cut is called to order. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. Howard) has made a point of order to be submitted to the consideration of the body. During the proceedings for the organization of the Senate for the trial of an impeachment of the President, the Chair regards the general rules of the Senate obligatory, and the Senate must determine itself every question which arises, unless the Chair is permitted to determine. In a case of this sort, affecting so nearly the organization of this body, the Chair feels himself constrained to submit the question of order to the Senate. Will the Senator from Michigan state his point of order in writing?

Mr. DIXON-Mr. President, I rise to a point of

order.

The Chief Justice-A point of order is already pending, and this point cannot be made until the other is decided.

Mr. DIXON-I desire to know whether a point of order cannot be made with regard to that question.

The Chief Justice-The Chair is of opinion that no point of order can be made pending another point of order.

Mr. HOWARD prepared his point of order and sent it to the Chair.

The Chief Justice-Senators, the point of order submitted by the Senator from Michigan is as follows:-"That the objection raised to administering the oath to Mr. Wade is out of order, and the motion of the Senator from Maryland to postpone the administering of the oath to Mr. Wade until other Senators are sworn, is also out of order under the rules adopted by the Senate of 2d of March inst., and under the Constitution of the United States." The question is open to debate.

Mr. DIXON-Mr. President.

The Chief Justice-The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DRAKE-I call the Senator to order. Under the rules of the Senate questions of order are not debatable.

Mr. DIXON was understood to say that questions of order referred to the Senate were debatable.

Mr. DRAKE-I do not so understand the rules of the Senate. There can be debate upon an appeal from the decision of the Chair, but there can be no debate in the first instance upon a question of order, as I understand the rules of the Senate.

The Chief Justice-The Chair rules that a question of order is debatable when submitted to the Senate.

Mr. DRAKE-If I am mistaken in the rules of

the Senate on that subject I would like to be corrected, but I take it I am not.

The Chief Justice-The Senator from Missouri is out of order, unless he appeals from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. DRAKE asked leave to read the sixth rule, providing that when a member shall be called to order by the President or a Senator, he shall sit down, and not proceed without leave of the Senate, and that every question of order shall be decided by the President, without debate, and subject to an appeal to the Senate.

Mr. POMEROY said the rule applied to submission to the Senate, without a question was not debatable.

Mr. DIXON said the question was now presented in a different shape from that presented yesterday by the Senator from Michigan, when he reminded them that after all this was a question of order, and ought to be so decided. The question now was, whether it was a question of the orderly proceedings of this body. The Senator from Ohio could take the oath. On that question he proposed to address the Senate. At the adjournment

yesterday, he was about remarking that the President of the United States was about to be tried before this body, in its judicial capacity, whether called a court or not, upon articles of impeachment presented by the House of Representatives. If upon that trial (continued Mr. Dixon), he should be convicted, the judgment of the body may extend to his removal from office and to his disqualification after to hold any office of profit or trust under the United States. How far the judgment will extend, in case of conviction, of course it is impossible for any one now to say. In all human probability it would extend at least as far as to his removal from office. In that event, the very moment the judgment was rendered, the office of President of the United States, with all its power and all its attributes, would be vested in the Senator from Ohio, now holding the office of President of this body. The office would vest in the President of the Senate for the time being. The question before this body now is for this tribunal to decide whether, upon the trial of a person holding the office of President of the Senate, and whom the office

of President of the United States, upon conviction, rests, can be a judge upon that trial, sir, is the question before this tribunal.

Mr. SHERMAN called the Senator to order. He claimed that the Senator was not in order in speaking upon the general question of the impeachment when a point of order was submitted to the Senate by the Chair. He thought they should adhere to the rules of the Senate.

The Chief Justice intimated that the Senator from Connecticut should speak within the rules. Mr. DIXON said that if permitted to go on without interruption, he had proposed to go into the general merits of the question, but as it appeared to be the opinion of the Senate that he could not do so, he would not trespass on its attention in that regard. He proposed to discuss the question under the Constitution of the United States and rules of order.

