in Vietnam about operational procedures and decisions.

Moorer repeatedly expressed his concerns about administration and congressional reductions in JCS recommendations for future conventional force structure. He believed that, in the post-Vietnam era, air and sea capabilities had to be the primary means of projecting US power and persuaded the President to accept his views on the need for a balanced conventional force structure. In September 1970, when the White House proposed keeping the Army at 16% divisions but cutting tactical air, anti-submarine warfare, and amphibious forces, the Chairman advised that an undesirable force mix would result because the Army required tactical air support and protected sea lanes for resupply. As a result, the proposed strength of the Army shrank to 13% divisions.62

During the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the spring of 1972, Moorer played a somewhat anomalous role, using his influence with the Chiefs to win their support for a presidential position which he had previously opposed. Knowing that the President intended to agree to terms which ran counter to JCS views, Dr. Kissinger was nevertheless confident that he could "deliver the Joint Chiefs" because he had "worked on Moorer all week." When the JCS balked at the terms that Nixon and Kissinger had negotiated in Moscow, the President and his National Security Adviser relayed to Moorer their "grievous distress" over JCS opposition. The Chairman told the Chiefs that the choice lay between saying no and saying that compromise was better than no treaty at all. The Chiefs agreed to "acquiesce" and then, under presidential prodding, declared themselves "in accord."63 Apparently won over by Kissinger, Moorer persuaded the Chiefs to agree to terms they had initially opposed. The JCS had wanted equality in offensive launchers but accepted

Soviet superiority in launchers because of the offsetting US lead in warheads.

Not only did the Chairman's influence increase during Moorer's tenure, but administrative action strengthened his position within the corporate JCS. In December 1971 Secretary Laird revised the World-Wide Military Command and Control System so that the channel of communications for execution of the SIOP and other time-sensitive operations ran from the NCA through the Chairman representing the Chiefs-rather than through the corporate JCS to the executing commanders. But at the same time that the power of the chairmanship had been enhanced, there was widespread disillusionment with the military.

Moorer's successor, General George S. Brown, USAF, came to the position wellversed in its political dimensions and its responsibilities. He was the first Chairman whose service had prepared him for the job by arranging assignments as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, a position in which he served both Gates and McNamara, and as Assistant to the Chairman under General Wheeler. Brown functioned well within the JCS system. He emphasized collegiality in working with the Service Chiefs and kept himself unusually well-informed about everything being done within the Joint Staff by meeting almost daily with the directorate heads and usually having lunch with the Director.

But General Brown served during a particularly difficult period for the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Five weeks after he became Chairman on 1 July 1974, President Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford became President. Nine months later, South Vietnam surrendered to North Vietnam, marking the failure of the twenty-five year US effort to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. Continuing public and congressional frustration with the outcome of the Vietnam War and with the military was reflected in diminished

confidence in military leaders and in tighter defense budgets.

Further complicating his tenure, General Brown had a penchant for remarks that embarrassed him and the administration. During a public appearance in October 1974 he referred to the undue influence of Jews and the Israeli lobby in the United States. An outcry ensued, and President Ford publicly admonished him. Brown apologized but, in

an interview published two years later, made comments that seemed disparaging of Britain, Israel, and Iran. While he later claimed that he had intended no criticism, his reputation as a Chairman who spoke first and considered the consequences later was not easily corrected. Thus Brown's service during the Ford administration was rocky. The Senate vote to confirm him for a second term was only 57-34.64

The Chairman's relationship with the administration of Jimmy Carter, who became President in January 1977, was even more uneasy. The President's approach to national security issues differed fundamentally from that of the JCS. Carter downplayed the role of military power in foreign policy and wished to lower the defense budget and reduce nuclear arsenals. His administration introduced procedures that strengthened the Chairman's role within the JCS but diminished the JCS ability to carry out its advisory role.

On 10 June 1977 President Carter withdrew NSAM 55, which had guided the JCS since 1961, replacing it on 22 September with a directive that gave the Chairman more latitude to represent JCS views in the absence of his colleagues but required the JCS to inform the Secretary of Defense before presenting advice to the President. While Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, preferred to work with the JCS through the Chairman, he directed that all contacts outside the department be coordinated through OSD. Some of Brown's subordinates seemed dismissive of the JCS role as an advisory body. For example, when Secretary Brown revised the programming, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS), he introduced greater JCS involvement in analysis of force requirements, program development, and resource allocation. Nevertheless, early in 1978 OSD circulated a lengthy draft of military planning, programming, policy, and fiscal guidance, prepared without consulting the Joint Staff. General Brown advised the Secretary that the draft reflected "one view of the world by well intended but militarily inexperienced analysts" and would require "extensive revision" before the Chiefs could take it seriously.65 Secretary Brown revised the draft and sent the President a brief summary that presented only fundamental issues.

