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invade Quemoy and Matsu would provide the pretext for attacking China. The Secretary of State voiced considerable concern about the political repercussions of using atomic weapons. Believing, correctly, that additional air and naval deployments would be enough to deter a communist attack, President Eisenhower rejected Radford's approach.

Again, in 1956, after Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, Eisenhower did not take Radford's advice although this time the Chairman had the support of the Service Chiefs. Radford favored military action to retake the canal on grounds that Nasser was "trying to be another Hitler." The President, however, saw no legal, moral, or strategic justification for military action. He strongly opposed the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and pressured the British and the French to halt and then withdraw. In the aftermath, Radford argued that, with their move into Syria, the Soviets "were likely to encourage the Syrians to attack Israel." Eisenhower responded more presciently that he expected the Soviets to "play their game short of anything which would induce the United States to declare war on them.”29

Clearly, the President distinguished between Admiral Radford as an advocate of the "New Look," in which capacity he met Eisenhower's needs, and as an adviser during crises, where he was too aggressive for the President. Clearly, too, in his conception of the Chairman's functions, Eisenhower considered the former role to be much more important. Radford retired in mid-August 1957. Two years later, while his successor was recuperating from surgery, Eisenhower brought Radford back as a civilian consultant.30

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, who succeeded Radford as Chairman on 15 August 1957, was also a "New Look" advocate but did not arouse such strong

opposition from the Service Chiefs or offer such bellicose advice during crises. During Twining's tenure, the Chairman acquired new statutory authority, which, however, was more apparent than real. On 3 April 1958 the President sent Congress proposals for reorganizing the Defense Department. "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," he said; "strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified." He called for organizing all combat forces into unified commands, "singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service," and for clear command channels to these commands. Eisenhower judged the JCS concept "essentially sound" and wanted no changes in JCS composition or functions. He did ask that the statutory limit on the Joint Staff's size-210 personnel-be removed and that the Chairman be given authority to assign duties to the Joint Staff and, with the Secretary of Defense's approval, to select the Director of the Joint Staff. He also asked for elimination of the prohibition against the Chairman's voting.31

Testifying in support of the President's proposals, General Twining asked the members of the House Armed Services Committee, "Did any of you ever try to manage an activity without having the authority to assign work to it?" Under current law, Twining said, he would have to call a meeting of the Chiefs every time the Secretary asked him to look into a matter. Technically, this was true, but, in practice, a Chairman often would take the initiative in assigning work to the Joint Staff and later secure the Service Chiefs' approval. Moreover, Twining testified, since the Director acted as "a sort of chief of staff " to the Chairman, the two men needed to have harmonious relations. Twining dismissed as meaningless the Chairman's acquiring a vote: "Every knowledgeable person is aware that we do not vote in Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberation. If we did, the majority view could stifle any minority dis

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General Nathan F. Twining with his JCS colleagues, 1957. Left to right: General Thomas D.
White, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA;
General Twining; Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; and General
Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant, USMC.

senting view. Therefore, we do not vote and
we do not intend to start voting."
#32 While it
was true that the JCS did not formally vote, all
the Chiefs nevertheless carefully tallied which
positions garnered the most support.33

Congress approved the President's proposals, and the DOD Reorganization Act entered into force on 6 August 1958. It authorized the Joint Staff-raised to four hundred officers-to perform such duties as the Chairman prescribed, allowed the Chairman "in

consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff" to select the Director, and removed the restriction against the Chairman's voting. The impact of these changes, however, proved less than expected. The Chairman's main problem lay not in assigning tasks but in bringing issues to decision; a service's objections still could cause indefinite delays. The more consequential reform was that making the operational chain of command run from the President and Secretary of Defense directly to the unified and specified commanders rather than through the military departments. As the result of this change, the JCS and the Joint Staff began acting as the military staff to the Secretary in his direction of the unified and specified commands. Ties between the Chairman and the commanders of the unified and specified commands grew steadily stronger.

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In some respects, General Twining proved more useful to the President than Admiral Radford had been. Late in 1957 the launching of the Soviet satellite, "Sputnik," aroused fears that the Soviet Union was winning the race to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles. For the first time, Eisenhower faced widespread criticism on a military issue. Members of Congress and some senior Air Force officers lobbied for a huge crash program to close the alleged "missile gap." The President thought that this was wasteful and unnecessary. Twining agreed with Eisenhower, who needed support from an Air Force general to hold down defense spending. Similarly, during the 1959 Berlin confrontation with the Soviets, Twining distanced himself from the Service Chiefs and endorsed Eisenhower's judgment that a major mobilization was unnecessary.