Mr. HOWARD-I call the Senator from Conneeticut to order, and ask whether it is now in order to take an appeal from the decision of the Chair?

Mr. DIXON submitted that there was not such a question of order as the Senator had a right to raise. The only question he had a right to raise was, whether he (Mr. Dixon) was out of order.

Mr. HOWARD-Very well; I raise that question distinctly, and call the Senator to order. I make the point that the twenty-third rule, adopted by the Senate, declares that all orders and decisions shall be taken by yeas and nays, without debate. said the twenty-third rule is a rule for the proThe Chief Justice, in deciding the point of order, ceedings of the Senate when organized for the trial of an impeachment. It is not yet organized, and in the opinion of the chair the twenty-third rule does not apply at present.

Mr. DRAKE appealed from the decision.

The Chief Justice Sustained. The Chief Justice re-stated the decision, and stated that the question was, shall the opinion of the chair stand as the judgment of the Senate? resulted-Yeas, 24; nays, 20, as follows:-The question was taken by yeas and nays, and

YEAS.-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, (Me.), Norton, Patterson (Tenn.), Pomeroy, Ross, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Van Winkle, Willey

and Williams-24.

NAYS.-Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill (Vt.), Morton. Nye, Stewart, Summer, Thayer, Tipton, Wilson and Yates-20.

So the decision of the Chair was sustained.

The announcement of the result was followed by manifestations of applause, which were promptly checked.

Speech of Mr. Dixon.

Mr. DIXON then proceeded with his argument, and said he was not unmindful of the high character of the Senator from Ohio, and did not forget what he had learned from his observations in the Senate for nearly twelve years of his just and generous nature. He acknowledged most cheerfully that that Senator was as much raised above the imperfections and frailties of this weak, depraved, corrupt human nature, as it was possible for any member to be.

Mr. CONNESS raised the question of order, that the Senator was not confining himself within the

limits of the debate.

The Chief Justice said he was greatly embarrassed in attempting to ascertain the precise scope of debate to be indulged in, and therefore he was not prepared to say that the Senator from Connecticut was out of order.

a man being a judge in his own case. They knew that, as had been said by a learned commentator, the omnipotence of Parliament was limited in that respect, and even that omnipotent body could not make a man judge in his own case. If it would shock humanity, if it would violate every feeling of justice throughout the world, for the Vice President to act, would it have less effect in relation to the presiding officer pro tempore? No language could depict the impropriety of a Senator acting as a judge in a case which, in a certain event, was to place him in the Presidential chair.

The President of the United States could not

waive his objection in this case. It was a question in which the people of the United States the laws and Constitution, and by the great rules were doubly interested, and it must be decided by argued. It was premature, for there were many of right. The objection was not as had been preliminary questions on which, if the Senator from Ohio were now sworn, he might proceed to vote. If there was anything desirable in a trial tially just, and that, in the second place, it must it was that, in the first place, it should be impar

just.

(Mr. Sumner) had spoken of it as a matter of trifling consequence, but it was nothing less than the high office of President of the United States. It was the highest object of human ambition in this country, and perhaps in the world.

Mr. STEWART (Nev.) called the Senator from Connecticut to order. He was discussing the main question, not the question of order.

The Chief Justice remarked that he had already said it was very difficult to determine the precise limits of debate on the point of order taken by the Senator from Michigan. The nature of the objection taken by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hendricks), and the validity of that objection must necessarily become the subject of debate, and he was unable to pronounce the Senator from Connecticut out of order.

Mr. DIXON resumed his speech. He ventured to say that with the great temptation of the Presidency operating on the human mind, it would be nothing short of miraculous if the Senator from Ohio could be impartial. Nothing short of the power of Omnipotence operating directly on the human heart, could, under such circumstance, make any human being impartial. It might be said that the objection made was not within the letter of the Constitution. The Constitution did not, he admitted, expressly prohibit a member of the Senate acting as presiding officer pro tempore, from acting as a judge in a case of impeachment. He was not prepared to say that the Senator from Ohio came within the letter of the express prohibition of the Constitution, but he certainly came within its spirit; and he assumed that the Senate was here to act, not on the letter, but on the spirit of the Constitution.

