this occurred in the first part of the conversation, before General Thomas went to his room; had taken part of the conversation before that; did not think it material. Mr. BINGHAM-I suppose it is not for the witness to swear what he thought about it. Mr. EVARTS-Examining as to the completeness or the perfection of the witness' memory. It is certainly material to know why he omitted some parts and testified to others. Mr. BINGHAM withdrew the objection. 1 James K. Moorhead sworn on behalf of the managers. Direct examination by Mr. BUTLER.-Witness is a member of the House of Representatives, and was present at the War Department on the morning of Saturday, February 22, understanding that General Thomas was to be there that morning to take possession of the Department; went there from his boarding-house, in company with Mr. Burleigh, who, he understood, had some conversation with General Thomas the night before; Mr. Van Horn had correctly stated what took place, and witness could corroborate the statement. Objection by Mr. Curtis. Witness proceeded to say that General Thomas went over to General Schriver's room; he was followed by Mr. Stanton and himself; Stanton there put a question to General Thomas, and asked witness to remember it, which induced him to make a memorandum of it; that he thought he still had among his papers; it was made briefly and roughly, but so that he could understand it; Mr. Stanton said, "General Thomas, you profess to be here as Secretary of War, and refuse to obey my orders;" General Thomas replied, "I do, sir." After that had passed, witness walked to the door leading into the hall, when he heard something that attracted his attention, and he returned; Mr. Stanton then said, "General Thomas requires the mails of the department to be delivered to him;" General Thomas said, "I require the mails of the department to be delivered to me, and I will transact the business of the office;" witness then asked General Thomas if he made use of those words, and he assented and added, "You may make as full a copy as you please;" that was all the memorandum witness made, and he made it at that time and place. Cross-examined by Mr. STANBERY.-Witness had not made a memorandum of the number of persons he found at Mr. Stanton's office when he arrived there, and could not remember all of them; there were a number of members of Congress; he had seen Mr. Van Horn and Judge Kelley there; had been there just about half an hour when General Thomas came in; saw him through the windows, which were open towards the White House, coming, somebody having announced the fact; he came alone. Q. Was he armed in any way? A. No, sir; not that I know of. (Witeess here made an observation inaudible in the reporter's gallery, but which caused considerable merriment on the floor.) When General Thomas came in he said, "Good morning, Mr. Secretary." "Good morning, gents;" thought Mr. Stanton asked him if he had any business with him; Mr. Stanton was sometimes sitting and sometimes standing; did not notice which he was doing when he spoke; thought he did not ask him to take a seat, and that witness did not take one; General Thomas then said he was there as Secretary ad interim, appointed by the President, and came to take possession; nothing was said before that: Mr. Stanton said, "I am Secretary of War; you are Adjutant-General; I order you to your room;" General Thomas replied that he would not obey the order: that he was Secretary of War, and ther: retired to General Shriver's room; Mr. Stanton followed, asking witness to accompany him; did not know what he wanted him for; supposed he was going to have further conversation; Mr. Van Horn also followed; thought there was some unimportant conversation before what he had detailed, but could not remember it; it was joking, or something of that kind, to no purpose; they did not seem to be in any passion; not hostile; witness did not recollect any of the jokes that passed; left the room shortly after the remark that Mr. Stanton asked him to remember; had got back into Mr. Stanton's room before that, and was induced to return from overhearing conversation that he thought was important, whereupon Mr. Stanton told him he wanted him to remember the remark in regard to the mails of the department and that he (General Thomas) was there as Secretary of War; witness came out first from General Schriver's room; Mr. Stanton remained but a very short time; it was then near twelve o'clock, and he and the other members went to the Capitol, leaving the rest of the company there; do not remember who stayed, a number of gentlemen; could not remember whether military or civilians; thought he had seen General Grant there during the morning, but not while General Thomas was there, and do not recollect General Thomas using the expression that he "wished no unpleasantness." Q. Did there appear to be any unpleasantness? A, General Thomas wanted to get in, I think, and Mr! Stanton wanted to keep him out. Q. But there was nothing offensive on either side? A. Nothing very belligerent on either side. Q. Was there any joking in Mr. Stanton's room, as well as in General Schriver's room? A. I do not. know, sir. Q. No occasion for a laugh? A. It was more stern in Mr. Stanton's room; Mr. Stanton ordered General Thomas to leave. Q. That is the only thing that looked like sternness? A. Yes, sir. Re-Direct examination by Mr. BUTLER.-Q. The President's counsel has asked you if on that occasion he was armed; will you allow me to ask if on that occasion he was masked. (Laughter). A. He was not, sir. Walter A. Burleigh sworn on behalf of the managers. Direct examination by Mr. BUTLER.-Q. What is your name and position? A. My name is Walter A. Burleigh, and I am a Delegate from Daeota Terri tory. Q. Do you know L. Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army. A. I do. Q. How long have you known him? A. For several years; I don't know how long. Q. Have you been on terms of intimacy with him? A. I have. Q. Has he been at your house since you have been here? Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember an occasion when you had a conversation with Mr. Moorhead about visiting Mr. Stanton's office? A. I recollect going to the Secretary of War with Mr. Moorhead on the morning of the 22d of February, I think, last. Q. On the evening before had you seen General Thomas? A. I had. Q. Where? A. At his house. Q. What time in the evening? A. In the early part of the evening; I cannot say precisely the hour. Q. Had you a conversation with him? A. Yes, sir. Mr. STANBERY-What is the relevancy of that? What is the object? Mr. BUTLER-The object is to show the intent and purpose with which General Thomas went to the War Department on the morning of the 22d; that he went with the intent and purpose of taking possession by force; that he alleged that intent and purpose; that in cousequence of that allegation, Mr. Burleigh invited General Moorhead and went up to the War Office; from the conversation what I expect to prove in this -after the President of the United States had appointed General Thomas, and given him directions to take the War Office, and after he had made a quiet visit there on the 21st, on the evening of the 22d he told Mr. Burleigh that the next day he was going to take possession by force. Mr. Burleigh said to him Mr. STANBERY-No matter about that. We object to the testimony. Mr. BUTLER-Then you don't know what you have to object to, if you don't know what it is. (Laughter). The Chief Justice decided the testimony admissible, speaking in a very low tone. Senator DRAKE-I suppose the matter of admitting the testimony is a matter for the Senate, and not for the presiding officer. The questions should be submitted, I think, to the Senate. I take exception to the presiding officer undertaking to decide that point. The Chief Justice, rising-The Chief Justice is of opinion that he should decide upon objections to evidence. If he is incorrect in that opinion, it is for the Senate to correct him. Senasor DRAKE-I appeal from the decision of the Chair. and demand the decision of the Senate. Senator FOWLER asked that the question be stated. The Chief Justice-The Chief Justice would state to the Senate that in his judgement it is his duty to decide on questions of evidence in the first instance, and that if any Senaior desires that the question shall then be submitted to the Senate, it is his duty to do it. So far as he is aware, this is the uniform course of practice on trials of persons impeached in the Senate of the United States. Senator DRAKE-My position. Mr. President, is that there is nothing in the rules of this Senate, sitting upon the trial of an impeachment, that gives that authority to the presiding officer over the body. That is my position of order. Senator JOHNSON--I call the Senator to order. The question is not debateable. Mr. BUTLER-If the President pleases, is not this question debateable? The Chief Justice-It is debateable by the managers and the counsel for the President. Mr. BUTLER-We have the honor, Mr. President and gentlemen of the Senate, to object to the ruling just attempted to be made by the presiding officer of the Senate, and with the utmost submission, but with an equal degree of firmness, we must insist upon our objection, because otherwise it would always put the managers in the condition, when the ruling is against them, of appealing to the Senate as a body against the ruling of the chair. We have been too long in parliamentary and other bodies not to know how much disadvantage it is to be put in that position-the position of apparent appeal from the decision of the chair, either real or apparent, and we are glad that the case has come up upon a ruling of the presiding officer which is in our favor, so that we are not invidious in making the objection. Although we learn from what has fallen from the presiding officer that he understands that the precedents are in the direction of his intimation, yet if we understand the position taken the precedents are not in support of that position. Lest i should have the misfortune to misstate the position of the presiding officer of the Senate, I will state it as I understand it. I understand his position to be that primarily, as a judge in a court has a right to do, the presiding officer claims the right to rule a question of law, and then if any member of the court chooses to object it may be taken in the nature of an appeal by one member of the court. If I am incorrect in my statement of the position of the presiding officer, I would be glad to be corrected. The Chief Justice-The Chair will state that under the rules of this body he is the presiding officer. He is so iu virtue of his office under the Constitution. He is Chief Justice of the United States, and therefore, when the President is tried by the Senate, it is his duty to preside in that body, and, as he understands, he is therefore the President of the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment; the rule of the Senate is the 7th rule, reading: "The presiding officer may in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions.' He is not required by that rule to submit these questions in the first instance; but for the despatch of business, as is usual in the Supreme Court, he may express his opinion in the first instance, and if the Senate, who constitutes the court, or any member of the court desires to ask the opinion of the Senate as a court, it is his duty then to ask for the opinion of the court. Mr. BUTLER-May I