As JCS presiding officer, Twining handled interservice budget disputes in a manner that was assertive but less abrasive than that of his predecessor. Late in 1959 after the JCS had discussed force levels for two weeks

without reaching agreement, the Chairman forced the pace by writing to the Service Chiefs:

I believe that the Secretary has provided... adequate information for us to proceed. I intend that we proceed expeditiously now; failing that, I can assure you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, will not be in a very strong position to comment on the Secretary's final action, having failed to provide the Secretary with advice or assistance in his deliberations leading to final action. He has requested this of us, and has given us every reasonable opportunity to furnish him sound military advice in support of a military budget that could be subjected to drastic curtailments in a period of financial stringency.

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As a result, the JCS reached agreement on major issues several days later.

In one important area, however, neither Radford nor Twining fulfilled Eisenhower's hopes for a Chairman who could lead the Service Chiefs to focus on the broader aspects of their jobs rather than narrow service interests. Early in his tenure, Radford had realized that the President's expectations would not be met. He found the Service Chiefs unwilling to delegate the management of their services to their vice chiefs so that they could concentrate on their national planning responsibilities, which, by default, gravitated to the Chairman. Eisenhower, too, reached the conclusion that while Radford and Twining had risen to be broad-gauged Chairmen, the Service Chiefs remained mired in service parochialism. In July 1959 the President complained that he could not “figure out what is causing the trouble in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization seems to be failing to do its job."37 All the services laid claim to an intermediate-range ballistic missile, while

the Army and the Air Force quarreled over responsibility for surface-to-air missiles as well as the place of Army aviation.

An August 1960 White House meeting to deal with strategic nuclear targeting and planning showed how deep the divisions ran. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, proposed that the new Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) be prepared strictly on a trial basis. Twining countered that "the crux of the problem is as it has been for nearly twenty years, that the Navy is completely opposed to serving under a single commander....General Twining said he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it." Twining felt that he confronted roughly the same challenge that Bradley had faced eleven years earlier. The Navy's objections to a detailed SIOP prepared by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff failed because Twining and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates worked out a solution which fit the President's objectives.38 In this case, as throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the Chairman's effectiveness derived from his identification with the policies of his civilian superiors, not from his ability to elicit cooperation among the services.

In making his last appointment as Chairman, Eisenhower chose Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who, in the President's judgment, had been less parochial than his two predecessors in that post. Lemnitzer became Chairman on 1 October 1960. His association with Eisenhower dated to the 1942 North African operation, and he and the President easily adjusted to each other. Less than four months later, however, Lemnitzer found himself working in a completely different environment.

The 1960s: Civilian Encroachment

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy replaced the Eisenhower administration's strategy of relying on massive nuclear retaliation with the strategy of flexible response, particularly emphasizing counterinsurgency capabilities. Kennedy also dismantled much of the NSC's formal decision-making apparatus, depending more upon improvisation and informality. Accustomed to working through established mechanisms, Lemnitzer did not adjust quickly.

Poor communication between the President and the Chiefs contributed to the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961. The Central Intelligence Agency had organized, trained, and equipped a group of anti-communist exiles to invade Cuba. After the JCS reviewed the invasion plans, the President made important changes without consulting the Chiefs. The invasion failed. Lemnitzer had not taken into account Kennedy's style, in which decisions were subject to change up until the moment of execution. Unfamiliar with the restrained language of JCS memorandums, Kennedy felt that the Chiefs had not been clear enough in expressing their reservations about the invasion plans. On both sides there was a residue of bitterness. Lemnitzer's standing at the White House dropped sharply. Further eroding the Chairman's influence, President Kennedy recalled General Maxwell Taylor to serve in the White House as Military Representative of the President to carry out an "advisory function in the fields of intelligence and of Cold War planning, with particular attention to Berlin and Southeast Asia."39

To set out exactly what he expected of the JCS, Kennedy on 28 June 1961 issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 55. In it he stated that he regarded the Chiefs in

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