There was no prohibition in the Constitution that the presiding officer pro tempore on a trial of this kind shall vote. The provision only was, that the Vice President of the United States shall not preside or give the casting vote in a trial of this kind. The reason of that provision has already been explained. That reason was so manifest that it was not necessary to give it. It was that there was such a direct interest in the Vice President in the result of the trial, that it was deemed improper that he should preside in a proceeding through which a vacancy might be created.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the provisions of the common law prevented

If the Senate were to decide that the Senator from Ohio, who is to be benefitted by the deposition of the President, could take part in the trial, there would certainly be some doubt entertained. in the public mind of the fairness of the trial. If history should have to record that fact, the sympathies of the civilized world would be with the deposed President.

Mr. Hendricks Withdraws His Chal

lenge.

Mr. HENDRICKS said that in making the objection, he did not question the general proposition of the right of the Senator from Ohio to vote on all proper questions, but he claimed that by his own acts he had accepted a position which disqualified him from sitting as a judge in this case.

It was, therefore, his own act, and not the act of the Senate, that disqualified him. This question necessarily arose often in the organization of bodies composed of many members. It often occurred in the House of Representatives, when members were called to be sworn, and it had necessarily to be decided before the organization was complete. The question must, therefore, be decided here. Substantially this body was a court. It had not to consider legislative questions at all. The judgment of each Senator was controlled altogether by questions of law and fact, and the body was, therefore, in its very essence and nature, a judicial body. The Senate ceased to be a body for the consideration of legislative questions, and became a body for the consideration of judicial questions.

The first step in passing from one character to the other character was the appearance of the Chief Justice of the United States in the chair. The next step was that Senators should take the oath that as judges they would be fair and just, and the question arose in this stage as to the competency of a certain Senator. The question was whether the Senator from Ohio could participate in the trial. He (Mr. Hendricks) had held in the Stockton case that a Senator might vote on question where he had an interest, but the Senate had decided differently, and he held to the decision of the Senate. He was somewhat surprised to hear the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner) argue now in the contrary view. He believed that the objection was made at the proper time, but as some of the Senators who had sustained the general objection, particularly the Senator from Belaware (Mr. Bayard), seemed to

a

Intimate that the objection might be reserved and made at another time, he would withdraw it. Mr. HENDRICKS having thus withdrawn his objection, the motion offered by Senator Johnson and the question of order submitted by Senator Howard fell to the ground.

Senator Wade Sworn.

Senator Wade thereupon came forward and took the oath administered by the Chief Justice. The other Senators who had not already been sworn were called on one by one, and took the oath, and then, the Chief Justice, rising, said, "All the Senators having taken the oath required by the Constitution, the court is now organized for the purpose of proceeding with the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. The Sergeant-at-Arms will make proclamation."

A Proclamation.

The Sergeant-at-Arms then made the formal proclamation in these words:-"Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silence on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States."

Mr. HOWARD-I submit the following order: Ordered, That the Secretary of the Senate inform the managers of the House of Representatives that the Senate is now organized.

Mr. Howard's Motion Adopted. The Chief Justice-Before submitting that question to the Senate the Chief Justice thinks it his duty to submit to the Senate the rules of procedure. In the judgment of the Chief Justice the Senate is now organized as a distinct body from the Senate sitting in its legislative capacity. It performs a distinct funetion; the members are under a different oath, and the presiding officer is not the President pro tempore, but the Chief Justice of the United States. Under these circumstances the Chair conceives that rules adopted by the Senate in its legislative capacity are not rules for the government of the Senate sitting for the trial of an impeachment, unless they be also adopted by that body.

In this judgment of the Chair, if it be erroneous, he desires to be corrected by the judgment of the court or the Senate, sitting for the trial of the impeachment of the President-which in his judgment are synonymous terms-and therefore, if he be permitted to do so, he will take the sense of the Senate upon this question, whether the rules adopted on the 2d of March shall be considered as the rules of proceedings in this body.