respectfully inquire whether that extends to the managers as to a question of law to be submitted to this court? The Chief Justice-The Chief Justice thinks not. It is a matter for the court. Mr. BUTLER-Then it immediately becomes a very important and momentous substance, because the presiding officer of the court, who is not a member of the court, and has no hand in the court, as we understand it, except on a question of equal division, gives a decision which prevents the House of Representatives from asking even that the Senate shall pass upon it, and, therefore, if this is the rule, our hands are tied, and it was in order to get the exact rule that we have asked the presiding officer of the Senate to state, as he has kindly and frankly stated the exact position. Now then, I say again The Chief Justice-The Chief Justice thinks it right and proper for the managers to propose any queation they see fit to the Senate, but it is for the Senate themselves to determine. Mr. BUTLER-As I understand it, we propose a question to the Senate, and the Chief Justice decides that we cannot get it decided without a decision of the Chief Justice, to which we object respectfuily as we A committee of conference thereupon was had, and the rule previously adopted in the House of Comported that in the trial the Managers of the House of mons was considered, and the rule adopted and reCommons should not address the Lord High Steward, and should not ask anything of him, but should address the House as "My Lords," showing the reason and giving as a reason that the Lord High Steward was but a Speaker pro tem., presiding over the body during the trial. When Lord Stafford came to ial the House of Lords instructed him that he must address the lords, and not the Lord High Steward at all. From that day to the latest trial in Parliament, which is Lord Cardigan's in 1841. the Earl of Cardigan being brought be fore the House of Lords, and Lord Chief Justice Denman sitting on that trial, the universal address has been, by counsel, prisoners, managers and everybody, "My Lord." There was to be no recognition of any superior right in the presiding officer over any other member of the court, nor did that matter stop here. In more than one case this question has arisen. In Lord Macclesfield's case, if I remember rightly, the question arose in this way:-Whether the presiding officer should decide questions, and he left it wholly to the House of Lords, saying to the lords, "You may decide as you please." Again, when Lord Ers kine presided at the trial of Lord, which was a trial early in the century, coming up with as much form as any other trial, and with as much regard for form and for the preservation of decency and order, the question was put to him, whether he would call points of law, and he expressly disclaimed that power. Again, in Lord Cardigan's case, to which I have just referred, before Lord Chief Justice Denman, upon a question of evidence in regard to the admissibility of a card, on which the name of "Harvey Garnett Tuckett" was placed, the question being whether the man's name was Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, or Harvey Garnett Tuckett, Lord Denman decided that he would submit to the lords if the counsel desired to press the question, but the counsel did not desire him to settle it; and the other side went on to argue, and when the Attorney-General of England had finished his argument, Lord Denman arose and apologized for having allowed him to argue, and said he hoped it would not be taken as a precedent, but saying he did not think it quite right for him to interfere, and when finally the lords withdrew and Lord Denman was giving the opinion to the lords of the guilt or innocence of the party, he apologized to the lords for giving an opinion in advance, saying that he was only one of them, as he was independent of his office of Lord High Steward, and that his opinion was no more or less than any of theirs, and he had only spoken, first, because somebody must speak. He says, using this remarkable language:-"This is not a court and jury. You, my lords, exercise the functions of both judge and jury, and the whole matter is with you.' Now, then, in the light of authority, in the light of the precedent, in which the presiding officer appeals,, in the light of reason, and in the light of principle, we are bound to object. And this is not a mere question of form. All forms are waived, but it is a question of substance. It is a question, whether the House of Representatives can get, on its own motion to the Senate, a question of law, if the Chief Justice, who is presiding, is to stand between the Senate and them. It is a question of vital importance; but if it was of no importance I could not yield one hair, because no jot or tittle of the rights of the House of Representatives shall fall to the ground by reason of any inattention or yielding of mine. Let me state it again, because to me it seems an invasion of the privilege of the House of Representatives. It is, that when the House of Representatives states a question of law to the Senate of the United States on the trial of the President of the United States, the Chief Justice presiding in the Senate, sitting as a court, can stand between the House of Representatives and the Senate and decide the question. Then, by the courtesy of some members of the Senate, the House of Representatives, through its managers, can get that question of law decided by the Senate. I should be inclined to deem it my duty, and the duty of the other managers, if we were put in that position, to ask instructions of the House, before we allowed the rights of the House to be bound hand and foot, at the beck of any man. I do not care who he may be, for it is, I respectfully