1985, Senators Goldwater and Nunn briefed him, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary on the Armed Services Committee's staff study on reorganization. On 16 October the Senate released its report, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, which was extremely critical of JCS performance. Among the report's ninety-one recommendations was a proposal to replace the JCS with a joint military advisory council composed of a chairman and a four-star officer from each service, each of whom would be on his final tour and presumably free of service parochialism. In

November the House passed the JCS reorganization bill that its Armed Services Committee had considered the previous spring."9

On 12 December Admiral Crowe testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on its staff report. He opposed replacing the Chiefs with a new body of military advisers but favored designating the Chairman instead of the Chiefs as principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC; giving the Chairman sole control of the Joint Staff; and inserting him into the chain of command. In later testi

mony, Crowe also supported creating the position of deputy chairman. The Packard Commission's interim report, issued in February 1986, included all of Crowe's proposals among its recommendations. In September the Senate and House reached agreement on reform legislation, and Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which became law on 1 October.80

Directing the first major reorganization of the JCS in almost thirty years, the new law made the most significant changes in the joint system since the National Security Act of 1947. It greatly enhanced the Chairman's authority by making him, rather than the corporate JCS, principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and NSC. It established the position of Vice Chairman, bestowed wide new powers on the CINCS, and increased the prestige and rewards of joint duty. The Chairman would consult the Service Chiefs and the CINCS as he considered appropriate and then submit what he deemed to be a suitable range of advice. Clearly, the intent was to minimize the type of dissent that had plagued JCS deliberations in the past.

Goldwater-Nichols prescribed that candidates for Chairman must have served as Vice Chairman, Service Chief, or CINC although the President could waive this requirement. It stipulated that a Chairman's two-year term would begin on 1 October of odd-numbered years; he might be reappointed for two more terms, except in time of war when there was no limit on tenure. The act retained the language of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, specifying that the Chairman outranked all other officers but did not exercise command over the JCS or the armed forces. The new law assigned to the Chairman functions previously discharged by the corporate JCS: assisting the President and the Secre

tary of Defense in the strategic direction of the armed forces; carrying out strategic and contingency planning; advising the Secretary about military requirements, programs, and budgets; and developing joint doctrine, training, and education for the armed forces. The Joint Staff came under the Chairman's direction and control. Finally, the act defined the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCS. The President might, however, direct that communications between himself or the Secretary and the CINCS be transmitted through the Chairman. The President also could designate the Chairman to assist him and the Secretary "in performing their command function."81

Principal Military Adviser

Admiral Crowe had worked behind the scenes to encourage support for the GoldwaterNichols Act and had changed some JCS procedures in anticipation of its passage. In assuming direct control of the Joint Staff after the law came into effect, he moved to enhance the quality of the staff, which had suffered in the competition with the service staffs for the most capable officers. He created new directorates to assist him in the areas of interoperability and joint doctrine and resource and budget matters. However, Crowe continued to use the Chairman's Staff Group-previously one of the few staff entities to work directly for the Chairman-to review Joint Staff papers before they reached him.

Three of the Service Chiefs and Secretary Weinberger had opposed aspects of the new law. Moreover, Crowe believed that he needed the Chiefs' expertise and experience. Therefore he adopted an evolutionary approach in exercising his new authority within the JCS. He continued to consult regularly with the Chiefs and to seek consensus.

Admiral Crowe worked effectively with Secretary Weinberger although their approach to issues often differed; he found the approach of Weinberger's successor, Frank C. Carlucci, more flexible.82

Despite his emphasis on collegiality, Crowe fully exercised the Chairman's expanded authority at important junctures. In 1987 during Operation EARNEST WILL,

which took place near the boundary between two unified commands, he used his enhanced authority to guide the creation of a joint task force to conduct the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.83 In October 1988, when the Chief of Naval Operations strongly opposed establishing a unified transportation command, Crowe decided to support its creation. With the Chairman's endorse

ment, the Secretary and the President then approved creating the US Transportation Command.84 Crowe's moving forward on a critical issue despite opposition from his own service demonstrated the impact of GoldwaterNichols.

General Colin L. Powell, USA, came to the chairmanship on 1 October 1989 determined to make full use of the Chairman's

expanded authority. He had the advantage of being the first Chairman to serve his entire tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, his extensive experience at the highest levels of government, his resulting close relationship with President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and during the last years of his tenure-the public prominence which he attained during

the Persian Gulf War gave him considerable latitude in the exercise of the authority granted the Chairman under GoldwaterNichols.

Powell had a clear idea of what he wished to accomplish. As Secretary Weinberger's Military Assistant and President Reagan's National Security Adviser, he had found that the military advice produced by the corporate JCS system frequently did not meet policy makers' needs because it was often untimely and diluted. He was determined that that would not happen during his tenure. Foreseeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he believed that it was his responsibility both to initiate a reorientation of military strategy in response to the changed world situation and to provide programming guidance to the services for a reduced force structure. Although he would have preferred having the Chiefs' support for his ideas, he was willing to proceed without it. When they did not endorse his views on strategy and force structure, he won the support of Secretary Cheney and President Bush for his proposals.85

Mindful of the operational and command prerogatives of the CINCs, Powell, nevertheless, exerted considerable influence on operations. During planning for the Panama operation in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, he pressed civilian leaders to identify national interests, examine all options, and define objectives before using military force. Once the decision to attack had been made, he played a major role in convincing the Bush administration to apply overwhelming force to achieve rapid success at low cost.

86

Powell preferred to work outside formal staff structures and processes. His management of the Joint Staff concentrated power in his hands. He abolished the Chairman's Staff Group as a buffer between him and the staff. On issues of importance, he preferred working directly with selected staff members rather

than using formal staffing procedures. To assure that the budget provided for his recommended force structure, General Powell had a J-8 deputy director work directly with the DOD Comptroller's office rather than using the formal planning, programming, and budgeting system. Powell liked to meet with the Chiefs in his office, where they were less constrained by prepared service staff positions than in "The Tank." He relied on frequent telephone conversations to maintain individual contact with the other members of the JCS.

As a result of Powell's active exercise of his authority, the Chairman's role expanded and his influence increased. The perceived extent of Powell's influence and his visibility— particularly publication during the 1992 presidential election campaign of his views on the necessity of limiting the circumstances in which US military force is applied-led to criticism that he had exceeded the appropriate role for a military adviser. He continued to exert considerable influence during the last months of his tenure, playing an important role in the formulation of President William J. Clinton's positions on such issues as homosexuals in the military and the US role in Bosnia.

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, who became Chairman on 25 October 1993, faced the task of charting a course for the US military in a world in which there was no major conflict and the United States was the sole superpower. Shalikashvili saw his role as principal military adviser as making civilian leaders aware of the range of feasible courses of action and their implications.

Shalikashvili believed that there were circumstances in which the limited application of force was justified. In the Clinton administration's discussions of the US response to the conflict that had raged in Bosnia since 1992, he opposed the deployment of US ground forces as combatants but supported participation in a NATO peace implementation force