Cries of "question," "question.'

The Chief Justice put the question. There was but one faint "no," apparently on the Democratic side.

The Chief Justice-The yeas have it, by the sound. The rules will be considered as the rules of this body.

To Mr. Howard-Will the Senator have the goodness to repeat his motion?

Mr. HOWARD repeated his motion, given above, which was put, and declared adopted.

Entrance of the Managers. After a few minutes' delay, at a quarter before three o'clock, the doors were thrown open. The Sergeant-at-Arms announced "The Managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of Representatives," and the managers entered and proceeded up the aisle, arm in arm, Messrs. Bingham and Butler in the advance. Mr. Stevens did not appear.

The Chief Justice-The managers on the part of the House of Representatives will take the seats assigned to thein.

They took their seats accordingly, inside the bar.

Order having been restored,

Mr. BINGHAM rose and said (in an almost inaudible tone, until admonished by Senators near him to speak louder)--We are instructed by the House of Representatives and its managers to demand that the Senate take process against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, that he answer at the bar of the Senate the articles of impeachment heretofore presented by the House of Representatives, through its managers, by the Senate.

Summons Against the President. Mr. Bingham having taken his seat, Mr. HOWARD offered the following:Ordered, That a summons be issued, as required by the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting in the trial of impeachments, to Andrew

Johnson, returnable on Friday, the 13th day of March

inst., at one o'clock P. M.

The question was put on agreeing to the order. It was declared carried and directed to be executed. Mr. HOWARD-I move that the Senate, sitting upon the trial of impeachment, do now adjourn." Several Senators addressed the Chair simultaneously, but Mr. ANTHONY was recognized. He offered an amendment to rule seven, to strike out the last clause, providing that "the presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one-fifth of the members present, be decided by the yeas and nays," and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"The presiding officer of the court may rule all questions of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the court, unless some member of the court shall ask that a formal vote

be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the court for decision; or he may, at his option, in of the members of the court." the first instance, submit any such question to a vote

The amendment would restore the rule to its original form before the amendment.

Mr. ANTHONY did not desire to press his amendment immediately, and at his suggestion it was laid on the table.

Mr. HOWARD then moved that the court adjourn to the time at which the summons was made returnable, Friday, the 13th inst.

Mr. SUMNER-Before that motion is put I should like to ask my friend, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Anthony), whether, under the rule now adopted, he regards that as debatable? Mr. ANTHONY-NO.

Mr. SUMNER--By these rules it is provided as follows:-All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record without debate, except

when the doors shall be closed for discussion.

Mr. ANTHONY-I have not read the rules in reference to the question, and I do not desire to press the motion at present.

Adjournment of the Court.

The Chief Justice-There is nothing before: the Senate but the motion to adjourn.

The motion to adjourn wss carried, and the Chief Justice declared the court adjourned until Friday, the 13th inst., at 1 o'clock, and vacated the chair. The managers then retired.

The Summons Served.

The summons was served on the President by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, on the afternoon of Saturday, March 7. On receiving the document, Mr. Johnson replied, that he would attend to the matter..

PROCEEDINGS OF FRIDAY, MARCH 13.

The Reply to the Summons.

On Friday, March 13, the day fixed for the reply of the President to the summons of the Court of Impeachment, the favored ticket-holders to seats in the galleries commenced pouring into the Capitol by ten o'clock, and by eleven o'clock the ladies' gallery was packed by as brilliant an audience as upon a full dress opera night. None were permitted to pass the Supreme Court door without a ticket, and guards were placed at half a dozen points from thence on to the entrance of the galleries. A heavy police force was on hand, and the rules were rigidly enforced, and hundreds of strangers, ignorant of the necessity of obtaining tickets, were turned back disappointed. The Senators' seats were arranged as before. In the open space in front of the President's chair were two long tables, each furnished with seven chairs-one interded for the managers, and the other for the counsel. Back of the Senators' seats, and filling the entire lobby, were about two hundred chairs for the accommodation of the members of the House, the Judiciary and others entitled to the floor.