submit, a question of the most momentous consequence; not of so much consequence now, when we have a learned, able, honest, candid and patriotic Chief Justice of the United States; but let us look forward to the time, which may come, in the history of this nation, when we get a Jeffries as Lord High Steward. We desire that the precedents of this good time, with good men, when everything is quiet, when the country will not be disturbed by the precedent. We desire that the precedent be so settled that it will hold a Jeffries as it did of old; for it brings to my mind an instance of Jeffries' conduct on an exactly similar question, when, on the trial of Lord Stanley, Jeffries being Lord High Steward, said to the Earl, as he came to plead (I give the substance of the words), "you had better confess, and throw yourself on the mercy of the king, your master; he is the fountain of your mercy, and it will be better for you to do it," and the Earl Stanley (if I remember the name aright), replied to him. "Are you, sir, one of my judges that gives me that advice; are you on my trial for my death?" and Jeffries quailed before the indignant eye of the man with whose right he tried to interfere, and said, "No, I am not one of your judges, and am only advising you as your friend." I want the precedent fixed in as good times as there were before Jeffries, so that if we ever have the misfortune to have such a Chief Justice as we have Andrew Johnson in the chair of the President, the precedent will be so settled that they cannot in any way be disturbed, but will be securely fixed for all time. more than this, "that if no question be raised by the Senate, and one-fifth of the Senators do not demand the yeas and nays, it authorized the presiding officer simply to take the sense of the Senate on all questions without a division," and there it ended. He begged leave further to say, in connection with what had fallen from his associate (Mr. Butler), that he looked on this question as settled by the very terms. of the Constitution itself; the Constitution, he argued, providing that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments. The expression, "the sole power," necessarily means, as the Senate will doubtless agree, "the only power." It includes everything pertaining to the trial, and every judgment that may be made is a part of the trial, whether it be on a preliminary question or on the final question. It seems to me the word was incorporated in the Constitution, touching proceedings in impeachment, in the very light of the longcontinued usages and practice of Parliament. It is settled in the very elaborate and exhaustive report of the Commons of England, on the Lord's Journal, that the peers alone decide all the questions of law and fact arising in such trials. In other words, it is settled that the peers alone are the judges in every case of the law and the fact; that the Lord Chancellor presiding is a ministerial officer, to keep order, to present to the consideration of the peers the various questions as they arise, and to take their judgment upon them. There his authority stops. This question is considered so well settled that it is carried into the great text book of the law, and finds a place in the Institutes of Coke, wherein it is declared that "the peers are the judges of the law and the facts. and conduct the whole proceedings according to the law and usage of Parliament." It is as I understand this question as it is presented here. I agree with my associate that it is of very great importance, not only touching the admissibility of evi dence, but touching every other question that can arise: for example, questions which may involve the válidity or legality of any of the charges preferred in those articles. We understand that the question is, whether the Senate shall decide that the presiding officer himself, not being a member of this body, which is invested with the sole power to try impeachments, and, therefore, to decide all questions in the trial, can himself make a decision, which decision is to stand as the judgment of this tribunal, unless reversed by subsequent action of the Senate. That we understand to be the question submitted, and on which the Senate is now to vote. It is suggested to me by my associate, The Chief Justice repeated his decision, to the effect that it was his right and duty, under the rules, to de-Mr. Butler, that this also involves the further propo cide preliminary questions, in the first instance without submitting them to the Senate, and that if any Senator demanded the judgment of the Senate upon them, they might then be submitted to the Senate." Senator DRAKE-I raise the question that the presiding officer of the Senate has no right to make a decision of that kind. The Chief Justice (determinedly)-The Senator is not in order. Senator DRAKE (not heeding the Chief Justice)— I demand that that question be put to the Senate. The Chief Justice (with still more determination)The Senator is not in order. Senator CONKLING-I ask whether the question is to the competency of the proposed testimony, or as to whether the presiding officer be competent to decide that question. The Chief Justice-It is the question whether the Chair in the first instance, is capable of deciding on that question or that the Clerk will proceed to call the yeas and nays. Senator CONKLING-Before the yeas and nays are called, I beg that the latter clause of the seventh rule be read. Senator HOWARD read the whole rule. The rule was read as follows:-The presiding officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer upon the trial shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial, not otherwise specially provided for. The presiding officer may in the first instance submit