General Brown played a key role in negotiating and securing ratification of a new Panama Canal Treaty that transferred ownership of the canal from the United States to Panama. He established a bond of trust with the Panamanian president and persuaded the Service Chiefs to accept a broadly worded guarantee of the canal's neutrality that sidestepped the sensitive questions of whether Panamanian sovereignty would be diluted and whether the United States could intervene there unilaterally. During the Senate debate, when the administration faced opposition from four former Chiefs of Naval Operations, one of whom-Admiral Moorer-was Brown's predecessor as Chairman, Brown wrote letters to senators, organized briefings for them, and helped persuade former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger to endorse ratification. The Chairman's support for the treaty was crucial to its ratification.

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In contrast, during SALT negotiations General Brown found himself at odds with the Carter administration. Despite the Chairman's warning that cuts in land-based missile launchers contemplated by the President could be highly destabilizing and that the Soviets would reject a US proposal for deep cuts, Carter remained convinced that such reductions were the only alternative to a costly US buildup. In April 1977, as the Chiefs had anticipated, the Soviets rejected a US proposal for deep cuts. Nevertheless, the JCS lost ground to the State Department and the NSC staff in the subsequent reshuffling of policymaking making procedures. Thus, in an area in which military advice was crucial but where the Chairman and the Chiefs differed profoundly with the President, the JCS played a

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General George S. Brown with General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, USAF, 1974.

subsidiary role. Stricken with cancer in early 1978, Brown was absent much of the time during his last months as Chairman.

The Road to JCS Reform

Developments during the tenure of General David C. Jones, USAF, who became Chairman on 21 June 1978, had important implications for the future of the chairmanship. Jones was nearing the end of his second term as Chief of Staff of the Air Force when President Carter nominated him to be Chairman. As Air Force Chief, Jones had regarded "the many long JCS meetings" as "an intrusion" on his time and hoped that when he became Chairman, he and the Chiefs could reform the JCS system internally.68

Jones already had a close working relationship with Secretary Brown and, as Chairman, met with him almost daily. Brown continued to introduce procedures that increased the Chairman's visibility and influence in the budget process. When the Secretary created the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to assist in screening service requests, he made the Chairman an ex officio member.

According to an officer who served on the NSC staff, Jones was adept at working his views into White House discussions without challenging his superiors. A worsening world situation seemed to offer opportunity for the Chairman to exert his influence on national security policy. However, Jones's August 1978 warning that the margin of US strategic superiority over the Soviet Union was narrower than ever, though seconded by the Chiefs and Secretary Brown, did not fit Carter's views, and he discounted it. Later, the failure of the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission, which the President had approved on Jones's recommendation after the Chairman had overseen its planning, lessened his ability to affect other decisions.69

President Carter's nomination of Jones as Chairman had been controversial, and his May 1980 nomination for a second term again sparked congressional criticism, as some senators thought the Chairman was too closely identified with the administration. The press reported that, to avoid a reconfirmation fight, Jones had privately agreed to resign if Carter were not re-elected. On 4 June General Jones issued a statement that it was "totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an Administration changes." At his reconfirmation hearing the Chairman defended his support of the Carter administration, citing the principle of civilian control of the military. He testified that while he had a critical responsibility to make the strongest possible case for his views to the Secretary of Defense and the President in deliberative sessions, once they rendered a decision, "I have a clear obligation, by law and by personal conviction, to carry out that order even if I would have decided otherwise."70

After Ronald W. Reagan's election as President, a campaign to persuade Reagan to replace the Chairman prompted former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and former Chairman Taylor to speak out against politicizing the chairmanship by removing an incumbent. Reagan retained Jones, but the Chairman's association with Carter administration policies, especially his endorsement of the SALT II agreement, limited his effectiveness in the new administration."

In July 1978, soon after Jones had become Chairman, the Steadman Group, commissioned by Secretary Brown in November 1977 to review the national military command structure, had submitted its report. The group found serious flaws in the JCS system, particularly with the JCS role in resource allocation and force planning. To correct these deficiencies, it recommended expanding the Chairman's role.