Senators Howard and Anthony were in their seats early, and by one o'clock half the Senators had appeared and ranged themselves in little knots discussing the momentous business of the day.

It was noticeable that not a single negro was in the galleries. The section usually occupied by them was illed with ladies. There was no rush and no crowding of door aisles. Everything was conducted with perfect order and decorum.

The Prayer.

The Chaplain invoked a blessing upon those now entering upon this high and important duty, and upon whom rest the eyes of the country and of the world, that they may be guided by Divine wisdom, that all their acts may be characterized by justice, and that the High Court may be led to such a verdict as God will approve, and to which all the people shall respond heartily, "Amen."

The morning hour of the Senate was occupied with the usual legislative routine.

Report of the Sergeant-at-Arms.

The Sergeant-at-Arms then subscribed to the following affidavit, read by the Clerk:

"The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept, addressed to me, were this day served upon the said Andrew Johnson, by delivering to and leaving with him copies of the same at the Executive Mansion, the usual place of abode of the said Andrew Johnson, on Saturday, the 7th day of March, instant, at seven o'clock. (Signed) GEORGE G. BROWN, Sergeant-at-Arms of the United States Senate.

The President Called.

The Chief Justice-The Sergeant-at-Arms will call the accused.

The Sergeant-at-Arms, in a loud voice:-"Andrew Johnson, President of the United States! Andrew Johnson, President of the United States! Appear and answer the articles of impeachment exhibited against you by the House of Representatives of the United States."

The doors were thrown open at this point, and every eye was turned that way for a moment, but Mr. Butler entered and took his seat with the other managers.

Mr. JOHNSON (Md.) rose and said something in a voice inaudible in the gallery, whereupon the Chief Justice said: The Sergeant-at-Arms will inform the counsel of the President.

The President's counsel, Messrs. Stanbery, Curtis and Nelson, were ushered in at the side door, and took seats at the table to the right of the chair, Mr. Stanbery on the right, the others in the order named. Mr. CONKLING offered the following, by direction of the committee, in order, he said, to correct a clerical

error:

Ordered, That the twenty-third rule of the Senate for proceedings on the trial of impeachment be amended by inserting after the word "debate," in the second line, the

following words:"Subject, however, to the operation of rule seven," so that if amended it will read as follows:23d. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of rule seven," &c.

Rule seven provides that the presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions.

Mr. CONKLING explained that such was the original intention, but that the qualifying words were accidentally omitted. The order was adopted.

At twenty minutes past one o'clock the Sergeant-atArms announced the members of the House of Representatives, and the members entered and distributed themselves as far as possible among the chairs and sofas not already occupied by those having the entree to the Chamber under the rules. Many, however, did not find seats at once.

The Plea of the President.

Mr. STANBERY then rose and said;-Mr. Chief Justice, my brothers Curtis, Nelson and myself, are here this morning as counsel for the President. I have his authority to enter his plea, which, by your leave, I will proceed to read.

Mr. Stanbery read the plea of President Johnson.

A Professional Statement.

Mr. STANBERY-I have also a professional statement in support of the application; whether it is in order to offer it now the Chair will decide.

The Chief Justice-The appearance will be considered as entered. You can proceed.

Mr. Stanbery then read his statement as follows: In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts and Thomas A. R. Nelson, of counsel for the respondent, move the court for the allowance of forty days for the preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment, and, in support of the motion, make the following professional

statement:

The articles are eleven in number, involving many ques tions of law and fact. We have, during the limited time and opportunity offered us, considered, as far as possible, the field of investigation which must be explored in the preparation of the answer, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is that, with the utmost diligence, the time we have asked is reasonable and necessary. The precedents as to time for answer upon impeachment be fore the Senate, to which we have had opportunity to refer, are those of Judge Chase and Judge Peck.

