Departments of the government, within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States; and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States, and in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United Btates, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, must continue to be one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President tonching the department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity subordinate to the President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, made responsible; and this respondent further answering, says;-He succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon and by reason of the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid, and not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned, and at no time received any appointment or commission, save as above detailed.

And this respondent further answering, says that on and prior to the fifth day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazzard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President.

And thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that Executive Department of the government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, and this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States to give effect to such, his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which the following is a true copy:

"Sir:-Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 5, 1867.Sir: Your note of this day has been received, stating that public considerations of a high character constrain you to say that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted. In reply, I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.

Very respectfully, yours,

(Signed) EDWIN M. STANTON. This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary; and having regard to the paramount executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of

War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed, and verily believes, that it was practically settled by the first Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances, acted on by each Congress and President of the United States in succession, from President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the first Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress; that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the Presi❤ dent, as part of the Executive power, and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the Executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone.

This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitation, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that consequently it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity, he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question did, in good faith, and with an honest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinon, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States, by a message dated on the second day of March, 1867, a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A, that the power last mentioned was conferred, and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty; nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole, and this has ever since remained, and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced, as aforesaid, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office. This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided. *** Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed; that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President, and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed, and veritably believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last mentioned act was and is whoily inoperative and void, by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States; yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to be examined and decided whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act, or if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretery for the Department of War, and having, in his capacity

tive duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising judicially any questions respecting the same. And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein, contrary to the settled convictions of the President formed as aforesaid, respecting the power confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President, that he could no longer advise with or trust, or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office, if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; to this end and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth; and this respondent proceeding to answer specitically each substantial allegation in said first article, says:

He denies that the said Stanton on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton on the day last-mentioned was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly insists that not only was it issued by him in the perfor mance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was in point of fact an imperative official duty; and he denies that any and all substantive matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do by law constitute a high misdemeanor in office within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

Answer to Article 2.

For answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington; and he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session, but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as a part of his answer to this article; and further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and this respondent maintains and will insist:

First, that at the date and delivery of said writing, there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War. Second, that notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well-established usage, to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim. Third, that if the said act regulating the tenure of civil officers be held to be a valid law, no provisions of the same were violated by the issuing of said order, or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

Answer to Article 3.

And for answer to said third article. this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles in so far as the same are responsive to the allegation contained in the said third article; and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article, as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the waid Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interm, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such 38 appears in Eaid written authority set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that department to act temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim until an

appointment should be made; but whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violiate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order, the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term; he further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.

Answer to Article 4.

For answer to said fourth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas or any other person or persons, with intent, by intimidations and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of the provisions of the said act of Congress, in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit, or was guilty of a high crime in office; on the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent stated that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim, was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension, and notwithstanding the said order of removal, and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, ad interim, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal. This respondent did not conspire or agree with the said Thomas. or any other person or persons, to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation or purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said orders of February 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton and the second to the said Thomas.

By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office, and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order, and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public property in his custody and charge, and by the second order notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office, and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton then in his custody and charge. Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders.

He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office, or of the books, papers, records or property thereof; the only agency resorted to, or intended to be resorted to, was by means of the said Executive orders requiring obedience, But the Secretary for the Department of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that department, and of the records, books, papers and other public property therein. Respondent further states that, in execution of the orders so given by this respondent to the said Thomas, he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton peremptorily refused obedience to the orders issued.

Upon such refusal no force or threat of force was used by the said Thomas, by authority of the President or otherwise, to enforce obedience, either then or at any subsequent time; and his respondent doth here except to the cle, and states for ground of exception that it is not stated sufficiency of the allegations contained in said fourth artithat there was any agreement between this respondent and the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation and threats; nor is there any allegation as to the nature of said intimidation and threats, or that there was any agreement to carry them into execution, or that any step was taken, or agreed to be taken, to carry them into execution; and that the allegation in said article that the intent of said conspiracy to use intimidation and threats, is wholly insufficient, inasmuch as it is not alleged that the said intent formed the basis or became a part of any agreement between the said alleged conspirators; and furthermore, that there is no allegation of any conspiracy or agreement to use intimidation or threats.

Answer to Article 5.

And for answer to the said fifth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, or at