after the warring factions had agreed to a framework for peace. Once the peacekeeping mission began, he argued strongly and generally successfully that the US military should perform strictly military tasks and not become involved in law enforcement.87 The Partnership for Peace, Shalikashvili's initiative for a NATO military cooperation program with the former members of the Warsaw Pact, advanced military contacts with former adversaries and laid the foundation for NATO enlargement. His efforts to place greater emphasis on US military-to-military contact with both Russia and China did not, however, win administration backing.

Shalikashvili's approach to the Chairman's role within the corporate JCS was closer

to Crowe's than to Powell's. He adopted a collegial approach in dealing with the Service Chiefs but, nonetheless, vigorously exercised his statutory authority. His close working relationship with Secretary of Defense William J. Perry enabled him to assert the Chairman's prerogatives against those of the services and the CINCS and to introduce procedures that expanded the Chairman's institutional role within the Defense Department. In using the Joint Staff, Shalikashvili resumed the practice of relying on the formal staff system.

Shalikashvili ensured that he was part of the chain for all communications to and from the CINCS. He convinced Secretary Perry that, during domestic emergencies, orders issued by the Secretary of the Army for

deployment of forces assigned to the unified commanders should be conveyed through the Chairman. Shalikashvili also expanded the scope of his activities to include areas traditionally the responsibility of the services. Believing that, as the senior military officer, he should exercise leadership on such issues as sexual harassment, he worked to achieve a coordinated approach to these issues among the services.

Working with Admiral William A. Owens, his Vice Chairman from 1994 until 1996, Shalikashvili extended and systematized the Chairman's participation in programming and budgeting. Implementing his statutory authority to submit alternative program and budget recommendations to the Secretary, he strengthened the Chairman's Program Assessment and introduced the Chairman's Program Recommendations into

the PPBS. Comfortable using formal structures and processes, General Shalikashvili exercised his authority in a way that strengthened the chairmanship as an institution.

The next Chairman, General Henry H. Shelton, USA, brought to the chairmanship a strong operational background with considerable experience in unconventional warfare. By the time that he became Chairman on 1 October 1997, the transition to the post-Cold War world had been completed. The chairmanship had been created to deal with the

Cold War and shaped by that conflict, but Shelton had to operate in a very different environment. The end of the US-Soviet confrontation had led to significant reductions in the size of the US military and the number of forces permanently stationed abroad and to increased participation of the remaining forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Accomplishing these new missions. brought increased emphasis on both joint and multilateral operations. The nature and scope of the advice which General Shelton gave

President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen when they considered the deployment of US forces in this changed environment reflected his operational background.

In carrying out his responsibilities, Shelton placed great confidence not only in his Vice Chairman, General Joseph Ralston, USAF, but also in the men who served him as Director of

the Joint Staff, relying on the latter as the channel for much of his work with the Joint Staff. The Chairman's collegial relationship with the Service Chiefs allowed him to capitalize on their particular expertise in formulating his advice to the NCA. At the same time, the changed focus of US foreign and defense policy and the resulting changes in force structure

and military posture led him to continue the practice begun under his two immediate predecessors of becoming directly involved in areas formerly almost exclusively the purview of the services. To ensure continued readiness in the new strategic environment, Shelton addressed issues affecting the quality of life, retention, and recruitment of service personnel. The central role which he played in winning support for major changes to the military pay and retirement systems illustrates the shift that had already taken place in the scope of the Chairman's activities when General Shelton began his second term on 1 October 1999.

Expanded Influence:

The Vice Chairman's Role

Contributing to the increased power of the chairmanship was the new position of Vice Chairman. The Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the Vice Chairman as the secondranking officer in the US Armed Forces. In place of the previous practice of rotating the chairmanship among the Service Chiefs during the absence of the Chairman, the new law specified that the Vice Chairman would serve as Acting Chairman. It did not further delineate the Vice Chairman's duties, leaving them to be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. While GoldwaterNichols authorized the Vice Chairman to participate in all JCS meetings, it prohibited him from voting unless he was acting as Chairman. This restriction meant that the Vice Chairman was not a full member of the JCS.

Soon after General Robert T. Herres, USAF, became the first Vice Chairman on 6 February 1987, he and Admiral Crowe worked out a list of the Vice Chairman's specific duties, which Secretary Weinberger accepted. In addition to the Vice Chairman's statutory responsibilities, they agreed that Herres would carry out several of the Chair

88

man's duties, primarily in the areas of requirements and joint doctrine, training, and education. Herres's principal functions were to act for the Chairman in all aspects of the PPBS, serve as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and represent the Chairman on the Defense Resources Board. He also dealt with nuclear and space policy. When the Bush administration established the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in 1989, the Vice Chairman became the Chairman's representative on that body. After General Powell became Chairman, the CroweHerres arrangement regarding the Vice Chairman's duties remained in effect for the rest of Herres's tenure. However, the Vice Chairman played a less active role on the DRB's successor, the Defense Planning and Resources Board, since Powell preferred to attend its meetings himself.

General Herres viewed his role as not only substituting for the Chairman but also extending the Chairman's influence.89 As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, he institutionalized the role of the military in the requirements process. When he first became Vice Chairman, Herres had to contend with service concerns that he was usurping some of the Chiefs' functions. But well before his retirement on 28 February 1990, the Vice Chairman's role had been accepted as integral to the joint system.

The range of the Vice Chairman's activities and the extent of his influence expanded during the tenure of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, who became Vice Chairman on 1 March 1990. Like Herres, Jeremiah had principal responsibility for requirements and represented the Chairman in the interagency policy-making process. But rather than retaining the formal delineation of the Vice Chairman's duties that had guided General Herres, General Powell and Admiral