, so do I. The motion of Mr. Drake was voted down by the following vote: YEAS.-Messrs. Cameron, Chandler, Conkling, Corbett, Drake, Ferry, Harlan. Howard, Morrill (Me.), Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Nye, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton and Yates-20. NAYS.-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Cragin, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Edmunds. Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson, McCreery, Morgan, Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Saulsbury. Sherman, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey, Williams and Wilson-27. The motion to postpone till Mondsay was agreed to. Mr. Sumner's Order. Mr. SUMNER offered the following order :Ordered, That the Senate, sitting for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, will proceed to vote on the several articles of impeachment at twelve o'clock on the day after the close of the argument. Senator JOHNSON objected, and it was laid over. Senator SUMNER-I send to the Chair two additional rules, the first of which is derived from the practice of the Senate in the trials of Judge Chase and Judge Peck, They were read as follows: Rule 25.-In taking the votes of the Senate on the articles of impeachment, the presiding officer shall call each Senator by name, and upon such article propose the fol lowing question in the manner following: Mr. how say you, is the respondent guilty or not guilty, as charged in the article of impeachment? Whereupon each Senator shall rise in his place and answer "Guilty" or "Not Guilty." Rule 24.-On a conviction by the Senate, it shall be the duty of the presiding officer forthwith to pronounce the removal from office of the convicted person, according to the requirements of the Constitution, and any further judgment shall be on the order of the Senate. Senator JOHNSON again objected, and the rules went over. The Chief Justice then directed the counsel for the President to proceed with the argument. Mr. Groesbeck's Argument. Mr. GROESBECK said:-Mr. Chief Justice and Senators: I am sorry that I am not so well to-day as I should like to be, but I know the desire of the Senate to get on with this argument, and have, therefore, preferred to come here this morning and attempt to present an outline, at least, of the views I have formed of the respondent's case. Since the organization of our government we have had five trials on impeachment, one of a Senator and four of judges, who have held their office by appointment, and for a tenure during life and good behavior. It has not been the practice, nor is it the wise policy of a republic to avail itself of the remedy of impeachment for the regulation of its elective officers. Impeachment was not invented for that purpose, but rather to lay hold of offices that were held by inheritance and for life, and the true policy of a republican government, according to my ap prehension, is to leave these matters to the people, who are the great and supreme tribunal to try just such questions, and they assemble statedly for that purpose with the single object of deciding whether an officer shall be continued or whether he shall be removed from office. I may be allowed, Senators, to express my regret that such a case as this is before you, but it is here, and it must be tried, and therefore I proceed as I promised at the outstart, to say what I may be able to say on behalf of the respondent. In the argument of one of the managers the question was propounded, "Is this body now sitting to determine the accusation of the House of Representatives against the President of the United States, the Senate of the United States or a court?" The argument goes on to admit if this body is a court in any manner as contra-distinguished from the Senate, then we agree that the accused may claim the benefit of the rules of criminal cases, although he can only be convicted when the evidence makes the case clear beyond a reasonable doubt, and in view of this statement, and in view of the labored effort which has been made by the managers in this canse, I ask, Senators, your attention to the question, In what character you proceed to this trial? We have heard protracted and elaborate discussion to show that you do not sit as a court. The managers have even taken offense at any such recognition of your character. For some reason that I will not allude to, they have done even more, and claimed for this body the most extraordinary jurisdiction. Admitting that it was a constitutional tribunal they have yet claimed that it knew no law, either statute or common; that it consulted no precedents save those of parliamentary bodies; that it was a law in itself; in a word, that its jurisdiction was without bounds, and could impeach from any cause and there was no appeal from its judgment. The Constitution would appear to give it somewhat its jurisdiction, but everything it may deem impeachable becomes such at once, and when the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" are used in that instrument they are without significance, and intended merely to give solemnity to the tribunal to sustain this extraordinary view of the character of this tribunal. We have been referred to English precedents, and especially to early English precedents, when, according to my recollection, impeachment and attainder, and bills of pains and penalties have labored together in the work of murder and confiscation. Senators, I do not propose to linger about these English cases. We have cases of our own upon this subject. We have teachings of our own. We know our fathers, in framing the Constitution, were jealous of delegating powers, and tried to make a limited constitutional government; tried to enumerate all the powers they were willing to intrust to any department of it. The Executive Department is limited; the Judicial Department is limited, and the Legislative Department we have supposed was also limited; but according to the argument made here in this trial, it is otherwise, and it has in its service and at its command an institution that is above all law and acknowledges no restraint-an institution worse than a court-martial, in that it has a broader and more dangerous jurisdiction. Senators, I cannot believe for one moment that there is lving in the heart of the Constitution any such tribunal as this, and I invite your attention to a brief examination of our own authorities and of our own teachings on this subject. It was with much doubt and hesitation that the jurisdiction to try impeachment at all was intrusted to the Senate of the United States. The grant of jurisdiction to the Senate was deferred to the last moment of time; nor was your jurisdiction overlooked. Allow me to call your attention to the proceedings in the Journal of the F Convention upon this subject. In the first report presented they proposed to allow impeachment |