to the Senate without a division all questions of evidence and incidental questions, but the same shall on demand of one-fifth of the inembers present, be decided by yeas and nays. Mr. BINGHAM, one of the managers, rose to call the attention of the Senate to the language of the rule just read, and submitted, with all due respect to the presiding officer, that that rule meant nothing sition that the managers, in the event of such deci sion being made by the presiding officer, cannot even call for a review of that decision by the Senate. Senator WILSON moved that the Senate retire for consultation. Mr. CONKLING and others—“No, no." Mr. SHERMAN sent to the Secretary's desk a paper, which was read, as follows: "I ask the managers what are the precedents in the cases of impeachment in the United States on this point. Did the Vice President as presiding officer, decide preliminary questions or did he submit them in the first instance to the Senate?" Mr. BOUTWELL, one of the managers, said "I am not disposed to ask the attention of the Senate further to this matter, as a question concerning the rights of the House. In proceedings of this kind, it seems to me of the gravest character, and yet I can very well understand that the practical assertion on all questions arising here of the principle for which the managers-on behalf of the House-stand, would be calculated to delay the proceedings, and very likely involve us, at times, in difficulty. In what I said I spoke with the highest personal respect for the Chief Justice who presides here, feeling that, in the rulings, he may make on questions of law, and of the admissibility of testimony, he would always be guided by that conscientious regard for the right for which he is distinguished; but, after all, I forsee if the managers here, acting for the House in the case now before the Senate and before the country, and acting, I may say, in behalf of other generations. and of other men, who, unfortunately, may be similarly situated in future times, were now to make the surrender of the right that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting here as the presiding officer of this body for a specified purpose, and for no other, has a power to decide even in a preliminary and a conditional way, questions that may be vital to the final decision of this tribunal on the guilt or innocence of the person arraigned. Here thay should make a, surrender, which would in substance abandon the constitutional rights of the House of Representatives and the constitutional rights of the Senate sitting as a tribunal to to try impeachment, presented by the House of Representatives; and, with all due deference, I say that the language of the Constitution, "when the President of the United States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside," is conclusive on this whole matter. He presides here, not as a member of this body, for if that were assumed then the claim would be not only in derogation, but in violation of another provision of the Constitution, which concedes to the Senate the sole power of trying all impeachments, and I know of no langnage that can be used more specific in its character, more conclusive in its terms. It includes, as we here maintain, all those men chosen under the Constitution, and representing here the several States of the Union, whatever may be their faults; whatever may be their interests; whatever may be their capacity; whatever may be their affiliations with or to the person accused, sitting here as a tribunal to decide the questions under the Constitution, with all the felicities, and with all the infelicities which belong to the tribunal itself under the Constitution, with no power to change it in any particular, and is exclusive-I say it with all due deference of every other man, whatever his station, rank or position elsewhere; whatever his relations to this body under the Constitution, the Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments, and no person elsewhere can in any way interfere to control or affect its decision or judgment in the slightest degree. Therefore, Mr. President, it must follow as a constitutional right that the Senate itself, without advice, as a matter of right, must decide every incidental question wt ich, by any possibility, can control the ultimate judgment of the Senate on the great question of the guilt or innocence of the party accused. If, under any circumstances, the testimony of any witness may be denied or admitted on judgment of any person or of any authority except this tribunal before which we here stand, then the party accused and impeached by the House of Representatives, may be acquitted or may be convicted on authorities, or by influences separate and distinct from the judgment and opinion of the Senate itself. On this point, I think there can finally be no difference of opinion; but, Mr. President, some of the managers, not having had an opportunity to consult with my associates on that point, and speaking, therefore, with deference to what may be their judgment, the judgment of the House, I should be very willing, for myself. to proceed in the conduct of this case on the understanding that the right is here and is now solemnly asserted by the Senate for itself, and as a precedent for all its successors, that every question of law or evidence arising here is to be decided by the Senate, without consultation with or the influence of the presiding officer. However worthy it is, as I know it to be worthy of consideration, the Constitution standing between the Senate here and the presiding officer there, I hold that the judgment must be exclusively here; still it should be willing that in all this proceeding the presiding officer of the Senate shall give his opinion