In the case of Judge Chase, time was allowed from the 3d of January until the 11th of February next succeeding to put his answer, a period of thirty-two days; but in this case there was but a single article,

Judge Peck asked for time from the 10th to the 25th of May to put in his answer, and it was granted. It appears that Judge Peck had been long cognizant of the ground laid for his impeachment, and had been present before the committee of the House upon the examination of the witnesses, and had been permitted by the House of Repre sentatives to present to that body an elaborate answer to the charges.

It is apparent that the President is fairly entitled to more time than was allowed in either of the foregoing cases. It is proper to add that the respondents in those cases were lawyers fully capable of preparing their own answers, and that no pressing official duties interfered with their attention to that business.

Whereas, the President, not being a lawyer, must rely on his counsel; the charges involve his acts, relations and intentions, as to all which his counsel must be fully advised upon consultation with him, step by step, in the preparation of his defense. It is seldom that a case requires such constant communication between client and counsel as this, and yet such communicatien can only be had at such intervals as are allowed to the President from the usual hours that must be devoted to his high official duties. We further beg leave to suggest for the consideration of this honorable court, that counsel. careful as well for their own reputation as of the interests of their client, in a case of such magnitude as this, so out of the ordinary range of professional experience, where so much responsibility is felt, they submit to the candid consideration of the court that they have a right to ask for themselves such opportunity to discharge that duty as seems to them to be absolutely necessary. (Signed)

March 13, 1868.

HENRY STANBERY,
BENJAMIN R. CURTIS,
JEREMIAH S. BLACK,

WILLIAM M. EVARTS,
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,

Counsel for respondent.

Mr. Bingham's Replication.

Mr. BINGHAM, Chairman of the Managers on the part of the House, said

Mr. President-I am instructed by the managers, on the part of the House, to suggest that under the eighth rule adopted by the Senate for the government of these proceedings, after the appearance of the accused, a motion for a continuance is not allowed, the language of the rule being that if the accused appear and file an answer, the case shall proceed as on the general issue. If he do not appear, the case shall proceed as on the general issue. The managers appeared at the bar of the Senate, impressed with the belief that the rule meant precisely what it says, and that in default of appearance the trial would proceed as on a plea of not guilty; if, on appearance, no answer was filed, the trial shall still, according to the language of the rule, proceed as on a plea of not guilty.

Address of Judge Curtis.

Mr. CURTIS, of the counsel for the President, said:

Mr. Chief Justice:-If the construction which the managers have put upon the rule be correct, the counsel for the President have been entirely misled by the phraseology of the rule. They (the counsel for the President) have construed the rule in the light of similar rules existing in courts of justice-for instance, in a court of equity. The order in the subpœna is to appear on a certain day and answer the plea; but certainly it was never understood that they were to answer the plea on the day of their appearance. So it is in a variety of other legal proceedings. Parties are summoned to appear on a certain day, but the day when they are to answer is either fixed by some general rule of the tribunal, or there will be a special order in the particular case.

Now, here we find a rule by which the President is commanded to appear on this day, and answer and abide. Certainly that part of the rule which relates to abiding has reference to future proceedings and to the final result of the case. And so, as we have construed the rule, the part of it which relates to answering has reference to a future proceeding. We submit, therefore, as counsel for the President, that the interpretation which is put upon the rule by the honorable managers is not the correct one.

Reply of Judge Wilson for the Managers.

Mr. WILSON, one of the Managers, said:-Mr. President-I desire to say, in behalf of the Managers, that we do not see how it would be possible for the eighth rule adopted by the Senate to mislead the respondent or his counsel. That rule provides that upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of the Senate as herein before provided, a writ of summons shall issue to the accused, reciting said articles, and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day and at a place to be fixed by the Senate and named in such writ, and file his answer to said articles of impeachment, and to stand and abide such orders and judgments of the Senate thereon. The rule further provides that if the accused after service shall fail to appear, either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed therefor, as aforeBaid, or appearing shall fail to file an answer to such articles of impeachment, the trial shall proceed nevertheless as upon a plea of not guilty.