or his ruling. If you please, on incidental questions of law and evidence, as they arise, the understanding being that any member of the Senate, or any one of the managers, or any one acting as counsel for the respondent, may have it settled by the judgment of the Senate, whether the ruling of the presiding officer is correct or otherwise. In the trial of Lord Melville (vol. 29, State Trials), Lord Erskine evidently acted upon this idea. A question of the admissibility of evidence having been argued by the managers on one side, and by the counsel for the respondent on the other eide, Lord Erskine said: If any noble lord is desirous that this subject should be a matter of further consideration in the Chamber of Parliament, it will be proper that he - should now move an adjournment. If not, I have formed an opinion, and shall declare it;" and on that theory he administered the duties of the chair. With respect to the rights of the House of Representatives and to the rights of the respondent, I should not, for myself, object; but I cannot conscientiously, even in his presence, consent to the doctrine as a matter of right, that the presiding officer of the Senate is to decide this question under such circum stances, that it is not in the power of the managers to take the judgment of the court as to whether the decision is right or wrong. Mr. BINGHAM, one of the managers, rose to call the attention of the Senate to an abstract which he had made on the question. It was to the effect that Judges of the realm and the Barons of the Exchequer were no part of the House of Lords, except for mere ministerial purposes; that the Peers are not triers or jurors only, but are also judges both of law and of fact, and that the judges ought not to givé an opinion in a matter of Parliament. [NOTE. This brief condensation is all that it was possible for the reporter to make, on account of the impossibility of hearing distinctly in the gallery, and of the total lack of facilities for properly reporting these most important proceedings.-KEPORTER.] Mr. BUTLER, referring to the question put by Mr. Sherman some time back, cited a precedent in case of the impeachment of Judge Chase, where the question whether a witness should be permitted to refer to his notes in order to refresh his memory on the stand, and where the President put the question to the Senate, which was decided in the negative. Yeas, 16; nays, 18. Mr. EVARTS, on behalf of the President, said:Mr. Chief Justice and Senators:-I rise to make but a single observation in reference to a position or an argument presented by one of the honorable managers to aid the judgment of the Senate on the question submitted to it. That question we understand to be, whether, ac cording to the rules of this body, the Chief Justice presiding shall determine, preliminarily, interlocutory questions of evidence and of law as they arise, subject to the decision of the Senate on presentation by any Senator of the question to it. Now the honorable manager, Mr. Boutwell, recognizing the great inconvenience that would arise in retarding of the trial from that appeal to so numerous a body on every interlocutory question, while he insists on the magnitude and importance of the right to determine, intlmates that the managers will allow the Chief Justice to decide unless they see reason to object. In behalf of the counsel for the President, I have only this to say, that we shall take from this court the rule as to whether the first preliminary decision is to be made by the Chief Justice, or to be made by the whole body, and that we shall not submit to the choice of the managers as to how far that rule shall be departed from. Whatever the rule is, we shall abide by, but if the court determine that the proper plan is for the whole body to decide on every interlocutory question, we shall claim as a matter of right, and as a matter of course, that that proceeding shall be adopted. Senator WILSON renewed his motion, that the Senate retire for consultation. The vote was taken by yeas and nays, and resulted: Yeas, 25; nays, 25, as follows: YEAS.-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Cole, Conness, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fowler, Grimes, Hendricks, Howe, Johnson. McCreery, Morrill (Me.), Morrill (Vt.), Morton, Norton, Patterson (N. H.), Patterson (Tenn.), Pomeroy, Ross, Vickers, Williams and Wilson-25. NAYS. Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Conkling, Cragin, Doolittle, Drake, Ferry, Fessenden, Frelinghuy sen, Henderson, Howard, Morgan, Nye, Ramsey, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle and Willey-25. It being a tie vote, the Chief Justice voted yea, thus giving practical effect to the position assumed by him, as to his right to vote. The circumstance created some flutter on the floor and much amusement in the galleries. The Senate, headed by the Chief Justice, then, at three o'clock. retired for consultation, and soon after the galleries began to thin out. The members of the House gathered in knots and indulged in boisterous conversation, and the counsel for the President consulted quietly together. One, two, three hours passed, and still the Senators did not return to their Chamber. The few spectators in the galleries_dawdled listlessly. Most of the members of the House sought other scenes more charming, and the general appear ance of things was listless and uninteresting. At last, at twenty minutes past six, the Senate returned, and the Chief Justice, having called the body to order, said:- The Senate has had under consideration the question which was discussed before it retired, and has directed me to report the following rule: Rule 7. The presiding officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and |