The learned counsel in the professional etatement submitted to the Senate, refer to the cases of Judge Chase and Judge Peck, and I presume that in the examination of the records of those cases, the attention of the counsel was directed to the rules adopted by the Senate for the government of its action on the ar gument of those case.

By reference to the rules adopted by the Senate for the trial of Judge Peck, we find that a very material change has been made by the Senate in the adoption of the present rule. The rule in the case of Judge Peck, being the third rule, prescribed the form of summons, and required that on a day to be fixed the Despondent should then and there appear and answer.

The same rule was adopted in the Chase case, but the present rule is in those cases the words to which I have called the attention of the Senate: "That he

shall appear and file his answer to said articles of impeachment, and that, appearing in person, shall be fail to file his answer to such articles, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as on a plea of not guilty." I submit, therefore, Mr. President, that the change which has been made in the rule for the goverment of this case must have been made for some good reason. What that reason may have been may be made a subject of discussion in this case hereafter, but the change meets us on the presentation of this motion, and we, therefore, on the part of the House of Representatives, which we are here representing, ask that the rule adopted by the Senate for the government of this case may be enforced. It is for the Senate to say whether this rule shall be sustained as a rule to govern the case, or whether it shall be changed; but standing as a rule at this time, we ask for its enforcement.

Mr. Stanbery Criticises the Action of the Managers.

Mr. STANBERY said the action taken by the honorable managers is so singular that in the whole course of my practice I have not met with an example of it. The President of the United States, Mr. Chief Justice, is arraigned on impeachment by the House of Representatives, a case of the greatest magnitude that we have ever had, and it, as to time, is to be treated as if it were a case before a police court, to be put through with railroad speed, on the first day of the trial. Where do my learned friends find a precedent for calling on the trial on this day?

They say: "We have notified you to appear here to answer on a given day." We are here. We enter our appearance. As my learned friend, Mr. Curtis, has said, you have used precisely the language that is used in a subpoena in chancery. But who ever heard that, when a defendant in chancery made his appearance, he must appear with his answer ready to go on with the case, and must enter on the trial? Of course we come here to enter our appearance. We state that we are ready to answer. We do not wish the case to go by default. We want time, reasonable time; nothing more. Consider that it is but a few days since the President was served with the summons; that as yet all his counsel are not present Your Honor will observe that of five counsel who signed this professional statement, two are not present, and could not be present, and one of them I am sure is not in the city. Not one of them, on looking at these articles, suspected that it was the intention to bring on the trial at this day. Yet, we understand the gentlemen on the other side to say, read these rules according to their letter, and you must go on.

If the gentlemen are right, if we are here to answer to-day, and to go on with the trial to-day, then this is the day for trial. But article nine says:-"At 12:30 P. M. of the day appointed for the return of the summone against the person impeached"-showing that this is the return day and not the trial day. The managers say that, according to the letter of the eighth rule, this is the trial day, and that we must go on and file our answer, or that without answer the court shall enter the plea of "not guilty" on the general issue, and proceed at once. But we say that this is the return day and not the day of trial.

The tenth rule says:-"The person impeached shall be then called to appear and answer." The defendant appears to answer, states his willingness to answer, and only asks time.

The eleventh rule says:-"At 12:30 P. M. of the day appointed for the trial." That is not this day. This day, which the managers wouid make the first day of the trial, is in the Senate's own rules put down for the return day, and there must be some day fixed for the trial to suit the convenience of the parties, so that the letter of one rule answers the letter of another rule.

But pray, Mr. Chief Justice, is it possible that, under these circumstances, we are to be caught in this trap of the letter? As yet there has not been time to prepare an answer to a single one of these articles. As yet the President has been engaged in procuring his counsel, and all the time occupied with so much consultation as was necessary to fix the shortest time when, in our judgment, we will be ready to proceed with the trial. Look back through the whole line of impeachment cases, even in the worst times. Go back to the Star Chamber, and everywhere, and you will find that even there English fair play prevailed.

This is the first instance to be found on record any